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SUMMARY 
The aim of this thesis is to assess how far trial 
on indictment in nineteenth century England conformed to 
-. " the present day concept of a fair trial. 
What by contemporary English standards are 
considered the essential elements of a fair trial the 
thesis deduces from current statute and case law. Having 
identified these elements it attempts to discover how 
far they were present in the nineteenth century system. 
The analysis broadly follows the chronology of the trial 
itself, with particular attention paid to legal aid, the 
campaign to abolish the rule rendering prisoners and 
their spouses incompetent as witnesses in their own 
defence, and appellate remedies. The conclusion reached 
is that, although at the start of the nineteenth century 
the trial system fell well short of the twentieth 
century model, by the century's end it had (except in 
relation to legal aid and appellate remedies) moved much 
closer to it. 
For its analysis of the trial system the research 
draws upon eighteenth and nineteenth century law texts 
supplemented by evidence as to trial practice gleaned 
from contemporary reports of trials (in particular the 
reports in The Times, the Central Criminal Court 
Sessions Papers and Legal Journals), legal memoirs and 
biographies, and unpublished material in the Public 
" Record Office and elsewhere. The most important single 
unpublished source consulted has been the notebooks 
which record the reserved criminal cases which came 
before the Common Law judges between'*1785 and 1828. 
-2- 
Reports of Royal Commissions, and Select Committees, 
draft Bills and the Reports of Parliamentary Debates 
(supplemented by articles in newspapers and journals) 
have provided the raw material upon which the account 
given of the reforms made and attempted during the 
century is based. 
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INTRODUCTION 
'How men were tried. There is no better touchstone 
for a social system than this question' 
Marc Bloch, Feudal Society. 
At common - law trial on indictment was the 
trial by a petty jury of twelve of an accusation of. 
crime (indictment) brought by a grand jury or jury. 
of presentment. 
The roots of the system lie in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries. Juries of presentment date 
back to at least the assizes of Clarendon 1166 and 
Northampton 1176 (which required the 
representatives of each hundred and township to 
present to the King's Justices the names of those 
suspected of crime). The petty or trial jury, on 
the other hand, was an -expedient devised in the 
thirteenth century to fill the gap caused by a 
Papal ban upon what until then had been the normal 
mode of trying suspects, namely the ordeal [1]. 
At, first, trial juries were drawn from the 
ranks of the presenting jurors attending before the 
royal Justices, and, like presenting juries, were 
expected to act of their own knowledge. In 1352, 
however, the accused was given the right to object 
to the presence of an indicting juror on the trial 
jury [2]. Also (and this development is difficult 
both to date and trace) the practice grew up of 
allowing the Crown to call witnesses to inform the 
jury. The size of the trial jury had early been set 
at twelve. By the mid-fourteenth century it was 
also a requirement that its verdict be unanimous 
[3]. At some unknown date between the thirteenth 
and mid-fifteenth centuries, the rule arose that 
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the accused could challenge upto thirty-five jurors 
peremptorily and an unlimited number for cause [4]. 
By the sixteenth century, although ýa jury 
might still act upon its own knowledge (a rule 
affirmed a century later in Bushell's case (1670) 
[5] and not rooted out of our law until the early 
nineteenth century [6]) the evidence of witnesses 
was the material upon which jury verdicts were now 
principally based. And to ensure that there should 
be no shortage of such material, statutes of Philip 
and Mary [7] required magistrates in felony cases 
to examine prisoners and their accusers, and to 
write down the material portions of what they said 
for use subsequently at trial. 
With the use of witnesses to prove the 
allegation against the accused, trial on indictment 
had by the sixteenth century begun to assume its 
modern shape. The first detailed account we have of 
trial procedure comes from this period [8]. The 
indictment is found by a grand jury of twenty-three 
after hearing the Crown witnesses. The accused is 
arraigned upon it. If he pleads not guilty and puts 
himself on his country (i. e. agrees to jury trial) 
a jury is empanelled to try him. If he refuses to 
plead. (or having pleaded not guilty refuses jury 
trial) he is put to the peine forte et dure (i. e. 
pressed by weights until he either agrees or 
expires). The jury having been empanelled, the 
evidence for the Crown, upon whom the proof lies, 
is gone through. First, the magistrates' 
examinations of the accused and the witnesses 
against him are read. Next the Crown witnesses are 
called. They testify on oath. Of their evidence the 
accused has had no forewarning. He is allowed no 
counsel to 'efend him. Lest-he detect a flaw in it 
he is refused a copy of the indictment. There are 
no rules of evidence. The accused is not always 
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confronted by the witnesses who speak against him., 
Confessions, obtained by torture from the accused 
himself or his accomplices, are not only admitted, 
in evidence but regarded as particularly cogent 
proof. The accused cannot himself give sworn 
evidence nor can he call witnesses. For his defence 
he is obliged to confine. himself to disputing with 
witnesses and the prosecutor, during the course of 
which altercation he may be questioned both by the 
judge and prosecuting counsel. After the judge has 
heard enough he charges the jury, and then proceeds 
to hear the next case. After they have heard two or 
three cases the jury will consider their verdicts 
in them. 
The seventeenth century saw important changes 
in the system. The use of torture was discontinued. 
The ban on the accused's calling witnesses was 
relaxed; by mid-century he was allowed to call 
witnesses (although not to have them sworn). After 
the Revolution of 1688 the pace of reform 
increased. In 1695 [9] the practice in treason 
trials was drastically modified, the accused being 
granted the right to counsel, to a copy of the 
indictment, and to have his witnesses sworn. Also 
the judges, determined that there should be no 
return to the judicial bullying of prisoners which 
had been so prevalent under Scroggs and Jeffreys, 
now prohibited all interrogation of the accused 
[10] (a protection which also had the consequence 
of rendering him incompetent to testify in his own 
defence). From around the same period we have the 
outlines of a hearsay rule [11]. 
During the eighteenth century the process of 
reform continued. In 1702 prisoners accused of 
felony were given the. right to have their 
witnesses sworn [12]. By about 1730 judges were 
'also starting to allow them the help of counsel in 
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questioning witnesses [13]. Evidential, protection 
for the accused increased. By 1750 it was fast 
becoming a settled rule that a confession obtained 
by improper inducement was not to be left to the 
jury [14], and a settled judicial practice to warn 
juries against convicting on unconfirmed accomplice 
evidence [15]. In 1772 the peine forte et dure was 
abolished [16]. Henceforth refusal to plead was to 
be treated as equivalent to a plea of guilty. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
which is the period with which this Thesis is 
concerned, there was much complacency about the 
trial system. English criminal procedure was spoken 
of by. native and foreigner alike as liberal, tender 
to the prisoner [17]. One doubts, however, whether 
present day accused would have viewed it in this 
light; its shortcomings were too numerous for that. 
As Glanville Williams puts it: - 
'Until one dips into legal history it is hard 
to realise how recent is our present notion of 
justice to the accused person and a fair 
trial. ' (18] 
A jurist looking at present day English law as 
to trial on indictment might, given the adversarial 
nature of our system, identify the following as 
basic to the concept of a fair trial: - 
(i) an impartial and legally trained judge 
[19] and an impartial jury [20]; 
(ii) the accused's right to be legally 
represented at his trial [21], to have 
unrestricted access to legal advice and 
assistance if in custody awaiting trial, 
and to have the State pay for such advice 
and representation if he is too poor to 
do so [22]; 
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(iii) notice to the accused in advance of trial 
of the case he has to meet [23]; 
(iv) the allowance to the accused of adequate 
time to prepare his defence [24]; 
(v) disclosure to the accused pre-trial of 
any 'unused material' in the possession 
of the prosecution [25]; 
(vi) protection of the accused against 
prejudicial pre-trial publicity [26]; 
(vii) full opportunity for the accused to test 
and challenge the evidence called by the 
prosecution , if oral, by cross- 
examination, or by other means if in 
documentary form [27]; 
(viii) full opportunity for the accused to 
answer the charge he faces by himself 
giving evidence and by calling witnesses; 
(ix) the right of the accused to the last word 
with the jury [28]; 
(x) full and adequate direction of the jury 
by the judge as to the relevant law; 
(xi) 'a built in safeguard against wrongful 
conviction in the form of a requirement 
that Crown prove its case beyond 
reasonable doubt; 
(xii) the right of the accused, if convicted, 
to appeal such conviction [29]. 
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The rules of evidence may also be seen as part 
and parcel of a fair trial [30], but many of these 
rules, some laid down in the nineteenth century, 
are now being challenged, for example the 
requirement of a corroboration warning in respect 
of the evidence of an accomplice giving evidence 
for the prosecution, and the evidence of a victim 
of a sexual offence. 
This Thesis seeks to discover how far trial on 
indictment in nineteenth century England conformed 
to the present day concept of a fair trial, and 
whether the reforms effected during the century 
had, by 1900, made any significant improvement to 
the lot of the accused. At a time when some of the 
evidential rules laid down in the nineteenth 
century are under attack or are being reconsidered, 
it is. salutary to examine the period in which these 
rules were created, and to ask how the present day 
situation is so different that they are no longer 
required or need modification? 
The approach adopted is to examine the 
protections which nineteenth century law conferred 
upon the accused, the handicaps to which he was 
subject, and the extent to which these protections 
and handicaps were during the century variously 
added to, expanded, reduced and abolished. 
In its analysis of the situation of the 
accused, the Thesis follows the chronology of the 
criminal process. After an introductory chapter 
describing in outline the nineteenth century 
English criminal justice system, it examines first 
how far an accused awaiting trial was able to 
prepare his defence and was protected against 
prejudicial publicity. It turns next to the trial 
itself. The role and character of the nineteenth 
century judge, the character of juries, and legal 
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representation for prisoners are all examined. The 
focus then switches to the rules of criminal 
procedure and evidence, the subjects considered 
under this head being the grand jury, criminal 
pleading, arraignment, the weapons available to an 
accused with which to attack the prosecution case, 
the means available to him of getting his version 
of events before the jury, the protective shield 
thrown around him by the law of evidence, and 
lastly the physical hardships inflicted on both 
prisoners and juries during trial. Finally, 
appellate remedies are examined. 
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CHAPTER 1 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
(a) Classification of offences 
Of major importance in nineteenth century 
criminal procedure was the classification of 
indictable offences into treasons, felonies, and 
misdemeanours. The accused's right to bail, to 
counsel, to a copy of the indictment and jury 
panel, his right of jury challenge, the mode of 
prosecution, the number of offences which could 
lawfully be charged in the indictment, whether the 
trial was by common or special jury, the penalty 
which the accused would suffer on conviction and 
the prosecutor's right to costs after such 
conviction, all depended upon the legal category 
into which the offence charged fell. 
Treason, the essence of which was breach of 
allegiance, was of two kinds - high treason (breach 
of allegiance to the King) and petit treason 
(defined by the Treason Act, 1351 [1] as when a 
servant slayeth his master, or a wife her husband, 
or when a man secular or religious slayeth his 
prelate to whom he owed faith and obedience'). It 
was capital, and involved forfeiture of lands and 
goods, and for men (and until 1790 for women also 
[2]) an aggravated form of death penalty. Petit 
treason was abolished in 1828 (3], such offences 
being reduced to the rank of murder. 
Felonies were offences punishable by death 
(only petty larceny was non-capital), forfeiture of 
goods to the Crown and escheat of lands. 
Prosecutions for felony could be by either appeal 
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or indictment. Appeal was an ancient mode of 
prosecution in which trial was by battle. Well nigh 
obsolete since the end of the medieval period, it 
had survived as a means by which the relatives of a 
deceased could still harass one who had been tried 
and acquitted of his murder. In 1819 an attempt to 
use it for just this purpose (4] led to its speedy 
abolition by statute [5]. In the early common law 
the list of felonies had been short - homicide, 
rape, arson, robbery, burglary, housebreaking and 
larceny - but by 1800 it had (due largely to the 
fondness of eighteenth century Parliaments for the 
capital penalty) swollen to over two hundred (6]. 
Not all those capitally convicted were, however, 
executed. The Crown had the power, liberally 
exercised in practice, to, commute the death penalty 
to some lesser sentence such as transportation, 
whilst for some felonies the accused could escape 
hanging by pleading benefit of clergy. 
Misdemeanours were offences less than felony. 
They were not capital nor did they involve 
forfeiture of property. The punishment for 
misdemeanour at the start of the century ranged 
from imprisonment, to the pillory, whipping (also 
commonly imposed for the felony of petty larceny), 
and the fine. Prosecution for misdemeanour could 
be either by indictment or by information laid in 
the King's Bench. 
(b) Police, prosecutors,. and deterrence 
At the start of the century, England lacked an 
efficient police force. The basic policing unit was 
the parish, responsibility for keeping the peace 
and catching wrongdoers resting with the parish 
constable. Elected annually the constable was 
unpaid, and those unlucky enough to be appointed 
often employed deputies to perform their duties for 
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them. In towns there was commonly a paid watch to 
supplement the efforts of the constables. London 
had a more elaborate system of watch than other 
towns, but there was no organisation covering the 
whole area. In the event of outbreaks of major 
disorder the magistracy could swear in special 
constables or, as a last resort, call in the 
militia, or the army [7]. The system was 
essentially amateur and hopelessly inadequate. 
As for prosecuting criminals, this was 
regarded as a private rather than a public 
responsibility - 
'a matter for the victims themselves or for 
other private individuals who could be 
persuaded to take a sufficient interest in the 
matter. ' [8] 
To encourage men to prosecute the law offered both 
rewards and immunities. A number of felony statutes 
offered prosecutors a pardon and a reward ranging 
from £10 to as much as £40 depending on the crime. 
In addition, the Home Office regularly offered sums 
for the detection and prosecution of criminals. So 
too did parishes, boroughs, associations for the 
prosecution of felons, banks and insurance offices. 
A criminal caught red-handed would commonly be 
wooed with promises of immunity and a share of the 
reward money to name and give evidence against his 
accomplices. There was an obvious potential for 
abuse. It was not unknown for men to be entrapped 
into or even falsely accused of crime so that a 
thieftaker could claim the £40 Parliamentary 
reward. McDaniel's case (1756) [9] had been the 
most notorious case of this kind but it had its 
nineteenth century counterparts [10]. The system 
also led to a heavy dependence upon accomplice 
evidence to secure convictions. 
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To deter the would-be criminal the law relied 
upon savage punishment. 
By mid-century the picture was much changed. 
Thanks to Peel the metropolis now had a 
professional police force, and so too did some 
boroughs and counties [11], and the day when all 
would do so, although not yet arrived, was not far 
off. The country still lacked a system of public 
prosecutors, but prosecutions were now increasingly 
overseen by either police, or publicly employed 
solicitors, and financed out of public funds. In 
1879 a Director of Public Prosecutions would be 
appointed [12], albeit with limited powers. Rewards 
were now of far less importance than at the start 
of the century. In 1818 the fixed Parliamentary 
rewards in felony had been replaced by rewards 
granted at the court's discretion [13]. As for Home 
Office offers of rewards and pardons these had in 
1850 only a limited life span ahead of them. In the 
1880s their use would be discontinued altogether 
because of the meagre results they were, by then, 
yielding in terms of the detection and conviction 
of criminals [14]. Finally, in the matter of 
punishment the law was becoming more humane. The 
number of offences capitally punishable showed a 
huge decrease - in 1861 it stood at just four. 
Transportation was in decline, and in 1867 would 
end altogether. The pillory had gone by 1837 [15]. 
Whipping had been abolished as a punishment for 
women in 1820 [16]. In 1861 it would, with some 
exceptions, be abolished as a punishment for males 
over sixteen [17] (only to be restored a year later 
by the Garrotters Act [18] for offences of robbery 
with violence). For most indictable offences the 
punishment was now usually imprisonment in one of 
its various forms or gradations. 
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(c) The courts 
The courts having jurisdiction to try 
indictments at the start of the nineteenth century 
were essentially those swept away by the Courts 
Act, 1971. 
The first tier courts were in London the Old 
Bailey, in England outside London the Courts of 
Assize, and in Wales and Chester the Courts of 
Great Sessions. To this list can be added the 
Court of King's Bench which, despite possessing a 
very wide criminal jurisdiction [19], in practice 
tried cases of high misdemeanour but little else. 
Between them these courts tried all capital cases 
as well as a share of the non-capital felonies and 
misdemeanours. In 1800 the number of Old Bailey 
Sessions was eight per year. The Great Sessions and 
the Assizes were, save in the northern counties, 
held twice a year. In the event of an outbreak of 
major disorder between Assizes judges could be sent 
out under a Special Commission to try offenders. 
The second tier courts were the Courts of 
Quarter Sessions, which sat quarterly in every 
county, and in such cities and boroughs as had a 
separate commission of the peace. Although in 
theory they had jurisdiction to try all crimes 
other than treason, in practice all they tried were 
cases of petty larceny and misdemeanour [20]. 
The bulk of the work of the first tier courts 
was done by the judges of the three common law 
courts (King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer). 
They were twelve in number and tried the most 
serious Old Bailey cases (the less serious being 
tried by the City Judges, that is the Recorder and 
Common Serjeant of London) [21], and all the Assize 
cases (assisted when necessary by Commissioners 
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appointed ad hoc to help get through the work at a 
particular Assize). They took no part, however, in 
the trial of Great Sessions cases; these were tried 
by four Welsh judges. 
The Welsh and the City Judges were part-time 
judges. When not sitting they were free to, and 
commonly did, practise at the bar. Several were 
also M. P. s. Quarter Sessions also relied on part- 
time judges [22]. At county Sessions the Chairman 
of the county bench acted as judge, whilst at 
borough Sessions the judge was commonly the 
Recorder of the borough who would often, although 
not always, be a barrister: (practising or non- 
practising). 
The only court having jurisdiction to review a 
conviction on indictment was the King's Bench, 
which had power to grant a new trial to a person 
convicted before it of misdemeanour, and to quash 
the conviction of accused tried before any court 
who could prove error on the face'of the record-(in 
error there was a further right of appeal from the 
King's Bench to the House of Lords). The number of 
accused who benefited from these procedures was no 
more than a handful per year. A less formal appeal 
procedure lay in the practice of judges' reserving 
cases. In the case of a trial held at thee. Old 
Bailey, at Assizes or the Great Sessions (but not 
Quarter Sessions), it was open to the trial judge, 
in the event of a conviction, to reserve any point 
of law, which had arisen during the'trial and as to 
which he entertained doubt, for consideration by 
all the common law judges (commonly referred to as 
"the Twelve Judges"), who, if they considered the 
conviction bad in law, could either recommend a 
pardon or arrest of judgment. Whether a point was 
reserved was entirely at the discretion of the 
trial judge, and in the first half of the century 
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the number of cases reserved in a year rarely 
exceeded twenty. The only other means of. 
overturning a conviction or sentence was extra- 
judicial - petition to the Home Office. 
In the second quarter of the century the 
structure of the higher criminal courts was 
remodelled. In 1830 the courts of Great Sessions 
were abolished, and Chester and the Welsh counties 
brought within the Assize system, with three 
additional common law judges appointed to help with 
the increased volume of Assize work [23]. In 1834 
the jurisdiction of the Old Bailey was both 
extended territorially, and placed on a, statutory 
footing by the Central Criminal Court Act [24]. 
The following year borough Quarter Sessions were 
reformed. Henceforth the sole judge of a court of 
borough Sessions was to be the Recorder of the 
borough, appointed by the Crown from the ranks of 
barristers of five years standing or more [25]. An 
Act: of 1842 [26] brought the law into line with 
practice by declaring that Quarter Sessions were to 
have no jurisdiction to try cases of treason, 
murder, capital felony or felony for which an 
offender could, on first conviction, be sentenced 
to transportation for life, whilst, in 1847 there 
was enacted the first of a series of statutes [27] 
giving petty sessions jurisdiction to try minor 
felonies (a jurisdiction which was steadily 
expanded over the next forty years). In 1848 the 
practice of reserving cases was placed upon a 
statutory footing with the establishment of a Court 
for Crown Cases Reserved [28]. The same Act also 
gave Quarter Sessions the power to reserve cases. 
, 
By the time these reforms were effected the 
volume of work, both at the Old Bailey and at 
Assizes, was much increased compared with the early 
years of the century. This reflected itself in the 
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frequency of court -sittings. The Act of 1834 
required that there be at least twelve Old Bailey 
sittings -a year, whilst in the 1840s Special 
Commissions began to be regularly issued for the 
holding of a third Assize in the larger counties. 
The Judicature Act, 1873 had relatively little 
effect on the higher criminal courts. The duties of 
the common law judges, now re-styled High Court 
judges, remained, so far as criminal work was 
concerned, essentially unchanged, as did their 
number (in 1900 there were still only seventeen 
Queen's Bench Division judges [29]). For a few 
years, Chancery judges were. sent out on Assize; 
this did not prove a success and the scheme was 
soon abandoned [30]. In the late' 1870s the 
experiment was tried of uniting adjacent counties 
for Assize purposes and of holding four Assizes a 
year. The reform, carried through under powers 
conferred by- the Winter Assizes Acts, 1876-7 and 
the Spring Assizes Act, 1879, worked badly, and in 
1888 the Government reduced the number of Assizes 
to three in most counties. 
(d) Numbers tried and conviction rates 
In 1805 the total number of persons committed 
for trial on indictment was only 4,605 [31]. By 
1818 this figure had risen to 13,567 [31]. In 1863 
it was 20,818 [32]. From this peak it began slowly 
to drop back to around 15,000 in the 1870s and 
12,000 in the last decade of the century (32]. But 
for the policy of making''petty felony triable 
summarily the figures for the second half of the 
century would, of course, have been far higher. Of 
those committed for trial the percentage acquitted 
was in the last quarter of the century running ., at 
around 17% [32] (in 1805 it had been 24% falling 
to 19% in 1818)J31]. 
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(e) Trial on indictment in 1800 
In 1800 in prosecutions for indictable 
offences, the first step following arrest was 
normally 'examination of the accused before a 
magistrate. Such examinations, which were the 
precursor of the present day committal hearing, 
normally took the following course. The magistrate 
would take, in the presence of the accused and 
subject to cross-examination by him or his lawyer, 
the evidence of the prosecutor and his witnesses 
and reduce the same to the form of depositions. 
The accused would then be called upon for his 
defence and, if he chose, could make an unsworn 
statement (which would be taken down in writing by 
the magistrate), and call witnesses of his own (in 
the 1830s some benches were adopting the practice 
of declining to hear defence witnesses, but in 1848 
the right of the accused to call witnesses was 
affirmed by statute). Alternatively he could (and, 
if legally represented, even at this early date, 
commonly would, where the evidence against him was 
strong) 'reserve his defence'. If the evidence 
called made out a prima facie case of guilt the 
magistrate would commit the accused for trial 
(usually in custody), bind over the prosecutor and 
his witnesses to attend and send the depositions 
and the accused's examination (if any) to the court 
of trial. 
Such preliminary examination, although usual, 
was not an essential step. It could be by-passed 
by the prosecutor going direct to the grand jury 
for a bill of indictment, or in misdemeanour by the 
prosecutor proceeding by information in the King's 
Bench, whilst in homicide an accused against whom a 
coroner's jury had brought in a verdict of murder 
or manslaughter would be committed for trial by the 
coroner, and could be tried upon the coroner's 
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inquisition (the document recording the result of 
the inquest) without either preliminary examination 
or indictment. 
Pending trial, the prisoner had no right to a 
copy of the evidence against him, nor in felony of 
the indictment upon which it was proposed to try 
him. Neither was there any duty on the prosecutor 
to disclose witnesses or evidence helpful to the 
defence case. If he could pay for it, the 
prisoner would usually be able to get legal advice 
and representation. Protection against adverse 
press publicity pending trial was more theoretical 
than real. 
At the court of trial, the first task was the 
finding of bills of indictment against those 
committed for trial. All bills which prosecutors 
were seeking to. prefer at that session of the court 
would go before a grand jury. The jury would hear, 
in private, the evidence in support of each 
indictment, and if this disclosed a prima facie 
case they would endorse the indictment 'true bill' 
and the accused would be arraigned and tried on it. 
Prisoners against whom no indictment was found 
would be discharged. 
Arraignment consisted of calling the accused 
to the bar of the court, putting the indictment to 
him and calling upon him to plead to it. Most 
prisoners pleaded either guilty or not guilty, 
although occasionally an accused would plead 
specially in bar, enter a dilatory plea or move to 
quash. the indictment. If the accused refused to 
plead or, having pleaded, refused to be tried by 
jury, he was deemed to have pleaded guilty. 
If the prisoner pleaded not guilty, the next 
step was to empanel a jury to try him. Most juries 
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in criminal cases were common juries (that is drawn 
from the ranks of men between twenty-one and sixty 
who owned freehold land worth £10 a year or 
occupied a house worth £20 a year), although 
special juries (consisting of jurors who were 
bankers, merchants or of the rank of esquire or 
above) were normally used to try cases of 
misdemeanour in the King's Bench. The accused had 
the right to challenge jurors for cause, and in 
treason and felony there was also a right of 
peremptory challenge. 
A jury having been empanelled, they would be 
put in charge of the accused and the trial would 
commence. 
In 1800 it was unusual, except in treason, for 
either side to be represented by counsel, and even 
where the accused did have counsel, if the charge 
was felony, the counsel was not permitted to make a 
speech to the jury on his behalf. Where there was 
no prosecuting counsel the judge would prosecute, 
calling the witnesses and examining them from the 
depositions sent up by the examining magistrate. 
After a short opening speech from prosecuting 
counsel (where there was one) the Crown witnesses 
would be called in turn and examined on behalf of 
the Crown. The accused had the right to cross- 
examine, although the right to cross-examine as to 
credit was more curtailed than it is today. The 
prosecution having closed its case, the judge would 
then call upon the accused to make his defence. He 
could not give evidence on his own behalf (a 
disability which during the debates on the early 
nineteenth century Prisoners' Evidence Bills was 
commonly defended on the ground that it protected 
S4 him from the 'moral torture of cross examination') 
but was permitted (save in misdemeanour where 
18 
represented by counsel) to make an unsworn 
statement. He could also call witnesses, either as 
to fact or character. The right to call character 
witnesses was, in fact, but one of a number of 
advantages and protections he enjoyed under the 
nascent law of evidence which are still with us 
today (the others included the rules as to the 
burden and standard of proof, the rules excluding 
hearsay and involuntary confessions, and as to the 
corroboration of the evidence of accomplices and 
complainants in sexual cases). If he called 
evidence, the prosecution had the right to the last 
word with the jury. The judge would then, if the 
case was one of any difficulty, normally, although 
not invariably, sum the case up, after which the 
jury would consider their verdict. Often they 
would reach a verdict in the jury box without 
leaving court, but if the case presented any 
difficulty they would retire to consider their 
verdict. If the jury's verdict was not guilty, the 
accused would be discharged. If the jury 
convicted, it would be open to him to move in 
arrest of judgment, the common grounds for such 
motion being indictment error and variance (between 
the indictment and the evidence called in support 
of it), which if made out would result in the 
prisoner being discharged (such a discharge left 
him at risk of being indicted afresh but in 
practice such risk was small). If the prisoner 
made no successful motion in arrest of judgment, he 
would be sentenced, along with the rest of those 
convicted, at the end of the session. 
To modern eyes one of the most striking things 
about criminal trials at the start of the century 
is the hardships to which both accused and 
prisoners were subjected. Court rooms were often 
inadequate, with two courts sometimes sitting in 
the same room [33], and at one court-house the 
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court room open to the street [34]. The conditions 
in which prisoners were held beneath the court were 
often insanitary and grossly cramped. During the 
trial the prisoner would be required to stand 
(unless ill or infirm). Courts, in order to get 
through the work, would commonly sit until late at 
night, or even into the early hours of the morning, 
despite protests of exhaustion from the prisoner 
and his counsel. In capital cases, the jury, once 
empanelled, would not be allowed to separate until 
they had reached a verdict, and once they had 
retired to consider a verdict would be kept without 
food, fire or drink until they reached a verdict, 
being only discharged without a verdict, where it 
could be shown that continued enclosure would be 
dangerous to the life of one or more of them. 
(f) Reform of the Trial System 
As will hereafter appear, during the course of 
the nineteenth century significant reforms and 
developments occurred both in trial procedure and 
in criminal evidence. The path of the reformer 
was, however, often far from easy. It took fifteen 
years to get the Prisoners' Counsel Act, 1836 on 
the statute book, and over half a century to 
persuade Parliament to overturn the prohibition 
upon the accused and his spouse giving evidence. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PREPARING FOR TRIAL 
'The sessions are on' said Kaggs 'if they get the 
inquest over and Bolter turns King's evidence: as 
of course, he will ... they can prove Fagin an 
accessory before the fact, and get the trial on on 
Friday, and he'll swing, in six days from this. ' 
Charles Dickens, Oliver Twist, c. 50. 
(a) Knowing the case that must be met 
For most prisoners tried on indictment in the 
nineteenth century the prosecution process began 
with arrest followed by a preliminary examination 
before magistrates [1], and where this procedure 
was adopted the prisoner, by the time he was 
arraigned, would know both the charge he faced and 
the evidence upon which it was based. 
He would learn what offence was alleged at the 
time of arrest [2] and he would be told again at 
the preliminary examination. In most cases the 
information given would be perfectly adequate for 
his purpose but not in all. To tell a man that he 
was charged with conspiracy to defraud or with 
embezzling £5 might leave him no wiser as to the 
particular transaction impugned. In such a case it 
was open to the accused to apply to the prosecution 
for particulars of the charge and, if these were 
refused, to apply to a judge [3]. In barratry and 
nuisance cases the practice of ordering particulars 
dates back to the eighteenth century [4], but it 
was only in the 1820s and 1830s that it began to be 
extended to embezzlement and conspiracy [5]. 
Unrepresented prisoners, of course, would seldom 
know of their right to apply for such an order, 
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and, even if they did, lack of means might prevent 
them exercising it pre-arraignment [6]. 
The prisoner would learn what evidence the 
charge was based on at the preliminary examination. 
To secure his committal for trial, the prosecutor 
had to adduce evidence sufficient to establish a 
prima facie case, and the depositions of the 
witnesses would generally [7] be (and after 1848 
had to be) [8] taken in the presence of the 
accused. Indeed it was very much in the interest 
of the prosecutor that they should be so taken, 
because, at trial, the depositions of witnesses who 
had died or who were too ill'to attend or who were 
being kept out of the way by the accused, could 
only be read if the accused had been present when 
they were taken and given the opportunity to cross- 
examine [9]. In treason he was, by statute, also 
entitled to have delivered to him ten days before 
trial, a list of the Crown witnesses (with their 
addresses and occupations) [10]. But this marked 
the limit of the law's indulgence. From fear of 
concocted defences, inspection of or a copy of the 
depositions was denied to him [11]. 
However, what a prisoner could not obtain from 
the court, he could sometimes obtain indirectly. 
The practice of reporting committal hearings meant 
that if his case was of interest (and even if it 
was not) some newspaper (local or national) might 
well carry details of the evidence given [12]. Even 
if there was nothing in the press, if he was 
represented at the committal by a solicitor the 
latter would invariably take a full note of the 
evidence [13], and if unrepresented but literate he 
could take his own note. However, none of these 
expedients was foolproof. Examining magistrates 
had power to exclude both press and solicitors from 
preliminary hearings [14], and some benches were 
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not slow to do so. Further the taking of an 
accurate and full note by any but a shorthand' 
writer was made extremely difficult by the practice 
adopted in some courts of having the witnesses' 
depositions taken by a clerk, out of the hearing of 
both the magistrate and the accused, and then 
simply read over to the witnesses in open court 
[15]. It is-impossible to guess how many prisoners 
ended up with some note of the committal evidence, 
but the number must have been small. The vast 
majority of accused were undefended and such 
prisoners, even if they appreciated the advantage 
of a note (and the first offender might well not do 
so) were often too illiterate to take one [16]. 
Without a note, the prisoner trying to prepare his 
defence would have to try to remember the evidence 
given, and here the old hand, familiar with the 
procedure and well able to appreciate the points in 
the evidence against him, would be likely to fare 
better than the novice. 
Reform came in 1836 with the Prisoners' 
Counsel Act which gave prisoners the right both to 
inspect and take copies of the depositions [17]. 
Welcome though the Act was it had a number of 
shortcomings. In the first place, it gave the 
prisoner no right to inspect or take copies of any 
statement he had made at the committal hearing 
[18], nor to take copies of other documentary 
exhibits [19] (anatomical exhibits seem not to have 
been subject to the prohibition on inspection 
(20]). A potentially more dangerous loophole was 
exposed in 1845 when Patteson J. held that the Act 
gave no right to copies of witness statements taken 
post-committal [21], such ruling leaving it open to 
prosecutors to adopt the Irish practice of 
deliberately keeping witnesses back at committal 
[22]. In Ireland the defence were in such cases 
refused even the names of the new witnesses [23]; 
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English judges, after initially adopting the same 
rule, proved more accommodating, being willing to 
allow defence counsel to inspect the back of the 
indictment to get the witnesses' names [24]. 
Another defect of the Act was that copies of 
depositions had to be paid for [25]. In 1848 the 
provision in the 1836 Act was re-enacted by the 
Indictable Offences Act but, although the wording 
of the clause was altered, nothing was done to deal 
with the problem of keeping back witnesses. 
However, later the same year, in Ward [26], 
Cresswell J. said that he thought that the fair 
course in such a case was for the prosecution to 
apprise the defence of the character of the 
additional evidence, and within a few years this 
had become settled practice [27], being strongly 
affirmed by Willes J. in 1867 [28] and Brett J, in 
1870 [29]. But what redress did the defence have 
where notice was not given? To this question the 
Australian courts gave a bold answer: the evidence 
could not be adduced [30]. All English judges were 
prepared to offer, however, was an adjournment to 
give the defence the opportunity to consider and 
meet the new evidence, and it was not until 1884 
that even this right was clearly established [31]; 
in 1867 the furthest Willes J. had been prepared to 
go was to say that failure to give notice was a 
matter about which the defence would be entitled to 
make strong comment [28]. 
There was also the question whether the 1836 
Act applied to coroner's depositions. This was a 
point of some importance, for the accused was not 
necessarily present at the coroner's inquest, and 
although the majority of those committed for trial 
for murder or manslaughter by coroner's inquisition 
also underwent a preliminary examination before a 
magistrate, not all did [32]. Decisions on the 
point were conflicting [33] and the accused's right 
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to a copy of such depositions was not finally 
placed beyond doubt until 1887 [34]. 
But committal upon a coroner's inquisition was 
not the only procedure whereby an accused could be 
brought to trial without the safeguard of a 
preliminary examination. At common law it was 
possible for a prosecutor to by-pass the 
magistrates' court completely, and simply go before 
the grand jury with his witnesses and ask for a 
bill of indictment. If the grand jury found a true 
bill, the first the accused would know of the 
proceedings was when he was arrested pursuant to 
the court's warrant, and he would stand his trial 
without knowing what the evidence against him was 
[35]. In 1859 the freedom of prosecutors to apply 
to the grand jury in this way was curtailed by the 
Vexatious Indictments Act [36], which declared that 
henceforth no indictment for perjury, conspiracy, 
indecent assault or certain other misdemeanours 
should be presented to or found by a grand jury, 
unless the accused had been committed for trial, or 
the prosecutor bound over to prosecute or give 
evidence, or the indictment was preferred by the 
direction of or with the consent of a judge of one 
of the superior courts. But the Act applied only to 
this limited class of offences, and, as the 
Criminal Code Commissioners forcefully pointed out 
in 1879, in all other cases the potential for abuse 
remained [37]. Within months of their report just 
such a case as they had- described occurred, with 
its victim an Alderman of the City of London [38]. 
The Criminal Code Bills sought to close the 
loophole but after the dropping of the 1883 Bill 
nothing further was done [39]. 
Then there was the procedure in misdemeanour 
by way of criminal information; here again there 
was no committal, and, where the information was 
25 
ex-officio, no disclosure whatever of the 
prosecution evidence pre-trial [40] (a state of 
affairs which remained unaltered until ex officio 
informations were abolished in 1967). 
Just as it was the policy of the common law to 
deny the accused a copy of the Crown evidence, so 
also it denied him a copy of the indictment [41]. 
The rule had been abolished as regards high treason 
in 1695 [42] and was abolished in misdemeanour in 
1819 [43], but as regards felony it remained 
unreformed throughout the nineteenth century [44]. 
The hardship denial of the indictment caused 
to an accused was not that it left him uncertain as 
to the offence for which he was to be tried (in the 
vast majority of cases this could not be in doubt), 
but that it made it more difficult for him to take 
indictment objections. Indeed, there is some ground 
for believing that judges may have regarded this as 
a powerful reason for maintaining the rule [45]. 
Hawkins claimed that the court had a discretion to 
allow the accused a copy of the indictment for 
pleading purposes [46], but it is doubtful whether 
this represented early nineteenth century practice 
[47]. However, a counsel determined to obtain a 
copy of the indictment would often be able to get 
one. He had a right to have the indictment read 
once slowly [48], and if this was done, he would of 
course be able to copy down what was read, and such 
was the prolixity of nineteenth century indictments 
that the mere threat to call for the indictment to 
be read (in practice all that was usually put on 
arraignment was a summary) would often induce the 
Crown to furnish a copy [49]. 
During the second half of the century repeated 
calls were made for reform of the rule [50], and 
clauses conferring upon those accused of felony the 
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right to a copy of the indictment were included in 
all of the Criminal Code Bills [51] and many of the 
Criminal Appeal Bills [52]. In fact, however, the 
matter had by the 1850s become less urgent due to 
the extent to which the scope for successful 
objections to the indictment had been cut down by 
Lord Campbell's Act. A final irony was that for all 
the clamour for reform, the scope of the rule was 
in 1848 actually extended with the Treason Felony 
Act of that year giving the Crown the option to 
prosecute certain treasons as felony, a course 
which, if adopted, deprived the accused of his 
right to a copy of the indictment [53]. 
Although a prisoner accused of homicide had no 
right to demand a second post mortem, by the second 
half of the century one finds courts prepared to 
allow defence doctors to examine organs removed on 
such examination. 
(b) Disclosure of unused material 
In a murder case in 1838 Patteson J., insisted 
that the prosecution call all eye-witnesses to the 
killing irrespective of their supposed sympathies 
and whether or not their names were on the back of 
the indictment [54]. In Pook [55] in 1871 Cockburn 
L. C. J. went even further, declaring it the duty of 
the police to ensure that the defence were given 
all information available about the alleged crime. 
These doctrines however failed to take root and by 
1900 the law still imposed no obligation on either 
prosecution or police to dislose 'unused material'. 
(c) Access to legal advice and representation 
The majority of those committed for trial were 
committed in custody [56]. Save in treason, where 
the prisoner's counsel had a statutory right of 
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access to him [57], the right of a remand prisoner 
to see a lawyer depended upon the rules of the 
prison in which he was detained. 
The rules of most prisons seem to have allowed 
fairly generous access to lawyers [58]. Indeed, in 
Newgate in the mid 1840s the regime was if anything 
too liberal, with sham attorneys and clerks of low 
attorneys being allowed to prowl amongst the remand 
prisoners touting for business; in the end, in 
order to protect prisoners from exploitation (which 
ranged from gross overcharging to out and out 
fraud) [59], the magistrates were obliged to deny 
access to all save duly qualified attorneys and 
their properly accredited clerks [60]. 
A recurrent problem for much of the century 
was the practice of some prison governors and 
police of insisting that interviews between 
attorneys and prisoners take place in the presence 
of a prison or police officer [61] (defence medical 
examinations [62] and the interviewing of possible 
prisoner witnesses [63] were sometimes also made 
subject to a like requirement). Indeed, it was only 
in the 1870s that the problem was finally tackled 
with both the Metropolitan Police General Orders, 
1873 and the Prison Rules, 1878 providing for 
interviews to take place in the sight (but not the 
hearing) of police or prison staff [64]. 
During the first half of the century, a 
serious obstacle to remand prisoners hiring lawyers 
lay in the practice of the police in some areas of 
taking from a prisoner all money found on him on 
arrest. In the 1830s judges repeatedly intervened 
to stress the impropriety of the practice (save in 
cases where it was clear that the money seized was 
stolen) [65] but for all that it continued, 
28 
particularly in Staffordshire, well into the 1840s 
[66]. 
In the 1890s a small but important improvement 
in police practice was made by a Home Office 
circular directing that an arrested person be 
allowed to make immediate communication with a 
friend or lawyer [67]. 
(d) Time to prepare for trial 
The time available to a prisoner to prepare 
for his trial would vary according to the nature of 
the charge he faced. A prisoner charged with high 
treason could not be put on trial until at least 
ten days after he had been served with a copy of 
the indictment, a list of the witnesses and a copy 
of the jury panel [68]. And in misdemeanour, the 
accused, if not in custody, had the right to 
traverse, that is to put off his trial until the 
session of the court next after that at which he 
was arraigned [69]. In felony, however, no such 
indulgence was given. There the prisoner would be 
put on trial at the session immediately following 
his committal (usually on the same day as the bill 
was found against him by the grand jury), which 
could mean, where he had been committed just before 
the session, his being tried within days of his 
arrest [70]. In 1812 Bellingham was tried for the 
murder of Spencer Perceval three days after the 
deed, and hanged four days later. Nor was his an 
isolated case. At the Old Bailey, where even in 
1800 there were eight sessions a year, prisoners 
frequently took their trials within days and 
sometimes within hours of their committal. At the 
Assizes and Quarter Sessions, with their less 
frequent sittings, the problem was less acute [71]. 
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In 1844 the Law Magazine [72] called for all 
prisoners to be allowed fifteen clear days between 
committal and trial. However, the only reform made 
was-in the opposite direction, namely the abolition 
in 1851 of the right to traverse in misdemeanour 
[73]. 
Where his case was called on before he was 
ready to go to trial, it was always open to the 
prisoner to apply for a postponement. In the early 
years of the century the attitude of judges to such 
applications was markedly unsympathetic. In 
Bellingham's case an application by his counsel for 
a postponement to allow medical evidence to be 
called as to the accused's sanity was brushed 
contemptuously aside [74]. In 1835 a protest staged 
by the Old Bailey bar against prisoners having 
their cases called on when they were unprepared 
with either counsel or witnesses, merely drew from 
the Common Serjeant the retort, 'Every prisoner is 
bound to be ready to take his trial on the first 
day of the session' [75]. As the. century wore on 
judicial attitudes began to change, with the courts 
becoming gradually less hostile to such 
applications [76], but even in 1900 it still 
remained the law that a prisoner indicted for 
felony could not demand of right a single day to 
prepare for his defence, and it was regarded as 
neither unusual nor unfair to expect counsel, 
briefed from the dock or assigned by the court, to 
conduct the defence after a hurried conference with 




'It was much to be lamented that ... no case now occurred ... which was not forestalled by ... accounts ... [in] the newspapers ... which created a prejudice against accused persons from which it 
was very difficult, if not impossible, to divest 
themselves' 
per Gaselee J., Old Bailey, September 11,1828. 
In 1800, as now, stirring up prejudice against 
an accused awaiting trial was'prohibited on pain of 
committal for contempt [1]. But it was ,a 
prohibition to which the press paid little heed. 
Newspapers had since the 1780s habitually reported 
evidence given at inquests [2] and preliminary 
examinations of accused [3]; and such reports did 
not confine themselves simply to the evidence 
given; if an accused committed for trial was known 
to be of bad character the public would be told 
[4]; in notorious cases every scrap of information 
and rumour which could be gleaned about the accused 
and the crime would be laid before the reading 
public [5]; any confession, which he had made since 
being taken into custody would be reported, and 
where possible reproduced verbatim [6], as would 
any letters by him on which the press had been able 
to get their hands [7]. Not infrequently what was 
published was wholly false. In 1823 Thurtell had 
to stand trial for murder falsely accused by The 
Times of having murdered before [8]. Worse still 
false reports were often coupled with blatant 
attempts to prejudge guilt. In 1824 the banker 
Fauntlerov was tried for forgery at the Old Bailey, 
having already been tried and convicted by the 
press; and in the press campaign against him no 
newspaper had behaved worse than The Times, which 
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had published a long but untrue biography depicting 
him as a voluptuary, who had spent his ill gotten 
gains on women and gaming [9]. 
And the press's bad example was readily copied 
by others. A notorious case would, pre-trial, 
spawn handbills, -pamphlets, and ballads about the 
crime, often containing the most scurrilous 
untruths about the accused (10], and on the day of 
the trial placards advertising such wares would be 
displayed outside the court building [11]. Whilst 
Thurtell was awaiting trial, he had to take 
proceedings in the King's Bench (12] to prevent the 
Surrey Theatre putting on a play, based upon the 
murder of which he was accused, and depicting him 
as the murderer. 
Largely unsuccessful attempts to prevent the 
reporting of preliminary examinations and inquests 
(ex parte proceedings as they were called) had been 
made since the 1780s [13]. In 1782 when newspaper 
reports of Bow Street examinations first began to 
be published, the Attorney General threatened to 
take action unless they ceased. The threat was 
heeded for a short time but soon things were as bad 
as ever. In 1796 the press appeared to have won a 
victory when, in Curry v. Walter [14], it was held 
that no action would lie for publishing a true 
report of an unsuccessful ex parte application to 
the King's Bench for a criminal information. They 
were further encouraged when three years later in 
Wright (15] Lawrence J. expressed his agreement 
with this ruling. In 1804, however, the trend was 
reversed when Heath J. jailed for contempt the 
printers of the Sussex Journal for publishing an 
account of the evidence -given at the preliminary 
examination of an accused for murder (16]; the mere 
publication of ex parte evidence before trial was, 
he declared, highly criminal. In 1806 Serjeant 
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Best, in an attempt not to clarify the law (which 
was he claimed clear) but to make it better known 
and give it teeth, sought leave to introduce a Bill 
making the publication of all ex parte proceedings 
in criminal cases an offence punishable with fine 
and imprisonment, and giving a penalty of £100 to 
anyone who would prosecute in such a case [17]. In 
the end, however, he bowed to arguments that the 
Bill infringed the liberty of the press and dropped 
it. In Fisher [18] in 1811 the King's Bench 
condemned such publications in trenchant terms. 
'Their only tendency', declared Lord Ellenborough 
C. J., 
'is to prejudge those whom the law still 
presumes to be innocent, and to poison the 
sources of justice'. 
Seven years later in Fleet [19], the court, in 
making clear that the embargo applied equally to 
reports of coroners' inquests was equally 
forthright. The press, however continued to ignore 
the prohibition, although some provincial 
magistrates and coroners were by now seeking to 
prevent ex parte hearings being reported by holding 
them in private [20]. 
In 1823 Park J. took up the topic. During the 
trial of Thurtell and Hunt he condemned the ex 
parte reports which had circulated pre-trial, not 
only on the ground that they created prejudice, but 
also because they led to the accused being 
furnished with what they had no right to, namely a 
written account of the evidence against them [21]. 
Months later during the trial of Pallett he warned 
that, if the press continued to publish reports of 
inquests, it would be the duty of coroners to 
exclude them [22]. These comments stung The Times 
into a fierce reply. Giving publicity to inquests, 
was, it claimed, in the public interest; it helped 
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to ensure that those responsible for atrocious 
crimes were detected, and also served as a check on 
coroners (it cited a recent case in which press 
reports of an inquest had helped to expose an 
attempt by a coroner to stifle a murder prosecution 
[23]). Park was not deterred. The next year at 
Fauntleroy's trial [24], he repeated his 
criticisms, and later that year Abbott C. J. [25] 
stressed that the fact that such reports were so 
numerous and frequent did not render them in any 
way lawful. 
How little the press was inclined to obey 
judicial bans on publication is illustrated by the 
way it behaved during the trial of the Cato Street 
conspirators in 1820 [26]. There, upon the accused 
severing their challenges, the court directed that 
no part of the proceedings in any of the trials 
should be published until the conclusion of all. 
Its reasons for making the order were two-fold - 
preventing prejudice to the accused and also 
preventing Crown witnesses from reading what others 
had said in evidence. Such orders were by no means 
new; they had been made three years previously in 
Watson [27] and Brandreth [28], but, as in those 
two cases, the order was no sooner made than it was 
breached. This time, the editor of the culprit 
newspaper, The Observer, was brought to book. 
Denman [29], his counsel, argued that he had done 
no wrong. There was no risk of prejudice to 
waiting jurors since they were obliged to sit in 
court during all the trials in order to be ready 
when called, whilst there was real advantage in 
such publication from the accused's point of view, 
for, if false evidence was given, members of the 
public reading of the same might thereby be induced 
to come forward in favour of the defence. But 
Abbott C. J. would have none of it and imposed a 
heavy fine. 
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By mid-century the attitude of the press to 
such bans was still obdurate. In 1848 The Times 
ignored a ban imposed by Perryn J. in relation to a 
case of treason-felony which he was trying in 
Dublin [30], and boasted in its leader: 
'We care as little for the solemn warning of 
Mr. Justice Perryn as for a veto of the Grand 
Llama of Thibet'. 
Had the law officers, instead of merely bemoaning 
in opening speeches to juries, the conduct of the 
press, sought vigorously to enforce the law, there 
might have been some prospect of putting an end to 
the evil, but no law officer* was ever prepared to 
go that far. 
That press freedom to comment upon pending 
cases was bitterly resented by prisoners is 
demonstrated by the frequency with which the topic 
was broached before juries by prisoners and counsel 
alike [31]. But what could a prisoner do about 
such damaging publicity? If he had the means, he 
could bring proceedings to restrain further 
publication, but to do so would often merely make 
matters worse [32]. An alternative course was to 
apply for a postponement of the trial, but it was 
rare for such applications to be granted [33]. In 
cases of extreme prejudice it was open 'to the 
Ring's Bench to order a change of venue; but there 
were doubts as to the scope of the jurisdiction 
(particularly in capital felony) [34] and 
applications were sparingly granted [35]; the 
remedy was in any event beyond the means of a poor 
prisoner. In the vast majority of cases the'only 
antidote which the law was able to offer to 
prejudical publicity was a direction to the jury in 
the summing up (often reinforced by observations 
from Crown counsel in his speech) to put all that 
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they had read and heard about the case out of their 
minds. 
In 1856 local prejudice against Palmer, the 
Rugeley poisoner, stirred up in no small measure by 
the newspapers [36], led the Attorney General to 
decide to move the trial to London. Certiorari was 
granted by the Lord Chief Justice removing the case 
into the Queen's Bench [37]. The object of the 
removal was to transfer the case to the Old Bailey. 
But then doubts arose as to the power of the Court 
to order such transfer (if it did not have such 
power the only alternative would be the 
inconvenience of a trial at bar). To get round the 
problem, a special Act [38] was passed giving the 
Queen's Bench power to order the trial at the 
Central Criminal Court of indictments found 
elsewhere. Thereafter most applications for change 
of venue were made under this Act. The Act did not 
however change the court's attitude to such 
applications; to have any hope of success an 
applicant had to make out a very strong case [39]. 
By the time Palmer's Act was passed the 
attitude of the courts to reports of ex parte 
proceedings was changing. In 1843, Denman, who by 
now was Lord Chief Justice, in his evidence before 
the House of Lords Select Committee on the Libel 
Law argued that the publication of reports of 
preliminary examinations before magistrates was in 
the public interest. Such reports, he claimed, 
often led to the detection and punishment of crime 
and the vindication of character, and the accused 
was not prejudiced thereby for the public, 
realising that they were ex parte, postponed 
judgment on the case until after trial [40]. In 
1858 in Lewis v. Levy [41], Lord Campbell, citing 
Denman's arguments, refused to lay down that the 
publication of reports of preliminary examinations 
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was unlawful; it was important, he said, -that the 
proceedings of courts of justice should be 
universally known. In 9=y (1865) [42] the Irish 
Judge, Le Froy, offered another argument in favour 
of such reporting - it was important that the 
public should know that magistrates did their duty 
impartially. Three years later in Wason v. Walter 
[43] Cockburn C. J. declared that the publication of 
a fair account of what took place in public courts 
was of great advantage to the public, and that this 
was as true of ex parte proceedings as any other. 
The coup de grace was administered in Usill v. 
Hales [44] in 1878 where it was held that the 
publication of a fair and. accurate report of 
proceedings in open court upon an ex parte 
application to a magistrate for a summons for 
perjury was not only lawful but privileged. 
The courts' new stance upon ex parte reports 
left the press free to publish with impunity all 
the evidence given at an accused's committal, 
including evidence which would or might be held 
inadmissible at trial [45]. They were thus free to 
publish and did publish (often verbatim) evidence 
of alleged confessions of guilt [46] and evidence 
about previous convictions in bail applications 
[47]. It left unaltered the old rule that it was 
contempt to publish prejudicial comment. 
As the century wore on the behaviour of the 
press gradually became more responsible in this 
regard. By 1865 the only details of an accused's 
criminal past which were given in police reports in 
The Times were those spoken to in evidence, and 
comments prejudging guilt were only occasionally to 
be found in its columns [48]. However, the latter 
vice was one which it had only recently given up 
[49]. In 1850, whilst the Mannings were awaiting 
trial for murder, both The Times and The Observer 
37 
left their readers in no doubt as to their belief 
in the accuseds' guilt. The behaviour of other 
newspapers was slower to change. As late as 1886 
the Barnsley Chronicle is to be found regaling its 
readers with an unflattering biography (including 
the whole criminal record) of a local man awaiting 
trial for murder [50]. In 1894 The People 
published an article alleging, quite falsely, that 
a woman called Hermann awaiting trial for murder 
had been convicted of a similar offence some years 
previously [51]. In 1895 The Review of Reviews 
published an article containing a scurrilous attack 
on Jabez Balfour, then awaiting trial for fraud 
[52]. In 1901 Bennett, the Yarmouth murderer, was 
the target of a vicious press campaign both before 
and during his trial [53]. 
Much of the blame for this state of affairs 
must be laid at the door of the Law Officers for 
failing to act to stamp out such abuses. 
Proceedings for contempt in such cases were rare, 
and when they were brought it was usually the 
victim of the attack who brought them [54]. 
Indeed, during the latter half of the century, the 
only notable intervention by the Law Officers to 
prevent comment upon a pending criminal trial 
appears- to have been the contempt proceedings 
brought against the Tichborne Claimant (then 
awaiting trial for perjury) and two M. P. s for 
asserting at a public meeting that he was innocent 
and the victim of a conspiracy - proceedings which 
scarcely had an even handed look about them when 
one reflected that the Attorney had not lifted a 





'It is a disgrace to the county to impose on the 
judge the necessity to act as counsel against the 
prisoner. ' 
Patteson J. in R. v. Anon. 
(The Bedford Mercury, March 23,1844) 
(a) The trial judge 
Between the nineteenth century judge and his 
present day counterpart there were three striking 
differences. First, he would conduct the 
prosecution [1] where no counsel was briefed to do 
so. Second, save where he consented to reserve a 
point of law or where the trial was for 
misdemeanour in the King's Bench, his rulings, jury 
directions and conduct were not subject to review 
by a higher court. Third, he was not always 
legally qualified. 
(i) Judges prosecuting 
At the start of the century, judges prosecuted 
the majority of indictments. Only in Government 
prosecutions (for treason or sedition) and in mint 
and Bank cases were prosecuting counsel regularly 
to be seen [2]. These cases apart, it was unusual 
to find counsel retained on either side. At the 
Old Bailey at the July session 1800, counsel 
prosecuted in only one case in eight. In the rest 
the judge prosecuted [3]. 
Nonetheless, prosecuting counsel were now seen 
in greater numbers than they had been a hundred 
years before. In 1700 it was almost unheard of for 
'counsel to prosecute in felony, and it was only 
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when, in the 1730s, the courts relaxed the 
prohibition on counsel appearing for prisoners, 
that a trickle of counsel instructed to prosecute 
had begun to appear [4]. Some incentive had been 
given for the employment of counsel in felony by 
statutes of 1752 and 1788 [5], which gave the 
courts power to award prosecutors their legal costs 
in such cases, but despite this reform the numbers 
of prosecutors employing counsel had remained 
small. Many were simply too poor to do so. And 
even where a prosecutor had means, his inclination 
would be not to do so. Why incur the expense (by no 
means certain to be reimbursed) of employing 
counsel to prosecute a prisoner, who, almost 
certainly, would not have counsel himself? What 
was the need? Why not do what most people did and 
leave it to the judge? After all he would perform 
the task for nothing. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the 
position had been completely reversed. Most cases 
on indictment were now prosecuted by counsel, the 
only place where the practice of judges prosecuting 
still lingered on being at Quarter Sessions and to 
a very limited extent before the City judges. 
Indeed, it had recently- been dealt a well nigh 
fatal blow by the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 (once 
this was in force the judge who prosecuted would, 
as part of that task, have to cross-examine the 
prisoner, and what could look more unfair? ) 
Nonetheless, it was to be a few years' dying, 
receiving a mention. in the 1904 edition of 
Pritchard's Quarter Sessions Practice [6]. The 
coup de grace came eventually came in 1908 with the 
Costs in Criminal Cases Act of that year [7]. 
The first calls for change had come in the 
1830s.. An early, landmark was the Report of the 
Royal Commission on County Rates in 1836 [8]. This 
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had condemned the practice of judges prosecuting in 
complicated cases as inefficient and a false 
economy, and had recommended that a prosecuting 
counsel's fee be allowed both at Assizes and 
Quarter Sessions in all cases involving an arguable 
point of law, or in which there were three of more 
witnesses. A decade later, the red judges (from 
whom there had been rumblings on the subject since 
the early 1830s) [9], increasingly irked at having 
themselves to prosecute serious cases, decided to 
make a stand on the issue. Complaining that it was 
unseemly for a judge to. act as prosecutor [10], 
they refused to have any further truck with the 
practice, and when cases came before them, with no 
counsel briefed to prosecute, they now simply 
handed the depositions down to one of the counsel 
in court with a request that he prosecute [11]. 
Their stand, which was applauded in The Times [12], 
the Commons [13], and in legal journals [14], 
proved something of a turning point, and in the 
second half of the century the practice of judges' 
prosecuting died out entirely at Assizes and became 
much diminished at Quarter sessions [15]. 
How was this change effected, given that, even 
by the end of the century, a system of public 
prosecutors (for which there had been repeated 
calls since the 1830s) [16] still had not been 
established? There appear to have been two main 
factors. First, money to finance prosecutions was 
made increasingly available. The courts' power to 
make awards of costs to prosecutors was extended 
[17], and at the same time the burden which such 
awards made on the rates was reduced when the 
Government in 1835 agreed to meet half the cost 
[18]. Second, it was no longer being left simply 
rto'the prosecutor to decide whether counsel should 
be employed. At the Old Bailey-and-at some Quarter 
Sessions there was by the 1850s a 'soup"system' in 
a 
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operation, under which briefs in cases in which no 
counsel had been retained to prosecute, were handed 
out by the clerk of the court to members of the bar 
mess in rotation [19]. In Liverpool, Manchester 
and Leeds responsibility for briefing counsel in 
prosecutions rested with an attorney, appointed and 
paid by the Council to prosecute all cases within 
the borough (Liverpool had been first with such a 
scheme in the 1830s, followed in less than a decade 
by Manchester and Leeds) [20]. In many petty 
sessional divisions of counties, the clerk to the 
magistrates would act as prosecuting attorney in 
all cases where the examining magistrates had 
certified that counsel ought to be retained to 
prosecute [21]. In the metropolis and in boroughs 
(where by statute [22] the clerk to the magistrates 
was prohibited from undertaking prosecutions) the 
police were pressed into service: one of the police 
officers in the case would be bound over to 
prosecute thereby investing him with the authority 
to instruct an attorney and through him counsel 
[23]. Private enterprise also made a contribution: 
poor prosecutors were now often openly touted by 
attornies with offers to conduct their cases for 
such costs as the court allowed [24]. 
That Recorders and Chairmen were still to be 
found prosecuting at Quarter Sessions in the last 
years of the century was' due in part to a gap in 
the law (the statutory power to award prosecutors 
their costs, although it had been extended during 
the century to certain classes of rmisdemeanour, 
still did not apply to all), but more to a belief, 
on the part of county benches in particular, that 
it was wrong to spend public money employing 
counsel to prosecute simple and straightforward 
cases ((25]. Nowhere was this view held more 
tenaciously that in Surrey, which in the last 
quarter of the century, was still applying costs 
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rules made fifty years before, and refusing 
prosecutors a counsel's fee in all cases where the 
prisoner had no counsel, a practice which resulted 
in almost all undefended prisoners being prosecuted 
by the Chairman [26]. ) 
From the accused's point of view, the obvious 
objection to judges' prosecuting was the look of 
the thing and the potential for unfairness. If 
there was no prosecuting counsel and a Crown 
witness was hostile, it was the judge who would 
have to cross-examine him on his deposition; if he 
proved favourable to the defence when cross- 
examined it was the judge who had to re-examine to 
limit the damage; if the. accused called witnesses 
(or gave evidence himself as he, could do after 1885 
in many cases of sexual assault) it was the judge 
who had to cross-examine. This descent of the 
judge into the arena not only looked unfair, but 
when done in a partisan spirit (an ever present 
danger where counsel appeared for the defence) it 
could actually work unfairness. Occasionally, 
however, having the judge prosecute would work to a 
prisoner's advantage. Depositions often came to a 
judge too late for him to have any hope of 
mastering them, and if a case was complicated, for 
it to be prosecuted by a judge who was not master 
of his brief, inevitably increased the prisoner's 
chances of escape [27]. 
(ii) Unappealability 
The fact that the conduct and behaviour of 
judges were not subject to review had two 
unfortunate consequences. 
First, it had an adverse. effect upon the 
standard, of summings, , up .. The fact that appeal on 
questions of law was at the judge's discretion led 
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to the absence of a body of law (such as has been 
developed by the Court of Appeal in the present 
century) as to the legal directions which a summing 
up must contain, and the form such directions 
should take (a gap which the pitiful precedents of 
summings up in books such as Chitty [28], and the 
occasional rulings of the Court for Crown Cases 
Reserved did little to close). There being no 
authoritative guidance on the question judges 
summed up as they saw fit. 
So far as one can judge from trial reports, 
summings up by the common law judges were generally 
full and thorough both as to law and evidence, 
although even as late as 1836'one can find Patteson 
J. acceding to a request from a jury to dispense 
with the summing up ( 2'9 ]-a practice common 
amongst the City Judges and one which could result 
in a prisoner being convicted by a jury without the 
latter having been given a word of legal direction 
from the judge. But the red judges, albeit that 
they dealt with the most serious cases, represented 
but a" tiny fraction of the total establishment of 
criminal judges (as late as 1915 the Queen's Bench 
Division judges numbered only 18 out of a total 
establishment of around 200) [30]; and among the 
inferior judges much laxer standards prevailed. 
In the first half of the century, summings up 
in trials before the City judges were often 
perfunctory, if not omitted altogether [31]. 
Indeed one of the reasons' why the City judges were 
during this period able to get through the 
prodigious number of cases they did, was by 
delivering summings up bereft of legal direction, 
and containing at most a scattering of observations 
on the evidence. The same bad practice also 
prevailed at many, Quarter Sessions. And, although 
the 'second ; "half of the century saw an improvement 
44 
in standards, even at the Old Bailey the tradition 
still had not entirely died out. Mr. Commissioner 
Kerr, who sat there as third City judge between 
1859 and 1901, remained until the day of his 
retirement notorious for his one line summings up, 
and his refusal to take a note of the evidence 
[32]. Indeed, so deeply ingrained was the practice 
that some Quarter Sessions Chairmen were still 
dispensing with summing up as late as 1913 -a 
state of affairs which the Court of Criminal Appeal 
astonishingly refused to condemn [33]. The vice of 
all this was that the accused was denied the 
benefit of having the jury clearly directed upon 
such elementary but vital matters as the burden and 
standard of proof and the legal ingredients of the 
offence charged. 
The lack of an appeal remedy also meant the 
absence of a vital check on judicial misconduct. 
Amongst the common law judges standards of 
conduct appear, on the whole, to have been 
reasonably high. At Assize trials in the 1820s 
prisoners can be seen asking the judge to act as 
their counsel, and receiving the assurance that he 
would watch their interests [34] (which was, of 
course, all that the expression meant) [35]. And 
the promise was kept. If there was an indictment 
or other legal point available to an unrepresented 
prisoner the judge would take it on his behalf 
[36]. A prisoner, who pleaded guilty to a capital 
charge, would be strongly urged to retract his plea 
and take his trial so that the case against him 
could be scrutinised to see whether there was in 
fact a defence available to him [37]; and where 
judicial pressure proved` unavailing, it was not 
unknown for the judge to direct that the evidence 
be_'gone through [38], or-'even that 'a plea of not 
guilty be entered [39]. ° To jurors, called on to 
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try on overwhelming evidence the guilt of a man, 
whom they had themselves heard plead guilty, such a 
proceeding must have seemed bizarre, but 
occasionally it was the means of saving a 
prisoner's life [40]. If prosecuting counsel 
opened a case unfairly he would be stopped [41]. 
Witnesses called to prove a confession would be 
subject to a rigorous judicial interrogation as to 
the events leading up to its being made so as to 
leave no doubt as to its voluntariness [42]. A 
medical man, who in an infanticide case sought to 
rely upon the discredited test of floating the 
lungs as proof that the child was born alive, would 
leave court with a judicial flea in his ear [43]. 
On occasions in joint trials one even finds a 
defence counsel, seeking to cast blame on an 
undefended prisoner, warned from the bench not to 
try and hang the judge's client to save his own 
[44]. 
But for all the generally high reputation of 
red judges, some inevitably fell short of the 
standard expected. Abinger C. B., for instance, had 
throughout his judicial career a reputation for 
arrogance and lack of impartiality. Indeed, in 
1843 his conduct towards Chartist prisoners, when 
presiding over a special commission in Lancashire 
and Cheshire [45], was the subject of protest both 
in the press and the Commons, whilst his 
contemporary Gurney B. was notorious for the 
unseemly haste with which he despatched cases 
(rushing through the calendar like a wild elephant 
through a sugar plantation was how one of his 
brethren described him to a Royal Commission [46]. ) 
Later in the century, Stephen J. earned criticism 
for his habit of late sitting (a penchant which he 
shared with Hawkins J. ) (47] and of subjecting to 
an 'interrogatoire' prisoners who gave evidence 
Yýunder the Criminal Law Amendment Act [48]. And red 
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judges were certainly not immune from the vice of 
the pro-prosecution summing up. Indeed so bad was 
Stephen J. 's conduct in this respect in the 
Maybrick case [49] that it was the subject of calls 
in the United States (Mrs. Maybrick was American by, 
birth) for England to copy the practice of the 
State courts there, and confine judges' summings up 
to a charge upon the law only [50]. However, such 
conduct was viewed far less critically than it is 
today. It was the right of a judge, claimed 
Brougham, to tell the jury what his opinion of the 
case was, and this was not a minority view [51]. 
It was, however, on the lower rungs of the 
judicial ladder that the effects of the lack of 
remedy against judicial misconduct were most 
pronounced. In the 1830s and 1840s trials before 
the City judges were a by-word for unfairness. 
They were rushed through so fast that prisoners 
sometimes did not even take in what was happening 
[52]. Often a trial would take no more than three 
or four minutes from start to finish [53]. In one 
year in the 1830s the average length of the trials 
held at successive Old Bailey sessions was 
calculated by one observer to be no more than 8/ 
minutes [52]. Worst conducted of all were the 
evening trials. During the sessions it was the 
custom for the sheriffs to give two lavish dinners 
a day, one at 3 o'clock and a second at 5 o'clock. 
The City judges, who dined at 5 o'clock, were 
notorious for returning to the bench afterwards the 
worse for drink [54]. In 1837 a City Alderman made 
an attempt to put a stop to these dinners [55] but 
they continued (albeit somewhat better conducted in 
later years) until 1877, when the dining room at 
the Sessions House was destroyed by fire [56]. The 
way Old Bailey trials were conducted was a regular 
subject of press comment at this time [57], but the 
. only occasion when such comment seems to have had 
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any effect was when The Times, in December 1838, 
made a particularly strong attack on Mirehouse, the 
Common Serjeant, for the way he had recently tried 
a sixteen year old called Saunders for theft [58] 
(after the article Mirehouse for a time at least 
changed his ways [59]. ) The second half of the 
century happily saw a considerable improvement in 
judicial behaviour so far as the Old Bailey was 
concerned [60]. Not so at county Quarter Sessions 
however. The reputation of such courts remained 
consistently bad throughout the century. Amongst 
the more serious criticisms commonly levelled 
against them were failure by Chairmen to take a 
proper note of the evidence [61], the display of 
open bias against prisoners and pressing them 
unfairly [62]. It was also a commonplace that 
county magistrates were generally more severe than 
red judges in the matter of sentence 
(notwithstanding that they tried far less serious 
offences than did the latter) [63]. 
(iii) Lay judges 
Chairmen of county Sessions also represented 
after 1835 the only class of judge not required to 
be legally qualified. Later in the century a few 
Chairmen were judges or retired judges [64], but at 
the start of the century the nearest most benches 
ever came to having a legally qualified Chairman 
was a man who had read for the bar but never 
practised [65], and the great majority could not 
boast even that slender link with the law. Prior 
to the Municipal Corporations Act, 1835 a similar 
state of affairs had prevailed at many borough 
Quarter Sessions; in 1835 the Royal Commission on 
Municipal Corporations had found that in only 78 
out of the 191 boroughs, where the Quarter Sessions 
was presided over by a Recorder, was there any 
legal requirement that he be legally qualified 
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[66], and that in a number of Quarter Sessions the 
court was constituted in much the same manner as 
county Sessions [67]. However, the 1835 Act 
changed all this by providing that henceforth the 
sole judge at all borough Quarter Sessions should 
be a Recorder appointed by the Crown from the ranks 
of barristers of at least five years standing [68]. 
In 1844 it was made obligatory for the Chairman of 
Middlesex Sessions to be legally qualified [69], 
and when the County of London Sessions was 
established in 1888 the County Council were 
empowered to apply to the Crown to appoint a 
legally qualified chairman for the sessions (which 
they did) [70]. Calls for it-to be made compulsory 
for all Chairmen to be legally qualified were 
repeatedly heard during the century but went 
unheeded [71], and it was not until 1962 [72] that 
this modest reform in fact went through. 
The consequences of having laymen acting as 
judges were inevitably unsatisfactory. They were 
wholly unequipped to act as counsel for 
unrepresented prisoners. What law they knew and 
the technique of summing up they picked up in the 
main from watching other Chairmen. If a difficult 
legal point cropped up the Chairman would often be 
left floundering. It was seldom much use for him 
to look to the Clerk of the Peace for help, for 
Clerks of the Peace, although solicitors, were 
rarely practitioners in or knowledgeable about 
criminal law [73]. At some courts it was the 
practice for the Chairman to canvass the view of a 
member of the bar not engaged in the case [74]. 
At 
others the Chairman would muddle through as best he 
could without giving reasons for his rulings [75]. 
Nor was it uncommon to find the law mis-stated in a 
Chairman's summing up. In 1844 the Law Times 
declared that county Quarter Sessions could not, as 
presently constituted, hope to survive the 
49 
establishment of an appeal system, so bizarre were 
the propositions daily laid down as law by county 
Chairmen [76]. But with no appeal remedy (apart, 
after 1848, from the reservation of a case at the 
court's discretion), there was no higher court to 
expose their errors and mistakes, and the matter 
could be brushed under the carpet. 
The unsatisfactory way in which points of law 
were dealt with at county Sessions stood in sharp 
contrast to the careful way in which they were 
dealt with at Assizes - where a point of difficulty 
cropped up during an Assize trial, the normal 
practice was for the judge immediately to rise and 
seek the view of his brother judge sitting in the 
adjoining nisi prius court [77] (a useful practice 
albeit one that has now died out). 
(iv) Other questionable practices 
As surprising as the use of lay judges, was 
the survival of vestiges of practices which had 
flourished in the days of Scroggs and Jeffreys but 
had been outlawed following the Revolution. One was 
judicial questioning. Judges who mid-century 
condemned police questioning as the impertinent 
assumption of a power which even the bench did not 
possess, had short memories. In the first quarter 
of the century, it had been by no means unknown for 
a prisoner who made an unsworn statement to the 
jury, to be questioned on it by the judge (and 
often in anything but a friendly spirit) [78]. 
Also, occasionally still to be found was a trace of 
the obnoxious seventeenth century practice of 
discharging a jury where the prosecution case broke 
down, in order to give the Crown the chance to plug 
the gap in its case. In 1825 Bayley J. discharged 
a jury where the adult complainant in a rape case 
proved wholly ignorant of the nature and obligation 
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of an oath in order that she might receive 
instruction [79], whilst in 1861 Hill J. discharged 
a jury in a corruption case where the principal 
prosecution witness, after refusing to give 
evidence, was committed for contempt (a course 
which the, Queen's Bench refused to condemn) [80]. 
(b) The Trial Jury 
(i) Eligibility to serve on a trial jury 
'The composition of the jury list seems to be 
conducted on the principle of selecting the 
most uneducated and incompetent persons in 
the county) with the requisite property 
qualification. ' 
10 L. T. (1847-8), 319. 
The hallmark of trial juries in the nineteenth 
century was their wholly unrepresentative 
character. 
The only persons eligible to serve as jurors 
were men aged between 21 and 60 and possessed of 
the requisite property qualification [81]. 
In 1800 the qualification for county Sessions 
and Assize jurors was the ownership of freehold 
land worth £10 a year or leasehold land worth £20 a 
year, the occupation of a house with fifteen or 
more windows, or occupation of a dwelling with an 
annual value for rating of at least £20 (£30 in 
London and Middlesex) (81]. In Wales the 
qualification was (until 1870) [82] 3/5 of that for 
English counties, whilst in the City of London and 
in boroughs the qualification depended upon local 
custom [83]. 
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(ii) Types of trial jury 
Most of those tried on indictment were tried 
by common juries (juries selected from the general 
pool of those eligible for service), but a handful 
were tried by special jury or by a jury de 
medietate linguae. 
A special jury consisted of jurors who were 
either of the rank of esquire or above or bankers 
or merchants [84] (after 1870 those who satisfied a 
special rating qualification were also eligible to 
serve) [85]. Trial by such a jury was available 
upon the application of either prosecutor or 
accused but only in cases of misdemeanour pending 
in the King's Bench or on the Revenue Side of the 
Exchequer [86]. To have a country case tried by a 
special jury it was necessary first to remove the 
indictment into the King's Bench. An order for a 
special jury having been there made the case would 
then normally be tried at nisi prius [87]. 
Special jurors, unlike common jurors whose 
service in criminal cases was unpaid [88], received 
a fee of a guinea for each case they tried; and it 
was not the practice to fine them for non- 
attendance [89]. 
Down to 1852 one of the most distinctive 
features of the special jury was the way in which 
it was selected. It was not, as was a common jury, 
selected by ballot from a panel returned by the 
sheriff. Instead it was 'struck': the sheriff 
would attend upon the proper officer of the court 
with the freeholders' books, and the latter, in the 
presence of the Crown solicitor and the Defendant's 
attorney, would nominate forty eight jurors out of 
the book, upon which the Crown solicitor would 
strike out twelve, and the defendant's attorney 
52 
another twelve. The twenty four remaining would 
then be returned for the trial, and of those of the 
twenty four who attended those jurors whose names 
first appeared on the list would serve [90]. 
The backgrounds of special jurors meant that 
they could usually be relied upon to find for the 
Crown in political cases, and in the first third of 
the century out of the small number of criminal 
cases tried each year by special jury, a 
significant number were political prosecutions 
(some 183 between 1816 and 1834) [91]. 
The jury de medietate linguae owed its origin 
to a statute passed in the time of Edward III [92] 
with the object of attracting wool merchants to 
England. By this statute any alien might, upon 
arraignment, claim the right of being tried by such 
a jury. If he did, a jury would be empanelled 
consisting as to one half of aliens (if so many 
could-be found, and if not, of as many as could be 
found) and as to the rest of native born citizens 
[93]. The alien jurors did not have to be of the 
same nationality as each other or as the accused. 
Nor did they have to possess the property 
qualification required of English jurors. The 
privilege was abolished in 1870 [94] on the ground 
that to continue it was to suggest-that foreigners 
could not receive a fair trial from an English jury 
[95]. Upto its abolition it was anything but 'a 
dead letter. Each year a number of accused would 
claim the right of , 
being so tried [96], although 
counsel would often try to disuade clients from 
doing so on tactical grounds. 
(iii) Juries for the trial of special issues 
Special issues would normally be tried by a 
common jury empanelled in the usual way. To this 
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rule there was an important exception. The issue 
of whether a woman capitally convicted was pregnant' 
(pregnancy entitled her to a respite of execution 
until the child was born) was tried by a jury of 
matrons [97] selected from amongst the women 
present in court [98], who would, with the 
assistance of a surgeon if they required it [99], 
examine the accused and deliver a verdict. By the 
1840s the procedure was widely discredited [100], 
and as a safeguard against a mistaken verdict the 
Home Office would usually order a medical 
examination of any woman found not pregnant [101]. 
1848 saw the abandonment of the policy of granting 
only a temporary respite to convicts found 
pregnant. Henceforth the reprieve in such cases 
would be permanent [102].. During the century a 
number of attempts were made to abolish the jury of 
matrons but in fact it survived until 1931 [103]. 
(iv) Jury packing 
In Ireland jury packing (achieved by ruthless 
use by the Crown of its stand-by powers to get 
Catholics off juries) was a source of grievance 
throughout the century [104]. 
In the first quarter of the century there were 
also loud complaints about packed English juries. 
These centred around the special juries used to try 
Crown cases in the King's Bench and the Exchequer. 
The same men, it was said, sat upon such juries 
term after term. They were chosen, it was claimed, 
because they could be relied upon to find for the 
Crown, and if they ever failed to do so they were 
never called to serve again. This state of 
affairs, it was said, arose because of the way the 
forty eight jurors to be struck were chosen; the 
Crown, so the allegation went, had an unofficial 
list of jurors regarded as 'sure men', and if a 
54 
name was drawn by the officer of the court which 
was not on that list, the Crown solicitor' would 
ensure that he was passed over by urging some 
objection, such as that he would not attend if 
summoned, or that he was dead; if this failed, 
jurors objected to would be got rid of by the Crown 
solicitor naming them amongst the twelve he desired 
to have struck; in this way a body of jurors 
amenable to the Crown could be and was obtained 
[105]. 
Allegations of packing had been made by Horne 
Tooke at his trial in 1794 [106], and thereafter 
the subject would not go away. In 1808 it was 
raised by one of the sheriffs with the Chief Baron 
[107]. The following year it was the subject of a 
petition to and debate in the Commons [108]. In 
1818 a Report from a Special Committee set up'by 
the City appeared to lend weight to the complaint 
[109]. In 1821 Bentham joined in with a 
devastating attack, published under the title 
'Elements of the Art of Packing' [105]. Faced with 
mounting public unease, Peel decided to act, and by 
the Juries Act, 1825 it was provided that in London 
and Middlesex the forty eight jurors from whom a 
special jury was to be struck should henceforth be 
selected by ballot [110]. This put an end to 
complaints of packing. In 1852 the system was 
further reformed, with the Common Law Procedure Act 
providing that special juries at Assizes should no 
longer be struck, but that instead the sheriff 
should be directed to return a specified number of 
special jurors, not exceeding forty eight, from 
which the jury should then be selected by ballot 
[111']. In 1870 this procedure was applied to 
London and Middlesex as well [112]. Henceforth a 
struck jury could only be had by special order of 
the trial judge [113]". 
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Packing of common juries does not appear to 
have been a problem in England at any stage during, 
the century. The potential for abuse was, however,, 
certainly. there, for the law left it entirely to_ 
the discretion of the sheriff how the panel was- 
selected [114] (with the only safeguard for the 
accused being his right to challenge the array, 
upon which challenge he bore the burden of proof). 
- 
In 1881 a Select Committee [115] had commended the 
Irish system of mechanical selection of panels but 
the idea was never taken up here. 
(v) The poor quality of common juries 
To critics the main shortcoming of common 
juries was their poor quality [116]. Educated men, 
it was claimed, were rarely to be found on them. 
Instead, they consisted in the main of small 
farmers and shopkeepers, often wholly unfitted by 
either education or intelligence to try complicated 
issues. That the educated and well to do rarely 
served on common juries was due to several factors. 
First, the vast majority of those exempt from jury 
service came from these classes [117]. Second, it 
was comparatively easy for a man who was not exempt 
to buy his way out of jury service. Until the 1825 
Act transferred the duty to parish overseers, the 
task of compiling jury lists fell to the parish 
constable who 'in consideration of some trifling 
gratuity often omitted the names of persons best 
qualified to serve' [118]. After the Act the same 
result could be achieved by an approach to one of 
the poorly paid sheriff's officers by whom the work 
of compiling jury panels was in practice done 
[119]. Yet another factor was the law's insistence 
on making land the basis of the qualification for 
jury service, thereby. placing outside the net those 
whose wealth consisted of personal property [120]. 
Even more important was a practice amongst 
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sheriff's officers (going back, it would seem, to 
the 1820s) [121] of not including special jurors on 
common jury panels. This practice, for which there 
was no warrant in the 1825 Act, was repeatedly 
condemned by both judges and Royal Commissions 
[122] but it continued largely unabated. The 1870 
Act went so far as to declare that special jurors 
were not to be exempt from serving on common juries 
[123], but even this made little difference. In 
1878 Serjeant Cox, the Second Judge at the 
Middlesex Sessions, wrote to The Times [124], 
saying that he doubted whether any judge or counsel 
had ever seen a special juror on a common jury at 
those Sessions. By 1913 the practice still had not 
been wholly eliminated [125], despite repeated 
judicial fulminations [126]. 
At the Committee Stage of the Juries Bill, 
1873 [127] the Attorney General, arguing that the 
quality of juries would thereby be improved, 
introduced an amendment proposing that all common 
juries should henceforth consist of four special 
and eight common jurors. The amendment was 
strongly attacked as an attempt to introduce caste 
justice [128] and was in the end withdrawn. Nor 
did a clause in the 1873 and 1874 Bills proposing 
that 'a trial judge should have power to direct 
trial by special jury in felony fare any better 
[129]. 
(vi) Working class jurors 
The last quarter of the century saw 
increasingly vociferous demands, particularly from 
the T. U. C. (the matter was the subject of 
resolutions at every Annual Congress between 1873 
and '1883) [130], that working men be allowed to 
serve on juries. 
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By the 1870s trickles of artisan jurors had 
already begun to appear at London and borough 
Sessions [131]. In his letter to The Times [132-- 
Serjeant Cox described his experiences of this new 
breed of juror: most asked to be excused on the 
ground of financial hardship. 
The T. U. C. itself accepted that its reform 
proposal would never work unless working men 
received compensation for the financial loss which 
jury service involved, and demanded that they be so 
compensated. This led to jibes in The Times [133] 
and elsewhere that working men wished to share in 
the privileges but not the burdens of jury service. 
Although the calls to widen the base of jury 
service fell largely on deaf ears, the demand that 
jurors be paid did not. As long ago as 1821 
Bentham [134] had pointed to the anomaly of paying 
those jurors who were best able to afford to serve, 
namely special jurors, a guinea per case, -whilst 
the humble common juror received only 8d a day in 
civil cases and nothing at all when sitting on a 
criminal jury. Bills providing for the payment of 
common jurors were introduced in 1863 [135] and 
1865 [136]. In 1870 the battle appeared won when 
the Juries Act passed with a section which provided 
for common jurors to be paid 10/- a day out of 
civil fees paid by civil litigants [137]. 
Unhappily, the provision proved unworkable. In 
many courts there was simply no money with which to 
pay the common jurors, and early in 1871 the 
Government had to repeal the section [138]. 
Between 1874 and 1898 no less than thirteen Bills 
[139] on the subject were presented to Parliament, 
but none reached the statute book, and it was not 
until 1949 [140] that this blot on the law was 
removed. 
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(vii) Jury challenge as a protection against 
jury bias 
Given the make up of common juries, it was 
inevitable that there should be complaints of class 
bias. And, there were. In 1913 the Departmental 
Committee on Jury Law reported that there was a 
belief that jurors discriminated against trade 
unionists and those holding different political 
views from their own [141], and the same complaint 
had been made from time to time by the T. U. C. 
[142]. 
The only means the accused had of countering 
jury bias was through exercise of his right of 
challenge. His most valuable right in this regard 
was that of peremptory challenge but the extent of 
this varied according to the nature of the offence 
being tried. In treason he had up to thirty five 
such challenges [143). In felony up to twenty 
[143] (in Ireland the right was confined to capital 
felony) [144). In misdemeanour he had, in strict 
law, no right of peremptory challenge, but, in 
practice, he was often allowed to challenge without 
assigning cause until he had exhausted the jury 
panel [145]. In addition to . the right of 
peremptory challenge an accused had, whatever the 
charge, the right to challenge individual jurors 
for bias or other sufficient cause. 
For the effective exercise of his right of 
challenge the accused needed to know the background 
of prospective jurors. But this information the 
law was loath to grant. In treason he had by 
statute [146] the right to have a copy of the jury 
panel delivered to him ten days before trial, a 
document which, after 1825 at least, would state 
the full name, address, occupation and 
qualification of every juror on the panel [147]. 
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In felony and misdemeanour, however, there was no 
right to see the panel. In 1844 the Law Magazine 
[148] argued that felony should be placed on the 
same footing in this respect as treason, but the 
judges were wholly against such a reform, refusing 
to allow the prisoner a copy of the panel even in 
treason-felony. In Dowling and Lacey [149] in 1848 
counsel tried a new tack. They claimed the right 
to examine jurors on the voire dire before they 
were sworn, with a view to discovering whether 
grounds for challenge existed. In making such 
application they were doubtless seeking to copy 
American practice, where the right to conduct such 
examination had been upheld by the courts as a 
necessary incident of the right to trial by an 
impartial jury, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution (1791) [150]. 
The judges, however, would have no truck with such 
a procedure. English law permitted jurors to be 
examined only after the ground of challenge had 
been stated [151], and even then only to a limited 
extent. For the rest of the century judicial 
practice on this question never shifted. The 
largest concession counsel was ever able to wring 
from a court was to be allowed to put a question to 
the jury panel as to whether any of them had any 
connection with, for example, the body which was 
financing the prosecution [152]. 
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CHAPTER 5 
REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL 
'Trials would take too long if men of law were 
allowed. ' 
Staunford, Pleas of the Crown, f. 151. 
A great number of cases were' disposed of ... with the usual rapidity exercised by the ... Common Serjeant and several prisoners were placed at the 
bar to be tried, convicted, and sentenced in the 
same breath with the reading of the charge against 
them. ' 
9 L. T. (1847), p. 319. 
(a) The right to counsel 
In 1800 a prisoner's right to counsel varied 
according to the nature. of the offence charged. 
Those indicted for treason had by statute the right 
to 'full defence by counsel' [1]. Misdemeanants had 
a like right by common law [2]. In felony the 
position was more complicated. In strict law the 
accused had no right to counsel (3], but the 
prohibition had in practice been much eroded. It 
had since as early as the fifteenth century been 
customary in capital cases to allow prisoners to 
have counsel to argue law [4], and in the course of 
the. eighteenth century a further exception had been 
added - judges had adopted the practice in felony 
cases of allowing the prisoner to have counsel to 
examine and cross-examine witnesses on his behalf 
[5]. This left felony prisoners subject to only one 
(albeit important) handicap: - they could not'have 
counsel to address the jury on their behalf [6]. 
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(b) The Prisoners' Counsel Act, 1836 
Between 1821 and 1836 repeated attempts were 
made to remove this handicap and to give those 
charged with felony the right to make full defence 
by counsel [7]. 
At first there was little enthusiasm for 
reform. Of five Bills introduced between 1821 and 
1828 only one got beyond the second reading stage. 
Twice (in 1824 and 1826) leave to bring in a Bill 
was refused outright, and by a large majority [8]. 
In the 1830s, however, the tide began to turn. 
1834 saw a Prisoners' Counsel Bill for the first 
time pass all its stages in the Commons, and the 
Bill of the following year did even better, passing 
all its stages in the Commons, and being referred 
by the Lords to a Select Committee. In February, 
1836 the legislative round began again for what was 
to be the last time. The 1836 Bill, which was 
identical to that of the previous year, was 
referred by the Commons to a Select Committee. The 
Select Committee reported in favour and it was 
passed by a substantial majority. In the meanwhile, 
the Home Secretary had asked, the Criminal Law 
Commissioners to report on the question. Their 
Report also was strongly in favour of the principle 
of the Bill [9]. It duly passed the Lords but with 
amendments (the most important being that striking 
out clause 2 which gave the prisoner's counsel the 
right to the last word). The Commons with 
reluctance accepted the amendments and in August 
the Bill received the royal assent [10]. 
Throughout the Parliamentary debate the stance 
taken by the supporters of the Bill was that the 
case for reform was unanswerable. The state of 
the law was they argued anomalous: a man was 
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allowed counsel to defend him for a twopenny 
trespass, but denied the like privilege where his 
life was at stake [11]. That was illogical. It 
was also unjust, for it denied the prisoner on 
trial for his life counsel to speak for him, 
however` unequal he might be to the task of 
addressing the jury himself. It was no answer to 
say (as Hawkins had in his Pleas of the Crown) that 
an innocent man needed no counsel to make a simple 
honest defence. The vast majority of prisoners 
were uneducated and incapable of making a speech 
explaining the facts of the case intelligibly, be 
they innocent or guilty. Indeed, even an educated 
man might find the task daunting (12]. And so 
unbending was the law that the rule was enforced 
against children and the infirm: 
'Your counsel cannot speak for you, you must 
speak for yourself ... this is the reply given to a poor girl of 15 - to a foreigner - to the 
feeble - to the blind - to the old. ' [13] 
The result was that men who, with counsel to speak 
for them would be acquitted, were, for want of 
counsel, convicted [14]. England and Ireland were 
alone among the countries of Europe in denying this 
right to prisoners [15]. They were also out to 
step with the practice in the United States and in 
the colonies [15]. 
The reformers' arguments left their opponents 
unmoved. They could see no need for the Bill. It 
was not true that innocent prisoners had difficulty 
in explaining themselves to juries (16], and in any 
case the the judge acted as, counsel for 
unrepresented prisoners [17]. The Bill was simply 
not wanted. The judges and the bar were hostile to 
it [18] nor was there any. popular demand for change 
(19]. Further if it became law serious 
-disadvantages would follow: - the length and 
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therefore the cost of criminal trials would be 
vastly increased [20]; counsel would appeal to the 
passions and emotions of juries and lead them 
astray by ingenious and unmeritorious arguments. 
[21]; the Bill would also lead to judges and. 
prosecuting counsel adopting a less temperate 
attitude towards prisoners (in his summing up the. 
judge would have to deal with the arguments raised. 
by defence counsel, and expose the fallacies, 
therein, whilst prosecuting counsel would tend to 
conduct cases with more heat if the defence counsel 
had a speech) [22]. 
The reformers answered these objections point 
by point. To say that the judge was the prisoner's 
counsel was misleading [23]. The judge was 
incapable of defending the prisoner satisfactorily, 
for he had no access to him and so could not 
possibly know the details of his defence [24]. 
Also it was his duty to hold the balance between 
the parties not to act as advocate for one side 
[25]. All the saying meant was that it was the duty 
of the judge to watch the interests of the 
prisoner, and to see that no point of law which 
told in his favour was overlooked [26]. That the 
legal profession and the judges were against the 
Bill proved little. Both were notorious for their 
conservatism [27]. As for the lack of public 
demand for the Bill, this was no yardstick of 
merit. There had been no public demand for the Act 
of 1695 which granted prisoners the right to 
counsel in treason, yet all now acknowledged the 
value of that reform [28]. The argument about 
expense and delay was unworthy. As Romilly had put 
it: 
'too much time could not be consumed when the 
; object was to 
discover truth and administer 
justice' [29]. 
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In any event it was false. The vast majority of 
prisoners went undefended through want of means, 
and that situation the Bill would not alter one 
iota [30]. Rather than leading to wrongful 
acquittals, the Bill would be likely to result in 
more convictions, for juries would no longer acquit 
out of sympathy excited by the prisoner's inability 
to defend himself [31]. As for the claim that 
judicial impartiality and prosecutorial fairness 
would be compromised, experience in trials for 
treason and misdemeanour did not bear out the 
claim, nor did the experience of the courts of the 
United States and the colonies [32]. 
(c) Poor Prisoners 
To the majority of prisoners the Act was 
utterly irrelevant. Whatever their legal right, 
in practice they were denied counsel by their 
poverty. In 1800 less than one prisoner in four 
tried at the Old Bailey had counsel, and by the end 
of the century, although things had improved, 
defended prisoners were still in the minority [33]. 
Nor was the position any better in the country 
[34]. Indeed at county. Quarter. Sessions it was 
markedly worse. 
That public opinion was prepared to tolerate 
prisoners being tried for their lives undefended 
appears to have been due to several factors. 
First, criminal procedure was viewed as essentially 
liberal [35]. Cottu and other foreign observers 
had commented upon how favourable to the accused 
was_English law, and was this not a just verdict? 
The judge would see that the prisoner had the 
benefit of any legal point which was in his favour, 
and he could be, convicted only if a jury of twelve 
were unanimously of the view that his guilt had 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt [36]. Given 
65 
these safeguards the risk of an undefended prisoner' 
being wrongfully convicted was surely minimal. -_ 
Second, the employment of counsel in criminal' 
trials was still a comparatively recent phenomenon, ` 
and it was still the exception rather than the rule`. 
to find counsel instructed for the prosecution even 
in serious cases [37], and if the prosecution had 
no counsel, how could it be said that the accused l, 
was at a disadvantage? 
During the campaign for the Prisoners' Counsel 
Act, the question of legal representation of poor 
prisoners was, in fact raised. A clause entitling 
poor prisoners to have counsel assigned to them was 
included in each of the 1833-36 Bills (counsel so 
assigned were to act without fee). Before the 
Lords' Select Committee on the 1835 Bill members of 
the bar spoke out against the clause, claiming that 
it would cause inconvenience and loss to the 
profession [38], and, although it appeared in the 
1836 Bill, it was dropped before the Bill reached 
the Lords. 
But the subject, once raised, would not go 
away. In 1843 Serjeant Cox (39] treated the 
launching of the Law Times as an opportunity to 
revive the topic. Counsel should, he argued, be 
assigned to poor prisoners from the pool of 
unemployed barristers who attended criminal courts. 
They ought to be paid out of the same fund as 
counsel briefed by the prosecutor, but, if need be, 
they would almost certainly work without fee [40]. 
The correspondence to which his article gave rise, 
revealed that in 1835 one of the sheriffs had out 
of his own pocket, funded a free representation 
scheme for Newgate prisoners, only to see it break 
down after one session (despite encouraging 
results), due to opposition from the lawyers (see 
p. 88. below). 
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In 1856 the call for the state to provide 
legal aid was repeated by Charles Greaves in a 
Report to the Lord Chancellor [41] on Criminal 
Procedure. An attorney and counsel paid for out 
of public funds should, he argued, be assigned to 
any poor prisoner found by the visiting magistrate 
of a gaol to have reasonable grounds of defence. 
Calls for state funded criminal legal aid were 
doomed to go unanswered [42]. A scheme utilising 
the free services of the unemployed bar was, 
however, less easily dismissed. Not only would it 
answer (however imperfectly) the needs of poor 
prisoners, but it would also provide young men 
seeking to break into the profession with much 
needed experience and an opportunity to show their 
worth. Moreover, it was all perfectly 
practicable. In Scotland a free representation 
scheme for poor prisoners had been operated 
successfully by the profession since the sixteenth 
century [43]. 
Periodically, during the second half of the 
century variants on Cox's scheme were proposed. In 
1860 one of the City judges [44] announced that he 
would be glad to see the younger members of the bar 
defend all cases of poor prisoners which were 
undefended, and said that he, would provide all 
facilities in his power for the purpose. In 1882 
it was suggested, in a letter to The Times [45], 
that barristers, who were willing to defend 
prisoners for a nominal fee (say 2/6d. to be paid 
out of the rates), write their names on a special 
list to be lodged with the gaoler or an officer of 
the court. In 1899 it was suggested in the Irish 
. Law 
Times (46] that defence briefs should be 
allotted to counsel, who were willing to undertake 
, such work without 
fee, on a soup basis. Nothing 
. came of any of 
these proposals. _ 
All foundered on 
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the rule of professional etiquette which prohibited 
a barrister from appearing in court without a brief- 
marked with the minimum fee of one guinea [47]. 
By the 1890s the subject was one which was, 
coming to be raised with increasing frequency in 
debates upon the Criminal Evidence Bills which the 
Government was seeking to get through Parliament, 
but the breakthrough did not come until the Dorset 
Sessions scheme of 1902 (48], which in turn led to, 
the Poor Prisoners' Defence Act of 1903. 
Prior to 1903, assignment of counsel and 
defence in forma pauperis were the only provision 
which the law made for the needs of poor prisoner,, 
and they benefited but a handful. 
(i) Assigning counsel 
Assignment was a practice developed by the 
judges as a means of ensuring that prisoners facing 
grave charges did not go undefended for want of 
means. The judge would ask one of the counsel 
present in court to undertake the prisoner's 
defence without fee, and the request was never in 
practice refused. 
It was suggested in a letter published in The 
Times in 1903 [49] that the practice dated from the 
time of the 1836 Act. The suggestion has the 
attraction of neatness but is certainly wrong. 
During the debates on the Prisoners' Counsel Bill 
of 1834, one of the arguments used against the 
assignment of counsel clause which it contained, 
was that the judges already had power to assign 
counsel, and counsel never refused to act [50]. 
Also one can find in The Times reports of criminal 
trials instances of counsel being assigned to poor 
prisoners in felony as early as the 1820s. 
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Assignment of counsel to argue a point of law 
on behalf of a poor prisoner can be traced back to 
at least the seventeenth century. The practice of 
assigning counsel to conduct his defence appeared 
first in treason. The Treason Act, 1695 required' 
the court'to assign to the accused, immediately on 
his request, such counsel (not exceeding two) as he 
should desire, but was silent as to what was to 
happen if he was too poor to fee them. By the late 
eighteenth century, if not earlier, the gap had 
been supplied by a rule of bar etiquette, requiring 
counsel assigned to a poor prisoner to act without 
fee. Erskine spoke of the rule in 1800 when 
accepting assignment as counsel for the penniless 
lunatic Hadfield, charged with shooting at the King 
[51]. 
By around 1820 the practice in treason had 
begun to spread to felony. The Times for 1818 
reports a judge at Lancaster Assizes asking counsel 
to undertake the defence of two brothers called 
Fitzpatrick [52], who were charged with robbery and 
too poor to be able to afford counsel. No further 
such cases appear in The Times reports of trials 
until 1825 when two are reported (the first a trial 
of two brothers called Daw [53] at Horsham Assizes 
for murder, the second a trial for murder at 
Monmouth where the accused was a pauper who had no 
English) [54]. There is reason, however, to think 
that the practice was at this ' date still new, for 
at the Old Bailey in April of that year, a horse 
thief called Probert [55], who applied to the court 
to assign him counsel was told by the Lord Chief 
Justice that the court had no power to assign 
counsel to undertake his defence (it could only 
assign counsel to argue 'law (in the event the day 
was-'-saved by one of the `counsel. in court 
volunteering his services). Nor does Probert's 
-case stand alone. In 1823 at Monmouth a prisoner 
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called Bedding [56], charged with capital felony, 
who requested assistance on the ground that he was 
too poor to employ counsel, was merely told by Park 
J. that he would see justice was done to him. A 
further, and in some ways even stronger indication, 
of the novelty of such practice, is to be found in 
cases such as Nuttall (1817) [57] where poor 
prisoners are found asking not for counsel to be 
assigned, but for the judge to act as their 
counsel. Certainly, assignment in felony appears 
to, have been unknown when Chitty published his 
F 
treatise on Criminal Law in 1816, for he makes no 
mention of it, despite discussing in detail both 
assignment of counsel in treason (for which he 
actually gives a precedent of an assignment) and 
defence in forma pauperis [58]. 
So far as one can judge from trial reports, 
assignment of counsel to poor prisoners in felony 
cases was, and remained, a rare occurrence during 
the late 1820s and 1830s, but became increasingly 
common during the 1840s and 1850s [59]. 
From the start, the power to assign seems 
rarely to have been exercised save in murder cases, 
and there was certainly not at any time during the 
first half of the century anything approaching a 
policy of assigning in all capital cases. (60]. 
Given the number of capital offences on the statute 
book, and given also that the majority of capital 
convictions for offences other than murder did not 
result in executions [61], this is not so 
surprising. But even in murder cases (where 
execution would , normally 
follow conviction) 
practice was far from uniform. During the period 
1820 to 1850, year in year out, prisoners were 
tried for murder (and convicted and, in some cases, 
executed) without counsel to defend them [59]. 
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Occasionally, the prisoner's lack of 
representation in such cases was out of choice 
[62], but more usually it was because he was poor 
and the court-had not seen fit to assign him 
counsel. 'In some cases, the reason why no -counsel 
was assigned was almost certainly that the judge, 
having read the depositions, considered the case 
weak, and thought counsel unnecessary. Where the 
accused was obviously insane, judges, rather than 
assign counsel, would simply call the surgeon of 
the gaol to prove the fact [63]. In infanticide- 
cases (where due to the primitive state of medical 
science it was notoriously difficult to prove a 
live birth), often the judge would, without 
troubling to appoint counsel, himself demolish the 
prosecution case by his- cross-examination of the 
medical witnesses [64] (this judicial technique was 
indeed responsible in no small measure, for the 
very high acquittal rate in this class of case). On 
the other hand, if the case was complex this might 
incline the judge to assign. In Johnson [65], -a 
case of murder tried in 1859 the judge assigned 
counsel to the prisoner well into the prosecution 
case, - the reason for this belated assignment 
apparently being that the case had turned out to 
involve more difficulty than had initially, been 
thought. With some judges failure by a prisoner to 
ask that counsel be assigned-would result in his 
going undefended. During an -Old Bailey trial in 
1844 [66] Abinger L. C. B. excused his failure to 
assign on the ground that the accused had not 
requested counsel. In Geering [67] in 1849, counsel 
was' not assigned until application was made by the 
prisoner's daughter, by which time one; of the 
prosecution witnesses was already, in the, middle of 
his evidence, and this despite the fact that the 
case (being one of murder by poisoning in which-the 
prosecution were -seeking- to get in evidence of 
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other deaths from poison) was one which cried out 
for an assignment. In an Irish case [68] from the 
same period, it was actually laid down that the, 
court would not assign counsel of its own motion. 
In other cases the decisive factor appears to have 
been that the judge did'not intend to leave the 
prisoner for execution if convicted (69]. And 
then again some judges seem to have been more 
reluctant than others to assign. One such was 
Martin B. In each of the years 1857,1858,1859, 
1861 and 1862, he is to be found presiding over a, 
murder trial with the prisoner undefended. In two, 
of the cases, it is possible to justify the failure, 
to assign, for in one a pro-defence summing up 
secured an acquittal [70], and in the other [71] it 
looks as though it was his intention from thel 
beginning to spare the prisoner in the event of 
conviction. But it is difficult to offer any 
reason, other than dislike of the practice, for his 
not securing representation for Jones [72], a young 
woman indicted at Kingston Assizes in 1859 for the 
murder of her child, and convicted after a trial in 
which she had been in a fainting state throughout,, 
or for his refusal at Stafford Assizes in 1861 of 
an application by another Jones [73] (the only one 
of five prisoners jointly indicted for murder who 
was undefended) to have counsel assigned to him. 
The fifth case [74] appears to have been one in 
which he over-estimated his power to get the jury 
to do as he wished, a pro-defence summing up 
failing to procure the acquittal of the prisoner 
for the murder of her child. 
By-1860, assignment in murder cases had become 
an almost routine practice, with judges often 
taking the initiative in the matter. But the 
occasional case in which an accused stood trial 
`undefended could still be found. Nine such cases 
-appear in The Times trial reports for 1860-69, and 
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six for the period 1870-79 [75]. The last case in 
those reports of an undefended prisoner convicted 
of murder is Eatwell in May, 1864 whilst the last 
case of a prisoner tried for murder undefended is 
Sherwood in May, 1879 (where the jury convicted of 
manslaughter only). After 1880 one hears no more of 
such cases, it by then being invariable practice to 
assign in murder. However, it was still extremely 
rare [76] to find counsel assigned in any other 
class of case. Factors such as youth, mental 
disability, or the severity of the punishment which 
would follow conviction rarely influenced judges to 
assign counsel where the charge was not capital 
[77]. Indeed as late as 1910 [78], the Court of 
Criminal Appeal found it necessary to say that in- 
rape cases 'the judge should endeavour to secure' 
the representation of the prisoner by counsel'. 
In 1903 Grantham J. [79] sought to justify to 
the Select Committee on the Poor Prisoners' Defence 
Bill, the illiberality of the judges in the 
assignment of counsel: - 
'I do not very often do it except in murder 
cases. I always do it then. I do not do it 
in any other cases because I defend the 
prisoners myself if they are not defended. I 
could in murder cases but I think it better 
not. My difficulty is to get a man that I 
think can do it properly and that I think I 
ought to ask, because at the present time he 
gets no fee for it ... if you go to a good man 
and ask him to do that you may be depriving 
him of an opportunity of earning a fee in 
another case or. in another court'. 
'BAs a means of providing representation for the 
poor in capital cases, assignment was far 
, 
from 
ideal. The counsel assigned would have no brief to 
work from. Having in most cases been brought in 
only when the case was about to start, and, in some 
cases, at an even later stage (instances are by no 
means uncommon of a prisoner requesting, or the 
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judge making, an assignment only after the 
prosecution opening, or even during the course of 
the evidence) [80], he had generally to try and' 
pick the case up as he went along. He would 
normally be allowed access to the depositions, and"' 
the court. might also grant him a few moments to 
confer with his client, but normally he got little, - 
more indulgence than that. And, if during the'", 
course of the case enquiries fell to be made, he'- 
had no attorney to assist him. 
Nor was there any guarantee that the counsel- 
assigned would be proficient. The selection was 
made from amongst those in court not already',, 
engaged on the case. Sometimes the judge would; 
call on the senior counsel in court [81]. 
Sometimes one of the barristers present would 
volunteer his services [82]. Occasionally the, 
accused would be invited to choose from the 
barristers in court [83]. But, however the choice 
was made, the risk was that the prisoner would end 
up with a counsel lacking the experience and 
ability necessary for an effective defence [84]. '' , 
In England, one occasionally finds assigned 
counsel bemoaning in jury speeches the lack of an 
attorney to assist them (85]. In Ireland, however, 
matters went further than mere grumbling. In a 
number of cases around mid-century, the court's 
power to assign counsel to a prisoner without also 
assigning an attorney was openly questioned. In 
January 1848, on the trial of the Codys [86] for 
murder, counsel assigned by the court expressed 
doubt as to the propriety to taking an assignment 
without an attorney, but, under pressure from the 
Lord Chief Justice of Ireland with reluctance 
agreed to do so. In Fogarty [87], tried at Down 
Assizes in 1850, counsel, * requested by Pigott C. B. 
to undertake the defence of a prisoner charged with 
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murder, declined to do so unless an' attorney was 
assigned. He was supported in his stance by one of 
the leaders present, who told the judge that there 
was a feeling among the bar that no counsel could 
with propriety undertake the defence of a prisoner 
without receiving instructions from an attorney. He 
further asserted that where counsel was assigned 
the Crown should pay him a fee, as upto a very` 
recent period had been the rule. Pigott retorted 
that it was his opinion that a judge might properly 
call on a barrister 'to give his honorary services 
to a prisoner who was unable to employ one', and 
cited a case tried recently at Clonmel, where 
counsel had at the request of the judge defended a 
prisoner without the assistance of an attorney. He 
conceded, however, that he could not compel counsel 
to act. The impasse was eventually broken when a 
solicitor present agreed to act. The case was 
deemed worthy of reporting in an English series of 
law reports. There is reason to think that in 
Ireland the reluctance to accept an assignment 
without an attorney continued after 1850. 
Certainly, as late as 1873, the Irish Law Times 
[88] was receiving letters from correspondents 
denying the power of the court to assign counsel 
without an attorney, and criticising members of the 
bar who accepted such assignments. In England, 
however, the practice seems always to have been and 
continued to be to assign without an attorney [89]. 
(ii) Defence in Forma Pauperis 
The other method whereby poor prisoners could 
in theory secure legal representation was by 
applying to defend in forma pauperis. 
Under the statute 11 Hen. VII, c. 12 paupers 
(by the nineteenth century the definition of a 
pauper was a person who was not worth £5 in the 
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world) [90] were granted the right to sue and 
defend causes with the assistance of counsel and 
attornies assigned by the court (who were to act 
without fee) and were exempted from the payment of' 
all court fees. 
In the course of the eighteenth century, 
defendants had occasionally been allowed to defend 
in forma pauperis in, criminal proceedings in the 
Ring's Bench [91], on the analogy of the 11 Hen. 
VII, c. 12. It is not -clear, however, from the 
reports of such cases whether the judges regarded 
the procedure as available in criminal cases 
generally or only in cases pending in the King's 
Bench. 
In 1818 a prisoner called Stokes [92] 
convicted of murder at York Assizes, made 
application in the King's Bench to sue out a writ 
of error in forma pauperis. Parke B., before whom 
the application came, said that he was not aware of 
any precedent for such a proceeding, but was not 
prepared to say it could not be done. He suggested 
that a simpler course would be to get the trial 
judge to reserve the case. This was in the end 
done, and no final ruling on the application was 
ever given. 
In Page in 1831 (93] and Nicholson in 1840 
[94] one finds defendants being granted leave to 
defend in forma pauperis. Predictably, both were 
prosecutions in the King's Bench, the first for 
perjury, the second for libel. 
After this one hears little of in forma 
pauperis in criminal cases, but it continued until 
the end of the century to be treated by text 
writers [95] as a means whereby poor prisoners 
could obtain free legal representation. 
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Whatever its theoretical availability, it 
appears in practice, to have been a dead letter. 
How little used it was is nowhere better 
demonstrated than by a leading article which 
appeared in the Solicitors' Journal in 1856 [96], 
suggesting that the procedure be extended to 
criminal cases. The problem, as much as anything, 
may have been prisoners' ignorance of the right. 
Whilst old hands would know of the court's power to 
assign counsel, there must have been few either 
amongst the criminal population or amongst the 
hangers-on around jails and police offices, who had 
heard of this King's Bench procedure with its latin 
name and its requirement for a supporting 
affidavit. 
(iii) The Dock Brief and the I. P. system. 
The bar, had it chosen to do so, could have 
solved the problem of the undefended prisoner, by 
sanctioning a free representation scheme of the 
type urged on it repeatedly during the century. In 
fact (apart from its co-operation in the assignment 
system) the only concession it made to the plight 
of the poor prisoner, was to permit counsel, in 
such cases, to accept briefs direct from the 
prisoner, his friends or family. 
The rule of etiquette that a barrister might 
not accept instructions save through an attorney 
was, at the start of the nineteenth century 
relatively new [97], and was not regarded as 
applying to all species of work [98]. In 
particular, it was generally believed not to apply 
to non-contentious work, and as late as 1888 (99) 
finds the Attorney-General, in a letter to The 
Times, repeating an opinion, given by his 
;. predecessor 
in office in 1872, that it-was not a 
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breach of etiquette for counsel to deal with the 
client direct in non-contentious matters. 
So far as the criminal courts were concerned, ` 
it was as late as the 1840s, common place, at least- 
in London, for barristers to accept briefs for both` 
prosecution and defence from the client direct. 
This came out into the open in 1844 when two Old' 
Bailey barristers, who had acted for a prosecutor' 
without an attorney, found themselves severely 
censured both by the court and the press [100]. 
The pair sought to defend themselves against the 
criticism by asserting that it had long been the 
practice, both at the Central Criminal Court and 
the Middlesex Sessions, for counsel to accept 
briefs for both prosecution and defence without the 
intervention of an attorney [101], and indeed, on 
September 24, a meeting of the Central Criminal 
Court Bar Mess passed a resolution asserting the 
existence of a custom to that effect [102]. 
Significantly, neither the resolution nor the 
assertions of the two barristers at the centre of 
the row were contradicted by any senior member of 
the bar [103]. 
In the debate which followed, the legal 
periodicals were firm in their condemnation of 
counsel, who conducted prosecutions without an 
attorney [104], but they found the matter of 
defence briefs less easy. The Law Times, in a 
leader on October 19, was prepared to accept that 
acting for a prisoner without an attorney was 
permissible, provided that the brief was handed to 
counsel by prisoner over the bar [105]. 
In the following month, in a case at the Old 
Bailey where it turned out that counsel had been 
retained for a prisoner called Ball [106] not by an 
attorney but by the Governor of Newgate, Rolfe B. 
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refused to condemn the proceeding, despite 
prosecuting counsel's assertion that the more 
proper course was for the prisoner to brief counsel 
from the dock. 
In 1850 the practice of counsel acting for 
prisoners without an attorney received apparent 
judicial approval in Doe d. Bennett v. Heg [107], 
with Lord Chief Justice Campbell's observation that 
'in criminal cases it* is conceded that the 
practice of a barrister not to plead unless 
instructed by an attorney does not prevail 
It is arguable that Lord. Campbell was there merely 
referring to the practice of judges' assigning 
counsel to poor prisoners, and, indeed the passage 
concludes with a reference to the practice. 
However, that is not how his words were interpreted 
by the Law Times, which, in a leader discussing the 
decision, spoke of it being 
'common practice on some circuits, as on that 
of North Wales for instance, for a prisoner 
when arraigned, to hand a fee to counsel who 
was bound to defend him without the 
requirement of a brief and an attorney' [108]. 
The justification, which the Law Times offered for 
the practice was one which a correspondent had 
offered nearly six years earlier, necessity: - 
' It would be manifestly a hardship on a poor 
prisoner to be deprived of the protection of 
defence by counsel because he is-unable to 
raise a double fee and, in truth, defences can 
usually be conducted almost as well without a 
brief as with one' [109]. 
_In, 
fact, the practice of accepting. briefs from 
prisoners direct was certainly, so far as London 
was concerned, one of long standing. In 1836-a 
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Report on the state of Newgate prison disclosed 
that two wardsmen (both serving convicts) were 
permitted to draw briefs for fellow prisoners for a 
fee of 5/- per brief, which they were allowed to 
retain [110]. Such briefs when drawn would then be 
placed in'the hands of counsel either before trial 
by the prisoner's family or friends or by the 
prisoner himself on arraignment. 
One species of defence brief, which appears to 
have evolved from the practice of briefing counsel 
direct, was the dock brief or 'docker' [111]. 
In the twentieth century the dock brief 
represented a method whereby a prisoner could 
secure the services of counsel for a nominal fee. 
It essential features were these: - counsel was 
briefed by the prisoner in open court, the prisoner 
being entitled to have the services of any counsel 
in court, who was not already engaged in the case, 
upon tendering a fee of one guinea plus clerk's fee 
(after 1951 two guineas plus clerk's fee) [112]. 
As in a case where the court assigned counsel, 
there was no solicitor and no written brief, save 
where the prisoner had chosen to write one or have 
one written for him. 
The Report of the Committee on Legal Aid & 
Advice in 1945 [113] spoke of the dock brief as an 
institution which had existed from time immemorial, 
and Abel-Smith and Stevens [114] speak of it having 
existed for many centuries before the general right 
to counsel was conceded. Neither cites any evidence 
to support these assertions. 
In fact, there is good reason for supposing 
that the dock brief is far more modern than this. 
It is- important to begin with, to rid oneself of 
-the notion that the dock brief represented a means 
80 
of obtaining representation for a purely nominal 
sum. True, that is what it had 'become by the mid- 
twentieth century, due to. the ravages of inflation, 
but in the nineteenth century the fee payable on a 
dock brief was anything but derisory. It 
represented in the first half of the century more 
than a week's wage for a working man [115]. It 
was the minimum brief fee which a barrister was 
allowed to accept, and it represented the standard 
brief fee which was being paid for prosecutions at 
the Old Bailey, Middlesex Sessions, and at Assizes 
and county Quarter Sessions [116]. The size of the 
fee alone indicates that it almost certainly had a 
nineteenth century origin, and indeed there are 
other reasons for so dating it. In the first 
place, it is difficult to believe that the right to 
deliver a dock brief can have antedated the right 
to employ counsel in felony cases, and so far as 
felony is concerned, it appears that it was only in 
the 1730s that the courts began to allow prisoners 
to have counsel to assist them examine witnesses. 
Secondly, one finds no references to dock briefs in 
any of the early nineteenth century practitioners' 
text books, not even in books like Chitty's 
Criminal Law, which discuss in minute detail the 
assignment of counsel in treason and defence in 
forma pauperis [117]. Third, the earliest 
references to something resembling a dock brief 
appear to come from around the 1840s. Fourth, 
there is the case of jl (1844) referred to above. 
This is significant for two reasons. First, for 
the fact that the Governor of Newgate thought 'it 
necessary to shoulder the burden of briefing 
counsel for prisoners, who could afford to pay a 
, brief 
fee but not an attorney's fee. If the dock 
brief-was then a known and well established right 
what need was there for him to do so? Second, 'for 
.. the comment made on 




It was not foreseen (by the Aldermen when 
they barred all but attorneys and their``* 
properly authorised clerks from Newgate) that- 
many a prisoner might raise a guinea to pay a 
counsel's fee without being able to pay an 
attorney, and that. all who were in this 
situation would consequently remain without a 
counsel'. - 
Then there is a comment made by Phillipps, the =- 
barrister and text writer, in his evidence to the 
1835 Select Committee upon the proposal that 
counsel should be assigned to all poor prisoners 
desiring representation: - 
Where are (such counsel) to get their 
instructions? Are they to communicate with 
the dock? That would be rather new in the 
practice of the Bar' [118]. 
Finally, there is the fact that, in the late 
nineteenth century, some very elementary rules 
concerning dock briefs were uncertain. For example, 
was a prisoner charged in the magistrates' court 
entitled to a dock brief? Was counsel entitled to 
take a fee of more than one guinea for a dock 
brief? Was counsel entitled, where the prisoner 
was charged on more than one indictment, to a 
separate one guinea fee for each indictment? [119] 
This scarcely suggests an institution of much 
antiquity. 
A feature of the dock brief, which requires 
explanation, is why the' briefing of counsel took 
place in court rather than beforehand. A partial 
explanation is offered by a letter, published in 
The Times during the 1844 controversy, from, a 
correspondent signing himself Veritas [120]. The 
letter, after arguing strongly in favour of 
prisoners being allowed to instruct counsel direct, 
made this point. If the prisoner delivered his 
-brief to counsel and the grand jury then threw out 
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the bill,. he would lose the brief fee, for the 
invariable rule of the bar was never to return 
brief fees come what may. Accordingly a poor 
prisoner, who could not afford to lose a guinea, 
was well advised to hold back his brief until he 
knew that a bill had been found (by no means a 
certainty with grand juries at the Old Bailey in 
the first half of the century even in clear cases) 
[121] and taking this course usually meant counsel 
being briefed in court. Nor is it difficult to 
imagine other circumstances which would compel a 
prisoner to brief counsel in open court, for 
example difficulty in raising the fee. 
There seems good reason to suppose that the 
dock brief simply represented one of two 
alternatives open to a prisoner who wanted to brief 
counsel but either could not afford or did not wish 
to have the services of a solicitor. The first was 
to have his friends or family brief counsel direct 
before trial. This had the advantage that counsel 
would have plenty of time to prepare the case, but 
the prisoner risked losing the fee if the grand 
jury threw out the bill. Second, to leave the 
briefing of counsel until his case was called on, 
which was the course he would have to take where 
the fee had only been raised at the last minute, 
and which he might wish to take in order to make 
sure that he did not pay over a fee unnecessarily 
, [122]. 
If, the dock brief offered the prisoner the 
opportunity of avoiding paying out a brief fee 
unnecessarily, its obvious disadvantage was that 
counsel instructed in this way had little time to 
take proper instructions* from his client. Some 
prisoners would hand over with their fee a prepared 
statement of the case,, but, many did not,, in which 
'case counsel would have to work from such scrambled 
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instructions as he was able to get over the dock. 
Some counsel made light of these difficulties. It 
was always Montagu Williams' boast that the only 
defence brief he ever required was a copy of the 
depositions [123], and, in days when prisoners 
could not give evidence, such a robust approach 
certainly left counsel free to develop what he 
considered the most promising line of defence, 
without the embarrassment of being tramelled by 
instructions from the client. The other advantage 
of the dock brief to the very poor was that the 
fee, although far from derisory, was low - the 
lowest for which a barrister's services could be 
got -and remained unchanged during the nineteenth 
century despite inflation. 
Whatever its merits, at no time during the 
second half of the nineteenth century, does the 
dock brief appear to have been particularly popular 
with prisoners. Indeed, some evidence of how 
relatively uncommon it was, is to be found in the 
periodic complaints in the last quarter of the 
century that prisoners were ignorant of their right 
to a dock brief [124]. 
In London, the dock brief was-overshadowed by 
a rival system which like the dock brief cut out 
the need for a solicitor, but which, unlike the 
dock brief, allowed counsel time to get up the case 
properly. This was the I. P. (in person) system. A 
barrister's clerk, who joined the profession in the 
1870s, described in his biography how, during the 
1870s, 1880s and 1890s, I. P. work, although 
confined to the less reputable of the profession, 
yielded those who had it a rich living. He 
describes the way the system worked thus: - 
'After a prisoner had been committed for 
trial, his friends would procure, at the cost 
of a few shillings, a copy of the 
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depositions ... hand them to the barrister of their choice, who would accept them as a brief; decide if witnesses were to be called 
and fight the case in court for a small fee 
paid in cash. The fee ... was generally made 
up of shillings or florins not always too 
clean' [125]. 
He goes on to say that I. P. defences were 
eventually stopped when abuses crept in, and large 
I. P. fees were taken for work which obviously 
should have been done in a more conventional manner 
[126]. What he says about the taking of large fees 
for I. P. work receives some confirmation in the 
proceedings of the Select Committee on the Poor 
Prisoners' Defence Bill, for one of the suggestions 
put to Grantham J., when giving evidence to the 
Committee, was that the normal fee for an I. P. 
brief was 5 or 10 guineas. 
, 
Grantham was in fact 
able to offer little information about the matter. 
He said that he thought the I. P. system a lot less 
frequent than fifteen or twenty years before when 
he had heard a good deal of it, adding that it was 
a form of practice, which had been very much 
discouraged by the Bar, but he was unable to 
contradict his questioner's claim that there were 
still about half a dozen I. P. cases every session 
i[127]. 
The I. P. system appears to have represented 
simply a continuation of the tradition, which 
existed in the 1830s, and to which the Central 
Criminal Court Bar vouched in 1844. Its survival 
was no doubt due to uncertainty as to the scope of 
the prohibition upon counsel receiving instructions 
from a client, direct, which, until the end of the 
century was far from total. How much uncertainty 
there was about. the matter, even as late as 1900, 
is-demonstrated by an incident which occurred in 
October of that year. A member of the Manchester 
, 
bar-telegraphed the Secretary to the Bar Council, 
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asking whether he would be in order to accept a 
brief from a woman to defend her husband in the 
police court the next day. The Secretary 
telegraphed back 'believe counsel so entitled; have 
no direct decision here' [128]. Before the year 
was out the practice had been condemned by the Bar 
Council, but what is revealing is the Secretary's 
reaction when confronted with the problem. The 
Report of the Committee of the Bar Council on Dock 
Defences published late in the same year [129], in 
fact mentioned I. P. defences in police courts,, 
observing that the practice, which at one time had 
prevailed in London to a considerable extent, was 
highly undesirable and had it was believed almost 
ceased. 
(iv) Charity and other sources of assistance 
For the prisoner who was destitute and could 
not afford to brief counsel, his only hope of 
representation (assignment apart) lay in private 
charity or the efforts of his friends [130]. 
In 1896, it was out of money raised by her 
friends that counsel was, at the last minute, 
procured for Mrs. Dyer, the baby-farmer [131], and 
even after the passing of the Poor Prisoners' 
Defence Act, 1903 one still finds examples of 
prisoners (especially prisoners charged with 
murder) being defended out of a fund raised by 
subscription [132]. Amongst those most likely to 
have their defence funded by friends were members 
of criminal gangs (usually the money was raised by 
holding a 'benefit' in a public house) [133]. 
For those who had no friends, or no friends 
able to raise money on their behalf, charity was an 
occasional provider of representation. In 1813 the 
murderer Cornwell was defended at the expense of 
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the committing magistrate, who had been moved by 
his complaint that he was friendless and unable to 
fee counsel [134]. In 1844 a prisoner at Berkshire 
Sessions had his counsel's fee paid by a member of 
the bar who took pity on him [135]. In the same 
year, during a piracy trial at the Old Bailey, one 
of the jurors trying the case offered to pay for 
counsel for the prisoners, an offer which Abinger 
C. B. declined on the ground that no counsel could 
do justice to a case who came into it half way 
through [136]. In 1873 a local man came forward 
to offer a substantial sum for the defence of the 
West Auckland poisoner Mary Ann Cotton, when he 
heard that her furniture had had to be sold to 
provide her with counsel [137]. 
In the first half of the century particularly, 
one comes upon instances of members of the bar 
stepping forward to defend unrepresented prisoners 
gratuitously. In 1801, at the Old Bailey trial of 
a woman called Harvey for murder of her child, the 
'prisoner appearing very much affected', counsel 
humanely volunteered to defend her [138]. In 1831, 
at Chelmsford Assizes, whilst the trial of a 
fourteen year old boy for murder was under way, 
Clarkson, a London barrister in a substantial way 
of practice, intervened to offer his services to 
the lad, who would otherwise have gone undefended 
[139]. Even as late as the 1880s one finds 
'Geoghegan, one of the best known juniors at the 
, criminal bar, intervening in a case to offer his 
, assistance to a fellow Irishman [140]. Such 
,. 
interventions, since they were subject to judicial 
.. approval, were presumably regarded as analagous to 
an: assignment, and therefore no breach of 
etiquette. 
From time to time complaints. appeared in the 
press of barristers doing criminal work for less 
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than the minimum brief fee. Usually touting rather 
than charity was the motivation here [141], but not 
always (Marshall Hall is said to have accepted a- 
dock brief at a fee of less than a guinea because 
he had taken pity on the accused) [142]. 
Where the charge was capital, a foreigner; 
without means would sometimes be provided with 
counsel by his Government [143]. 
One of the few examples of systematic charity 
in the matter of prisoners' representation was to'- 
be found at the Central Criminal Court. There had 
in 1835 been the scheme of sheriff Salomon. He had 
paid a Mr. Yorston, out of his own pocket, to 
attend at Newgate to take written statements from 
prisoners of their defences, so that they could be 
handed to such counsel as they selected, or to the 
court. by which they were tried. Yorston had also 
to advise him of the names of prisoners who 
appeared to be innocent, but were without defence; 
and for such prisoners he had retained counsel at 
his own expense. The scheme worked well but came 
to an end after only one session due to opposition 
from the profession [144]. A less ambitious, but 
more enduring scheme, was that, which dated back to 
at least the late 1820s, whereby the sheriffs of 
London and Middlesex intervened in selected cases 
to provide counsel for prisoners who would 
otherwise have been unrepresented. The first case 
in which The Times trial reports mention counsel 
being retained in this way, is the trial of Sheen 
in 1827 [145] for murder. In the main, the 
sheriffs' intervention was confined to cases of 
murder, but occasionally one sees them providing 
counsel for a poor prisoner charged with a lesser 
crime. In 1851 [146], for instance, they provided 
counsel for a foreigner charged with theft, and for 
a 'strange sickly looking girl' called Adams [147] 
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charged with perjury. In 1859, [148] they 
briefedcounsel to defend a girl called Sloman 
charged with concealment of birth. 
Where the sheriffs did intervene, no attorney 
was employed, the attorney's work being done by one 
of the under-sheriffs (see e. g. Gould 1844 [149] 
where the under-sheriff swore an affidavit in 
support of an application for postponement, and was 
present in court, giving instructions to counsel, 
during the application). 
During the course of an Old Bailey case in 
November, 1882 [150] counsel referred to a fund 
maintained by the sheriffs, out of which the fees 
for counsel were paid. It is not possible to 
identify with certainty the fund referred to but 
there is reason to suspect that it may be the 
Sheriffs' Fund, a charitable fund founded in 1807-8 
to help distressed prisoners and their families 
[151]. 
The London system may not have been unique. A 
scattering of cases suggests that it was in the 
second half of the century being copied outside 
London and Middlesex [152]. 
Towards the end of the century, another source 
of funds for those charged with major crime was the 
press. Newspapers would from time to time set up 
defence funds for prisoners whose plight had caught 
the: ="public imagination. One of the earliest 
examples of such ,a fund, was that established in 
-1888 by the Sussex Daily News for Sabina Tilley 
charged with child murder [153]. But there was 
another form of press involvement which was less 
desirable- - that = whereby those accused of 
; sensational crimes sold their, life stories to the 
,, Press in. return for the funds to employ fashionable 
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counsel. The Home Office were always unhappy about- 
this practice, and, in 1915 in the case of Smith 
('the brides in the bath' murderer), refused to., 
allow the prisoner to assign the copyright in his 
projected life story to the newspaper (a refusal 
which led'to a strong letter to the Home Secretary 
from Marshall Hall (154], the counsel who was to,. 
have been retained out of the funds the newspaper-, 
had agreed to provide). The Home Office concern_- 
was, however, well founded. By the 1930s some 
newspapers were no longer content with life, 
stories, but were demanding as the price of legal 
representation for notorious murderers a sealed 
letter confessing guilt not, to be opened until 
after the prisoner's execution [155]. 
(v) The Mackenzie adviser and the amicus curiae 
For prisoners who took their trial undefended 
(as so many did) the only possible sources of 
assistance other than the judge were what in the 
twentieth century has become known as the MacKenzie 
adviser, and the amicus curiae. 
The right of a prisoner to have a friend sit 
near him 'to take notes, quietly make suggestions 
and offer advice' was upheld by the King's Bench in 
1831 [156]. The privilege appears, however, to 
have been little exercised in trials on indictment. 
The practice of counsel present in court 
intervening as amicus curiae to suggest points of 
law in favour of an unrepresented prisoner was of 
considerable antiquity [157], and such 
interventions were common at busy courts well into 
the 1850s [158]. It is not hard to understand why. 
At a -busy court, there would at any one time be 
sitting in court counsel who were not engaged in 
the case being tried, some waiting for their cases 
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to be called on, others brief less and trying to 
improve their skills by watching their seniors, and 
get their faces known amongst attornies (all the 
while hoping against hope that a brief might come 
their way). An experienced counsel would be 
unlikely to stand by and watch a prisoner be 
convicted for want of counsel to draw the judge's 
attention to a point of law in his favour, whilst 
for a* brief less barrister intervention would be a 
means of getting noticed and gaining experience on 
his feet. 
(d) Reform 
By the 1890s the pressure to remove the 
accused's incompetency, coupled with the increasing 
number of statutes which actually did so, made the 
issue of legal representation ever more urgent. It 
was obviously only a matter of time before the 
Government got a Prisoner's Evidence Bill on the 
statute book, and when it did so every 
unrepresented prisoner would face the problems 
which undefended prisoners were already 
experiencing in those cases where statute made them 
competent. In addition to having to cross-examine 
and state his case to the jury unaided, he would 
have to make (without legal advice) the crucial 
decision whether to give evidence or not, and, if 
he gave evidence without counsel to take him 
through his examination in chief and to re-examine, 
, there was great 
danger of his defence (and, in 
particular his answer . to prosecution cross- 
examination) not being adequately laid before the 
jury, even if the judge intervened to assist. 
, 
The matter had first been taken up in 1883 
when Leighton had moved an amendment to the 
Criminal Code, Bill that no Bill would be 
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satisfactory which did not provide for the 
assignment of counsel to poor prisoners [159]. 
In 1893 the Society of Chairmen and Deputy 
Chairmen of Quarter Sessions in England and Wales 
passed a resolution to the effect that provision 
should be made in the Evidence in Criminal Cases 
Bill then going through Parliament for the 
assignment of counsel to poor prisoners who desired 
to be-legally represented, such counsel to be paid 
out of public funds [160]. 
The Lord Chancellor, believing that such a 
clause might remove some of the objections to the 
Bill, decided to refer the question to the judges. 
Of the judges only Cave J. was wholeheartedly 
in favour of the proposal, the attitude of the 
majority being that the reform was not needed and 
likely to lead to a whole host of evils not least 
of which would be waste of court time, and great 
public expense [160]. 
Faced with such an overwhelming majority 
against the proposal it was quietly dropped. 
In 1894 the Law Journal [161] took up the 
question, suggesting that in the case of poor 
prisoners the conventional docker fee ought to be 
paid by the county. 
The matter was next raised during the debate 
on the 1897 Criminal Evidence Bill, when the M. P. 
for Leeds proposed that the Bill should include 
provision for the defence of poor prisoners [162]. 
The proposal was lost but led the Senior Treasury 
counsel, Sir Harry Poland Q. C., in a letter to The 
Times to argue that a system of assigning counsel 
alone would not meet the need. It was essential 
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that a solicitor should also be assigned to get up 
the case. 
During the Committee Stage of the 1898 Bill, 
an unsuccessful attempt was made by Gibson Bowles 
to move an amendment providing for the assignment 
of counsel to poor prisoners [163]. 
While the 1898 Bill was on its way through 
Parliament pressure for reform was mounting. 
At a meeting of the Bar Council on January 17, 
1898 a motion was proposed by Lord Robert Cecil 
'That in the Opinion of the Council it is desirable 
that every prisoner should be defended by counsel' 
[164]. The next month, the Council appointed a 
Special Committee to report upon the matter. 
During the following months, the Committee 
made extensive inquiries as to the practice in 
other parts of the English speaking world. The 
replies made interesting reading. In Scotland, 
agents (i. e. solicitors) 'for the poor' were 
appointed annually by the Faculty of Advocates; the 
agents visited the gaols and 'counsel for the poor' 
were then instructed by them appearing at trial 
without fee. In Victoria by Order in Council all 
persons 'without means charged with capital 
offences, and all aboriginals charged with an 
indictable offence might, on application to the 
sheriff, be provided with- the services of. such 
barrister and solicitor as they might select, the 
fees-being paid out of monies voted by Parliament. 
Substantially the same practice obtained'' in New 
South" Wales and New Zealand. In Queensland, 
however, only aboriginals and Polynesians were 
, --defended-at Government expense. In Canada, it was 
, the practice of the superior, courts to assign 
counsel to prisoners who were unable " to ` afford to 
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retain one, but the services of such counsel were 
honorary and unpaid. In Massachussets, prisoners 
accused of capital crime were defended at the 
expense of the Government by counsel assigned by 
the court. 
In November the Committee reported [165]. It 
came out strongly in favour of free legal 
representation for poor prisoners. In 1899 the 
Annual General Meeting of the Bar approved the 
report, and passed a resolution (framed in words 
borrowed from the report) that: 
'it is in the interests of all prisoners 
(considering their interests alone) that they 
should be defended by counsel, and that the, 
passing of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 
renders it more desirable than before that 
they should be so defended'. 
However, the resolution having been passed, 
the Bar Council took no steps to secure its 
implementation. Eventually the Dorset Sessions Bar 
gave a lead. 
In 1902 they put into operation at their 
Sessions a free representation scheme based on the 
Scots system [166]. 
According to a letter published in The Times 
in April, 1903 [166], the scheme was. a great 
success. 'Even in the absence of the assistance of 
solicitors', declared the writer, 
'remarkable results were achieved; it is 
considered that at least five persons were 
acquitted who would otherwise have been 
convicted, in cases involving either indecent 
assault, housebreaking or uttering false coin. 
The length of sittings was not increased 
because in clear cases prisoners pleaded 
guilty on the advice of counsel, and relied 
upon an appeal for the mitigation of 
sentence'. '- 
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Unfortunately, when news of the scheme got 
abroad it was attacked by other members of the bar 
as improper and a breach of etiquette. ' The matter 
was referred by the Sessions Bar to the Attorney- 
General, and he recommended them to discontinue it 
which they did. 
However, the Dorset Scheme had created a very 
favourable impression, and in 1903 a group of 
barrister M. P. s [167] introduced a Poor Prisoners' 
Defence Bill [168], providing for a national scheme 
of free legal representation for all prisoners 
committed for trial; any prisoner not having the 
resources to instruct counsel might apply to have 
solicitor and counsel allotted to him; the 
solicitor should be allotted from a list, kept in 
counties by the clerk of the peace and in boroughs 
by the town clerk, of solicitors who had given 
notice of their willingness to undertake poor 
prisoners' work without fee, and they, like any 
counsel instructed under the scheme, were to work 
without fee. The Bill received an enthusiastic 
reception in The Times and its correspondence 
columns, but it was attacked by Poland and by some 
of-. the judges. Poland complained that the scheme 
was unworkable, would fail for want of solicitors 
prepared to work without fee, and argued that it 
was anomalous that it was limited to proceedings on 
indictment [169]. There was also opposition 
amongst the London bar - it was declared 
unnecessary and undesirable by the Central Criminal 
Court Bar Mess and unworkable by the Bar Messes of 
, Middlesex and the County of London Sessions [170]. 
Despite this, opposition, the Bill was referred 
-to, -a Select 
Committee. The Committee, in its 
Report. [171], accepted the principle that a 
prisoner without,, means ought to be in 'no worse a 
position to establish his innocence than the 
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prisoner who was able to pay for legal assistance. 
It also acknowledged that, although it was the 
business of the judge to see that the prisoner's' 
defence was fully developed, yet the judge was not- 
in a position to do this as efficiently as counsel, '' 
because he had no opportunity of communicating with 
the prisoner and ascertaining the details of the' 
defence. It stressed that the problem was 
particularly acute where, as at county Quarter 
Sessions, the judge was not legally qualified. But= 
although it accepted the principle of free' 
representation, the Committee recommended that the 
Bill be drastically remodelled in two respects. "' 
First, solicitors and counsel defending a poor 
prisoner under the Bill were to be paid out of 
funds provided by Parliament. Second, legal 
assistance should only be afforded to a prisoner 
where this appeared desirable, having regard to the 
nature of the defence set up by him in evidence 
given or statements made at the committal hearing. 
The requirement that the prisoner should 
disclose his defence at committal was something 
which had been urged upon the Committee by the 
judges (in particular, Grantham 3. in his evidence 
to it) [172], who ever since the coming into force 
of the 1898 Act, had been inveighing with 
regularity and ferocity, against the practice of 
prisoners 'reserving their defence' [173]. It was, 
they argued against the prisoner's interests and 
calculated to lead to sham defences. 
All of this, of course, ignored the fact that, 
under Jervis' Act, a prisoner was at committal 
required to be cautioned against speaking. 
However, the judicial hostility to the reserved 
defence carried the Committee with it: an honest 
defence ought to be disclosed at the first 
opportunity, and a prisoner not disclosing his 
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defence at committal was not deserving of legal 
assistance paid for by the State. 
The Bill, as amended received the royal assent 
on August 14,1903 with a commencement date of 
January 1st, 1904. S. 2 provided for the making of 
rules to carry the Act into effect, and work upon 
the rules began in late 1903. It did not go 
smoothly. When the draft rules were produced they 
contained a rule intended to ensure that prisoners 
were left in no doubt that disclosure of defence 
was a precondition to legal aid. The rule in 
question (draft rule 3) [174] provided that 
examining magistrates might, after delivering to 
the prisoner the statutory caution under s. 18 of 
the 1848 Act, explain to him that they had power to 
certify that the case was one in which legal aid 
should be given at the public expense, if the 
nature of his defence, as disclosed in his 
statement or evidence, satisfied them that it was 
desirable to do so, and it it appeared that he had 
not himself the necessary means. Both the Bar and 
the Law Society [175] protested strongly against 
the rule, arguing that it would practically compel 
the prisoner to make a statement committing himself 
to a line of defence, and would be. contrary to the 
statutory caution. There was no answer to the 
point and the clause had to be dropped. 
The reception the Act got in the higher courts 
when it came into force was very mixed. None-of 
the judges who saw fit to comment on its provisions 
welcomed it as a long overdue reform [176]. At 
Middlesex Sessions, the Judge, Sir Ralph Littler 
Q. C., told the grand jury that the Act was useless 
and 'probably mischievous as well'. At Manchester 
Assizes Bigham J. painted the Act as being 
positively disadvantageous to prisoners - it robbed 
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them of a line of defence which in the past had 
served them well, namely 
'I am a poor man and cannot get the assistance 
which a rich man can get. Therefore my case is 
not put before the jury as it ought to be be. ' 
From the Lord Chief Justice it received a 
favourable reception, but not because it conferred 
a boon on prisoners. To him the merit of the Act, 
was that it compelled prisoners to disclose their 
defence 'The scheme and motive of (the) 
legislature' he declared (adding that this was the 
opinion of his brethren too) was 
'to induce innocent people, who are unjustly 
charged and who have a true defence to 
disclose their defence at the earliest 
possible moment, and to induce them to abstain 
from the practice, which has worked so much 
harm in the past, of prisoners under all 
circumstances, whether innocent or guilty; 
reserving their defence. ' [177] 
The Justice of the Peace, when reporting this 
speech commented: - 
'judges generally seem to think that the Act 
was passed to assist only innocent people 
unjustly charged'. [177] 
Other judges contented 
that they proposed 
restrictively. Clearly, 
little since 1893. 
themselves with indicating 
to construe the Act 




'Mr. Montagu Williams ... anticipating that a true bill might be found in the Empion case applied to 
the Recorder in that event to appoint Wednesday in 
the February session for ... the trial. Mr Williams said he made the application on the ground 
of the formidable dimensions of the indictment, 
which he said, amid some laughter, he understood 
had taken three learned gentlemen to draw and three 
other learned gentlemen to carry into court. ' 
The Times, January 12,. 1875, 
Central Criminal Court report 
(a) Finding the indictment 
Proceedings at the court of trial began with 
the finding of the bill of indictment by the grand 
jury. 
. -, The grand jury was a filter whose purpose was 
to weed out weak and baseless cases. Only a grand 
jury could find a bill of indictment, and a 
prosecutor seeking a bill had to lay his evidence 
before it for its scrutiny. 
It consisted of not less than twelve nor more 
, 
than twenty-three jurors and reached its decision 
by majority vote [1]. At Assizes the grand jurors 
. were normally all county magistrates [2]. At the 
Old Bailey and Quarter Sessions, however, they 
. 
were chosen from amongst the common jurors, with 
*care 
taken to ensure that those selected were, by 
, rateable, value or 
description, of a better class 
, that the ordinary common 
juryman [3]. 
.,,, At the start of the session for which they had 
, 
been: summoned, the grand jurors would be sworn [4] 
and the judge would then deliver his charge to 
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them, in which he would give them legal directions 
about any case likely to give difficulty. The 
witnesses in the various cases would then be sworn 
in batches in open court [5], and sent along to the 
grand jury room to wait their turn to be examined 
by the grand jury. The examination was conducted 
in private and in the accused's absence. If in a 
case the jury were satisfied that there was prima 
facie evidence of guilt, - they would indorse the- 
bill 'true bill' and it would be carried into court 
to be tried; if it did not so satisfy them they, 
would indorse it 'no true bill' in which event the 
accused would, at the end of the session, be 
discharged by proclamation (which would usually be 
an end to the prosecution) [6]. 
In the first half of the century a complaint 
frequently levelled at London grand juries was that 
they regularly threw out clear cases, which had 
already passed the scrutiny of examining 
stipendiary magistrates [7]. In the 1820s and 
1830s they threw out each year almost ten per cent 
of the bills sent before them [8]. Indeed, so bad 
was their reputation in this respect that it earned 
them the nickname 'The hope of London thieves' [9]. 
For this state of affairs, there were several 
reasons. First, London grand jurors, not being 
magistrates, had little legal knowledge and no 
experience of examining witnesses [10], and were 
thus poorly equipped for the task they had to 
perform. Also, they had to 'work in the dark'; 
they were not furnished with the depositions; all 
they had to work from was the bill and the names 
indorsed on its back [11] (this was in marked 
contrast to the practice in Ireland where grand 
juries worked from the depositions and never saw 
the witnesses) [12]; they thus had no idea what the 
'witnesses were expected- to say; the inevitable 
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result was that on, occasions, they would fail to get 
from witnesses-, evidence vital to the prosecution 
case. Another factor was tampering with witnesses. 
Of the cases which broke down at the grand jury, 
stage, many did so because the prosecution 
witnesses-were either kept away by the defence, or 
bribed to change or water down their evidence X13]. 
By changing his evidence a witness ran little risk. 
The fact that the grand jury, hearing took place in 
private, with no, record kept, before jurors without 
depositions, made perjury, difficult to detect and 
impossible to prosecute [14]. Eventually,, a, 
partial solution was found, that of allowing a 
clerk to attend°the grand jury,,, furnished with the 
depositions, ` to . explain . 
the case to.. them and to 
assist in the examination of witnesses. Already in 
use in -the Queen's Bench. in the -1830s, the 
procedure was in 1838 adopted at, the Old Bailey. 
The result was a sharp droptin the number of bills 
thrown out [15]. 
Reform was not, however, enough -to satisfy= 
critics of the grand jury. They, wanted to see it 
abolished - in London at least. To them the grand 
jury `-was">wholly unnecessary; if a stipendiary 
magistrate had found a prima- facie case, what need 
was' there to have his decision., reviewed by a. jury 
of- laymen? Nor was. this all. There - was the 
inconvenience to witnesses, and the expense to the 
public caused by, grand jury hearings; even where it 
wasp known that the- accused, was going to plead 
guilty'-at -- trial, the prosecution witnesses still 
had 
. 
to, -appear before- the-, grand jury, 'whilst in 
contested cases the system. meant, their having to 
attend court'' twice; and for this dual attendance 
the public paid .. '[ 16 .. s . _. Others criticised the 
secrecy_ of grand jury. proceedings; - the., public was 
not admitted and, if ar bill t., was ,,, thrown out no-one 
'knew'why4[17]. ' - Then there. were the opportunities 
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the system offered to the vexatious and - to. 
blackmailers. -'Anyone could -go straight to the. ---, 
grand jury and ask for a bill without. troubling;,. `- 
with a committal hearing and without any notice to- 
the accused [18]; in such a case the first the 
accused would know'of the matter would be+ off--arrest v;. 
after bill found [19]. Even worse a prosecutor, 
having obtained his bill, was under no obligation. 
to bring it on for trial [20], a state of ý affairs : -= 
which was an incentive to blackmail. In 1859,.. 
Parliament tried to stem the abuse with its 
Vexatious Indictments Act. (see p. -25'above). 
Some of the loudest demands- for: reform came 
from the grand jurors themselves. In the 1840s and. 
-, 
1850s grand juries at the Old Bailey and -the.. 
Middlesex Sessions repeatedly made presentments 'as,, 
to their own inutility' [21]. Bills for the.. 
abolition of metropolitan grand juries were. 
introduced in 1849,1852 and 1857 [22]; all were. 
lost through lack of Parliamentary time. Following 
his translation to the Lords, Thesiger, the, 
promoter of the 1852' and 1857 Bills, introduced 
Bills there in 1860 and 1861, (23] but with no. 
greater success. Opposition to the'reform both in. 
Commons and Lords centred around claims that the., 
Bill was the thin end of the wedge (the first step. 
to the abolition of all grand juries), and that it 
would mean the- sweeping away, of a, valuable 
constitutional safeguard (for -the future the, 
decision as to whether a man should stand trial., 
would in London rest with an official removable at, 
the pleasure of the Crown) [24]. After - the, loss-,, 
of the Bill of 1861 calls for abolition were still 
heard periodically [25], and indeed in 1892 a Bill. 
[26] was actually introduced for the abolition of 
grand juries` at Quarter sessions; it was however 
lost. The Criminal Evidence Act,,, 1898 led to a 
short-lived controversy as to whether an accused-. 
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had a right to give evidence before the grand jury 
[27], but, with the number of bills thrown out 
running at less than 1% per annum [28], grand jury 
reform had ceased to be a burning issue. 
(b) Pleading rules 
The indictment which came back from the grand 
jury room would, even in a simple case, be a prolix 
document, often well nigh unintelligible to anyone 
but a lawyer. And within its pages might lurk an 
error or flaw which would win a prisoner an 
unmeritorious acquittal. 
The law required indictments to be certain 
with both offender and offence described with 
accuracy and minute particularity; indeed, so 
complex were the rules of criminal pleading that it 
took Chitty, writing in 1816, over 130 pages to 
expound them [29]. And since the law did not 
permit amendment of indictments, the effect of the 
accused's being able to point to a defect was that 
the prosecution automatically failed. 
Nor was it merely indictment defects which 
would bring a prosecution to a halt. A variance 
between the indictment and the evidence called to 
support it would have the same effect. To try and 
reduce the risk of variance to the minimum, it was 
usual for the pleader to include in an indictment a 
number of alternative counts all founded on the 
same transaction, hardly differing from each other 
except in small particulars, but intended to cover 
every possible combination of facts which the 
evidence might prove [30]; but this, of course, 
also served to add both to the length of the 
document and to the, risk of formal errors creeping 
in. 
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Where there was an indictment defect or a 
variance, the accused would normally take the point 
after verdict by motion in arrest of judgment [31]. 
It was open to him to raise the objection to they 
indictment on arraignment (by plea of abatement or 
demurrer), but there were grave disadvantages in so 
doing. First, in misdemeanour, if a plea in 
abatement [32] or demurrer [33] was determined 
against the accused, he would not normally be 
allowed to plead over [34]. Second, if the plea 
succeeded it would not result (as would a 
successful motion in arrest of judgment) in his 
discharge, but would merely delay the proceedings 
for a short time: - the indictment would be quashed 
and a fresh bill sought from the grand jury, with 
the accused remanded in custody in the interim [35] 
(in theory a fresh bill could also be preferred 
against an accused who was discharged upon motion 
in arrest, but it was not usual for this to happen) 
[36]. 
For an example of how minor indictment defects 
and variances could win a prisoner an unmeritorious 
acquittal one need look no further than Sheen's 
case [37]. In 1827 Sheen killed his child by 
deliberately cutting its throat in its mother's 
presence, and was indicted for murder. In the 
indictment the name of the child was given as 
'Charles William Beadle'. At the trial the only 
evidence adduced as to the child's name was to the 
effect that he was always called 'William' or 
'Billy', in the light of which the judge directed 
an acquittal on the grounds of variance. A fresh 
indictment was at once preferred again charging the 
accused with murder of the child, but this time 
containing no less than thirteen counts, varying 
the name and description of the child in every 
conceivable combination. On arraignment the 
accused pleaded autrefois acquit, averring in his 
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plea that the child mentioned in both indictments 
was the same, and that he. was as well known by the 
name of Charles William Beadle as by any of the 
names and descriptions in the new indictment, and 
the plea being supported by evidence the jury were 
directed to bring in a verdict of autrefois acquit. 
And Sheen's was not an isolated case: a perusal of 
the nisi prius reports of the time throws up many 
other examples -a prisoner acquitted of murder 
because the indictment misstated the cause of death 
[38], of arson because the indictment omitted the 
word unlawfully [39], of burglary because the 
ownership of the premises burgled was laid in the 
wrong person [40], of forgery because the 
indictment misdescribed the forged document [41], 
or failed to follow its wording exactly [42]. 
However, it is important not to overstate the 
problem. In the main, it was only in cases where 
the prisoner had counsel that indictment points 
were taken [43], and the percentage of prisoners 
who had counsel was throughout the first half of 
the century small (although it must be conceded 
that where counsel did appear it was a matter which 
would invariably claim their attention, many of 
them displaying great ingenuity [44] in the points 
taken to such an extent that the consideration of 
such points formed a substantial part of the work 
of the Twelve Judges). 
The first attempt at reform came in 1826. By 
his Criminal Law Act of that year, Peel made two 
'small changes in the law [45]. First, the Act set 
out a' list (and unfortunately for the cause of 
reform only a short list) of formal defects which 
were not to be a ground of 'arrest of judgment or 
proceedings in error [46] (the effect was that 
where an indictment contained one of the specified 
defects the objection had to be taken by demurrer 
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or not at all, and if taken by demurrer would only 
delay and not defeat the prosecution). Second, it 
gave the court power to amend the indictment where, 
upon a plea of abatement, it was shown that the 
name or addition (i. e. rank, occupation, residence) 
of the accused was mis-stated [47]. 
In 1828 came another small reform, the 9 Geo. 
IV, c. 15 empowering the court in cases of 
misdemeanour to amend the indictment where there 
was a variance between the indictment and a written 
document or record produced in evidence -a power 
which was extended in 1848 to cases of felony tried 
at sessions of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery 
[48], and in 1849 to cases of felony tried at 
Quarter Sessions [49]. 
Useful as these reforms were they only 
scratched the surface of' the problem, and by the 
1840s there were calls for root and branch reform. 
The acquittal in 1841 of Lord Cardigan of attempted 
murder by reason of the misnomer of his victim in 
the indictment brought the problem into the public 
eye [50], and the following year saw a Times leader 
[51] calling for legislation on the subject during 
the coming Parliamentary session. In 1844-5 the 
subject was considered by the Criminal Law 
Commissioners. Their Eighth Report [52] made 
clear the need for reform but was guarded as to the 
form it should take. Not so Greaves in his answer 
to a questionnaire from them. The whole system of 
criminal pleading, he argued, needed to be 
remodelled: - indictments should be framed in the 
simplest and plainest form so as to be intelligible 
to anyone of average intelligence with the courts 
given power in cases of defect or variance to order 
amendment [53]. 
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For a time it looked as though the campaign 
for reform would come to nothing but eventually in 
1851 reform did come in the shape of Lord 
Campbell's Criminal Procedure Act. As regards 
indictment defects, this declared first that the 
defects listed in the 1826 Act should not 
invalidate an indictment [54], and second that all 
formal objections to the indictment must be taken 
before the jury was sworn and not afterwards, the 
court to have power upon such objection to order 
the indictment to be amended [55]. In cases of 
variance it gave the court the same power to amend 
as possessed by a judge at nisi prius [56] (that is 
power to amend in the case of any variance not 
material to the merits of the case, which did not 
prejudice the accused in his defence) [57]. It 
also simplified the forms of indictment in the case* 
of certain crimes (in particular homicide and those 
involving criminality in relation to documents) 
[58]. In its objective of seeking to prevent 
acquittals based on unmeritorious pleading points 
the Act was largely (although not completely) [59] 
successful; certainly, there was following the Act 
a, marked reduction in the number of indictment 
points reserved and taken upon writ of error. What 
it did not, however, tackle was the problem of the 
prolixity of indictments (itself a by-product of 
the rules as to certainty and variance). An attempt 
was made to address this problem along the lines 
suggested by Greaves in the Criminal Code Bills of 
1878 to 1883, but it was not until 1915 that the 





The grand jury . having returned a true bill, 
the accused was then arraigned, and in 1800 there 
were aspects of the law as to arraignment and plea 
which were anything but favourable to him. 
Mention has been made already of the law's 
refusal to allow the accused to plead over in 
misdemeanour. Even more harsh was its treatment 
of those who refused to plead. If when called on 
to plead a prisoner made no answer, a jury would 
immediately be empanelled to try whether he was 
mute of malice or by visitation of God [61]. If the 
jury found him mute of malice, or, if on 
arraignment he had expressly declined to plead or 
answer directly (which conduct was taken as 
dispensing with the need for a jury's verdict on 
the question), or if, having pleaded, he refused to 
put himself on his country, his contumacy was 
treated as equivalent to a conviction, and the 
court would proceed forthwith to sentence [62]. 
This had always been the law in treason, petty 
larceny and misdemeanour, and when the peine forte 
et dure was abolished in 1772 the rule had been 
applied to felony as well [63]. Eventually, in 1827 
the law was reformed, Peel's Criminal Law Act 
providing that henceforth an accused who, on 
arraignment, pleaded not guilty was deemed thereby 
to put himself on his country, and that where a 
prisoner, on arraignment, was mute of malice or 
refused to answer directly, the court should have 
power to direct that a plea of not guilty be 
entered [64]. 
Another problem and one at least as common in 
practice as contumacy was-that of the prisoner who 
had (or might have) a defence in law, but who, 
despite the judge's (and his counsel's) entreaties 
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insisted on pleading guilty, conceiving that to 
plead not guilty would be to add falsehood to 
crime. In 1860 Lord Brougham in an attempt to deal 
with this difficulty, introduced a Bill [65] into 
the Lords which proposed that the question put on 
arraignment be altered from 'Are you guilty or not 
guilty? ' to 'Do you wish to be tried or do you 
plead guilty? ' This sensible small reform, 
although having the support of the Lord Chancellor 
and of many outside the House (not least prison 






ATTACKING THE PROSECUTION CASE 
'The self-defending prisoner unless he is an old 
hand usually does not cross-examine at all, or 
attempts to put his cross-examination into 
controversial assertions for which he gets pulled 
up. What questions he does ask result in 
emphasising the case against him. ' 
A. M. Sullivan, The Last Serjeant, p. 124. 
The accused having entered a not guilty plea 
and been given in charge to a jury, the prosecution 
would begin to call its evidence. 
What witnesses the prosecution called was a 
matter for its discretion. During the first half of 
the century there was a' tendency for judges to 
react to the refusal of the prosecution to call a 
witness, whose name appeared on the back of the 
indictment, by either calling the witness 
themselves [1] or insisting that the Crown tender 
him for cross-examination [2]. After 1860, 
however, this practice was abandoned, the only 
obligation now cast upon the Crown, in respect of 
witnesses it chose not to call, being that of 
having them at court in case the defence wished to 
call them [3] (a rule change which, in an age when 
the calling of evidence by the defence gave the 
Crown the reply, had major implications for trial 
tactics). 
The defence had the right to insist that those 
witnesses the Crown did call remained out of court 
until called [4], and where the prisoner was 
represented the right was invariably insisted upon. " 
To undermine and discredit the evidence of 
prosecution witnesses, the accused had the tool of 
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cross-examination. However, at this date its 
effectiveness as a defence weapon was limited by 
two factors - the denial of legal representation to 
poor prisoners, and legal rules placing curbs upon 
cross-examination. 
(a) Lack of legal representation 
Attempts by unrepresented prisoners to cross- 
examine were, for the most part, pitifully 
ineffective [5]. Sometimes the judge would make 
the task even harder by insisting that all 
questions be put through him. In trial reports, 
one occasionally finds an example of effective 
cross-examination by an undefended prisoner, but 
few prisoners displayed such skill, and those who 
did were apt to be regarded with suspicion [6]. 
(b) Curbs on cross-examination 
(i) Leading questions 
As for legal 
counsel putting 
examination was, 
regarded by some 
objection was 
unsuccessfully) as 
curbs, the propriety of defence 
leading questions in cross- 
at the start of the century, 
judges as doubtful [7], and the 
still. being taken (albeit 
late as 1836 [8]. 
(ii) Cross-examination of witnesses as to their 
pasts 
More important were the obstacles to the 
cross=examination of witnesses as to their 
discreditable pasts. Of these the most obvious was 
the rule which rendered a person, who had been 
convicted of (and received judgment for) treason, 
felony or crimen falsi [9], incompetent to testify 
[10], (after 1828 competency was restored, save in 
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crimen falsi, once the convict had served his 
sentence) [11]. Any prisoner wishing to raise=. = 
such a conviction against a witness had to produce 
a copy of the record of the conviction or judgment: 
[12],. whereupon unless a pardon was produced the 
witness would be held incompetent. If he failed to 
produce a copy of the record, not only would the 
witness be permitted to testify, but the prisoner 
would be debarred from cross-examining as to the 
conviction [13]. 
Then there was the privilege against self-, -- 
incrimination which in 1800 had a wider scope than 
it does today, entitling- a witness to decline to.. 
answer, not only on the ground of incrimination of-. 
crime, but also where the answer would expose him., 
to a penalty, forfeiture or ecclesiastical censure 
[14]., In 1806 the judges advised the Lords that 
the privilege also excused a witness from answering 
a question which would expose him to an action for, 
debt [15], but this ruling was reversed by statute 
the following year [16]. 
In the latter half of the century the scope of. 
the privilege was gradually reined in by the 
judges. In particular, whilst acknowledging that a 
witness might lawfully refuse to answer a question 
where the answer would form a link in a chain of 
evidence leading to his conviction [17], they 
insisted that they, not the witness, were to be the 
judges of whether a question was incriminating, 
although controversy on the point lingered on until 
the 1880s [18]. 
By the 1850s Brougham was advocating that the 
law should go even further than this. In 1853 he 
included in his Law of Evidence and Procedure 
Amendment Bill [19] of that year a clause 
abolishing the privilege, and substituting for it a 
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rule forbidding incriminating answers being used 
against the witness in subsequent proceedings. But 
the clause met strong opposition. It was argued 
that such a change in the law would be a means of 
circumventing the prohibition upon the 
interrogation of prisoners, and might also result 
in a"witness being compelled to disclose facts 
which would lead to the discovery of other evidence 
against him which could be used to procure his 
conviction. These arguments carried the day and 
the clause was lost [20]. 
The most troublesome aspect of the privilege 
was, however, that part of it which related to 
degrading questions. In a number of seventeenth 
and eighteenth century cases [21] it had been held 
that a witness was not obliged to answer a question 
which would degrade or disgrace him (e. g. whether 
he had been whipped for petty larceny), and the 
rule had been applied to attempts to question 
jurors upon the trial of a challenge for cause 
[22]. ' According to Peake [23], the rule fell into 
desuetude during the eighteenth century, only to 
re-emerge with a vengeance at the start of the 
nineteenth, with Lord Ellenborough ruling not 
merely that degrading questions need not be 
answered, but also that they should not be put 
[24]. He sought to justify his ruling on the 
ground of public policy - if such questions were 
allowed witnesses would not come forward. Others 
offered as a justification for the rule. the 
grievance to a witness of having old disgraces 
dragged up after he had rehabilitated himself [25]. 
But as Best C. J. pointed out there was another side 
to 'the coin: - if such questions were not permitted 
juries would be prevented from learning facts about 
a witness's character which it' was important for 
them to . know, ' and ' innocent men might suffer [26]. 
So' far as one can judge-from contemporary trial 
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reports, the new rule was far from universally; 
enforced. One finds, . 
for instance, numerous 
examples from the first quarter of the century of 
accomplices called by the Crown being cross-, * 
examined unmercifully as to their character [27]., - 
Reported cases also afford instances [28]. Indeed, 
it appears that Lord Ellenborough may himself have. - 
had a change of heart on the subject, for, in a, 
case in 1818, he is reputed to have threatened to 
commit a witness for contempt unless he answered a 
question as to whether he had previously been- 
imprisoned [29]. 
From the defendant's point of view the 
important thing, so far as such cross-examination 
was concerned, was not to be able to compel an 
answer, but to be able. to put the question, a 
refusal to answer being generally treated by the, 
jury as tantamount to an admission [30]. And his 
right to do so had by 1850 been clearly 
established. The last case in which a judge is 
reported as disallowing a question as degrading is 
Pitcher [30] in 1823, and a severe blow was dealt 
to the authority of such cases by Denman's Act of 
1843, which restored to competency those convicted 
of crimen falsi or undergoing punishment for 
treason or felony. For it was scarcely to be 
believed that it was Parliament's intention that 
those, who had, by reason of their infamy, formerly 
been incompetent as witnesses should now be not 
merely competent but also protected from 
questioning about their. infamy. And if such 
questions could be put to witnesses of this sort 
why not to all witnesses? Indeed, by the 1850s, 
serious doubt was being expressed as to whether 
there was in fact any privilege to refuse to answer 
degrading questions [31]. In 1853 Brougham in his 
Evidence Bill sought to put the matter beyond doubt 
by abolishing the privilege, but the clause did not 
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pass. In 1865 any lingering doubt as to the right 
to question witnesses as to previous convictions 
was removed by s. 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 
that year [32], which provided that if a witness 
declined to answer such questions, the conviction 
might be proved against him (thereby extending to 
criminal cases a rule laid down for civil cases by 
the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854). 
Although the 1865 edition of Russell on Crime 
had treated it as arguable that the privilege still 
survived, eight years later it was laid down by 
Cockburn L. C. J. in the clearest terms that there 
was no such privilege [33]. After this it was 
treated by text writers as defunct [34]. The only 
remnant which survived was in relation to jury 
challenges, albeit that the privilege had displayed 
a considerable capacity for survival in relation 
rape prosecutions [35]. 
By 1892 the want of such a privilege was being 
keenly felt. Two of the leading advocates of the 
day [36], who had the previous year, in two 
notorious cases, pushed cross-examination as to 
character to its limits, found themselves roundly 
condemned both in the leader and the correspondence 
columns of The Times [37]. Several letters 
suggested that English law adopt the plan of the 
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (already adopted in 
English courts martial) and give the judge the 
power to disallow any question as to credit, unless 
of the opinion that the imputation conveyed by it 
would, -if 
true, seriously affect the credibility of 
the , witness 
[38]. Arguably, judges already had 
such power at common law [39], and, in any, event, 
as The Times leader pointed, out, leaving the matter 
to the discretion of the judge did not solve the 
problem: -judges were always reluctant to intervene 
because they could, never feel sure they had a 
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ý.. 
complete knowledge of the facts of the case; also,,, 
to disallow the question was to shut the stable 
door after the horse had bolted; by the time the- 
question had been asked, the damage had been done; "" 
in the end one had to trust to the discretion of 
the advocate not to ask such questions. In the-' 
event the storm passed and nothing was done [40]. 
(iii) The rule in The Queen's case 
i 
Another serious fetter on cross-examination as 
to credit was that imposed by the judges in 1820 byF 
their ruling in The queen's case [41]. There they. ' 
had advised the House of Lords that a party seeking 
to cross-examine a witness about a previous-, 
statement in writing by him,, had to show the 
writing to him, and, if he acknowledged it as his r 
read it as part of his (the party's) evidence. In-- 
criminal cases, the document upon which defence 
counsel would most frequently seek to cross-examine 
would be the depositions, although prior to 1836- 
the refusal of the law to allow a prisoner either 
to inspect or have a copy of the depositions" 
represented an obstacle (albeit not an 
insurmountable one) to such cross-examination. - 
When prisoners were by the Prisoners' Counsel Act, ` 
1836 given the right to a copy of the depositions, 
the judges took steps to ensure that cross- 
examination upon depositions should henceforth be 
in accordance with the rules laid down in 
Queen's case. In 1837, before going out on 
circuit, they issued a Practice Direction [42]. 'A 
Crown witness was not to be asked about what he did 
or did not say in his deposition, unless it had 
first been read out, and,. if it was so read out, it 
was to be treated as evidence for the prisoner. 
Such a_krule was extremely disadvantageous to the :4z 
defence: it deprived the cross-examiner of the 
advantage of surprise; it meant that the exposure 
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of the discrepancy between the witness's evidence 
and his deposition was bought at the price of 
having the whole deposition go in; and since the 
deposition, when read, became part of the defence 
case, such cross-examination automatically gave the 
Crown the right to the last word with the jury. 
Before 1837 was out a determined attempt had 
been made to test the resolution of the Judges to 
enforce the Practice Direction. In Edwards [43], a 
murder case tried before Littledale and Coleridge 
JJ. (neither of whom had been present when the 
Practice Direction had been agreed to by the 
judges), defence counsel claimed that not all the 
judges were applying the new rules (Tindall C. J., 
it was said, had treated it as an open question 
whether the rules were binding). Further, it was 
argued that, under the new rules, a prisoner was in 
a worse position than he had been before the Act 
(which could scarcely have been the intention of 
Parliament); before the Act, it was claimed, 
defence counsel had commonly been allowed to cross- 
examine upon depositions without putting them in 
(Adolphus for the Crown conceded the existence of 
such a practice but claimed it was irregular), and 
that, moreover, the judges had frequently 
themselves undertaken such cross-examination. In 
the end the judges in Edwards cut short the debate 
by doing just that. 
Edwards thus affirmed a possible` avenue of 
escape from the rigours of the Practice Direction. 
However, few judges- were, it seems prepared to 
allow it to be used. The report of Edwards' case 
refers to the Practice Direction being enforced by 
most judges, and gives a long list of judges who 
had enforced it [44]. Occasionally, - one finds 
over the next twenty years examples of judges being 
prepared to follow Edwards, and themselves cross- 
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examine on the depositions, or allow counsel to be, 
their mouthpiece, without putting them in, but the 
general attitude appears to have been that ascribed 
by the Common Law Commissioners to Patteson J. 'I 
will not break the law and you must not'. [46] 
A device resorted to to evade the Practice 
Direction was that of placing the deposition in the 
witness's hand, asking him to read them to himself,: 
and then asking him when he had done so whether he 
stood by his answer [47]. The justification, 
offered for not putting the deposition in in such a 
case was that the witness was not being cross- 
examined on it, but simply being invited to refresh 
his memory. However, in 1843 the Fifteen Judges in 
a reserved case [48] declared it illegal. Their 
decision (probably because it was never reported), 
appears to have gone unnoticed, and certainly it 
did not put a stop to the practice. In Matthews, 
1849 [49], Pollock C. B. described it as on the 
extreme verge of established rules of practice, 
and, in 1851, the matter was considered by the 
Court for Crown Cases Reserved in Ford, which 
repeated the 1843 ruling. Even after this, one 
finds occasional, albeit unsuccessful, attempts to 
revive the practice [51]. 
Yet another technique used to evade the 
Practice Direction was simply to ask the witness 
whether he had ever said what he was now saying 
before? Strictly, the question was improper. As 
Patteson J. stressed in Shellard (1840) 'have you 
always said so except before the magistrates? ' was 
the correct way for the question to be put [52]. 
However, it was not unknown for judges to turn 
,a 
blind eye, and allow . such questions despite 
prosecution objections. 
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One limitation imposed by the judges on the 
Practice Direction was to hold that it did not 
apply to depositions irregularly obtained [53]. 
As to whether it applied to coroner's depositions 
was uncertain [54]. 
That the rule in The Qy 
a powerful disincentive to 
depositions is beyond doubt. 
told that he must put the 
commonly abandon this line 
[55]. 
en's case operated as 
cross-examining upon 
Counsel, upon being 
deposition in, would 
of cross-examination 
In 1854 the rule was abolished as regards 
civil cases by the Common Law Procedure Act [56]. 
Henceforth a witness in a civil case could be 
cross-examined about previous written statements 
without putting such statements in, although, if it 
was sought to contradict him from the statement, 
then it had to go in. In 1856 Greaves in a Report 
on Criminal Procedure (57) recommended that 
criminal law be brought into line with civil law on 
this point, and in 1865 this was done by the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1865 [58]. 
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CHAPTER 8 
GETTING ACROSS THE PRISONER'S STORY I 
THE COMMON LAW RULES 
'Now where a man who is interested in the matter 
in question would also prove it, 'tis rather a 
cause for distrust than any just cause for belief 
... and the law removes them from testimony to stop them sliding into perjury' 
Gilbert, Evidence, p. 122. 
(a) The Incompetency Rule 
As well as seeking to undermine and discredit' 
the prosecution evidence, an accused would also be' 
concerned to get his own version of events before 
the jury. But here he faced a handicap. The law 
denied him the right either to give evidence 
himself or to call his wife to give evidence on his 
behalf. 
Contemporary lawyers explained the disability 
in terms of a larger rule - the doctrine of 
incompetency through interest, which barred from 
the witness box, in civil and criminal suits alike, 
any person regarded as having an interest in the 
outcome of the proceedings. However, for all that 
text writers spoke of the incompetence of the 
accused and of the parties to a civil suit as being 
of a piece, and offered the same justification for 
the rule in both cases, namely that the evidence of 
an interested person would inevitably be biased and 
therefore worthless [1], the two cases were not in 
fact the same. In the first place, an accused was 
permitted to do something which the parties to a 
civil suit could not do, namely make an unsworn 
statement. Secondly, there was, so it was claimed, 
a far more compelling reason than interest, for 
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refusing to allow an accused to give evidence on 
his own behalf, namely the need to . protect 
prisoners against self-incrimination [2]. To 
abolish the incompetency rule would, so the 
argument went, lead to the establishment in England 
of something akin to the disliked French form of 
procedure, with prisoners compelled by rigorous 
cross-examination (conducted, where there was no 
prosecuting counsel, by the judge) to convict 
themselves out of their own mouths [3]. The 
country had had experience of such a system in the 
days of Scroggs and Jeffreys [4], and after the 
Revolution had set its face against prisoners being 
subjected to such 'moral torture' [5]. 
Faced with the law's refusal to allow him to 
testify an accused had to. resort to other means to 
get his story across. 
(i) Cross-examination 
One such means was cross-examination. By 
putting his case to the prosecution witnesses in 
cross-examination, an accused could not only make 
clear, at an early stage, what his answer was, but 
occasionally might even succeed in getting those 
witnesses to agree that the facts were indeed as he 
asserted. But cross-examination is a lawyer's 
tool, and, although in reports of nineteenth 
century century trials one occasionally comes 
across undefended prisoners capable of cross- 
examining with real skill, effective cross- 
examination was beyond the majority of undefended 
prisoners. The common error of the undefended 
prisoner, when called on to cross-examine, was to 
make-assertions instead of putting questions; this 
would frequently produce a rebuke from the bench 
after which the accused would generally lapse into 
silence [6]. Nor was this an area in which the 
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judge could do much to aid the prisoner. The judge 
could probe weaknesses, and inconsistencies in the 
prosecution evidence but he could not (save where. 
the prisoner had given his account on arrest or at 
committal, or, where, during his attempts at cross- 
examination, he gave some clue as to his what his- 
case was) put the prisoner's version to witnesses 
because he had no means of knowing what it was [7]. `' 
(ii) The pre-trial statement 
Another device was the pre-trial statement -a 
statement made either on his arrest to the 
arresting officer or before the committing 
magistrate. The Crown, although not obliged to lay, 
such statements before a jury, would generally do 
so [8] and indeed many judges openly favoured this 
course [9]. One of the grounds, on which Patteson; 
J. (in 1844) [10] exhorted police officers not to* 
stop prisoners volunteering statements, was that 
such statements were often a means of demonstrating 
the innocence of the accused. But many prisoners 
made no such statements. Indeed, at committal 
hearings, such prisoners as had lawyers would, even 
in the 1800s, commonly reserve their defence [11], - 
a practice which adverse judicial comment did 
little to discourage. 
(iii), The unsworn statement 
The method of getting the prisoner's story 
before the jury, which approximated most closely to 
the giving of evidence, was the making of ýan 
unsworn statement. 
However, the privilege 
statement was not accorded 
Undefended prisoners, 'and 
charged with treason and 
of making such a 
to all prisoners., 
defended prisoners 
(until 1836) felony 
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enjoyed the right, but a defended prisoner charged 
with misdemeanour did not. 
In White (1811) [12] Lord Ellenborough sought 
to justify the rule in misdemeanour on the grounds 
of 
'the confusion which would necessarily follow 
if a case were to be conducted at the same 
time both by counsel and by the party 
himself'. 
Reports of misdemeanour trials in The Times 
[13] and the State Trials Reports [14] suggest 
that White was confirming an existing practice 
rather than laying down any new rule. However, the 
practice was certainly not one of any great 
antiquity. As recently as 1795 Rooke J., in the 
trial of Redhead Yorke for misdemeanour, had 
allowed the defendant and his counsel to share the 
task of examining and cross-examining witnesses, 
and at the end of the evidence had further given 
the defendant the option of addressing the jury in 
person or by his counsel. The rule laid down in 
White was reaffirmed by Abbott C. J. in 1824 in 
Perkins[16]: - 'If', said the Chief Justice, 
'the party addresses the jury in person he 
must cross-examine the witnesses, for if 
counsel cross-examined and the party spoke 
great inconvenience would ensue'. 
Abbott was, however, prepared to admit one 
qualification to the rule, ýnamely that a defendant, 
who employed counsel merely to argue points of law 
and suggest questions to him for cross-examination, 
would not thereby lose his right to address the 
jury. 
Ellenborough's argument .. about.. confusion was 
less ' than:, convincing. In felony trials' it was,, and 
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had been for many years, regular practice for, 
counsel to cross-examine and the accused to address 
the jury, and noone appears to have found the 
practice productive of confusion there. 
An undefended prisoner was called on to make 
his unsworn statement (or defence as it was 
commonly called) at the close of the prosecution 
case, as was the defended prisoner in felony. In 
treason, however, the prisoner, if defended (and 
prisoners in treason invariably had counsel), was 
called on for his defence after his counsel had, 
addressed the jury and his witnesses had given 
evidence [17]. 
The law was remarkably indulgent to prisoners 
in respect of the content of unsworn statements., 
All manner of hearsay could be and was introduced 
[18]. Passages from newspapers and books. could be 
read [19]. However, there were limits to judicial 
tolerance. In the early part of the century 
blasphemy cases were a recurrent problem in this 
respect. The accused would frequently seek to 
defend himself by quotations from religious texts. - 
This would lead to an admonition from the bench 
that he should not try and justify one blasphemy by 
another, which would be followed by protests from 
the accused that the judge was preventing him from 
defending himself [20]. 
Another indulgence which the law extended was 
that the prisoner, instead of delivering. his 
defence ex tempore, could, if he wished, put in. a 
written defence, and either read it himself or have 
it read for him by an officer of the court. 
A written defence offered, in many ways the 
best method of getting across the prisoner's 
answer. Often such defences were the handiwork of 
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friends [22] or lawyers [23]. Indeed, in Newgate 
in the 1820s, there seems to have been a 
flourishing trade in written defences, a prisoner 
who could not afford to brief counsel using what 
money he had to pay for a defence to be written 
[24]. 
The written defence did, however, have its 
disadvantages, of which the gravest was that, being 
of necessity prepared in advance of the trial, by 
the time the prisoner was called on to deliver it 
it might well have been rendered wholly inapposite 
by the turn the evidence had taken. This 
disadvantage could, of course, be avoided if the 
defence was actually prepared as the case was going 
on, and this was sometimes done [25]. Bought 
defences were a particular source of danger to 
prisoners. They rarely assisted and could often do 
the prisoner dreadful harm. It was not unknown for 
a prisoner to hand in a paper to be used in his 
defence, only to discover, when it was read, that 
it was an admission of guilt, coupled with a plea 
in mitigation [26]. Some judges sought, to protect 
prisoners handing in bought defences by insisting 
onreading the defence themselves, or having it 
read and explained to the prisoner before it was 
put in [27]. 
Those prisoners, who did not come into court 
armed-., with a written defence, generally made a poor 
show of explaining their case. Young -children 
would often merely sob and say nothing [28]. And 
many `, 1,, adults fared no better. Illiterate, 
inarticulate, in awe of the court, terrified for 
their. 'lives, without friends or advice,. not knowing 
whatto. say they said nothing. In a case before 
thes., Reading, special, commission in,. 1831, of ten 
prisoners, jointly indicted for riot, only one, 
when called upon, offered a defence [29]; and 
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newspaper reports of trials show that this was by 
no means an uncommon phenomenon [30], even where 
the charge was capital. Those prisoners who did 
manage to get a few words out in their own defence 
rarely went beyond a bare denial ('I am as innocent 
as the child unborn' [31]; 'I know nothing of it' 
[32]), a few words of explanation ('I was 
intoxicated' [33]), or the offering of a stock 
defence (e. g. the pickpocket's claim 'I found the 
handkerchief under my feet, I picked it up got on 
the footpath and the policeman collared me' [34]). 
Yet others, making no attempt at defence, simply 
begged for mercy ('I hope you will be merciful, I 
have a wife and two children' [35]). Where the 
evidence was circumstantial or complicated, it was 
an exceptional prisoner who was able to deal with 
the points against him in an orderly and reasoned 
fashion. Most prisoners, if they attempted to speak 
at length, descended into rambling irrelevance 
[36]. At a trial in 1843 [37] the jury were so 
irritated by having to sit through the prisoners' 
speeches, that they asked the judge whether it was 
necessary for them to sit and give attention to 
matters entirely irrelevant such as the last two 
speeches. Even a man of education might find the 
task of making an effective address beyond him 
[38]. 
For all that most undefended prisoners, when 
addressing the jury, cut a poor figure and did 
their cases little good, a few were able to use the 
right effectively [39]. 
One way of making the statement of an 
undefended prisoner a more effective vehicle for 
getting across his defence would have been for the 
trial judge, at the end of the prosecution case, to 
call his attention to the principal points against 
him, and to invite him to deal with them one by 
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one. This was in fact the solution adopted, in the 
Indian Code of Criminal Procedure Act 1861 [40] and 
there is evidence that it was also by the 1880s and 
1890s being adopted unofficially at some Quarter 
Sessions [41]. In the 1800s one occasionally sees 
the technique used by. examining magistrates [42], 
but in jury trials it was apparently unknown. 
Where a prisoner was defended by counsel, it 
11, 
was-often a nice question whether he should make an 
unsworn statement [43]. Where the charge was 
treason, there was much to be said against his 
doing so (most prisoners in practice did not), for, 
if he made a statement, he would make it after his 
counsel had addressed the jury, and the danger 
would be that he would end up merely doing, for a 
second time and less well, what his counsel had 
already done, thereby risking trying the jury's 
patience. Where the charge was felony the position 
was somewhat different. If the prisoner did not 
make ,a statement, the jury would hear no address 
from either him or his counsel (except in so far as 
his counsel had been able to address argument to 
them under the guise of a submission to the judge 
on_y_law), and this was clearly a factor to be 
weighed in the balance. In some cases the decision 
was easy to make. Where the defence was insanity, 
the best way of convincing the jury that the 
prisoner was mad, could sometimes be to let him 
address them. And if the prisoner had an 
explanation or facts to offer, which could not be 
otherwise got before the jury, there was clearly no 
alternative but for him to offer a defence, and, in 
such a,, case, it was obviously prudent for the 
defence to be written and approved, if not drafted, 
by, counsel. Where there was nothing to be gained 
bya, defended prisoner making; an unsworn. statement, 
the sensible course was for, him, when called upon, 
to 'leave it to his counsel'. But not all 
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prisoners were prepared to do what was sensible. - 
Some, upon being called upon, proceeded to offer an' 
ex tempore defence which left their counsel in' 
despair. Nor was it unknown for a prisoner to handy 
in, to be read, a written defence which his counsel: 
had not even seen still less approved [44]. In' 
some of these cases, poor communication between, 
counsel and client was no doubt to blame (a far 
from uncommon problem in an age where it was 
unusual for counsel to have conferences in criminal 
cases, and where many counsel were, in any event, ' 
instructed so late in the day as to render a 
conference impractical). In others, the 
explanation was pigheadedness, dissatisfaction at 
counsel's failure to bring out a point which the 
prisoner mistakenly believed vital to his defence, 
or fear that, if he said nothing, it would go badly 
for him with the jury. In capital cases, it was 
not unknown for defended prisoners to seek to make 
a second statement to the jury at the end of the 
judge's summing up, and such requests were usually 
indulged in favorem vitae [45]. 
The prisoner who succeeded in making an 
effective defence to the jury was, however, still 
not out of the wood. In the first place he might 
find prosecution witnesses being recalled so that 
matters raised by him in his defence could be put 
to them. In Carey (1803) [46] the prisoner, charged 
with the murder of his wife, handed in a written 
petition in which he alleged that the deceased had 
been afflicted by asthma and consumption for some 
years before her death. The judge had the 
deceased's father called to deal with the point. In 
the 1800s the course was one commonly adopted [47] 
at the Old Bailey, and we find it referred to as 
late as 1884 [48]. That such a course should be 
adopted where the prisoner had not put his case to 
the witnesses was understandable, but, on 
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occasions, one finds witnesses being recalled even 
where he had done so. Secondly, the prisoner's 
statement would be subject to comment from the 
judge. In the eighteenth century, it was the 
practice to tell juries that a statement by a 
prisoner, uncorroborated by evidence, was worthless 
[49]. This mode of direction was still being 
employed at the start of the nineteenth century. 
However, not all judges took such a strict line 
[50]. ' Thus in Power (1805) [51] one finds the 
Recorder of London commending the explanation given 
by the prisoner in her defence as 'probably true'. 
By 1840 however, judges, whilst warning juries that 
the prisoner's statement was made without the 
sanction of an oath and had not been tested by 
cross-examination, were, it seems, generally 
prepared to concede to such statements some 
evidential weight. In Beard (1837) [52] Coleridge 
3'. said that a prisoner's statement would carry 
such weight with the jury as, all the circumstances 
considered, it was entitled to. In Dyer (1844) 
[53] Alderson B. said that if the prisoner's 
statement fitted in with the rest of the evidence 
it, would be very material. By the 1880s the 
doctrine laid down in Beard and Dyer seems to have 
gained general acceptance [54]. How far juries in 
fact heeded such directions is hard to say. The 
point that the prisoner had failed to call 
witnesses to support what he said where, if he was 
speaking the truth, such witnesses did exist, was 
obviously a powerful (if often unfair) one, but 
where the prisoner was the only person'who could 
prove the truth of what" he was saying, it can 
hardly, 
"have 
struck an intelligent jury as ' fair to 
criticise him for failing to do what the law did 
not permit him to do. Third, if the account, which 
the prisoner gave in his unsworn statement, was one 
which he had not mentioned on his arrest, or before 
the examining magistrate, on this score also he 
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courted the risk of adverse judicial comment (55]. 
This risk was at its height in the closing years of 
the century. 
(iv) The calling of witnesses 
The fourth and final means of getting the 
prisoner's version before the jury was by the 
calling of witnesses to fact - persons who had 
witnessed the events giving rise to the charge, or 
who could otherwise (e. g. by giving evidence of 
alibi) demonstrate the prisoner's innocence. 
In the matter of the calling of witnesses, the' 
position of prisoners had during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries been much improved. The 
common law rules, which denied a prisoner in a 
capital case process to compel the attendance of 
his witnesses and the right to have them sworn, had 
been swept away by statute [56], and by 1835 it was 
also settled law that, in a criminal case, there 
was no obligation to tender conduct money to a 
witness subpoenaed on behalf of a defendant [57]. 
However, for all these improvements in the 
law, 
. 
poor prisoners often had the greatest 
difficulty in getting material defence witnesses to 
court. A prisoner, who was in custody and who 
could not afford an attorney, even if he was aware 
of his right to issue subpoenas (and many would not 
be), would rarely be able to serve them. Even if 
he could get a message to his witnesses, and they 
were anxious to help, their poverty would 
frequently prevent their doing so. Attending as a 
witness at Assizes or county Quarter Sessions would 
usually involve travel, and, if the accused came 
from a part of the county remote from the county 
town, attendance would for his witnesses involve a 
costly journey, or, if they could not afford to pay 
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for transport, many days walk [58]. Having made 
the journey to the court of trial, the witnesses 
would then have to wait until the case was called 
on. The wait could extend over many days, during 
which they would have to provide themselves with 
food and accommodation. At the Old Bailey in 1819 
it was by no means uncommon for witnesses in 
Middlesex cases to have to hang about the court for 
ten to twelve days and upwards [59]. 
Sometimes, prisoners' attorneys would try and 
reduce the expense by warning witnesses for the day 
or time at which they believed the case was likely 
to come on. But this was a risky game. All cases 
in the calendar were liable to be called on at any 
time, and, if, when a prisoner's case was called 
on, his witnesses had not arrived, judges would 
rarely put the case back to wait for them to arrive 
[60]. The publishing of a daily list would have 
done much to alleviate the problem. This modest 
reform had been canvassed before a Royal Commission 
in 1816, but it was to be many years before it was 
implemented [61]. 
Where a prisoner had witness difficulties, it 
was, in, theory, open to him to apply to the court 
to postpone his trial. However, such applications 
were sparingly granted. The application had to be 
supported by an affidavit, and this requirement 
would not be dispensed with simply because the 
prisoner was poor [62]. In the affidavit the 
prisoner would have to give the name of the 
witness, indicate the nature of the evidence he 
would give and detail the efforts he had made to 
procure his attendance [63]. Even where the 
, 
prisoner, had good grounds for postponement, he 
, might, still be refused 
if he made his application 
too late (it'was by no means unknown for a prisoner 
not to raise the matter of his absent witnesses 
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until asked by the judge, at the close of the Crown` 
case, if he had witnesses to call, and there 'were 
some judges who held that an application made after' 
the jury had been sworn came too late) [64]. 
How reluctant judges were to grant, 
postponements in the early part of the century is 
well demonstrated by the case of Nesbitt [65], 
tried for murder at Maidstone Assizes in July; - 
1820. When the case was called on, Nesbitt's 
counsel applied to have the case stood over to the 
next Assize, on the ground that the prisoner, on 
his arrest, had been deprived of money, in` 
consequence of which he had been unable to secure 
the attendance of his witnesses. Counsel added 
that an affidavit in support of the application was 
being prepared and would be ready in a few hours. - 
Wood B. rejected the application, out of hand, 
declaring that plenty of time had been allowed. 
As well as granting postponements, judges 
would, on occasion, give cases a fixed day, but, 
predictably, the majority of such applications 
appear, in practice, to have been made and granted 
for the convenience of counsel rather than for the 
assistance of their clients and their clients' 
witnesses [66]. 
Then again, the witnesses had to be competent 
at law, and the doctrine of incompetency through 
interest debarred the accused from calling two 
important categories of potential witnesses - his 
wife, and co-prisoners standing trial with him and 
it was not unknown for unscrupulous prosecutors to 
silence potential witnesses for an accused by 
indicting them with him [67]. Also barred from 
the witness box were children, Quakers, and 
atheists. 
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To these fetters upon the calling of defence 
evidence, Bentham was for adding another. He urged 
that the prisoner's right to call alibi evidence be 
made conditional upon his having served before 
trial an alibi notice, giving details of the alibi 
and the witnesses to be called in support of it 
[68]. Alternatively, the court might, he 
suggested, be empowered to adjourn the trial to 
enable the prosecution to investigate a late 
disclosed alibi. In 1835 his idea was taken up 
briefly by a House of Lords' Select Committee [69], 
but in the end it was dropped, and it was not until 
1967 that the alibi notice became part of English 
criminal procedure. In fact in the nineteenth 
century such a reform was hardly needed. Alibi 
evidence had a bad name [70], and was universally 
distrusted [71], nowhere more so than in Ireland 
where the word 'aliboy' was in everyday speech a 
synonym for false witness [72], and where a false 
alibi was classified as a Kerry or a Tipperary 
alibi [73], according to whether it bore upon the 
whereabouts of the accused or a Crown witness at 
the material time. Foster [74], writing in 1762, 
had, warned that the only alibi deserving of credit 
was that disclosed at the first opportunity, and 
that an alibi raised only at trial, which the 
prosecution had had no opportunity to investigate, 
ought to be 'heard with uncommon caution', and the 
same -point was regularly hammered home to 
nineteenth century juries [75]. 
(b). The impact of the Prisoners' Counsel Act 1836 
upon the right to make an. unsworn statement-, 
When,, the Prisoners' Counsel Act 1836 gave 
prisoners charged with felony,, the right to have 
counsel - . address - 
the jury on their behalf, the 
question immediately arose had the prisoner's right 
himself to address the jury survived the Act? 
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There was nothing in the wording of the Act to 
suggest that it had not. On the contrary, the 
wording of the Act followed that of the Treason 
statutes (viz. the prisoner was to have the right`; 
to make 'full defence' by counsel), and under the 
Treason Acts a prisoner represented by counsel was; 
always permitted to make a statement. 
The judges, however, chose to construe the Act: 
restrictively. In Boucher, at Gloucester Assizes, 
(1837) [76], Coleridge J., at the conclusion of. - 
counsel's speech in a felony case, refused an. - 
application by the prisoner to make a statement-, 
saying: 
'Prisoner, your counsel has spoken for you I 
cannot hear both'. 
This ruling was followed by Bosanquet J. the next 
year in Burrows [77]. He gave as his reason for so 
ruling that: 
'the recent statute only meant to put 
prisoners in the same situation as they were 
before where defended by counsel in cases of 
misdemeanour, and in those cases certainly a 
defendant could not be allowed the privilege 
of two statements, one by himself another by 
counsel. ' 
He rejected the analogy of treason, saying that 
treason had always been considered an exception, 
the reason for the greater privilege being that the 
statute giving the right to counsel in treason said 
that the accused was to be permitted a full 
defence. This reasoning, of course, ignored the 
fact that a prisoner's unsworn statement was not 
simply an exercise in advocacy, a second speech, 
but a vital opportunity to give his explanation, 
and that if denied the right to make a statement 
where represented, this meant that he was in a 
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worse position in this respect than if undefended. 
Further, so far the treason point is concerned, 
Bosanquet seems to have overlooked the fact that 
the wording of the 1836 Act was, if anything, wider 
than that of the treason statutes (it empowered 
accused to make 'full answer and defence by 
counsel'). In Rider (July 1838) [78] Patteson J. 
offered another reason for the rule, namely that if 
a prisoner stated to a jury what he could not 
prove, the jury ought to dismiss what he said from 
their minds, and, in so far as what he said was 
comment upon the evidence, his counsel could do 
this much better than he could. This analysis 
ignored the fact that unrepresented prisoners had 
always traditionally been allowed to say whatever 
they wished in answer to the charge, and, in 
particular, had always been permitted to give 
explanations of the evidence against them as well 
as comments upon it, and that not all judges denied 
such explanations evidential weight. In Taylor 
(1859) [79] Byles J. offered a third objection to 
the practice, namely that it would: 
'lead to prisoners being examined on their own 
behalf without the sanction of an oath and 
then a speech commenting on their statement. ' 
If a prisoner defended by counsel could not 
make a statement, could he get round the difficulty 
by giving his explanation through his counsel? In 
Beard [80], decided at the same Gloucester Assize 
as Boucher, Coleridge J. answered this question 
with'. an, emphatic no. 'I cannot permit a prisoner's 
counsel', he said, 'to tell the jury anything which 
he' is-, not in a position to prove'. The following 
year, he repeated this ruling in Butcher [81]. The 
ruling was, in fact, in line with that which had 
been given in a clutch of civil cases in the early 
1830s [82]. 
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Not all judges, however, were willing to. _ 
construe the new Act as excluding the prisoner's, ' 
right to make an unsworn statement. In March 1838, 
at Oxford Assizes, in a case called Malinas [83] 
defence counsel was, in his speech to the jury,. 
bemoaning the fact that his client could not make 
his own defence, when the trial judge, Alderson B, 
interrupted him saying: 
'I see no objection in this case to his doing 
so. I think it is right that a person should'' 
have an opportunity of stating such facts as 
he may think material ... besides it is often the genuine defence of the party and not a 
mere imaginary case invented by the ingenuity; _ 
of counsel. ' 
Later that same day, Gurney B., sitting in the 
adjoining court, was induced to follow the same 
course in the case of Walklo [84], but it is 
clear that he was influenced principally by 
considerations of judicial comity, and he was at 
pains to stress that Malings was a very peculiar 
case, and that he did not wish his (Gurney's) 
ruling to be drawn into a precedent. In 1884 [85], 
Serjeänt Ballantine was to claim in a letter to The 
Times that Alderson B. later 'recalled' the 
decision in Malinns. Whether this is right or not, 
there seems little justification for Gurney's 
comment that it was a very peculiar case (it was a" 
charge of wounding with intent where the prisoner 
had made a statement to the magistrates in the same 
terms as his unsworn statement to the jury). If 
counsel in Burrows was correct, Alderson had, prior 
to Malings, given a similar ruling on the Northern 
Circuit, and six years after Malinas we find him 
declaring in peer (1844): 
'I would never prevent a prisoner from making 
a statement though he has counsel ... If it 
were otherwise the most monstrous injustice 
might result to prisoners. ' 
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Another judge who was for allowing a defended 
prisoner to make an unsworn statement was Denman 
L. C. J., who is cited by counsel in Burrows as 
having recently ruled to that effect in a case on 
the Western Circuit. 
In Williams [86] in 1846 Rolfe B., after 
having Malings cited to him, said there was good 
sense in the decision and decided to follow it. 
Cases like Malings, Dyer, and Williams were, 
" however, against the trend, and by 1850 the 
practice, followed it seems by almost all judges of 
the superior courts, was to allow a prisoner to 
make a statement in a felony case only if 
unrepresented. This was certainly what was said in 
1884 in the course of the correspondence in The 
Times generated by the O'Donnell case. And there is 
confirmation for the claim from a number of 
sources. First, the Old Bailey Sessions Papers - 
those for 1846 show only one case, out of all the 
hundreds of felony trials held at the Old Bailey in 
that year, where a prisoner represented by counsel 
made an unsworn statement. Second, there is the 
reaction of Rolfe B. in Williams, when first 
confronted by counsel's application that his client 
should be allowed to make an unsworn statement: 
'I never heard of such a thing. It is contrary 
to all the rules of practice'. 
Third, there is the observation of prosecuting 
counsel in Manzano (1860) [87] that defence 
counsel's application that the prisoner be allowed 
to. make -a statement was. unusual. Indeed, it was 
the post-1836 refusal of judges to allow defended 
prisoners. to, make unsworn statements that gave rise 
to `the standard defence-_ploy-of complaining to the 
-jury that the prisoner's mouth was closed (what a 
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Times leader [88] was to refer to as 'the stock 
argument about the marvels the prisoner could prove 
if his mouth were not shut'). ., 
It may be that at Quarter Sessions a laxer 
rule prevailed than at Assizes and the Old Bailey 
(certainly a correspondent to The Times in 1884 was 
for so saying) [89], and, even at the Old Bailey 
and before Assize judges, one gets occasional' 
deviations from normal practice. In Taylor (1859) 
Byles J. allowed a prisoner the option of having 
his counsel make a speech to the jury or making a 
statement himself. In Manzano (1860) (a murder 
case), Martin B. allowed the prisoner to make a- 
statement of how he came into possession of certain 
clothes belonging to deceased, because of the- 
importance of the case, although he added that it 
was a bad practice requiring, as it did, the judge 
to make comments on the prisoner's statement 
(perhaps adverse to him), insamuch as the counsel 
for the prosecution had no right of reply. In 
1871, at Hampshire Assizes, Pigott B. in the case 
of Stephens [90], allowed two prisoners represented 
by counsel to make statements, saying: 
'I think no harm or injustice is ever done by 
permitting prisoners to tell their own story. 
It is often a truthful statement'. 
In the early 1860s two unsuccessful applications 
that prisoners be allowed to make unsworn 
statements made at the Old Bailey were thought 
worth reporting by the editors of the Old Bailey 
Sessions Papers [91]. 
Where the judge refused to allow a statement 
by the prisoner, and there was no pre-trial 
statement, defence counsel, if he could not get the 
prisoner's version out byýcross-examination, or by 
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the calling of witnesses, had only one course open 
to him - to put his client's account to the jury as 
a hypothesis [92]. 
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CHAPTER 9 
GETTING THE PRISONER'S STORY ACROSS II 
THE FIRST REFORMS 
'If they threw on the accused the onus of proving 
that he had used all means of making a ship 
seaworthy, they must in justice allow him to be 
called as a witness'. 
The Attorney-General (1876) P. D. XXVIII, 900. 
(a) First attacks upon the incompetency rule in 
criminal cases 
If 1836 saw the prisoner's right to make an 
unsworn statement curtailed, the 1820s and 1830s 
saw a major assault launched on the doctrine of 
incompetence through interest. The doctrine had 
been savaged by Bentham [1], and satirised by 
Dickens [2], and gradually it began to buckle. 
In 1829 the absurd rule which prohibited the 
victim of a forgery from giving evidence to prove 
the falsity of the forged document was abolished 
[3]. 
In 1843 Lord Denman's Act abolished the rule 
save in the case of the parties individually named 
on the record and their spouses [4]. 
Next to fall was the rule rendering the 
parties to a civil suit incompetent. This was 
abolished, as regards County Courts by the Act of 
1846 [5] which created them, and as regards the 
superior courts by Brougham's Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act of 1851. The reform was bitterly 
opposed by the Lord Chancellor and viewed with 
great mistrust by the profession [6]. 
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The bar upon the testimony of the spouses of 
the parties, which the 1851 Act had left untouched, 
survived only two years longer, being abolished by 
Brougham's Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1853. 
Following the reform of the incompetency rule 
in respect of parties to civil actions and their 
spouses, it was perhaps inevitable that there 
would be an attempt to abolish the rule in criminal 
cases. That attempt came in 1858 with Brougham's 
Law of Evidence Further Amendment Bill [7], which 
proposed that the accused and his spouse should be 
competent but not compellable in all trials on 
indictment. The Bill got no further than a first 
reading. 
It was reintroduced the following year [8]. 
On the motion for leave, it was was strenuously 
opposed by the Lord Chancellor and other Law Lords. 
It would, they argued, entirely alter the 
administration of justice. Like the 1858 Bill it 
got no further than a first reading [9]. 
In 1860 Brougham tried again with a Bill of 
more modest scope - it was only to apply to trials 
for,, misdemeanour. It was greeted with a marked 
lack, of enthusiasm, although Lord Campbell was 
prepared to concede a proposal limited to cases of 
assault and libel might have value. Like its 
predecessors it was dropped after its first reading 
[10]. 
During the rest of the decade, no serious 
attempt at legislative reform of the criminal rule 
was made. 
In 1863, a private member called Whalley 
introduced a Petty Offences, Bill [11],. which sought 
to make the accused competent in his own defence in 
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all summary proceedings. ' His object, he declared, 
was to counter police perjury in magistrates' 
courts. The Bill received no support and was 
withdrawn at the second reading stage [12]. 
The following year it was reintroduced by 
Whalley and M'Mahon [13]. The Solicitor-General 
spoke strongly against it, arguing that it would 
expose accused persons to cross-examination, and to- 
the risk of a failure to testify being taken as 
evidence of guilt. At this it was withdrawn [14]. 
In 1865 Bills to make the accused a competent" 
witness in all criminal proceedings were introduced- 
by M' Mahon and Scully, and by Fitzroy Kelly (15]'. ' 
On the second reading debate on Kelly's Bill the` 
Attorney-General, whilst speaking out strongly 
against reform, gave an assurance that the 
Government would try to give an opportunity for 
full discussion of the question. Upon that 
assurance M'Mahon agreed to the second reading of 
his own Bill being deferred [16]. Such opportunity 
was, however, never afforded and both Bills were 
lost. 
If legislative reform was still many years 
off, several writers on criminal law and evidence 
did during the 1860s add their voices to the demand 
for reform. In 1860 Pitt Taylor, the author of 
what was by many regarded as the leading textbook 
on evidence (and the draftsman of the 1851 Act), 
pointed to the recent sensational case of the 
Reverend Hatch (who having been convicted of 
indecent assault retaliated by prosecuting his 
accuser to conviction for perjury) as clear proof 
of the need for reform [17]. Two years later, 
J. F. -Stephen published his General View of the 
Criminal Law, in which he restated and developed 
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before a wider public, arguments he had first put 
forward in a lecture in 1857 [18]. 
But although the calls for change excited no 
general enthusiasm, it was difficult to deny that 
the existing rule was open to severe criticism. 
First, there was the charge of inconsistency. 
If the law excluded the accused from the witness 
box on the ground of interest, why, it might be 
asked, was the prosecutor, who was frequently by 
payment of the expenses and otherwise as much 
interested as the party accused, not similarly 
incompetent? The answer that the prosecutor was 
the Crown not the complainant hardly convinced. 
Also, if interest was a ground of incompetency how 
came it that the law admitted accomplices as 
witnesses? Again, if the accused was incompetent 
he ought logically to be incompetent for all 
purposes, and yet he was not (on a motion for a 
criminal information the court would receive 
affidavit evidence from him; and there were many 
interlocutory applications in proceedings on 
indictment where the law would act upon the 
affidavit of an accused). 
Then there were the practical difficulties and 
anomalies to which the rule gave rise. 
In felony and misdemeanour, the effect of the 
rule, when combined with the prohibition upon an 
accused who had counsel making an unsworn 
(statement, was literally to close the mouth of 
such' accused, and leave him to rely upon indirect 
expedients such as pre-trial statements as a means 
of, getting, his version across. - 
There was the ridiculous state of affairs the 
rule could lead to in cases of affray or factional 
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violence, nowhere better described than by the__ 
Irish Q. C., 0 'Hagan: - t. 
'A fight took place between two factions ... 
coming home from a fair. Informations and 
cross-informations were sworn with the very 
object of including among the accused such;: 
individuals as could give evidence for the, 
defence. The 'Ryans' ... were first put upon their trial. Their opponents, 'the Carrolls',. 
came to the table one after another and told 
one side of the story. Where their evidence- 
closed, the case closed. The jury retired to, 
consider their verdict and then what occurred? 
The Carrolls all walked into the dock to taken 
their trials before a new jury, and the Ryans. 
walked out of it for a time in order to be` 
examined as witnesses. The new jury heard a, 
new case. Each jury was forced to decide upon 
one-sided evidence" [19]. 
And a similar turning of the tables occurred 
where a person, convicted on the evidence of a 
single witness, prosecuted that witness for 
perjury. On such a prosecution, it would be the" 
alleged perjurer whose mouth was closed, and in the' 
event that the prosecution was successful, (and the 
device was, as in Hatch's case, sometimes used as- 
an indirect means of appealing a jury's verdict) 
one would have conflicting verdicts, brought in by 
different juries, in relation to the same subject 
matter, neither of which would have heard the 
principal witness in the case tried by the other. 
The exclusion of the prisoner's spouse from 
the witness box, produced its share of absurdities. 
Of these none was more striking or notorious than 
the rule in bigamy prosecutions that the first wife 
was incompetent and the second wife competent [20]. 
Added to this was the problem that it was uncertain- 
whether a reputed wife was caught by the bar [21]. 
ýt 
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However, if Parliament was showing no 
enthusiasm to reform the rule, some inroads were 
being made on it in the courts. 
In the first place, the problem posed by 
cross-indictments for assault was occasionally 
dealt with by trying them together [22]. 
Second, by the 1850s, it had come to be 
settled law that a prisoner who had pleaded guilty, 
or against whom the Crown had offered no evidence 
or entered a volle prosequi, was competent to give 
evidence for an accused jointly indicted with him 
[23]. And there were some judges who were prepared 
to push this principle even further. In 1845, at 
Maidstone Assizes, Alderson B. allowed a prisoner 
to call his co-accused notwithstanding that the 
latter was herself contesting guilt [24]. In 1870 
Mellor J., without giving reasons, took the same 
course in a trial at Worcester Assizes [25]. So 
too did a number of other Assize judges including 
Piggott B., Lush J. and the Irish judge, Ball J. 
[26] 
It was inevitable that, sooner or later, the 
point would be tested, and the occasion came in 
gar *in 1872 [27], when Keating J. reserved the 
question. The Court for Crown Cases Reserved was 
emphatic that the practice was wrong. If a 
prisoner was allowed to be called for a fellow 
prisoner he would be subject to cross-examination 
whereby lay great dangers; he might for example be 
cross-examined as to his past life; alternatively 
he might be asked questions which he would find 
himself obliged to decline to answer on the grounds 
of" self-incrimination; and in either case the 
result would be seriously to injure his case. 
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Another stratagem one finds being used to 
render prisoners, both contesting guilt, competent 
for each other was application for separate trials. 
Around the mid-century, such applications seem to 
have been but rarely granted. In Barber (1844) 
[28] an application, supported by an affidavit from 
Barber's attorney to the effect that it was 
intended such separate trial to call the otherR 
prisoners for the defence, and that it was believed 
that their evidence would lead to his acquittal was 
rejected out of hand by Gurney B. Separate trials 
he said, were often desired by prisoners, but the 
application was never granted save where, as in the 
recent case of Sealey, the Crown consented to 
severance. It may be that as the century wore on 
judicial practice on the point grew more lenient. 
In the 1890s it was being claimed in several 
quarters that applications for separate trials were 
seldom refused [29]. If that be right, the change 
appears to have been a very recent one, for reports 
from the 1870s and 1880s indicate a continuing 
judicial reluctance to grant separate trials [30]. 
The only class of case in which, throughout the 
century, judges would always grant a separate trial 
was that in which conspiracy had been charged 
against defendants, the evidence against whom 
disclosed substantive offences in respect of which 
they would, if charged therewith, have had to have 
been tried separately [31]. 
Yet another device which appears sometimes to 
have been employed, to enable prisoners jointly 
indicted to testify for each other, was that of 
severing their challenges. The prisoners would 
exercise their rights of challenge separately and 
to such extent as to create the risk of exhausting 
the panel of jurors present at court. Where such 
a course was taken by prisoners, it was open to the 
court (in order to prevent the panel being 
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exhausted), so long, as sufficient jurors remained 
to make up a jury, to direct a separate trial of 
one or more of the prisoners; and, indeed, the 
Crown could apply to the court for such a direction 
[32]. The threat, of severing challenges was, where 
the number of accused was large, a very powerful 
one, for, exhaustion of the panel would involve 
delay whilst the sheriff summoned a fresh panel 
[33]. One sees the device being employed 
successfully in Chartist trials in the 1840s [34]. 
In Sealey in 1844 [35], severance of challenges was 
the means by which defence counsel were proposing 
to try and achieve separate trials, until the 
consent of the Crown to severance of the indictment 
rendered such a proceeding unnecessary. In Fisher 
[36] in 1848 Platt B., referring expressly to 
Seale v, said it was an ill practice for a judge to 
allow severance of challenges, but, ill practice or 
not, it was still sufficiently prevalent for 
Greaves to have devoted several paragraphs to it in 
his Report on Criminal Procedure in 1856 [37]. 
The practice of admitting a prisoner (who had 
been acquitted, pleaded guilty, had his trial 
severed, or was otherwise permitted to give 
evidence) to testify for a co-prisoner gave rise to 
some novel problems. Could such a prisoner, called 
at the trial of his co-prisoners A and B, who gave 
evidence for A which incriminated B, be cross- 
examined by B? In Woods & May (1853) [38] one of 
, 
the City judges had ruled that he could, and this 
was, also the decision of the Court for Crown Cases 
Reserved two years later when the point was tested 
`before 
athem in Burdett [39]. Jervis L. C. J., 
, 
however, left open the question whether there would 
, 
be a right to cross-examine where a prisoner called 
, a: 
: witness, who did not criminate his fellow 
prisoner.,. In that situation, he said, the latter 
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would have only the right to examine the witness as' 
his own witness. 
Attempts to outflank the prohibition upon the" 
wife of a prisoner giving evidence for his co-ý 
accused at their joint trial, go back further in 
time. The point had come before the Twelve Judges' 
as early as 1826 in Smith [40], and they had upheld 
the trial judge's ruling that a prisoner could not 
call in proof of an alibi the wife of a co- 
prisoner. However, Smith was a case where the 
wife's evidence was arguably capable of benefiting 
her husband as well as the prisoner seeking to call 
her. What if calling the wife on behalf of a co-: 
prisoner would not in any way benefit her husband? 
Did the principle in Smith's case apply then? 
Phillips, writing in 1838 [41] argued that it might 
well not, and that was in fact the view taken 
(albeit with considerable hesitation) by Wightman 
J. in Bartlett & Anderson (1844) [42]. This 
aberrant authority was however, eventually 
overruled in 1872 by the Court for Crown Cases 
Reserved [43], which held that the wife of a 
prisoner jointly indicted stood in the same 
position, as regards the admissibility of her 
evidence, as her husband. 
(b) United States and Colonial reform 
Outside England matters were, in the 1860s, 
moving at_an altogether faster pace. In 1864 the 
State of Maine passed a statute making the accused 
and his spouse competent but not compellable 
witnesses [44]. Similar legislation followed in 
other States, and by 1878 no fewer than twenty- 
eight American States had passed statutes 
permitting prisoners and their spouses to testify 
[45]. Nor was it only in the United States that 
the reform was being brought in. Three years 
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before the Maine reform, 'a statute was passed 
giving judges in British India power to examine the 
accused, and to put to him such questions as they 
thought necessary (the provision did not however 
apply in the Presidency, Towns of Calcutta, Madras, 
and Bombay, where English law continued to apply) 
[46]. In 1872 the Indian Evidence Act (drafted by 
Stephen) was passed, one of the provisions of which 
was s. 120 which made the spouse of an accused 
competent as a witness for the defence. 
(c) Piecemeal reform in England 
Although the Bill of 1865 seeking to effect 
major reform was lost, some modest' legislative 
inroads were made in England in the 1860s on the 
bar on prisoners' evidence. 
The first comprised a clutch of -statutes 
designed to remove all doubt that the Acts of 1851 
and 1853 applied to proceedings on the Revenue side 
of the Exchequer [47], which were arguably criminal 
proceedings. 
Next, in 1867, came the Master & Servant Act 
[48], which provided, as part of its framework for 
the enforcement of contracts of employment, certain 
penal provisions, breach of which was punishable 
summarily by fine and imprisonment, and gave 
persons accused of such breaches, and their 
spouses, the right to give evidence in-their own 
defence. This was but a small breach in the 
general rule, the offences being summary only and 
essentially civil in character. Nevertheless, it 
marked the beginning of a trend of creating ad hoc 
exceptions to the general rule, which by the 1890s 
'had, succeeded in reducing-the law to a state which 
, cried out-for reform., 
149 
The next such statute followed four years 
later in the shape of the Merchant Shipping Act. 
1871 [49], a temporary Act but one which could. 
scarcely be dismissed as an unimportant breach. 
The Act: 
(i) made it an indictable misdemeanour 
punishable by two years' imprisonment to 
send an unseaworthy ship to sea; 
(ii) cast upon a person charged with such 
offence the burden of showing that he 
used all reasonable means to ensure her 
being sent to sea in a seaworthy state, 
or that her going to sea under such 
circumstances was reasonable and 
justifiable; 
and 
(iii) made such person a competent witness in 
his own defence. 
The exception was later to be justified, in 
Parliamentary debates [50], on the ground that, 
where the law cast a burden of proof upon an 
accused, common justice required that he be allowed 
to give evidence in order to discharge such burden. 
However, the argument was less convincing than it 
sounded. It was not difficult to instance cases, 
both at common law and under statute, where the 
accused bore a burden of proof but with no right to 
give evidence. 
The 1871 Act marked the opening of the 
floodgates. In the next seven years no less than 
ten more Acts were passed, giving persons charged 
with offences created thereby, the right to give 
evidence in their own defence. In the case of six 
of these Acts (the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1872 
[51], Metalliferous Mines Regulation Act 1872 [52], 
the Sale of Food & Drugs Act 1875 (53] the 
Merchant Shipping Acts, 1875 and 1876 [54] (which 
placed on a permanent footing the provisions as to 
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unseaworthy ships contained in the 1871 Act) and 
the Threshing Machines Act, 1878) [55] the 
justification could be, and was, offered that the 
Act cast a burden of proof on the accused. Another 
of the Acts, the Conspiracy & Protection of 
Property Act, 1875 [56], could be regarded as 
merely extending the exception created by the 
Master & Servant Act, 1867, and, yet another, the 
Evidence Act, 1877 [57], could be claimed to deal 
with proceedings which, though criminal in form, 
were essentially civil in character. But for the 
exception created by the remaining two Acts, the 
Licensing Act, 1872 (58] and the Contagious 
Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878 [59] no such apology 
could be offered. 
These ten Acts were conspicuous for their 
failure to adopt any common form of wording. Seven 
of them were silent as to cross-examination, and 
none faced up to the issue of whether the failure 
of an accused to give evidence might be used 
against him, as by being made the subject of 
comment. 
(d) Russell Gurney's Act 
In the same year as Parliament passed the 
Master & Servant Act, it also attempted to tackle 
the problem of the prisoner prevented from calling 
witnesses by poverty. The Criminal Law Act of 
1867 required examining magistrates to ask the 
prisoner whether he wished to call witnesses. If 
he elected to do so, depositions were to be taken 
from such witnesses, and, if they gave evidence 
material to establish his innocence (and not going 
simply to character), they were to be bound over to 
. 
attend the court of trial, where the judge would 
have power to order their expenses paid out of 
public funds. The principle of the Act was not in 
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fact new. A similar scheme was being operated by 
magistrates in the West Riding as early as 1851 
[60]. 
Despite the hopes of its promoter, Russell 
Gurney, the Act was to prove of only limited value 
to prisoners. Ten years on getting witnesses to 
court' was still a real problem for many poor 
prisoners (61]. One of the shortcomings of the 
Act was that it was only witnesses who attended the 
committal hearing who could be bound over to attend 
trial, and for a prisoner in custody getting 
witnesses to attend the committal hearing could be 
just as much a problem as getting them to attend 
the trial. Also, since payment of witnesses' 
expenses was only made after trial, a prisoner, 
whose witnesses were too poor to afford to make the 
journey to the court of trial and provide for their 
subsistence there, whilst waiting for the case to 
be called on, was in no better position after the 
Act than before it [62]. Third, the Act (like the 
Poor Prisoners' Defence Act, 1903) made assistance 
conditional on the prisoner showing his hand. 
By the 1890s, to assist prisoners to get their 
witnesses to court, it was the practice in some 
gaols for the staff to go round the week before 
trial, and ask remand prisoners if there were any 
witnesses they wished to have called at their 
trial, and, if there were, to request the police to 
contact them [63]. In. 1892 the Home Secretary 
gave an undertaking to take steps to see that this 
practice was adopted at all gaols [64]. 
(e) Quakers and atheists 
A small reform passed in 1869 benefiting 
prisoner and prosecutor alike was the abolition of 
the incompetency of atheists to give evidence in 
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criminal proceedings. By the Evidence 
Amendment Act [65] such witnesses wei 
permitted to affirm, thereby extending I 
privilege which Quakers had enjoyed, in 







GETTING THE PRISONER'S STORY ACROSS III 
THE FIGHT FOR REFORM 1870-1885 
'the rule of law which incapacitated the accused 
... from giving evidence on his own behalf had the 
effect of excluding the evidence of the person who 
knew most about the transaction'. 
Sir Charles Russell (1888) P. D., CCCXXIV, 70. 
(a) The attack on the incompetency rule mounted in 
the late 1870s 
Not only did the 1870s see the creation of 
exceptions to the rule of the accused's 
incompetency, but they also saw the rule itself 
come under sustained attack. 
The subject was debated by the Social Science 
Congress in 1874 [1]. A survey of the practice in 
the United States, published by the Society for the 
Amendment of the Law, showed that a majority of 
American states had abolished the incompetency 
rule, and that the general view in those States in 
which the reform had been tried was that it had 
worked well [2]. The survey in fact merely served 
to confirm the message, which had been put abroad 
by Russell Gurney, upon his return from serving as 
one of the Alabama arbitrators. He had, he said, 
been assured by both the Chief Justice and the 
Attorney-General of New York that the system had 
been the means of preventing wrongful convictions, 
and that judges and lawyers, who had originally 
been *hostile to the reform, were now fully 
convinced of its advantages and utility. 
In 1876 [3], 1877 [4] and 1878 [5] Bills for 
abolition were introduced in the Commons. 
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The scheme of the 1876 Bill was unoriginal. 
The accused and his spouse were to be competent but 
not compellable, with no fetter placed upon cross- 
examination as to credit. Introduced too late in 
the session to have any hope of becoming law, the 
1876 Bill provided Ashley, its promoter, with an 
opportunity to test the Parliamentary water. The 
reception it received on its second reading debate 
was not encouraging. Of the eight members, who 
spoke in the debate, six came out strongly against 
the Bill, variously condemning it as a retrograde 
measure [6], a return to barbarism [7] and a Bill 
for torture [8]. The two members who spoke in its 
favour were Whalley [9] . 
(the co-promoter of the 
Petty Offences Bills of 1863 and 1864) and Russell 
Gurney [10], the Recorder of London. Whalley's 
support was more of an embarrassment than a help, 
for, predictably, the ground he gave for favouring 
the Bill was that it would be an antidote to police 
perjury [9]. Russell Gurney could not, however, be 
so,, 
-easily 
dismissed. He had huge experience and a 
high reputation as a City judge, and had recently 
discussed the working of the reform with a number 
of U. S. judges and lawyers, as well as observing 
trials in which the accused had given evidence. At 
the end of the debate, Ashley withdrew the Bill, 
but indicated that he regarded Russell Gurney's 
support as important for changing public opinion 
[11]. His words might have carried more conviction 
had not Russell Gurney's brother Old Bailey judge, 
Sir Thomas Chambers, the Common Serjeant, spoken 
out strongly against the Bill in the debate [12], 
and had the Attorney-General (who only troubled to 
enter the chamber towards the end of the debate) 
offered his support rather than speaking against 
the Bill [13]. 
The 1877 Bill did not get beyond a first 
reading. The 1878 Bill, however, made much more 
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satisfactory progress. On the second reading 
debate, the majority of those who spoke were in 
favour of the reform [14], and the language used by 
its opponents was more temperate than it had been'"=ý 
in the 1876 debate (Serjeant Simon, for example, `'. 
whilst still opposing the Bill, no longer saw fit 
to dub it a Bill for torture) [15], and at the end' 
of the debate it was given its second reading by a" 
substantial majority (185 to 76) [16]. 
The stance of the Government had also changed. 
The Attorney-General, whilst pointing to drawbacks 
and confessing to a great difficulty in making his 
mind up on the reform, was not overtly hostile. On- 
the contrary, he offered encouragement to the 
reform lobby. The Government, he told them, was, in': 
the course of preparing a Criminal Code, which 
would contain a provision dealing with the matter 
of prisoners' evidence, and he suggested to Ashley' 
that the Bill ought to go to a Select Committee, so` 
that the Government should have the benefit of that 
Committee's report when it brought in its own 
measure [17]. This offer Ashley willingly accepted 
[18]. 
Why did the 1878 Bill fare so much better than 
that of 1876? A number of possible answers suggest 
themselves. First, the 1876 Bill had attracted a 
good deal of attention in the legal press and 
elsewhere [19], and some powerful voices had been 
raised in its support. Further, an extraordinary 
rape case, tried at Liverpool in 1877 [20], had 
seemed to vindicate reformist claims that the right 
to give evidence would be a boon to the innocent. 
Another factor must have been the decision of 
Ashley and Russell Gurney, the Bill's promoters, to 
include in it clauses protecting the accused 
against cross-examination as to previous 
'convictions, and against any adverse inference 
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'4 
being drawn from any failure on his part to give 
evidence [21]", thus meeting two of the major 
criticisms which had been made of the 1876 Bill. 
Perhaps, also, the speeches in the 1876 debate did 
not, even then, mirror accurately the state of 
opinion in the House. 
In the Commons debates on the two Bills, the 
arguments marshalled for and against the reform 
were ones that were to be heard, again and again, 
over the next twenty years. 
On the one side, it was urged that the 
existing rule made it difficult for juries to get 
at the truth. They were denied the explanation of 
the one person who knew most about the-facts [22]. 
To allow the accused to give evidence would lead to 
the acquittal of the innocent, and the surer 
conviction of the guilty [23]. This, it was 
claimed, had been the experience of the American 
criminal courts, and there was no reason to think 
that the-reform would work any less satisfactorily 
in England [24]. 
The arguments against the reform were various. 
First, whilst it was not denied that the 
reform would lead to more convictions, it was 
disputed that it would be for the benefit of 
innocent prisoners. On the contrary, it would 
operate to their disadvantage. It would undermine 
the principle that it was for the prosecution to 
prove the guilt of the accused [25]. The accused 
would, in practice, be compelled to go into the 
witness box or risk the jury drawing a ',, 
damning 
inference from his failure , to do so [26] . An 
innocent prisoner, who had a criminal record or was 
of-. bad, character, would be placed in. an impossible 
dilemma: if he gave evidence, he risked his record 
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or character being brought out in cross-examination 
E27]; if he did not give evidence, he risked the r,. 
jury taking against him on that score [26]. For- 
the innocent, but uneducated, prisoner (undefended.; 
as most were), there was the real risk that his. 
nervousness and confusion might create ant 
impression of guilt, and, under cross-examination, - 
at the hands of skilled experienced counsel he 
might easily be made to appear guilty [28] 
(particularly if he yielded to the temptation to: 
lie to make his case better) [29], with no counsel 
of his own to undo the damage by re-examination,. 
(Serjeant Simon suggested that no more than one 
prisoner in twenty would be capable of standing up 
to cross-examination) [30]. In short, the reform, -} 
if carried, would set at nought the principle of.. 
English law that an accused could not be compelled' 
to criminate himself, in favour of the continental' 
system of moral torture. of prisoners [31], and- 
would result in prisoners who, under the existing 
system, would be acquitted through the weakness of. 
the prosecution case, under cross-examination 
convicting themselves out of their own mouths [32]. 
Second, in the case of undefended prisoners 
there were very real practical problems. With no 
counsel to examine and re-examine, how was the 
prisoner's story to be brought out, if he could not 
tell it, and what guidance would he receive and 
from whom as to whether he should testify? [33] 
Third, the reputation of the bench- would be 
compromised. Where there was no prosecuting 
counsel, or, where prosecuting counsel was 
inexperienced or inept, the judge would be obliged 
to undertake the task of cross-examining the 
accused. This would destroy the appearance of 
judicial impartiality, and lead to unseemly 
wrangles- between bench and prisoner, particularly 
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where (as at some county Quarter Sessions) the 
judge was biased and unscrupulous [34]. 
Fourth, the reform.. if carried would lead to 
the most shocking perjury, which would injure 
public morals and the administration of justice 
[35]. 
Fifth, it was untrue that under the existing 
system a prisoner could not give his explanation to 
the jury. On the contrary he could give his 
explanation on arrest, or before the examining 
magistrate, and, where undefended, by an unsworn 
statement at trial [36]. 
(b) The Criminal Code Bills 
For the period 1878 to 1883 the focus for the 
reformers was a succession of Criminal Code Bills, 
each of which contained a prisoners' evidence 
clause. 
The scheme of a Criminal Code had originated 
with J. F. Stephen [37], and by late July, 1877 the 
Government was converted, with Stephen instructed 
to start work drawing up a Bill [38]. Stephen, 
using' his own Digest of Criminal Law as his 
starting point, did the work with remarkable 
rapidity, and when the Bill was introduced into the 
Commons in May, 1878, it contained, as the 
Attorney-General had promised, a prisoners' 
evidence clause [39]. However, this clause was 
very different to Ashley's scheme. Modelled on the 
provisions of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure 
[40], It provided that a prisoner should, at the 
_close 
of the prosecution case, have the option, if 
defended, of being examined by his counsel, and, if 
; undefended,, of making a statement. The examination 
. or-. statement would not 
be on oath, but the 
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prosecution would have the right to cross-examine 
him on it, although they would not be allowed to, 
put questions going to either credit or character. 
After being cross-examined, he might, if defended, 
be re-examined or, if undefended, give such further } 
explanation as he pleased. His statement, not being 
on oath, he would not be liable to be prosecuted ": 
for perjury. 
In an article written in 1877 [41], Stephen. 
had sought to justify dispensing with the oath in 
the case of prisoners on two grounds. First, it 
would not be practical to prosecute prisoners who 
gave false evidence on oath for perjury, and yet 
not to prosecute them would undermine respect for 
the administration of justice. Second, the 
temptation for an accused to lie was so great that 
it would overbear the ordinary sanction of 
truthfulness which the oath provided. The 
Solicitors Journal, commenting on the 1878 Code 
Bill, offered another reason - dispensing with the 
oath solved the problem of cross-examination as to 
credit: - 
'if the prisoner's evidence is put forward as 
prima facie credible because the prisoner is 
examined on oath, the logical consequence is 
that he ought to be cross-examined as to 
credit; but, where his evidence is not on 
oath, this reasoning does not apply. ' [42] ' 
One problem, which Stephen's clause did not 
attempt to deal with, was that of protecting the 
accused, who chose not to give evidence, against 
the risk of an adverse inference being drawn from 
his silence. 
By early June, 1878 it was clear that the Bill 
had little hope of passing that session. It was 
too bulky and there was too little time left, and 
on August 15th, it was withdrawn and referred to'a 
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Royal Commission consisting of Stephen, Lord 
Blackburn, Lush L. J., and the Irish judge Barry J. 
for report and revision [43]. 
The Commission worked at great speed, and by 
Spring it had produced a revised Code Bill [44]. 
As its later published Report made clear, it was 
divided on the question of whether prisoners and 
their spouses should be 'allowed to give evidence 
[45], and although its Code Bill contained such a 
provision, the clause was very different to that in 
Stephen's 1878 Bill. A prisoner, or his spouse, 
should be a competent witness for the defence. If 
, 
they gave evidence, it would be on oath, and, like 
any other witness, they would be subject to cross- 
examination, although the court would have a power 
to limit cross-examination of the accused as to 
credit to such extent as it thought fit [46]. Once 
again, the problem of the accused, who chose not to 
give evidence, was not addressed. 
On April 3,1879 the Bill was given its first 
reading in the Commons [47]. In introducing the 
Bill, the Attorney-General was diffident in his 
approach to the prisoners' evidence clause, telling 
the House that on the subject his mind was evenly 
balanced. He acknowledged that there could be no 
means of arriving at the truth so surely as that of 
the examination of the accused, but, on the other 
hand, -the change might operate harshly in the case 
of a 'man unjustly accused of crime, but whose 
antecedents were of a character which would 
unfairly prejudice him if they were exhibited to 
the jury. He should, he said, be glad of full and 
ample discussion of this point of the measure, and, 
if the House should exhibit a feeling adverse to 
the introduction of such a principle, he would at 
once,, -consent to its withdrawal [48] . The debate, 
which followed, showed that the reform was far from 
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popular in all quarters [49]. By the summer of 
1879 it was becoming obvious that the Bill, like 
that of 1878, would be lost through lack of 
Parliamentary time [50], and, on June 12th, the 
coup de grace was administered when Lord Chief 
Justice Cockburn wrote a long letter to the 
Attorney-General criticising the First Part of the 
Bill (mainly on drafting grounds), and promising 
further letters, commenting on the other parts of' 
the Code [51]. A month later the Bill was 
withdrawn [52]. 
(c) Weston and the extension of the right to make. 
an unsworn statement. 
At this juncture, Cockburn, who was reputed to 
be an opponent of the proposal that prisoner should 
be permitted to give evidence [53], saw fit 
unilaterally to introduce a major modification of 
the law as to unsworn statements. In 1879, in a 
murder case (Weston) at Maidstone Winter Assizes 
[54], he ruled that defence counsel might, in his 
speech to the jury, give the accused's account of 
how the fatal shot came to be fired, adding that 
counsel were in the place of the prisoner and 
entitled to say anything which he might say. This 
ruling represented a repudiation of Beard, which 
had, for nearly forty years, been regarded as 
settling the point. However, being a decision of 
the Lord Chief Justice, it was followed by several 
puisne judges, although at least one declined to 
follow it [55]. 
In 1881, by coincidence, the very same point 
arose before Cockburn's successor in office, Lord 
Chief Justice Coleridge. Again, the case was a 
murder case (Le Froy) [56], and, again, the venue 
was -Maidstone - 
With some reluctance, Coleridge 
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acceded to Montagu Williams' application that he be 
allowed to tell the jury his client's account of 
events. However, once the case was over,. he lost 
little time in calling a meeting of the Council of 
Judges to discuss the propriety of the practice 
adopted in Weston's case [57]. 
At the meeting, held in the Queen's Bench 
rooms on the 26th November, 1881 (three weeks after 
the Le Froy trial), the judges present passed, by a 
majority of 19 to 2, a resolution that 
'It is contrary to the administration and 
practice of the criminal law, as hitherto 
allowed, that counsel for the prisoner should 
state to the jury, as alleged existing 
facts, matters which they have been told in 
their instructions, on the authority of the 
prisoner, but which they do not propose to 
prove in evidence'. 
The two dissentients were Hawkins and Stephen JJ. 
(Stephen J. had at the meeting moved an amendment 
that it was undesirable to express any opinion upon 
the matter, but this had been lost, again 19-2, 
with himself and Hawkins its only supporters) [57). 
In January 1882, North J. announced the 
decision of the judges. in a case at Reading 
Assizes, and the announcement was given publicity 
in legal journals [58]., This ought to have settled 
the. point but, astonishingly, it did not. 
. 
In December 1883 at the Old Bailey, on the 
-trial of O'Donnell [59] for murder, Sir Charles 
Russell, in the teeth of objection from the 
Attorney General, prevailed upon Denman J. to allow 
, him-: to. state 
the prisoner's account to the jury, 
-arguing that 
he was only claiming the right to do 
. 
that. which the, prisoner could do himself, if 
undefended. Denman offered to reserve the point, 
163 
which led to the Attorney-General abandoning his 
objection. On the same day as the jury's verdict 
was received in the O' Donnell case, the Attorney- 
General wrote to Coleridge L. C. J., asking that the. 
uncertainty as to the law upon the point be. 
removed, and suggesting that the next time the 
question arose in a case of no great public 
importance, permission to make the statement should 
be refused and the point reserved. He added that,.. 
if the practice was henceforth to be as laid down-, 
in O'Donnell's case, it was in his view essential 
that the Crown be allowed a right of reply. He 
mentioned that he had raised with Denman J. the 
question of the judges having already had a meeting 
upon the point, but was assured by him that this 
was not so (Denman, who was not present at the 
meeting, was later to explain that he had forgotten 
about it). Coleridge replied to the Attorney's 
letter by return, telling him of the November, 1881 
resolution and expressing the view that, because of 
possible difficulties about reserving the point, 
the best way forward might be to make the 
resolution generally known. This was done. The 
correspondence was published both in The Times and 
in a number of legal journals, and a lively 
correspondence followed in The Times [60]. 
Several of those who wrote supporting the 
resolution did so on the ground that there was :a 
danger that counsel, in placing his client's 
version before the jury, would embellish it or omit 
parts which he considered damaging to the prisoner 
[61]. 
Within months of Cockburn's ruling in the 
Weston case, another development took place which 
was to prove of lasting importance - judges began 
to allow prisoners represented by counsel to make 
an unsworn statement to the jury. 
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Amongst those most prominent, in. fostering this 
change was-Hawkins J., one of the dissentients at 
the November, 1881 meeting. Hawkins was, in fact, 
either the first or one of the first judges to 
allow in an unsworn statement. The case was Hull & 
smith, a robbery case tried at Leeds Assizes on 
February 3,1880 [62]. As defence counsel began to 
complain to the jury that his clients' mouths were 
closed, Hawkins J. observed that it was not so: 
'Prisoners were at liberty to make any 
statement they chose; the jury were not bound 
to believe it, but it ought to be taken into 
consideration ... if the prisoner had made a 
statement in writing, he saw no objection to 
it being read, but if it were an oral 
statement, it might be better to have it from 
the prisoner himself'. 
Before finally committing himself to allowing the 
two prisoners before him to make written 
statements, Hawkins left court to consult with Lush 
L. J., who was sitting in the adjoining court. On 
his return, he said that Lush L. J. entirely agreed 
with him and had himself so acted in more than one 
case. There was no decision of the Court for 
Crown Cases Reserved to the contrary and, in so far 
as the books contained dicta to the contrary, they 
were only the expressions of opinion of individual 
judges made probably under circumstances not fully 
set, out in the reports. It would be a barbarous 
state of the law if a prisoner were not permitted 
to, give his own explanation. In 1884 Lush L. J. 's 
Marshall, in a letter to The Times, revealed that 
the.,, former's reason for agreeing to the course 
proposed by Hawkins was that, under Jervis' Act, a 
prisoner had a right to make a statement before the 
examining magistrates, and any such statement might 
go before the jury;, if he had the right before the 
magistrates why should he not have the, same right 
when actually before the jury? [63] 
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The course taken by Hawkins J. in Hull & Smith 
appears to represent a substantial change of view 
and stance on his part. In the Penge murder cas _ ,_ 
three years before, he had listened in silence to 
Sir Edward Clarke's lament that his clients could-, 
not give their explanation, and had certainly not 
proferred to them the opportunity to make ,a 
statement to the jury [64]. 
Hawkins' example was followed by Bowen J. -in 
August, 1880 [65] and by Coleridge L. C. J. in 
January, 1881 [66]. 
At the November 1881 meeting of the judges, 
the propriety of allowing prisoners, represented by 
counsel, to make unsworn statements was raised but 
the matter adjourned sine die [67]. 
Opinion was, however, clearly moving in favour 
of the new practice. On May 4,1882, at Liverpool, ° 
in the case of Shimmin [67], Cave J. declared that 
for the future he intended to allow prisoners, 
whether defended by counsel or not, to make a 
statement at the conclusion of counsel's speech, 
subject to the prosecution having a right of reply. 
He added that the rule was one in which the other 
judges of the High Court concurred. In a later case' 
at the same Assize [68], he reiterated what he had 
said in Shimmin, adding that it was important that 
the profession generally should be acquainted with 
the practice intended to be followed in future. 
Some assumed that Cave J. was declaring a new rule 
of practice, decided upon by the Council of Judges 
[69], but subsequent events make this doubtful 
[70]. 
In Everatt [71], in January 1883, Hawkins i 
laid down the same rule as had Cave J. at 
Liverpool, and that year also saw Day J., Lush L. J. 
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and North J. adopt the new practice [72]. It was 
also spreading to Quarter Sessions [73]. 
However, there were dissentient voices. In 
Taylor-_& Boynes [74], tried in May 1883, Coleridge 
L. C. J., upon the application of counsel, and after 
consulting with the Master of the Rolls, 'against 
his better judgment' allowed the defendants to make 
an unsworn statement, but, before the case was over 
he had repented of his decision, and declared that 
he, would not do so again until the opinion of all 
the judges had been obtained. In December, 1883, 
Williams J., in a letter to the Times [60], had 
come out strongly in favour of the practice, 
stating that nothing but an Act of Parliament would 
induce him to depart from it. His letter produced 
a, spirited rejoinder from Lord Bramwell, condemning 
the new practice root and branch [60]. In Houltby 
[75], an arson case tried at York Assizes in late 
January, 1884, Field J. refused an application by 
defence counsel for leave for the prisoner to make 
an -unsworn statement, saying that he could not 
change the law because he thought the law unjust. 
By March 1884 Day J. had had a change of heart. In 
yelasquez [76], tried at the Old Bailey in that 
month, he refused to allow a defended prisoner to 
make a statement, observing that the last time he 
had. -, done it had been in a capital case, and the 
result had been disastrous for the prisoner. In 
Attwood & Tatham [77], tried in November, 1884, 
A. L. - Smith J. reverted to the practice, which had 
been followed by Byles J. in Taylor 
_J78], 
of 
putting the prisoner to his election whether he 
would ý,. make a statement himself, or have counsel 
address the jury on his behalf, ruling that he 
could-not do both. 
Understandably, there, was, uncertainty at the 
bar as to what the position was. In Ross [79], 
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tried at the Old Bailey in April 1884, Geoghegan, a=.. _ 
very senior and experienced junior, expressed his 
regret that a recent rule of the judges prevented 
the prisoner from giving his own version of the 
matter, and the trial judge, Stephen J., had to 
interpose to make clear that the November, 1881.., - 
resolution merely prohibited counsel relating their 
client's instructions to the jury and did not-_ 
prevent the prisoner himself making a statement. 
Watters [ 80 ] in 1883 appears to be the first . 
case in which Stephen J. (the other dissentient at: 
the 1881 meeting) is recorded as permitting an- 
unsworn statement by a defended prisoner, but, from 
this time on, he was in the forefront of those 
supporting the change in the law, particularly-, 
post-1885. 
By early 1885, it appears that the matter had 
recently been before the Council of Judges again,. 
and a resolution in favour of the new practice 
adopted, for, in Millhouse [81] in January 1885, 
Coleridge L. C. J. declared himself bound by a 
resolution of the judges (with which he did not 
agree) to allow a prisoner, represented by counsel 
to make an unsworn statement, but said that the 
resolution did not extend to a case where the 
prisoner proposed to call witnesses, and on this 
ground declined to allow the prisoner to do both. 
And, certainly, from 1885 onwards there are 
numerous instances of successful applications by 
counsel for their clients to be allowed to make 
unsworn statements [82]. But it is clear that 
there was still dissension and reluctance on the 
part of some judges to accept the new practice. In 
1888, complaint was made, in a Commons debate on 
prisoners' evidence, that there were some judges 
who still refused to' allow a prisoner defended by 
counsel, to make an unsworn statement [83], and, 
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indeed divergent judicial practice was offered as 
the principal justification for amending the 
Criminal Evidence Bill, 1898 so as to include a 
clause preserving the right of prisoners to make 
unsworn statements [84]. 
If the rule allowing defended prisoners to 
make unsworn statements was the subject of 
dissension, so was the manner in which the right 
was to be exercised. First, there was the question 
of the stage in the case at which such statement 
should be made. Stephen J. always insisted that 
the statement be made before counsel's address, on 
the grounds that it would otherwise be merely a 
corroboration of what counsel had said (85], and 
this had certainly been the course taken in Malinas 
and pvyer in the 1840s. Other judges, however, took 
the view that the statement ought to be made after 
counsel had addressed the jury [86]. Then, there 
was the doubt'about whether written statements were 
to be permitted. In Riegelmuth (1886) [87] Stephen 
J. "refused to allow to be read a statement, which 
the" prisoner had not himself composed. In the 
Maybrick trial (1889) [87] he similarly refused to 
allow Sir Charles Russell to put in a written 
statement. This represented a departure from the 
practice in treason cases, in pre-1836 cases and in 
undefended cases, and it was certainly not the 
practice followed by all the judges [88]. Less 
controversial was the rule that the making of a 
statement gave the prosecution a right of reply. 
In1883, in his letter to the Lord Chief Justice, 
the Attorney-General had asked for such a right, 
and" 'the right of reply was in fact quickly 
established by 'such cases as Shimmin [67]. It 
represented a tacit acknowledgment that what was 
said' in' such statement was evidence, for (the 
Attorney General's prerogative right apart) only 
the calling of evidence gave the Crown a right of 
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reply. It also represented a reversal of the rule 
laid down in Taylor in 1859 and in Manzano in 1860. 
What prompted the judges to overturn, in the 
space of six years, a rule which had stood since . 
the 1840s? Cockburn's decision in Weston, which., 
started the ball rolling, came at a time when the 
Criminal Code Commissioners, in a Bill which he had 
recently publicly criticised, were proposing, 
albeit with some diffidence, that prisoners and 
their spouses be rendered competent witnesses. He 
was a reputed opponent of that reform. Was Weston 
an attempt by him to head off the reform by 
introducing an alternative answer to the problem of 
the defended prisoner's -inability to place his 
explanation before the jury, or was it simply a 
'hard case'? (certainly it would be difficult to 
find a case which demonstrated more forcibly the 
injustice of denying a defended prisoner an 
opportunity of placing his explanation before the 
jury). Perhaps both. The practice, which evolved 
out of the controversy, engendered by the Weston 
and Le Frov cases, of allowing defended prisoners 
to make unsworn statements was certainly hailed by 
opponents of reform as having solved the problem of 
the prisoner's mouth being shut [89]. It enabled 
the defended prisoner to give his explanation (as 
Stephen had proposed in his 1878 Bill) whilst at 
the same time safeguarding him from cross- 
examination. It was, as'one correspondent to The 
Times put it in November, 1881: - 
'a wholesome ... compromise between the old idea of the prisoner's mouth being closed 
... and the new idea -a very dangerous one 
- of administering an oath to and cross- 
examining him' [90]. 
However, there is no reason whatever to believe 
that this was the object of Hawkins and Stephen 
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JJ., the two principal architects of the new 
practice. Stephen had for over twenty years been an 
advocate of allowing prisoners to give evidence, 
and Hawkins was, in the 1880s, no less enthusiastic 
in his support for the reform. They may have seen 
it as a temporary solution to the problem of the 
defended prisoner until a Prisoners' Evidence Act 
could-be passed, but certainly not as a substitute 
for such an Act. 
For all the controversy the subject of unsworn 
statements by defended prisoners generated in the 
1880s, the right, once established, was one of 
which the bar . seems 
to have availed itself 
sparingly. In the majority of trials on indictment 
in the 1880s and 1890s where the prisoner had 
counsel, the right seems not to have been taken up 
[91], counsel taking the view 'that they could put 
the case for the defence much better than the 
accused' and fearing 'the possible effect of an 
unwise statement from their client'. However, it 
remained a valuable right in cases like Weston 
where' the true facts were known only to the 
prisoner and the complainant or deceased, and, 
where a statement was the only way of getting the 
prisoner's account before the jury. 
(d)_ The later Criminal Code Bills 
Whilst the judges were busy hammering out the 
new rules for unsworn statements, in Parliament 
attempts were still being made to get the Code, 
with its prisoners' evidence clause, passed into 
law. 
Lý. 
On February 6 
Government introduced 
[92] . On. the same 
introduced a criminal 
1880, the Conservative 
its third Criminal Code Bill 
day_, three private members 
Code 
. 
(no. 2) Bill containing 
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a batch of wordy clauses dealing with prisoners' 
evidence. The Government Bill passed its second 
reading but the calling of a general election put 
an end to its further progress, the private members* 
Bill having in the meanwhile been dropped. 
When Parliament reassembled after the 
election, the Attorney-General in the new Liberal' 
Government announced that the Government did not 
intend to introduce a Criminal Code Bill in the 
present session [93]. 
In 1882, came yet another attempt to pass the 
Code into law - this time in the form of ,a 
Criminal Law Amendment Bill [94], which contained a 
large portion of the Code. The Bill passed its 
second reading [95], but was dropped at the 
committee stage. 
1883 saw what was to be the final Government- 
attempt to pass the Code into law. Honouring a 
promise made during the second reading debate of 
the 1882 Bill [96], the Government introduced a 
Bill containing only the procedural part of the 
Code - the Criminal Code (Indictable Offences" 
Procedure) Bill [97]. The prisoners' evidence 
clause [98] was in the same terms as that in the 
1879 Bill. During the second reading debate, -: a 
number of members touched upon the matter of the 
prisoners' evidence clause. Most who did were in 
favour of reform [99] but not all - Morgan Lloyd, 
for example, moved an amendment to the effect that 
no Bill would be satisfactory which directly or 
indirectly compelled an accused, or his spouse, to 
submit to cross-examination. When the Irish 
nationalist M. P. s came into the Chamber (they 
arrived, to the Attorney- General's evident 
annoyance, at a late hour) [100] the atmosphere' 
changed markedly. They launched into a fierce 
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criticism of the Bill, attacking a number of its 
clauses as calculated to lead, in Ireland, to 
oppression and abuse [101] (interestingly the 
prisoners' evidence clause, although criticised by 
one of their number, was not a particular target of 
their anger; indeed one them actually conceded that 
there might be something to be said for it) [102]. 
When to the opposition of the Irish members were 
added complaints from English members [103] that 
the House was not being afforded a proper 
opportunity to debate the measure, the fate of the 
Bill was virtually sealed. It ended up predictably 
withdrawn. One thing of value which the debate did 
throw up, and which was ultimately to find its way 
into the 1898 Act, was the suggestion that 
prisoners should give evidence from the witness box 
and not the dock [104]. 
(e) The Bills of 1884 
With the dropping of the 1883 Bill, the 
Criminal Code passed into history. The attempts to 
abolish the bar on prisoners' giving evidence, 
however, continued unabated, and there were by now 
clear signs that public opinion was moving in the 
reformers' favour. In 1882 the subject had been 
debated at the Social Science Congress and in the 
correspondence columns of The Times, and most of 
those who had spoken and written called, for reform, 
a--call echoed in 1883 in a Times leader and by The 
Law Society [105]. The response was the 
introduction in 1884 of Bills in both Lords and 
Commons 
The Commons' Bill [106] was a-Government Bill. 
The' Lords' --Bill [107]-, -was sponsored, by Lord 
Bramwell' who was fast emerging as, one of the 
principal advocates of reform. He told the House 
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that he had long been in favour of the reform and 
that recent correspondence in the press had.., 
convinced him that it was now within the range of.. 
practical politics. He explained that if the Bill 
currently going through the Commons passed there, 
he would withdraw his own Bill [108]. 
Both Bills were extremely short. They, 
declared that a prisoner and his spouse should be 
competent at every stage of the proceedings. In 
the matter of cross-examination as to credit, 
however, they diverged. The Government Bill 
provided that the accused should not be asked any 
question tending to show that he had committed or 
been convicted of any offence other than that. 
charged save where such evidence was admissible to 
prove his guilt of the offence charged or where he 
had given evidence of good character. Bramwell's 
Bill contained no such restriction (like Hawkins J. 
he believed that an accused who gave evidence 
should enjoy no special, privileges). Both were 
silent as to the matter of comment upon an 
accused's failure to testify. 
Bramwell's Bill passed through the Lords 
quickly and easily, completing all its stages in 
just over three weeks [109]. At the second. reading 
debate, of the six peers who spoke five were 
enthusiastically in favour, whilst the sixth, Lord 
Brabourne, whilst expressing some misgivings 
declared that he would not oppose the Bill. 
The Commons Bill had a much more difficult 
passage. After it had passed its second reading, 
the Government succeeded in getting it referred , 
to 
the Grand Committee rather than to a Committee of 
the Whole House. This led, however, to loud 
complaints that the Government, was stifling debate 
. [110]. In the Committee itself so many amendments 
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were moved that in the end the Government was 
obliged to withdraw the Bill. At this the Lords' 
Bill was also dropped. 
The 1884-85 session saw the Government try 
again. In November Lord Bramwell re-introduced his 
Bill of the previous session [111]. Like the 1884 
Bill it passed through its stages in the Lords 
quickly and without difficulty [112]. In December 
it was given its first reading in the Commons. In 
February, 1885 the Government introduced its own 
Bill [113] (couched in identical terms to its 1884 
Bill). This never got beyond the first reading 
stage, and in July it was withdrawn, with Lord 
Bramwell's Bill again being dropped. 
(f) More ad hoc reform 
But whilst attempts to secure general reform 
were proving unavailing, the trend established in 
the 1870s of individual statutes creating ad hoc 
exceptions to the rule continued. In the space of 
three years five statutes (the Married Women's 
Property Acts, 1882-84 [114], the Corrupt and 
Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883 [115], the 
Explosive Substances Act, 1883 (116] and the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885) [117] were 
passed, containing provisions rendering accused 
persons charged on indictment with certain 
specified offences competent in their own defence, 
and their spouses similarly competent. Also in 1881 
the statutory exceptions to the incompetency rule 
were' also imported into the law as to courts 
martial [118]. 
Of these statutes, by far the most, important 
were the Explosive Substances Act, 1883 (passed in 
a' single night following a wave of dynamitard 
'outrages) and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885. 
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S. 3 of the 1883 Act made manufacture or 
possession of explosives in suspicious, - 
circumstances an offence, save where the accused- 
proved that the manufacture or possession was for a 
lawful purpose, and made an accused charged with 
such offence and his spouse competent in his own 
defence (a provision justified on the familiar_ 
ground that the section cast a burden of proof on °, - 
the accused). 
That the 1885 Act contained a prisoners' 
- evidence clause was due to the efforts of private-- 
members. During the passage of the Bill through the. 
Commons a handful of backbenchers persuaded the,. 
House and the Government to include such a clause. 
as a -safeguard against blackmailing prosecutions 
(119]. The clause (s. 20) was particularly far: 
reaching, conferring upon the prisoner and his 
spouse the right to give evidence not only in 
relation to offences charged under the Act (i. e., 
unlawful sexual intercourse, procuring= 
prostitution, permitting premises to be used for 
unlawful sexual intercourse, abduction, gross-, 
indecency and brothel keeping), but also in respect-, 
of charges of rape, indecent assault on a female,: 
and abduction contrary to ss. 53-55 of the Offences. 
against the Person Act, 1861. 
The section was silent as to cross-examination 
as to credit. S. 4 of the 1883 Act, however, was 
explicit - the prisoner was to be subject to cross- 
examination to the same extent as an ordinary 
witness. 
Neither Act sought to safeguard from adverse 
comment or inference the prisoner who elected not 
to give evidence. In this they followed a pattern 
set by earlier Acts. 
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After the 1885 Act nothing was evert to be 
quite the same again. The Act meant that, at 
almost every Assize and Old Bailey session, there 
would now be in the calendar for trial a number of 
serious indictable offences in respect of which the 
accused had the right to give evidence in his own 
defence, and the experience of the practical 
working of s. 20 would henceforth regularly be 
prayed in aid in Parliament and elsewhere both for 
and against the proposal for general reform. Also, 
the Act exposed the law to the charge that it was 
fragmentary and inconsistent. If a prisoner 
accused of rape could give evidence in his own 
defence, what logic denied the privilege to a man 
on trial for his life? 
Within a year of the coming into force of the 
Act different opinions were being expressed as to 
how well it was working. Stephen J., in an article 
in The Nineteenth Century, claimed it was working 
well [120]. Cross-examination of prisoners was not 
being used as an instrument of torture. Very 
little use was in fact made of the power to cross- 
examine and cross-examination as to credit was 
rare. The Law Journal was less satisfied [121]. It 
pointed to the inconsistent way in which the 
provisions of the Act were applied by different 
judges. Where a prisoner did not tender himself as 
a witness, it was, said the Journal, the habit of 
Denman J. to discourage comment on the fact, whilst 
Lopes J. had declared in terms that it was unfair 
to suggest that it was fear of admitting facts 
showing his guilt which had caused the prisoner to 
stay out of the witness box. Stephen J.,, ' on the 
other hand, adopted the opposite practice, not only 
allowing the prosecution to comment upon the 
prisoner's, failure to testify, but commenting upon 
the, fact himself in his summing up, and also 
. subjected 
the prisoner, if called, to a form of 
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'interrogatoire'. The Times reports of criminal 
trials for 1886 confirm the justice of the 
criticism. At Exeter in February, in a case of 
indecent assault, Hawkins J. expressly warned the 
jury against drawing any adverse inference from the 
accused's failure to testify. Three months later, 
in a trial under the Corrupt and Illegal Practices 
Prevention Act, 1883, Pollock J. stood by and 
allowed Avory, who was prosecuting, to comment 
strongly on such failure [122]. 
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CHAPTER 11 
GETTING THE PRISONER'S STORY ACROSS IV 
VICTORY FOR THE REFORMERS 
"the prisoner ... now ... was entitled to to go into the witness box, much to his disgust in many 
cases, and tell the truth or what he called the 
truth. ' 
Bigham J., grand 'jury charge 1904. 
(a) 'Irish members ... taught the House of Commons how to talk for twenty-four hours without 
pause' [1j. 
Between 1886 and 1895, no less than nine Bills 
were introduced in Parliament, seeking to make the 
accused and his spouse competent witnesses in all 
cases. 
Such of the Bills as started life in the Lords 
(as seven of them did) encountered, in general, 
little opposition there. Where the Bills ran into 
trouble was in the Commons, where the Irish 
Nationalist M. P. s were determined that the reform 
should not pass, and were prepared to adopt any and 
every obstructionist tactic to defeat any Bill 
introduced on the subject. They conceded readily 
enough that in England the reform might be 
advantageous, but were adamant that: - 
'Ireland was not in a suitable condition for 
the application of such a reform; ... owing 
to'agrarian and political conditions there the 
administration of public justice inspired 
- little confidence. 
' [2] 
An accused had to cope with biased magistrates and 
judges, packed juries, and Crown counsel over 
zealous to secure convictions, whilst in summary 
cases his rights of appeal were' far more limited 
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than those of his English counterpart. However 
desirable it was in principle, in Ireland the 
reform would simply lead to oppression [3]. 
By the time the Irish M. P. s turned their 
attention to the Prisoners' Evidence Bills, the, 
Commons had already experience of their ability to 
block legislation. The most notorious incident had 
been in 1881 when, on the first reading of the 
Protection & Property Bill, they had responded with 
forty-one hours of obstruction. To try and limit 
their obstruction the Commons had in 1882 amended 
their standing orders [4]. 
The 1886 [5] Bill ended up being counted out 
on its Commons' second reading [6] but, had it not, 
been, O'Brien, the M. P. for Tyrone North, left the 
House in no doubt it would have been blocked [7]. 
During the Commons' second reading of the 1887 Bill 
[8], the Government attempted to buy off the 
opposition of the Irish members by offering to 
exclude Ireland from its provisions [9], but the 
offer was spurned [10]. A Bill excluding Ireland 
would be the thin end of the wedge: - 
'once the principle was established in 
England, the temptation to extend it to 
Ireland would be irresistible. ' 
The debate ended up being adjourned in the early 
hours of the morning, to complaints by the Attorney 
General of Irish obstruction, in order that M. P. s 
might 'get away for some little though much needed 
rest' after the Irish members had prolonged it by 
moving a succession of adjournment motions [11]. 
The offer to exclude Ireland having been 
rejected, the Government, in reintroducing [12] the 
Bill in 1888 [13] offered no such concession. At 
the second reading stage, a number of M. P. s urged 
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on the Government the wisdom of excluding Ireland 
[14], but the Government stood firm, arguing that, 
if the Bill conferred, as they believed, a benefit 
upon accused persons, it would be both illogical 
and wrong to deny Irish prisoners that same benefit 
[15]. The nationalists' reponse was a promise to 
use all their efforts to defeat the Bill [16]. 
Predictably, it became bogged down in committee, 
and, eventually in November, the Government was 
obliged to withdraw it. 
The spectre of Irish opposition, coupled with 
pressure of Parliamentary business, almost 
certainly lay behind the dropping of the 1889 [17] 
and 1891 [18] Bills (the first was withdrawn at the 
second reading stage, the latter was dropped, after 
having passed all its stages in the Lords, without 
ever reaching the Commons). 
On the Lords' second reading of the 1892 [19] 
Bill, the Government was urged to exclude Ireland 
[20]. It would not. In the Commons several 
members tendered the same advice [21]. By the end 
of the second reading debate the Government 
indicated it was ready to give way on the point 
[22], but this did not save the Bill which 
ultimately foundered in committee. 
In introducing the 1893 [23] Bill, the Lord 
Chancellor accepted that for the last six years the 
measure had been blocked by Irish opposition. Like 
its predecessors this Bill also ended up being 
withdrawn, but not this time due to Irish 
opposition, but to the delay that had been caused 
by, the Government seeking the opinion of the judges 
upon a proposal, by the Society of Chairmen and 
Deputy Chairmen of Quarter Sessions in England and 
Wales, that there should be included in the Bill a 
clause empowering the court to assign counsel (to 
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be paid out of the public funds) to prisoners who 
desired to be defended by counsel [24]. 
In 1895 the Government introduced two 
identical Bills [25] in the Lords. Both excluded 
Ireland [26]. The first never reached the Commons t 
and the second got no further than the second- 
reading. 
If the attempts to carry the reform during- 
this decade were defeated, the Parliamentary 
debates at least had the merit of throwing up new 
points for discussion. In the Lords' debate on the 
1887 Bill, Lord Salisbury argued for unrepresented-, 
prisoners being given assistance from the bench in' 
order to get across their defence [27], whilst in 
the Commons Bradlaugh pressed for the inclusion of 
a clause requiring magistrates to caution prisoners 
that they were not obliged to give evidence [28]. - 
In the 1888 debate Wharton asked whether a 
prisoner's giving evidence without calling other 
witnesses would give the prosecution a right of 
reply, observing that, if it would, the Bill was ä 
trap [29]. 
The opposition of the Irish members was in 
stark contrast to the state of English opinion 
which, after 1885, was very much pro-reform. The 
speeches of English M. P. s and Lords during the 
debates on the Bills were overwhelmingly favourable 
[30]. The Times, in a leader in 1891 [31], treated 
the matter as too clear for argument. Four senior 
criminal judges [32] publicly expressed dismay that 
what they regarded as an essential reform had still 
not been enacted, adding their voices to that of 
Stephen J. [33], who had advocated the reform many 
times in print, and those of the Law Lords who had 
spoken in Parliament. Moreover events both at home 
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and abroad were making it increasingly difficult to 
deny the need for reform. 
During the period 1882 to 1893 no less than 
six colonial legislatures passed statutes rendering 
the accused and his spouse competent witnesses in 
criminal proceedings - India [34], South Australia 
(1882) [35], New Zealand (1889) [36], New South 
Wales (1891) [37], Queensland (1892) [38] and 
Canada (1893) [39], and, according to Windeyer, the 
Chief Justice of New South Wales, in a letter to 
The Times in 1896 [40], in that jurisdiction the 
reform had been found to work well. 
At the same time, back in England, Parliament 
was continuing to add to the list of statutory 
exceptions to the incompetency rule - with no less 
than nine Acts, creating such exceptions, being 
passed between 1885 and 1895. Some of the new 
statutory exceptions could be justified on the old 
ground that the Act in question threw a burden onto 
the accused (e. g. the Betting & Loans (Infants) 
Act, 1892 [41], and the Corrupt & Illegal Practices 
Act, 1895) [42], but for the exceptions created by 
such statutes as the Public Health (London) Act, 
1891 [43], the False Alarms of Fire Act, 1895 [44] 
and the Law of Distress (Amendent) Act, 1895 [45] 
it was difficult to find any explanation other than 
fashion. Of the newly created exceptions, the one 
of the most practical importance was that created 
by the, Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1894 
[46] (which like the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 
1885 permitted child complainants to give unsworn 
evidence subject to a corroboration requirement). 
Two of, the statutes (the Diseases, of Animals Act, 
1894 [47] and the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894) [48] 
merely, re-enacted exceptions created by earlier 
Acts.. 
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These developments, in their turn, led to a` 
change in the way the reformers argued their case. ---'_: 
First, they began to pray in aid; 
increasingly, the way in which existing statutes; 
which permitted prisoners to testify had been found 
to work in practice. In the debate on the 1888. -. 
Bill, the Attorney-General (drawing no doubt'. 
heavily on Stephen J. 's article of 1886) claimed-' 
that the unanimous testimony of bar and bench was 
that the Criminal Law Amendment Act was working, 
well [49]. In the debate on the 1895 Bill, Lord. 
Halsbury cited the case of Barber [50], tried and 
convicted at the Old Bailey for fraud, and 
subsequently sued for damages for the same fraud. ' 
At the trial of the civil action, Barber had given' 
evidence in his own defence, and, so convincingly,, '-, 
that the jury stopped the case, leading the trial. 
judge, Lord Coleridge, to observe that, if the 
defendant had been able to give evidence at his 
criminal trial, he could not possibly bave been 
convicted and punished (51]. 
Second, it was urged that the law was now in'a 
thoroughly anomalous and unsatisfactory state, and 
could not be allowed to remain in such condition. ' 
This was a multi-faceted point. There were first 
of all the anomalies and problems created by the 
poor drafting of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, " 
1885. Of these the most. glaring was the fact that' 
a prisoner was competent in his own defence in 
cases of rape but not in cases of attempted rape. " 
Then there was the difficulty which arose when an 
accused was charged in the same indictment with 
offences under the 1885 Act, in respect of which he" 
was competent, and common law offences, such as' 
conspiracy and common assault, in respect of which 
he was not [52]. What was the status of evidence 
given by the prisoner, in the course of such trial, 
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which bore upon the question of his guilt or 
innocence of the common law offence? Was it 
inadmissible and was it the duty of the judge to 
direct the jury to disregard it? To this problem 
at least, an answer had not been long in coming, 
the Court for Crown Cases Reserved ruling in Owen 
(1888) [53] that if a prisoner, in the course of 
giving evidence upon a charge in respect of which 
he was competent to give evidence, made a statement 
in the nature of an admission of another charge, 
such statement stood in the same position as any 
other admission against interest. But how 
satisfactory an answer was it? There was also the 
point, stressed by Lord Halsbury in the debate on 
the 1895 Act, that the prosecutor, by the way he 
framed his charges (e. g. by charging conspiracy 
rather than the substantive offence) could 
effectively determine whether the accused would be 
capable of giving evidence at his trial or not 
(54]. 
The 1885 Act, however, was only part of the 
problem. Wherever one turned, one could find 
anomalies. A prisoner could be examined when 
charged with personation of a voter, but not where 
the charge was personation for the purpose of 
fraud. He could be examined where the charge was 
sending an unseaworthy ship to sea, but not where 
the charge was manslaughter by so acting. He was 
competent to give evidence where charged with 
unlawful possession of explosives, but not where 
charged with manslaughter arising from such 
possession. On a charge of forging a trade mark he 
was competent, but not when charged with any other 
species of forgery. Where the charge depended 
upon the sending of a letter he could give evidence 
if the case was one of libel, but not where the 
allegation was of sending a threatening letter 
. [55]. Then there was the bizarre nature of some of 
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the statutory exceptions. What public policy 
required that a man charged with giving a false 
alarm of fire, or, levying distress, when not the'-' 
holder of a bailiff's certificate, (both offences 
punishable by fine), should be competent to give 
evidence in his own defence, but denied the right 
to a person charged, under the Chimney Sweepers" 
Act, 1894, with soliciting business in a manner-' 
calculated to cause annoyance (an offence likewise 
punishable by fine)? Again, the number of 
statutory exceptions was now so numerous that, as 
Lord Herschell claimed in the debate on the 1895 
Bill (with some exaggeration), it now required a 
special education, on the part of those who" 
presided at criminal trials, to know, whether or 
not, the persons accused before them were capable 
of giving evidence or not [56]; and certainly the 
public was bemused to the. extent that judges at the 
Old Bailey were, according to Poland, adopting the 
practice, in cases where the accused was 
incompetent to give evidence, of pointing this fact 
out to the jury, lest they fall into error, and 
draw an inference against the accused by reason of 
his failure to do what the law prohibited him from 
doing [57]. 
Added to the above were the problems caused by 
careless drafting, and lack of uniformity in the 
wording of the statutes creating exceptions to the 
incompetency rule. The point was devastatingly 
made by Frederick Mead, a London stipendiary 
magistrate, in 1892 in an article in The Nineteenth 
Century [58] 'Different words' he wrote 
'introducing varying incidents have been 
continuously used. For example in four cases a 
defendant, but not the wife or husband, may be 
called (Merchant Shipping Act, 1876, Contagious 
Diseases of Animals Act, 1878, Metalliferous Mines 
Regulation Act, 1872, Threshing Machines Act, 
186 
1878). In two cases a defendant may call his wife 
but a woman, when charged, is deprived of the 
reciprocal advantage (Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 
1875). Sometimes it is left to the discretion of 
the defendant whether the husband or wife shall-be 
called, sometimes to that of the proposed witness, 
whether husband or wife. ' 
The only way, so it was argued, of bringing 
the law to a satisfactory condition was either to 
abolish the incompetency rule or the exceptions to 
it, and of these two courses the latter was not a 
practical possibility, for, as Lord Coleridge C. J. 
put it, it was too late for any going back [59]. 
(b) Sir Herbert Stephen lends a hand 
1896 saw the Government introduce yet another 
Prisoners' Evidence Bill (60]. Like so many of its 
predecessors, it passed the Lords easily and 
quickly enough. In the Commons, however, it got no 
further than a first reading, being eventually 
withdrawn to ironic opposition cheers in July. A 
private member's Bill [61], introduced in February, 
seeking to make prisoners competent in all summary 
cases'fared no better. 
The same year also saw the beginning of a 
sustained English campaign against the reform. In 
the van of the campaign was Sir Herbert Stephen, 
the Clerk of Assize of the Northern Circuit, and 
the'son of the late Stephen J. 
in 1895 he had written to The Times (62] 
complaining that, in cases where prisoners gave 
evidence, the bar was departing from its 
traditional standards of. fairness. In April 1896, 
he published an -article', in The Nineteenth Century 
163]°' attacking then current Government Bill. The 
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article was provocatively entitled 'A Bill to 
Promote the Conviction of Innocent Prisoners'. The 
thrust of his argument was this. The only persons, 
who could comment upon the merit of the proposed 
reform, were those who had seen it working in 
practice. The chief class of cases in which, 
prisoners gave evidence were those under the, 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 which were 
invariably tried either at the Central Criminal 
Court or at Assizes. It followed that it was from 
amongst those, who were regularly present at or. 
engaged in these cases, that opinions as to its: 
workings should be canvassed, not from judges like, 
Lord Esher, Lord Halsbury and Lord Herschell, who 
had spoken in favour of the Bill in the Lords, but 
who had probably never seen a trial in which a 
prisoner had given evidence, and had certainly not 
been engaged in such cases on any regular basis. 
He himself had considerable experience of such 
cases, first as a practising barrister on the South. 
Eastern Circuit, and, since 1889, as Clerk of, 
Assize of the Northern Circuit (his estimate was 
that there were 100-200 cases a year on the 
Northern Circuit, in which prisoners were competent 
to give evidence, either under the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act or under one of the other Acts 
permitting prisoners to testify). His experience 
led him to the conclusion that, whereas in cases 
where prisoners were not competent to give evidence 
not one in a thousand was wrongfully convicted, in 
cases where prisoners did give evidence at least, 
one a year was wrongfully convicted. A number of 
factors contributed to such wrongful convictions. 
First, where prisoners gave evidence, the jury- 
decided the case on a balance of probabilities., 
Second, innocent prisoners were convicted because.: 
of the way they gave their evidence; if they gave- 
it badly or dishonestly it went against them, and 
yet there were many prisoners who could not answer 
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a series of questions, concerning a matter in which 
they had a strong interest, without looking as 
though they were lying, and not a few people were 
absolutely incapable of answering questions 
straightforwardly and to the point. Third, where 
prisoners gave evidence, prosecuting counsel 
examined them and addressed the jury, not as 
ministers of justice, but as if striving for a 
verdict at nisi prius. He conceded, however, that 
there might possibly be something to be said for 
allowing a prisoner to give evidence where statute 
cast upon him a burden of proof, or, where the 
proceedings though criminal in form were litigous 
in substance. Stephen had chosen his ground 
cleverly. Until then opponents of reform had never 
had been able to dispute the reformers' claims that 
the reform had been tried in criminal cases in the 
United States and in the Colonies, and, in England, 
in civil cases and in prosecutions under the 1885 
Act, and had been found to work well. Now here was 
someone, with considerable experience of the 1885 
Act, claiming that it worked not in favour of but 
to the prejudice of innocent prisoners. 
Ar 
The article started a controversy which only 
stopped when the 1898 Bill became law. 
In May 1896, there was published a report upon 
the current Bill by a committee of the Bar Council 
[64]. This reached quite the opposite conclusion 
to Stephen. It unanimously recommended that the 
principle of the Bill was, on the whole, a sound 
one, and should, in the interests of public 
justice, be made of general application. The 
committee's only misgiving was about 
'the difficulty ... frequently' experienced by 
-prosecuting " counsel", under, existing Acts in 
judging as to the propriety _of commenting or 
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not upon the prisoner's absence from the, 
witness box' 
and suggesting that, if the Bill became law, the 
judges should be invited to give guidance on the 
propriety of such comment. 
Pitt Lewis, who was on that committee, 
published a reply to Stephen's article, in the May 
issue of The Nineteenth Century [65], under the 
title 'A Bill for the Protection of Innocent 
Prisoners'. Despite its title, the article, in 
fact, appeared to confirm several of Stephen's 
claims. In the first place, Pitt Lewis conceded 
that it was difficult, if not impossible, to answer 
arguments based on personal experience, 
particularly when they came from a person "as to 
whose opportunities of judging and whose sincere 
desire to judge rightly there can be no manner of 
doubt". He further conceded that were three 
classes of prisoner who suffered by giving 
evidence: - 
(i) those against whom the prosecution case 
was weak, but whose guilt was exposed in 
the course of their evidence; 
(ii) those who, though innocent, brought about 
their own conviction by lying on 
collateral matters; and 
4 
(iii) those who told the truth at their trial, 
but told it so badly, and in such 'a 
bungling way that the jury did not 
believe them. 
The first class he claimed were deserving of 
sympathy only if one regarded a criminal trial, not 
as a search for truth, but as: - 
190 
'a ... game of skill ... in ... which the 
party on the defensive was entitled. to be 
declared the winner of the game, and 
acquitted, unless the attacking party ... have 
strictly and conclusively proved their case, 
without any aid whatsoever from the party on 
the defensive'. 
The second class were equally undeserving of 
sympathy. The third class of sufferers was he 
admitted deserving of sympathy but it was extremely 
small, for, the conviction of such persons required 
not merely a stupid accused, but an equally stupid 
jury, and against the hardship suffered by them 
should be balanced the advantage, which other 
innocent prisoners reaped, through being able to 
prove their innocence in the witness box. He 
concluded with the claim that there was no risk of 
the impartiality of the bench being compromised by 
the reform, and lamenting the bar which the current 
Bill sought to place on cross-examination of 
prisoners. 
In June came Windeyer's letter to The Times 
[66], asserting that five years' experience of the 
working of the New South Wales Criminal Evidence 
Act had left him wholly . 
in favour of the reform. 
Within days there appeared in The Times a letter 
from Stephen [67], claiming that the English 
experience was to the contrary. 
(c) The 1897 Bill 
1897 saw a yet further addition to the list of 
statutes which permitted accused persons, charged 
thereunder, to give evidence - the Chaff Cutting 
Machines Act [68]. The Act was passed without 
opposition, the ground of the exception being the 
casting by the 'Act of a burden of proof on the 
accused. It also saw the Government introduce yet 
änother Criminal Evidence Bill [69]. 
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It would seem that the Government's original 
intention was that the Bill should extend to 
Ireland, but, when on the motion for leave, the 
Attorney-General was pressed upon the point by 
Maurice Healy, he equivocated and said that he 
would consult with the Attorney-General for Ireland 
and the Chief Secretary [70]. Healy's warning shot 
worked, for when the Bill was introduced it had a 
clause excluding Ireland, and, in the second 
reading debate, the Attorney General admitted that 
this had been done for purely 'parliamentary 
reasons' [71]. 
This was not its only omission. Unlike the 
Bill of the previous year (and the majority of the, 
Bills introduced between 1884 and 1896), it failed 
to give any protection to the accused in the matter 
of cross-examination. In moving the second. 
reading, the Attorney-General sought to explain. 
this volte face. It had been urged, he said, by 
many lawyers, including Lord Selborne and Lord 
Bramwell, that it was not right to throw any 
immunity around the accused. He had asked many 
judges whether they found that the power of cross- 
examination had worked hardly to the prisoner, who 
had given evidence, and they, one and all, said 
that it had not. It seemed better to have one 
uniform and simple code of law, and he was 
confident that the judges would never allow the 
position of the prisoner to be prejudiced, or the 
licence of counsel to go too far in the matter of 
examination or cross-examination of prisoners (72]. 
During the second reading debate, little 
emerged that was new. The Attorney-General, 
predictably, prayed in aid the unsatisfactory state 
of the existing law, with all its anomalies. There 
were, he said, two systems under which accused 
persons were now tried and one or other ought to be 
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abandoned. He argued that the 'reform had worked;. 
well in the United States and the Colonies. It had. 
been supported by such great judges as Stephen J., 
Lord Coleridge, Lord Bramwell, Lord Selborne and 
many others, and, coming to living judges, almost 
every judge on the bench was in favour. He 
certainly knew no judge who was against. The Bill 
was also supported by a number of important bodies 
including the Law Society [73). 
The Bill's opponents paraded the usual stock 
arguments against reform. They were particularly 
severe in their criticism of the failure of the 
Bill to protect against cross-examination as to 
credit [74], it being pointed out that, in the 
Colonies where the reform was said to be working 
well, such protection was given [75]. Nor was the 
Attorney-General's claim that the 1885 Act had 
worked well allowed to pass unchallenged. That was 
not, said Lloyd Morgan, the view of the rank and 
file of the bar who had actual experience of its 
working [76]. Amongst those who spoke out against 
the Bill were the Irish members who had not been 
appeased one whit by the exclusion of Ireland [77]. 
The bulk of the House however was pro-reform 
and the Bill passed its second reading by a 
substantial majority (210 to 41) [78]. Despite 
this encouraging vote it became a victim of the 
pressure of Parliamentary business and ended up 
being withdrawn. 
(d) The Bar Council Report and the continuing 
public debate 
In the meanwhile, a committee of the Bar 
Council had, in March 1897, produced a Report on 
the'Bill. This time Stephen was on the committee. 
The ,, majority of the committee, predictably, came 
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out in favour of the principle of the Bill, but, 
with the exception of Pitt Lewis, were strongly in 
favour of there being included in the Bill a 
clause, along the lines of cl. 1(d) of the 1896 
Bill, restricting cross-examination as to credit. 
They also repeated what the 1896 committee had said 
about the matter of prosecution comment upon the. 
prisoner's failure to give evidence. Stephen 
produced a minority report. This repeated the 
arguments of his 1896 article, but with additional 
-criticisms (the Bill would offer a strong 
temptation to the prosecution to be careless in, 
preparing their cases, because they would trust to_ 
the prisoner's evidence, or his refusal to give, 
any, to make out their case; it would produce 
perjury which, in practice, it would be hopeless to, 
punish; and given that the current conviction rate, 
stood at over 80%, the slight increase in 
convictions which the Bill would procure, seemed to, 
him an advantage of little importance). He 
acknowledged that the question of cross-examination 
was one of difficulty. To protect prisoners 
against cross-examination as to previous 
convictions or character would place them in a 
position, to which as witnesses, they were not 
entitled. On the other hand, if they were so 
examined, a man of suspicious character would 
always be convicted. He thought that, on the 
whole, the second was the greater evil of the two, 
In an attempt to draw the sting of the report, he 
expressed regret that the committee had not 
attempted, to ascertain the opinion of the 
relatively small number of barristers, who had been 
frequently engaged in defending prisoners since the 
passing of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. Such 
men had an experience of the results of prisoners 4l 
being allowed to give evidence, which made their 
opinion of unusual weight when compared with that, 
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of the leaders of the profession and other eminent 
persons. 
The following month, in a letter to The Times 
[79], Stephen took the matter a stage further. 
After claiming that of the judges, Day, Vaughan 
Williams, Lawrence and Collins, were all of the 
opinion that the Bill was a mistake, he stated 
that, on the Northern Circuit, between 5 and 10 
innocent persons were convicted each year, as a 
result of giving evidence. He also launched an 
attack on the absence of a provision in the Bill 
protecting the prisoner against cross-examination. 
It was forgotten, he said, that you may not ask any 
other witness was the prisoner convicted of so and 
so? The true purpose of-cross-examining prisoners 
as to previous convictions was not for the purpose 
of damaging his credit, but to make the jury think 
that, because he had done it, or something like it, 
before, he had done it again, and this operated 
very harshly on habitual criminals, who were often 
arrested and charged simply because a crime had 
been committed and they were in the neighbourhood 
at the time. 
Nor was Stephen without support. In April, 
the North London and Middlesex Sessions Bar Mess 
sent to the Lord Chancellor a copy of a resolution 
they had passed, protesting strongly against the 
Bill. ' The letter which accompanied it invited the 
Lord Chancellor to read -Stephen's Article in The 
Nineteenth Century, if he had not already done so 
(80]. 
The correspondence columns of The Times for 
1897 also contained a number of letters supporting 
Stephen. Frederick Mead confirmed that, in his 
experience, defence counsel were considerably 
hampered in those case where the prisoner could now 
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give evidence. If counsel failed to call his 
client, the failure would be the subject of a 
damning comment on the part of the prosecution. if 
he did call him, he thereby lost the right of 
reply, and, if the prisoner had a tainted 
character, he would be cross-examined about it. 
All this was a hard price to pay for the privilege 
of taking an oath [81]. The absence of a 
restriction in the 1897 Bill on cross-examination 
as to credit was also criticised in articles in 
both The Times (82] and The Scots Law Times [83]. 
Another correspondent pointed out that the problem 
was particularly acute in magistrates courts, where 
the average borough J. P. believed that the past of 
the prisoner was, as much, or more to do with the 
case, as the evidence for the prosecution [84]. 
The plight of the ignorant prisoner without counsel 
was also referred to in letters time and time 
again. A chairman of Quarter Sessions argued that 
such a prisoner was far better served by making an 
unsworn statement, than by going into the witness 
box and running the risk of being reduced to 
confusion and self-contradiction under cross- 
examination [85]. Alfred Lyttleton [86], the 
Recorder of oxford, suggested that the type of 
reform needed was something along the lines of the 
Indian Code of Criminal Procedure Act, 1882, under 
which the judge was required to call the prisoner's 
attention, one by one, to the heads of evidence 
against him, and invite him to offer his 
explanation if he wished. Stephen took up the 
suggestion with enthusiasm, whilst at the same time 
ridiculing a claim by Evelyn Ashley that what 
Lyttleton was advocating was the exact replica of 
existing procedure at Quarter Sessions [87]. 
The start of the New Year saw the debate still 
continuing in the columns of The Times. A 
correspondent, with experience of the Indian Code, 
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pointed out that that also had its shortcomings, 
since judges, in drawing the attention of prisoners 
to the points against them often cross-examined and 
put questions which assumed the guilt of the 
prisoner, whilst a failure to answer would lead to 
an adverse inference being drawn by the jury [88]. 
Another correspondent predicted that the need for 
impecunious prisoners to be legally defended would 
be rendered all the greater by the Act [89]. 
In March, 1898, Stephen published a sixty-four 
page pamphlet, obviously written with an eye on the 
forthcoming Bill, entitled 'Prisoners on Oath Past 
Present and Future'. The pamphlet, in addition to 
restating his case on the matter, contained a 
detailed analysis of and reply to every argument 
advanced by the reformers in both the 1897 Commons' 
debate and in The Times correspondence. 
On March 2nd, Grantham J. wrote to The Times 
urging that there should be no restriction on 
cross-examination of prisoners, citing a case which 
he had tried in which the cross-examination of a 
prisoner as to his past had prevented a guilty man 
escaping and a complainant's reputation being 
blasted. 
(e) The passing of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 
In the meanwhile, the legislative round had 
begun again with the Government introducing into 
the Lords its latest Criminal Evidence Bill [90]. 
"In the debates on the Bill, one senses that it 
was-realised on all sides that this time the reform 
would finally be carried. The 1897 Bill had passed 
its Commons second reading by a large majority, and 
'the*" Government now made a determined effort to buy 
off all remaining opposition. . The new Bill 'for 
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purely Parliamentary reasons' excluded Ireland 
[91], and, in order to head off the critics of 
unrestricted cross-examination, included a clause 
limiting cross-examination as to credit. 
As was to be expected, the Bill passed quickly 
through the Lords. On the Lords' second reading 
debate in March, the Lord Chancellor and Lord 
Herschell both went out of their way to try and 
discredit Stephen's claim that the 1885 Act was 
yielding an annual crop of 5 to 10 wrongful 
convictions on the Northern Circuit [92]. They 
stressed that no particulars, no facts, no proof 
had been offered in support of the claim, and, 
asked how, if specific cases had been cited,. 
Stephen could hope to prove either that the 
prisoner in question was innocent, or, that it was 
his giving evidence which convicted him. They 
also cited Home Office statistics to show that his 
figure of 100 to 200 for the number of cases, tried 
annually on the Circuit, in which prisoners gave 
evidence was hopelessly overstated (it was in fact 
less than 100 per year). Further, said the Lord 
Chancellor, if Stephen were right one would expect 
to find complaints about the working of the Act in 
petitions to the Home Office, but extensive 
research by the Home Office had failed to reveal a 
single such complaint (when, in the Commons' 
debate, this bad point was repeated by the 
Attorney-General [93] it was speedily demolished by 
Maurice Healy, who pointed out that a prisoner was 
hardly likely to petition on the ground that his 
own evidence had got him convicted) [94]. Lord 
Herschell rounded off the attack on Stephen by 
refuting the latter's . claim 
that he (Lord 
Herschell) had no experience of prisoners giving 
evidence. He had, he said, in fact appeared for 
the Crown in one of the first prosecutions brought 
under the 1883 Act. 
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It is clear from Home Office files that, -prior 
to the debate, a good deal of work had been-done by 
the Department's officials to try and unearth 
material which could be used to discredit Stephen's 
arguments, and, embarrassingly, the research, as 
well as yielding the statistics deployed in the 
debate, had also resulted in an internal memorandum 
[95] stating that there could be no doubt that the 
proportion of 'shaky' convictions was larger in 
cases under the Criminal'Law Amendment Act than in 
others. Considering how few such cases were in 
proportion to the total number of convictions, the 
number of petitions on the ground of innocence was 
striking. And one of the reasons for this, it was 
suggested, was the law of evidence. In rape 'cases, 
for, example, if the accused did not give evidence 
he suffered, but, if he did, almost inevitably the 
jury would frame the question to be decided by them 
"Which is telling the truth he or she? " and, if 
they did, no doubt they would convict many guilty 
men who under the general law of evidence would 
escape, but the result would be a number of shaky 
convictions. Home Office experience showed this 
was the case, and one could not help thinking that, 
among the shaky convictions, there might be an 
unusual proportion of miscarriages of justice. The 
memorandum concluded: - 
'the experience of the Department ... does 
seem to ... suggest that the assimilation of 
the general law of evidence to the law 
applicable to rape and other similar cases was 
likely, among other effects, to increase the 
number of shaky convictions founded rather on 
a strong probability than a probability which 
excludes reasonable doubt, (which) would, of 
course, tend to increase the number of 
wrongful convictions'. 
If ,, 
the Lord Chancellor was aware of this 
memorandum, he made no reference to it, but 
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concluded the debate by presenting a petition from 
the Law Society in favour of the Bill [96]. - 
Between the Lords' second reading in March and , 
the Commons' second reading in April there was a 
flurry of correspondence in The Times. An Indian, 
judge had pointed out that, under the Indian 
system, the problem of innocent prisoners telling 
obvious lies, in a foolish attempt to better their 
case, was well known [97]. Frederick Mead [98], 
said that with undefended prisoners, who were often 
too ignorant even to understand what was meant when 
they were called upon to ask questions, there was, 
in his experience, rarely difficulty if they were 
allowed or encouraged to make any statement they 
pleased as the evidence proceeded. But a rigid 
adherence to procedure, which required them to 
reserve all their explanations till the end of the 
prosecution case, put them at the same disadvantage 
whether they were in the dock or the witness box. 
Hawkins J., during the same period, also 
pronounced against the Bill on the ground that, 
under the law as it then stood, the prisoner had 
every opportunity of telling his story under the 
best possible circumstances, namely when first 
before the magistrates. If his story was truthful,. 
it might lead to his being discharged there and 
then, whilst, if he went to trial, the fact that he 
had disclosed his story at the first opportunity 
and thereby given the prosecution the chance to 
investigate it would be in his favour [99]. 
At the second reading debate in the Commons 
twelve of the members who spoke spoke against the 
Bill, and of these half were lawyers [100]. 
The Attorney-General's speech opening the 
second reading debate was, in the main, a 
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repetition of the arguments he had used the 
previous year. There were, however, some 
differences. In the first place, he had to explain 
why the Government had changed its mind, yet again, 
on cross-examination. He gave as the reason 
fairness to the prisoner. He repeated the Lord 
Chancellor's attack on Stephen's claims, and 
rejected calls for the adoption of the Indian 
practice of the judge calling the prisoner's 
attention to the points against him. 
Interestingly, throughout the progress of the Bill, 
he declined to be drawn on the question of judicial 
opinion on the subject (a change of stance from the 
previous year which did not pass unremarked) [101]. 
The opponents of the Bill stressed that 
opposition to the measure had of recent years 
increased [102]. Pickersgill and Atherley-Jones 
claimed that the rank and file of the bar were 
against the Bill [103] and it was also said that 
the judges were against it [104]. It was argued 
that the real object of the Bill was not to protect 
the innocent, but to increase the number of 
convictions. Of those who were tried and 
convicted, 60% had been previously convicted and 
90% were of depraved character. Persons of this 
sort, guilty or innocent, would make a poor showing 
in' the witness box [105]. It was their habit, 
innocent or guilty, to tell lies to get out of 
scrapes, and, if liable to cross-examination as to 
their way of life, would have little hope of 
escaping conviction, innocent or not [106]. 
Several members commented upon the Government's 
about turn upon the subject of cross-examination 
[107], 'Bowles observing that the Bill changed every 
year, [108]. A remark of Cotton L. J. about the 
adverse change the Bill would work in the 
-relationship between judge and prisoners was cited 
[109Y], and one of"the arguments which had been used 
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against the. Prisoners' Counsel Bill in 1836 was 
disinterred, namely that the Bill would lead to an 
increase in the length of trials [110]. The Bill 
nevertheless passed its second reading by a large 
majority [111]. 
In June there was a long debate upon a motion' 
that the Bill should be referred to a Select 
Committee [112]. The motion, if passed, would have 
destroyed all hope of the Bill passing that 
session, and the Government would have none of it. 
The principle of the Bill had been clearly 
established by the large majority with which it had 
passed its second reading. In the end the Bill was 
referred to a Committee of the Whole House. 
The discussion of the Bill in committee was 
extensive and wide ranging. 
Some members, recognising that the Bill was 
going to pass, embarked on a damage limitation 
exercise. Amendments were moved proposing that the 
Bill should be for a trial period of 3 [113], 5 or 
7 years [114], that it should not apply to 
Magistrates' courts [115], that it should not apply 
to prisoners under 16 years of age [116], and, 
even, that it should not apply to Wales [117]. All 
were blocked. 
A matter which it was predictable would loom 
large in the Committee's deliberations was the 
Government's failure to include in the Bill a 
clause prohibiting comment upon the failure of a 
prisoner to give evidence. And so it proved. 
Lloyd Morgan moved that the Bill be amended to 
include a clause to the effect that the failure of 
a prisoner to give evidence should not raise any 
presumption against him, and that no reference to 
'or comment upon such failure should be made during 
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the trial [118]. To omit such a clause he argued 
was to compel prisoners to give evidence. The 
Solicitor-General was dismissive. Although in many 
cases it was, he said, a hard thing that comment 
should be made upon a prisoner's failure to give 
evidence, there was a residue of cases in which 
comment was necessary. As to the rest, the judges 
could be relied upon to see that the right of 
comment was not abused [119]. Also, there were 
practical problems about prohibiting comment. How 
was auch a prohibition to be enforced? Was a 
counsel who commented to be guilty of contempt? 
Were proceedings to be instituted against a judge 
who made comment? [120] (in fact a very effectual 
remedy had been proposed by Lloyd Morgan as long 
ago as 1892 - the quashing of any resulting 
conviction) [121]. And then again by prohibiting 
comment, you would prevent a judge telling the jury 
not to allow themselves to be prejudiced by the 
accused's failure to give'evidence [122]. He could 
have added that none of the existing statutes which 
allowed prisoners to give evidence contained such a 
clause, nor had any Prisoners' Evidence Bill since 
1878. But Lloyd Morgan was not alone in his 
misgivings. Other members pressed the Solicitor to 
give . way [123]. His response was to offer a 
partial concession. He would agree to a 
prohibition upon comment by counsel for the 
prosecution. On the question of comment by the 
judge however he declined to yield [124]. It would 
he-'argued be wrong to place such a fetter upon the 
judge. Where an accused's defence reflected 
gravely on the character of prosecution witnesses, 
to the extent that an acquittal would mean their 
ruin, it was only just that the judge should be 
allowed to comment upon the failure of the accused 
to back up his attack by evidence. In the end, 
this was where the Committee agreed to draw the 
line. '"A suggestion by Abel-Thomas that the judge 
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should, in a case where the accused failed to give 
evidence, be required to charge the jury that no 
adverse inference should be drawn therefrom was 
lost. 
The clause restricting cross-examination of a 
prisoner as to his character and previous 
convictions unsurprisingly generated much 
discussion. Gibson Bowles urged the Government to 
drop it [125], whilst Healy from the Irish benches 
urged that all cross-examination of a prisoner as 
to his character be prohibited [126]. Others urged 
the Government to strike out the provision 
permitting a prisoner, who had attacked the 
character of the prosecutor or his witnesses, to be 
cross-examined as to his own bad character. Such a 
provision, they argued, would inhibit him in his 
defence. Further, it represented a substantial 
change in the law and one wholly to his 
disadvantage. Under the existing law a prisoner 
was unrestricted in his right of cross-examination; 
he could attack the character of prosecution 
witnesses without any fear of thereby having his 
record put in [127]. But the Attorney-General 
stood his ground and the sub-clause to the proviso 
remained. One important drafting concession was, 
however, won from him. He agreed that in clause 1 
the words 'person charged' should be substituted 
for 'person called' [126]. This small amendment' 
had the effect of preventing the Crown cross- 
examining a prisoner's spouse as to his character" 
in cases where he attacked the character of a 
prosecution witness but did not himself give 
evidence. 
The Government also agreed to the inclusion in 
the Bill of clauses providing that the giving of 
evidence by the accused should not give the Crown a 
right of reply (a particularly vital safeguard), 
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[129], and that an accused 
do so from the witness box 
an amendment which made it 
leave unaffected the right 
unsworn statement, both a, 
at trial [131]. 
who gave evidence should 
[130]. It also accepted 
clear that the Act would 
of a prisoner to make an 
t committal hearings and 
A proposal that the Bill include a clause 
putting it beyond doubt that the right to testify 
was not to extend to hearings before the grand jury 
was however lost [132], as were proposals that 
prisoners should have the right to refuse to answer 
questions criminating them of the offence charged 
[133], that there be included a clause declaring 
that nothing in the Bill should affect the burden 
of proof [134], that prisoners under 16 who gave 
evidence should not be subject to cross-examination 
[135], that prisoners and their spouses giving 
evidence should not be subject to prosecution for 
perjury [136], and that the trial judge should be 
under a duty to caution an undefended prisoner that 
hewas not obliged to give evidence, but that if he 
did he would be subject to cross-examination [137]. 
An amendment proposing that undefended prisoners be 
assigned counsel was rejected by the Chairman of 
the Committee as outside the scope of the Bill 
[138]. 
The Committee stage was concluded in late 
July. The Bill received its Commons third reading 
the following day, and on the 12th August it 
received the royal assent. 
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(f) The first year of the New Act. 
The new Act got off to an inauspicious start, 
with uncertainty as to its commencement date [139],. 
and controversy as to whether it gave prisoners the 
right to testify before the grand jury [140]. and 
no sooner had the Court for Crown Cases Reserved 
ruled against such a right [141] than Hawkins J. 
began openly to cast doubt upon whether prisoners 
were entitled thereunder to give evidence beforey 
examining magistrates [142]. Nor were prisoners, 
showing any great enthusiasm to avail themselves of 
their right. At the July, 1899 session less than 
half of the prisoners tried at the Old Bailey gave 
evidence in their own defence [143], whilst of 
sixty one prisoners charged with murder whose cases 
were reported in The Times for 1899 only nine went; 
into the witness box [144]. 
Part of the reluctance of prisoners to testify 
may have been due to fear of prosecution for 
perjury, for during 1898-99 there was much debate 
as to whether a perjury prosecution should follow 
as of course where a prisoner was convicted after 
giving evidence in his own behalf [145]. Wright, 
J. even talked of raising the question before the 
Council of Judges [146]. The policy ultimately 
adopted was to reserve prosecution only for 
aggravated cases. Really there was no alternative. 
To have indicted everyone who gave perjured 
evidence for himself would, as Grantham J. pointed 
out, have meant the judges being on circuit almost 
continuously [147]. 
At the same time as the issue of prosecution 
for perjury was being debated, the judges were also 
adopting the practice (aped by prosecuting counsel) 
of criticising, as open to suspicion, any 
explanation offered by a. prisoner in the witness 
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box which had not been offered before the examining 
magistrates. This marked the beginnings of an 
attack upon the reserved defence which was to find 
its clearest expression in the Poor Prisoners' 
Defence Act, 1903 [148]. 
Also some prosecuting counsel were beginning 
to adopt practices disloyal to the spirit, if not 
the letter of the Act, such as telling the jury in 
opening that the only satisfactory answer to the 
charge could be the answer of the prisoner, or, 
where the prisoner did give evidence, making the 
" 
sneering comment that his evidence was only that of 
a prisoner [149]. 
As has already been seen the coming into force 
of, the Act made a scheme of criminal legal aid 
daily more urgent, whilst at the same time sounding 




THE LAST WORD 
'In too many cases counsel for the defence being, 
afraid of the speech in reply ... abstained from 
calling witnesses. ' 
Lord Brougham (1860) P. D. CLX, 85. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the fear of 
giving the prosecution the last word with the jury 
operated as a powerful deterrent to the calling of 
evidence by accused persons. 
Where the prosecution was conducted by the 
Attorney-General there was nothing the accused 
could do to prevent the Crown having the last word, - 
the Attorney having a prerogative right of reply 
whether or not defence evidence was called. In all 
other cases, however, whether the Crown had the 
reply depended upon the nature of the charge and 
the course the defence case took. - 
In treason, if the defence called evidence, 
both prosecution and defence counsel made closing 
speeches, with the Crown having the last word. If 
no defence evidence was called, the defence had the 
last word. 
In misdemeanour, the accused's position was 
more disadvantageous still. If he called evidence 
not only would this give the prosecution the last 
word,. but his counsel had no right to a closing 
speech (only one speech was allowed to defence 
counsel which, irrespective of whether there were 
defence witnesses to call, had to be made 
immediately upon the close of the Crown case) [1]. 
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These rules meant that, in deciding whether to 
call witnesses, the defence would have to weigh the 
benefit it hoped to reap from their testimony 
against the harm it might suffer from the 
prosecution reply (in misdemeanour that harm could 
be particularly great if the defence witnesses 
failed to come up to proof or were badly mauled in 
cross-examination, for the defence, lacking a 
closing speech, would have no opportunity to try 
and repair the damage). That counsel frequently 
chose to hold back available evidence rather than 
risk .a reply is beyond doubt [2]. 
Nor was this the only impact which the reply 
had on trial tactics. After 1820 it was but rarely 
that defence counsel would risk cross-examining a 
Crown witness on discrepancies between his 
testimony and his deposition, for, in order to do 
so, he would have to put the deposition in, and the 
putting in of any document by the defence at any 
stage gave the prosecution the reply [3]. Again, 
defence counsel when addressing the jury had to 
take care not to state facts not in evidence for to 
do so would give the Crown the reply [4]. Unless 
one knew one's opponent, even the calling of 
character witnesses involved an element of risk, 
for strictly the calling of such witnesses gave the 
prosecution the reply, and, although the right was 
one which Crown counsel was expected to exercise 
only in exceptional circumstances, if he decided to 
stand on his rights the judge could not prevent him 
doing so [5]. The only situation in which the 
defence case could be conducted without concerning 
itself, about the risk of reply was where the 
prosecutor was in person, prosecutors in person not 
being allowed to address the jury either by way of 
opening or reply [6]. 
., 
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Pre-1836, the rules in misdemeanour in theory 
applied also in felony. However, since in felony 
the accused's counsel could not address the jury on 
his behalf, the practice was for Crown counsel not 
to avail themselves of the right of reply where 
defence evidence was given [7]. Indeed, on some 
circuits, indulgence went further than this, it 
being the custom for prosecuting counsel not to 
make even an opening speech (save in complicated 
cases) [8]. Thus, in felony trials, at the close 
of the prosecution case, what the jury would hear 
would be the accused's unsworn statement followed 
by any evidence he chose to call, with no 
prosecution reply to either. 
The Prisoners' Counsel Bills had obvious 
implications as regards the reply, as the Attorney- 
General was not slow to point out in debate [9]. 
If felony prisoners were given the right to make" 
full defence by counsel, the Crown would beyond 
doubt henceforth exercise the same right of reply 
in felony as in misdemeanour. The point appears to 
have been overlooked by the draftsmen of the early 
Bills [10], for they are completely silent on the 
question of the reply. The first Bill to provide 
for the point was that of 1833, which proposed that 
the prisoner should have the last speech in both 
felony and misdemeanour. In 1835 the criminal Law 
Commissioners came out strongly in favour of 
allowing the accused the. last word [11], and both 
the 1835 and the 1836 Bills contained a clause to 
that effect. When the 1836 Bill reached the Lords, ' 
the clause was struck out at Committee stage, the 
principal ground of opposition to it being that it 
would create an inconsistency of practice between- 
civil and criminal cases [12]. At the third 
reading stage an attempt was made to reinstate it 
but failed by ten votes [13], and the Bill was sent 
back to the Commons with the clause struck out. The 
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Commons refused to accept the amendment, but with 
only a day of the session left, Ewart reluctantly 
gave in and the Bill was passed in the form in 
which it had come down from the Lords [14]. 
The judges were not slow to spell out what the 
implications of the new Act would be as regards the 
reply: In early 1837 they issued a Practice 
Direction [15]. In felony cases, counsel for a 
prisoner was not to be permitted to cross-examine a 
prosecution witness upon his deposition, without 
putting in the deposition, which would in turn give 
the Crown the right of reply; the calling of 
character witnesses would give the reply although 
it would be a matter for discretion whether counsel 
would exercise it; the Law Officers would be 
entitled to reply, although no evidence had been 
produced on behalf of the prisoner. Thus, the 
matter was clear - as its opponents had predicted, 
part of the price to be paid for the right to full 
defence by counsel in felony was that the prisoner 
who called evidence would be subject to the reply. 
A question which soon had to be faced was 
whether, in a case where there were several 
accused, the calling of evidence by one gave the 
prosecution a right of reply against all. It 
received from the judges no clear answer [16]. 
-Events took an 
important turn in 1853 with the 
publication of the Second Report of the Royal 
Commission on Common Law Procedure [17]. This 
stressed that, in civil cases, the one great object 
of counsel for a defendant was to avoid calling 
witnesses so as not to expose the case to the 
danger, of a reply. The upshot of the Report was 
s. 34 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, which, 
while'it did not abolish the reply in civil suits, 
did give counsel for a defendant who called 
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evidence, the right to make a second speech at the 
close of such evidence. This meant that henceforth 
the defendant's counsel would, at least, be able to 
deal with any ground which had been lost in the 
course of the defence case. 
The passing of the 1854 Act obviously posed 
the question whether the reform should be extended 
to criminal cases. In 1856 the Lord Chancellor 
commissioned a report on criminal procedure from 
Charles Greaves. He recommended [18] that criminal 
and civil procedure be brought into line on this 
point. He also argued forcibly against the Law 
Officers' prerogative right to the last word. On 
the question of whether the law should be altered 
to give the prisoner the last word in all cases, he 
pointed out that the Second Report of the Criminal 
Law Commissioners had favoured such a reform, and 
that the last word was given to the prisoner in: 
civil law systems, in Scotland and under the New 
York Criminal Code. He also acknowledged that the 
existence of the Crown's right of reply led in many 
cases to evidence material to a prisoner's case not' 
being. called. However, in his view, the balance of 
convenience was against making such a change. There 
was no evidence that the right of reply had led to 
practical inconvenience. If defence counsel were, 
allowed the last word the judge would often be 
placed in the embarrassing position of having to 
expose in his summing up the unsoundness of the 
defence arguments; also there would be no incentive 
for prisoners not to bring forward all manner of 
irrelevant evidence. 
The Government took no steps to give effect to 
Greaves' recommendation, and in 1860 Denman and 
Ewart presented a Bill [ 19 ] to bring the practice 
in felony and misdemeanour into line with that in 
civil. suits. It passed the Commons but the Lords 
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sent it back with an amendment to the effect that 
it should be left to the discretion of the trial 
judge whether the defence should have a second 
speech (such discretion to be exercised in the 
light of the number of witnesses called and all 
other relevant factors). The amendment was strongly 
attacked in the Commons (20] and in the end the 
Bill was lost. In 1861 a similar Bill was 
introduced but did not get beyond a first reading 
[21]. Eventually, in 1865 the reform was carried 
in the form of s. 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
The Act, by permitting prosecution witnesses to be 
cross-examined on their depositions without the 
deposition being put in, also limited the scope for 
the reply [22]. 
Although the 1865 Act did not, as Greaves had 
recommended, abolish the Law Officers' right of 
reply, that right was by now coming under attack 
from other quarters. In the Practice Direction of 
1837 the judges had spoken of the right as being 
exercisable not only by the Attorney General but by 
any, counsel representing him, but by the 1860s not 
all judges were prepared to allow it so wide a 
scope. In 1858 Byles J. declared the right limited 
to>>the Attorney-General personally [23], and the 
following year he repeated this ruling in a mint 
prosecution [24]. In 1865 Martin B. denied the 
claim of the Attorney-General of Chester to 
exercise the right, declaring it exercisable only 
by the Attorney-General of England in person [25]. 
Also, ; 
hard on the heels of the 1865 Act came 
arguments that the Act had abolished the 
prerogative right. This palpably unsound argument 
was rejected by a number of judges [26] but it took 
a long time dying. As late as 1872 [27] the point 
was still being taken at the Old Bailey. The judges 
gave, equally, short shrift to arguments that the 
right; wäs limited to the Attorney-General and not 
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claimable by the Solicitor-General. In 1878 Hawkins 
J. [28] attempted a reverter to the old rule, 
declaring that any counsel representing the Law 
Officers could claim the right, but his decision 
was against the tide of opinion, and in 1884 the 
matter was put beyond doubt by a resolution of the 
Council of Judges [29] that henceforth the right 
would be allowed only in cases where the Law 
officers were personally involved [30]. 
The problem of how the right of reply should 1" 
be exercised in cases involving co-prisoners was 
one which still had not been fully solved even by' 
the 1860s. In Blackburn [31] in 1853 Talfourd J. 
had held obiter that, where prisoners were jointly 
indicted for the same offence, the calling of 
evidence by one gave a right of reply against all, 
and there were other decisions, both earlier and- 
later to like effect [32]. In Marlow & Beesley' 
(1867) [33] however, Smith J. held that the Crown 
only had a right of reply against those prisoners- 
who called evidence, a ruling which was followed in 
several subsequent cases [34], including Burns 
(1887) [35], where it was further held that in such- 
a case counsel for the prisoners on whose behalf no 
evidence was called could make their speeches after 
the reply for the Crown. In Trevelli (1882) [36] 
Hawkins J. steered a middle course between these 
conflicting lines of authority by holding that the 
calling of evidence by one prisoner would give the 
Crown a right of reply against all prisoners to 
whose case the evidence was relevant, and this 
ruling too attracted its adherents [37]. 
The Criminal Code Bills, 1878-83 proposed no 
change in the law as to the reply. However, a 
clutch of cases in the 1880s reversing the rule 
forbidding the making of unsworn statements by 
prisoners defended by counsel, brought a change in 
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the law, with the rule laid down in Manzano (1860) 
[38], that the making of such a statement did not 
give the Crown the right of reply, being overturned 
[39]. 
A point which was slow to be appreciated 
during the long debate, about prisoners giving 
evidence was that the reform, like that of 1836, 
had implications for the right of reply. One of the 
first M. P. s to raise the question was Wharton, who 
in the debate on the 1888 Bill asked whether the 
giving of evidence by a prisoner would give the 
Crown the reply, observing that if it did the Bill 
would be a trap [40]. But by most it went 
unnoticed. Certainly, none of the Prisoners' 
Evidence Bills introduced in the 1880s and 1890s 
contained any provision on the' point, and it was 
only at the Committee stage of the 1898 Bill that 
the Government was prevailed upon to agree to the 
inclusion of a clause providing that the giving of 
evidence by the accused should not give the 
prosecution the right of reply [41]. 
For all that the reply had an impact on trial 
tactics, its importance in this regard must not be 
over-stressed. It is worth reminding oneself that 
many prisoners had no witnesses as to fact to call 
in"any event [42]. Then again, the right of reply 
could only be exercised by counsel and it was by no 
means in every prosecution that counsel was 
briefed. And, if the prisoner was undefended, his 
ignorance of the rules as to the reply would 
prevent his being influenced by them. The dilemma 
as to whether to call evidence and risk the reply 
assumed its most acute form in capital cases, and 
this was to remain true in the twentieth century 




CONDITIONS AT TRIAL 
11 
'The hungry judges soon the sentence sign 
And wretches hang that jurymen may dine' 
A. Pope, The Rape of the Lock, III, 21 
(a) For prisoners 
At many courts the conditions in which 
prisoners waiting to be tried were held were very, 
bad. In 1887, a Home Office Committee reported [1], 
that at eight court houses prisoners, waiting to be 
brought up, were held in cupboard like boxes with 
bases measuring little more than two feet square 
[2], whilst at other places the practice was to 
keep them together unsegregated in a single dark 
room with no seats, no heating and inadequate 
sanitary facilities [3]. 
When he was eventually brought into court the 
prisoner was brought up unshackled [4], and was 
ixsually spared the indignity of having to hold up 
his hand on arraignment and verdict taken [5]. But 
unless he was infirm [6] he was expected to stand 
however long his trial lasted [7], and as now, he 
would (save in misdemeanour where he was sometimes 
allowed to sit . with 
his counsel) have to 
communicate with his lawyers by notes or whispered 
instructions from the dock [8]. 
Further, since it was the practice for courts 
to sit until late at night, a prisoner might find 
his case called on or -continuing at an 
hour at 
which both he and his counsel (if he had one) were 
physically exhausted. At the old Bailey late 
sittings were traditional (fostered in part by the 
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sheriffs' practice of holding a 'dinner 'at 5 p. m. 
for the judges) [9]. - At Assizes the cause was more 
usually a heavy list and too few days allotted to, 
get through it. Protests about the practice were 
made in Parliament from time to time but little 
usually came of them. When in, 1834 an M. P. 
complained that at the recent Armagh Assizes Baron 
Smith had tried fourteen cases (some of them 
capital) between 6 p. m. and 6 a. m. [10], several 
M. P. s' sprang to his defence claiming that he had 
merely been trying to spare the prisoners the 
hardship of having their cases put over to the next 
Assize, and although the Commons voted to hold an 
inquiry into this and other charges against the 
judge, nothing came of it. 
As the century wore on, courts moderated their 
sitting hours but late sittings continued to occur 
from time to time both at the Old Bailey [11] and 
at. Assizes [12] right through until'the end of the 
century. 
(b) For the Jury 
t -If the way prisoners were treated during long 
trials was deplorable, the treatment meted out to 
jurors was if anything worse. 
",. The power of a trial judge to adjourn a trial, 
which did not finish within the day, had been 
established in the last years of the eighteenth 
century [13], but where a trial for treason or 
felony was so adjourned, the jury were not 
permitted to separate over the adjournment [14]. 
Instead they would be taken either to a room in the 
cöurti, building [15] or, more usually, to ahotel, 
and kept there over the adjournment in the charge 
of-.., a, -bailiff sworn 
to allow no-one to speak to 
them.., Old Bailey juries were normally taken to a 
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hotel (the London Tavern, the London Coffee House, 
the City Terminus Hotel, the Cannon Street Hotel,, 
all were used at different times during the 
century) [16]. Provincial juries did not always 
fare so well. In 1848 a York jury complained that 
all they had been provided with were six shake-, 
downs on the floor (the under-sheriff, when taxed, 
by the judge, claimed that this was the: 
accommodation normally provided) [17]. 
The purpose of the rule against separation was. 
to prevent the jury being tampered with (18]. It. 
never applied in misdemeanour (there the jury were- 
allowed to return home overnight) [19] and indeed, 
in the eighteenth century had not always been, 
strictly applied in felony cases. To jurors the 
rule caused huge inconvenience, particularly at 
weekends when they were locked up, not merely,., 
overnight, but on two consecutive nights and for. 
the whole of Sunday, with a communal outing to. 
church [20] or an airing in a quiet spot such as, 
the Temple Gardens [21] the only relief from the 
tedium. 
It also had an unfortunate impact upon the way 
trials were conducted. It was one of the causes. of 
late sittings. To avoid having to lock the jury 
up, judges, would sit late to finish a case [22], 
with the result that the defence case was taken at 
a time when the powers of concentration and 
comprehension of jurors (as well as accused) were 
at their lowest ebb. Later on in the century it 
bred an unwillingness to start felony trials after 
lunch. In The Tichborne case, it was the principal 
reason why the Claimant was charged with the 




Once the jury had retired to consider their 
verdict, they became subject to an even more 
stringent regime [24]. They were to be kept locked 
up without fire food or drink until they reached a 
verdict. In cases of long retirement jurors would 
often become faint or ill through lack of food. 
Where this happened a surgeon would be sent in to 
examine them. If he swore that to continue to hold 
them would involve risk to the life of one or more 
of their number they would be discharged, but 
nothing short of risk to life would normally 
persuade a judge to discharge them [25]. 
At Assizes if a jury still had not reached a 
verdict by the time the judge was ready to leave 
the Assize town, it was open to him to have the 
jury placed-in a cart, carried along behind him as 
he made his way to the next county town, and shot 
into a ditch if they had not agreed by the time he 
reached the county border [26]. In a Lords' debate 
in 1859 [27] and in Winsor v. R. [28] in 1865, the 
judges were at pains to assert that carting had 
never been practised or sanctioned by the common 
law. In this, however, they were badly mistaken. 
Carting may have been rare in the nineteenth 
century but it certainly took place. A jury was 
carted at Tralee Assizes in 1825 (29], whilst as 
late . as 1848 Platt B., whilst sitting at Oxford 
Assizes, gave orders for a cart to be got ready for 
a'jury which could not agree [30]. 
m= :ý Until 1865 whether a judge had power (in the 
absence of danger to life) to discharge a jury 
which could not agree [31], and whether there could 
be a second trial after a discharge in such 
circumstances [32] were -regarded as doubtful 
questions. The doubts were finally removed by the 
decision of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved in 
Winsor v. R., but, even after this decision, judges 
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remained very slow to discharge juries which could 
not agree. 
The law's tactic of starving jurors into - 
verdicts made jury trial a lottery in cases of 
disagreement and the feeling was that the loser in 
such lottery was usually the accused. As Pope had 
it 'wretches hang that jurymen may dine' [33]. 
Another rule inconvenient to jury and accused 
alike was that which obliged the judge, in the 
event of the death, illness or other absence of a 
juror, to discharge the jury and start again. Since 
on such a retrial the usual practice was simply to 
call a new juror to fill the gap, swear the jury 
thus afforced again, and then read over to them the: 
evidence given in the aborted trial [34], the; 
remaining jurors had the tedium of hearing evidence, - 
gone through twice whilst the accused ended up 
being tried by a jury one of whom had not heard all, 
the witnesses. 
As the century wore on there was inevitably 
pressure for reform [35]. The first rule to be, 
done away with was that which denied a jury fire 
and refreshment after retirement. By the 1860s it. 
had already been done away with in Ireland [36],, 
and, even in England there had been occasional 
infractions in civil cases [37]. Between 1864 and 
1869 no less than four Bills were presented to the_ 
Commons containing clauses providing for the 
abolition of the rule. It was finally done away 
with by the Juries Act, 1870, which declared that 
henceforth the matter should be in the trial 
judge's discretion. 
The rule prohibiting the separation of juries 
in treason and felony proved much more enduring. 
Between 1864 and 1897 nineteen Bills [38] on the 
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subject were presented to Parliament, but it was 
only in 1897 that the reform was finally carried 
[39], and even then treason, treason-felony and 
murder were excepted (in these cases the separation 
rule continued to be applied right down until 1948) 
[40]. The rule that illness, death, or absence of 
a juror obliged the judge to discharge the jury 
proved equally resistant to change. Bills for its 
reform introduced in 1868. [41] and 1874 [42] were 
lost and it was not until 1925 that the rule was 
finally altered [43]. 
A solution to the problem of deadlocked 
juries, which was periodically canvassed during the 
century was that of the majority verdict. Majority 
verdicts in civil, cases had been advocated by the 
Common Law Commissioners in 1831 [44], and 
investigated so far as criminal cases were 
concerned by the Criminal Law Commissioners in 1845 
[45]. During the second reading debate on the 
Juries Bill, 1873 (which proposed to reduce the 
size of the jury to seven in all save capital 
cases) the Attorney-General canvassed abandoning 
the unanimity rule in non-capital cases, but by the 
Committee stage, having ascertained that the judges 
were divided on the proposal, he dropped it [46]. 
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CHAPTER 14 
EVIDENTIAL PROTECTION I 
ONUS AND STANDARD OF PROOF; 
THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE (PROCEDURAL RULES) 
' .. * the testimonies and proofs of the offence 
ought to be so clear and manifest as there can be 
no defence of it'. 
Coke, Inst. iii, 29,137. 
The protection conferred upon the accused by 
the law of evidence was throughout the nineteenth 
century substantial. Not only did the law cast the, 
burden of proof on the prosecution but it 
rigorously excluded hearsay, involuntary' 
confessions and evidence of the accused's bad 
character, and insisted that juries be cautioned 
against the dangers of convicting without 
corroboration where the charge was perjury, or the 
evidence came from an accomplice or a rape 
complainant. 
(a) Burden and standard of proof 
That it was for the prosecution to prove guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt was, in 1800, a rule well 
known to lawyer and layman alike. One has to look 
no further than the Commons' debates on the early 
Prisoners' Counsel Bills to see this [1]. This is 
not to say, however, that juries always received a 
direction on the matter [2]. And where a direction 
was given it might take one of a number of forms, 
ranging from one framed in terms of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt [3] to a direction to convict if 
guilt was proved (or clearly proved) [4], or proved 
to their (complete) satisfaction [5], or if they 
believed the prosecution witnesses [6] (this was in 
fact the form of direction contained in the 
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precedent of a summing up given in Chitty's 
Criminal Law published in 1816) [7]. 
In the heyday of capital punishment, a judge, 
who intended to leave a prisoner for execution if 
convicted, would sometimes warn the jury of this 
when directing them on the standard of proof [8], 
and even in the second half of the century it was 
not unknown for summings up in capital cases to 
buttress the direction on the standard of proof 
with a warning that the life of a fellow creature 
was at stake [9]. Such warnings proved, if 
anything, too effective, and in the 1850s and 1860s 
Pollock C. B. reacted to the acquittal rate in 
capital cases by trying to water down the standard 
of proof [10]. His much criticised initiative 
(which consisted of directing the jury that the 
degree of certainty for a conviction was merely 
that upon which they were accustomed to act in 
their own 'grave and weighty concerns') [11] did 
not, however, survive his retirement from the bench 
in 1866. 
That the burden upon the prosecution included 
a duty to disprove defences raised by the accused 
was in the nineteenth century less than clear. Text 
writers [12] and judges often wrote and talked as 
if. the burden of proving defences was on the 
accused. Whether the burden referred to was 
persuasive or merely evidential was rarely made 
clear, but this is hardly surprising given that the 
distinction between the two burdens was at the time 
but imperfectly understood [13].. One defence upon 
which the accused undoubtedly did bear the 
persuasive burden was insanity. The, law presumed.. a 
man `', to - be sane, and if a prisoner relied., upon 
insanity as a defence it was for him to prove it. 
This had been clear law since Arnold's case in 
1724,. if not before [14]. But insanity seems not 
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to have been regarded as a case alone. In 1816 one 
can find Abbott J. directing a jury that it was for 
a prisoner who relied on the defence of duress to 
.,: 
'make it out most satisfactorily' [15]. Again take 
murder. It had been laid down by both Gilbert and 
Foster [16] that in murder, once the fact of 
killing was proved against a prisoner, the burden 
was then on him to prove that the case was not one.; 
of murder, either by proving matters (such as 
provocation or lack of intent) which reduced the 
offence to manslaughter or which showed that the, ý° 
killing was justifiable or excusable (i. e self 
defence, accident), the law presuming malice from- 
the fact of the killing, and throughout the century, 
it was normal practice so to direct juries [17].,, 
In Woolmington in 1935 [18] the House of Lords held 
that the burden on the accused was only evidential, 
but in the nineteenth century it was spoken of [19]. 
and seemingly regarded as persuasive [20]. And it 
may well be that the rule laid down by Foster, 
spread over into non-fatal assault as well. 
Certainly, in two cases this century (Davies 1913 
and Lobell 1957) [21], the Court of Criminal Appeal 
has had to overturn rulings by High Court judges 
that in assault the burden of proof on the issues 
of accident and self defence was on the accused 
(rulings which the prosecution in each case sought 
to uphold by reference by dicta from nineteenth 
century homicide cases). Also, it must not be 
forgotten that, as the century wore on, in an 
increasing number of statutory offences the burden 
of proof on particular issues was cast by statute 
on the accused [22]. 
A question never answered at any time during 
the century was to what standard of proof an 
accused was required to prove an issue upon which 
he bore the burden of proof? When in 1843 the 
judges in ! ('Naghten's case [23] delivered what 
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still` remains the definitive exposition of the law 
of insanity in criminal-cases, they wholly ignored 
the question. Indeed, the question seems to have 
been 'neither asked nor answered (at least in 
England) until the 1930s, either in relation to 
insanity or to issues upon which the accused by 
statute bore the burden of proof [24]. The usual 
jury direction in such cases was that it was for 
the accused to make out, to (clearly) prove the 
defence or'issue, that it was for him to 'satisfy 
them upon it, or that they must believe the defence 
made out [25]. It may be that many, if asked, 
would have said that the standard of proof required 
of the accused was proof beyond reasonable doubt 
[26). Certainly the use of expressions such as 
'believe', 'satisfy' and 'clearly prove' suggest 
this. 
(b) Procedural aspects 
The area in which the nineteenth century law 
of criminal evidence most 'clearly lacked maturity 
was its procedural aspect. 
(i) -Elementary rules 
At the, start of the century, some elementary 
questions as to admissibility still awaited 
`resolution. For example, by- whom was a factual 
'issue upon which admissibility depended to be 
determined, the judge or the jury? Upon whom did 
the burden of proof in relation to'such issue rest? 
`, Waszit open to the accused to call evidence on the 
-issue and, if so, at what stage? In Woodcock [27] 
in'1789 Eyre C. B. had held that it-was for the jury 
to = determine the admissibility of -a, dying 
: declaration, and, although this aberrant ruling was 
within -ýa matter, of years overturned by the Twelve 
"Judges [28], as late as 1853 one could find doubt 
225 
being expressed as to whether the issue of whether-- 
a prosecution 'witness was married to one of the_ 
accused, and therefore incompetent, was one for the 
judge or the jury [29]. As for the burden of.. 
proof, in' 1848, Patteson J. is to be heard-, 
observing arguendo in the Court for Crown Cases-. 
Reserved that it was for the prisoner to prove that - 
a- confession had been procured by an inducement 
[30]. And, although in Warringham [31], three years 
later, Parke B. laid down the precisely opposite 
rule, there is no certainty that his ruling was 
taken as settling the point, for forty years later, 
[32] counsel is still to be found arguing before 
the Court -' for Crown Cases Reserved, albeit 
unsuccesfully, that the burden was on the prisoner.; 
Warringham had, however, been followed in Jenkins, 
[33] in 1869 where Kelly C. B. held that, where a. 
question arose as to the admissibility of a 
statement as a dying declaration, the burden of 
proof of the state of mind of the declarant was on 
the prosecution, and the standard of proof was 
proof beyond reasonable doubt. In a case heard at.. 
the old Bailey in 1828 [34] Gaselee J. refused to 
allow defence counsel to call evidence bearing upon 
the issue of the voluntariness of a confession 
save as part of the defence case, despite counsel's 
protests that, by that time, the confession might 
well have been allowed in and the damage done.. 
There was, said his lordship, no precedent for such 
a proceeding. 
(ii) Trying admissibility in front of the jury 
From an accused's point of view no feature of 
the law of evidence was more unsatisfactory than 
the way issues of admissibility were tried. 
Eighteenth century practice had been for legal 
argument as to the admissibility of confessions to 
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take place in the presence of the jury [35], and 
the advent of the nineteenth century brought no 
change. Reported cases [36] indicate that where the 
Crown sought to, put in confession evidence, the 
procedure followed was for the witness, who was to 
prove the confession, to be questioned minutely as 
to what had passed between him and the prisoner 
prior to the making of the confession, and, if 
anything emerged which cast doubt on its 
admissibility, the judge would hear argument on the 
point and rule. Reports make no mention of the jury 
being invited to withdraw at any stage and the 
clear impression one gets is that the jury was 
present throughout. That would be consistent with 
what we know about eighteenth century trials, and 
it. would also explain a case such as Yarham (1846) 
[37], -where defence counsel, in his closing speech,, 
is to be found making reference to a statement 
earlier ruled inadmissible by the judge. 
Nor do confessions appear to have been a case 
apart. On the contrary, there are grounds for 
believing that throughout the century the normal 
practice. was for all legal argument, whether as to 
admissibility or otherwise, to take place in the 
presence of the jury. In the debate on the 1824 
Prisoners' Counsel Bill Denman referred to the 
practice of counsel in felony cases using legal 
objection and argument as an indirect means of 
making a jury speech [38]. Other evidence is 
afforded by reports of trials. In 1837 [39] one 
finds; Parke B. explaining in his summing up a 
ruling he had earlier given on an indictment point, 
andin 1840 [40] a judge is to be seen taking the 
same, course in relation to a ruling on 
admissibility -a step which suggests that the jury 
had been present during argument. From the report 
of: -an, 1843 [41] case 
it is clear that argument as 
to , 
the right of reply took place in front of the 
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jury. The case of Ingrey [42] tried before the 
Lord Chief Justice in 1900 is even clearer. In 
Forster [43] in 1855 a jury, in convicting the 
accused of uttering counterfeit coin, added that 
they found this verdict without considering in the 
least the evidence of a subsequent uttering which { 
had been adduced by the Crown -a rider which 
suggests that they had been present when the 
admissibility of this evidence was argued. Then 
there is the frequency with which one finds" 
objections as to admissibility being taken during-' 
the prosecution's opening. speech [44] -a state of 
affairs which is difficult to explain save on the 
basis that there was no duty on the Crown to 
refrain from opening potentially inadmissible; 
evidence, which in turn is consistent with a 
practice of arguing admissibility in front of the 
jury. There is also twentieth century material, 
which appears to look back to an earlier practice 
of conducting legal argument in the presence of the' 
jury. In the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice in 
Thompson (1917) [45] there are dicta which seem to 
imply that argument in front of the jury was the'' 
normal rule, and sending the jury to their room the 
exception. Then there is the difficulty which the' 
Court of Appeal was still having as late as 1973 
[46] in stamping out the practice of having' 
submissions of no case argued in front of the jury., 
As the nineteenth century wore on, however, 
one sees attempts made to protect the accused" 
against the prejudice to which the existing', 
practice gave rise. A variety of expedients was 
resorted to. In a handful of 1820s cases [47] one". 
finds-evidence of something resembling the American', 
practice of counsel discussing points of law with' 
the judge at his bench in voices too low to bet 
heard by the jury. The practice does not however" 
seem to have taken root, and one hears no more of` 
228 
it thereafter. In Taylor [48] in 1851-the judge,.. 
on the application of both counsel, gave a ruling, 
before the trial began and out of the hearing of 
the waiting jury, upon a question of similar fact 
evidence. In Winslow [49] in 1860, again before the 
trial began, and with the express. object of 
avoiding prejudice to the prisoner, Martin B. 
received written submissions from counsel upon the 
admissibility of similar fact evidence, and gave a 
ruling thereon in private. During the remainder 
of the century the practice was occasionally 
adopted in other cases [50]. In 1917, however, it 
was severely condemned by the Court of Criminal 
Appeal, on the ground that it gave rise to no 
shorthand note [51]. An expedient occasionally 
resorted to at the Old Bailey in the 1860s was that 
of requiring a witness, before he answered a 
question, the answer to which it was thought might 
well be inadmissible, to write down the answer so 
that the judge might consider it [52]. Yet another 
was to couch the objection or argument in terms 
which the jury were unlikely to be able to follow 
[53]. 
The first case in which an English court is 
reported as sending a jury away whilst a question 
of'-'admissibility was argued, would appear to be 
Tvimv [54] tried at the Old Bailey in 1880. The 
practice was, however, slow to take hold. It was 
becoming more common by 1910 [55] , and seven years 
later in Thompson the Lord Chief Justice, in 
expressing his disapproval of Winslow, observed 
that where the judge considered that it would 
unfairly prejudice the accused to hear legal 
argument in the presence of the jury he should 
direct the jury to retire to their room. However, 
he`made'clear that the accused had no right to 
require that the jury be sent out. The matter was 
one for the discretion of the judge. This was in 
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fact the same rule as had been laid down by the 
American courts in the 1880s and 1890s [56]. The 
first practitioners' book to make mention of the 
practice appears to have been the 1921 edition of 
Roscoe [57], which noted that the jury was 
sometimes asked to retire whilst questions of law 
were argued. 
(iii) Procedure where inadmissible evidence got 
before jury 
For much of the century, where inadmissible 
evidence got in front of the jury, the practice was 
for the judge simply to strike it from his notes 
and tell the jury to disregard it [58]. By the 
start of the twentieth century, however, there were 
signs that the courts were beginning to recognise 
there were some cases where justice demanded that 
the trial be stopped and the jury discharged [59]. 
(iv) Exclusionary discretion 
Of an exclusionary discretion one finds no 
trace. If evidence was admissible the judge was 
bound to admit it, however slight its probative 
value [60]. As late as the 1870s and 1880s, even 
in capital cases, arguments that similar fact 
evidence tendered by the Crown had little weight, 
or would cause damning prejudice, were simply 
brushed aside [61]. Such matters had no bearing 
upon admissibility. However, although a judge had 
no power to exclude unfairly prejudicial evidence, 
a suggestion to prosecuting counsel not to press, 
the evidence (coupled where there was doubt as to 
admissibility with a threat to reserve the point) 
would often suffice to prevent its being laid 
before the jury. As early as 1858 one finds. 
Williams J. [62], when faced with an argument that, 
the prior utterings relied upon by the Crown were 
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too remote in time to have any probative value, 
declaring: - 
'the judge reposes confidence in counsel that 
they will not give in evidence what has no 
tendency to prove guilty knowledge but only to 
prejudice the prisoner'. 
By the early twentieth century, - the practice of 
urging counsel not to press evidence was 
sufficiently firmly established to be described by 
Lord Moulton in Christie [63] as 'very salutary' 
and 'usually sufficient' to prevent the evidence 
being put in. Indeed, prior to 1898 it was by this 
means that judges, who were so minded, were able to 
prevent prisoners, who availed themselves of a 
statutory right of giving evidence, being cross- 
examined as to character. 
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CHAPTER 15 
EVIDENTIAL PROTECTION II 
HEARSAY 
'You must not tell us what the soldier or any other 
man said', interrupted the judge, its not 
evidence. ' 
C. Dickens, The Pickwick Papers, c. 34. 
The rule against hearsay, with roots going 
back to the seventeenth century, was throughout the 
nineteenth strictly enforced in criminal cases. 
In the early years of the century this 
strictness led to severe curbs being placed upon 
the leading of evidence of complaint in rape and 
sexual assault. That evidence of complaint was 
admissible in such cases was too clear for 
argument. The practice of admitting it went back 
to Hale's day and far beyond [1]. Indeed, without 
evidence of fresh complaint,, a rape prosecution 
stood little chance of success [2]. But a 
complaint, being in law not evidence of the truth 
of the facts stated [3] but merely of consistency 
on the part of the complainant, the judges were by 
the 1820s refusing to allow the prosecution to lead 
more than the fact of a complaint having been made 
[4] (it being left to the prisoner to elicit the 
terms of the complaint if he wished, as he might do 
where the story the complainant had told initially 
differed from that which she was now telling). 
The rule, which had been criticised by Parke B. in 
1839 [5], was seen at its most bizarre in yak 
(1834) [6] where Patteson J. held that a police 
constable, who had received a complaint of robbery 
from the prosecutor, could not be asked whom the 
prosecutor named as his attacker, but could be 
asked whether, in consequence of the name given, he 
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went in search of any person and who that person 
was (a distinction which proved too subtle for some 
of Patteson's brethren) (7]. In the second half of 
the century, some judges were openly refusing [8] 
to follow the rule and and allowing the prosecution 
to lead both the fact and the terms of the 
complaint. Eventually in 1896 the question came 
for decision before the Court for Crown Cases 
Reserved in Lill an [9], which held that the terms 
as well as the fact of a complaint could be led, 
giving as one of the justifications for so ruling 
that it prevented the jury speculating as to what 
the terms of the complaint were. 
Confessions aside, the most important 
exceptions [10] to the rule in criminal cases were 
those relating to dying declarations and the 
reading of depositions. As the century wore on the 
law as to the first became ever more strict, whilst 
the scope for the latter was progressively 
enlarged. 
At the end of the eighteenth century' it had 
commonly been thought that dying declarations were 
admissible in all cases civil and criminal. Indeed, 
one finds the law so stated by text writers as late 
as, 1810 [11]. And such a view of the law seemed in 
accordance both with principle and authority. With 
principle because the reason given for admitting 
such. declarations in evidence, namely the 
unlikelihood of a man dying with a lie on his lips 
[12], applied as well to civil suits as to 
criminal. In accordance with authority because 
there- was a handful of pre-1820 cases, which 
appeared to show that admissibility was not 
confined simply to homicide cases. Of these cases 
the most important was Wright v. Littler (1761) 
[13] in which-Lord Mansfield had held the deathbed 
confession , of an attesting witness to a deed that 
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he. had forged it, admissible to impeach the 
validity of the deed (a decision later followed by; 
Heath J. in an unreported case, cited with approval 
by Lord Ellenborough in judgments given in 1805 and 
1808) [14]. The others were the Douglas PeeraQ_. 
case (1769) [15] where the dying declarations of 
Lady Douglas as to the paternity of the claimant., 
had been held admissible, and Drummond (1784) [16] 
in which, on an indictment for robbery, the dying, 
confession of another person recently executed that 
he was the true robber, had been rejected solely. - 
because the deceased as a convict would have been 
incompetent to give evidence. 
By 1836 Parke B. was able to describe the 
theory of the general admissibility of declarations, 
in extremis as 'long exploded' [17], the only class 
of case in which such evidence was by then 
admissible being homicide prosecutions. The first- 
English case in which one finds this new strict, 
rule applied is Doe d. Sutton v. Ridgway in 1820 
[18] (there is a New York case to like effect in 
1818) [19]. There the King's Bench refused to 
admit a dying declaration to prove pedigree in an, 
ejectment action, Wright v. Littler being explained 
away on the basis that the declaration was admitted 
so that the party impeaching the deed should not, 
by the death of the attesting witness, lose the 
benefit of a matter which he could have put to him 
in cross- examination had he lived. Four years 
later came the important ruling of the same court 
in Mead [20] (a prosecution for perjury) that dying 
declarations were only admissible where the death 
of the deceased was the subject of the charge. 
Although the court did not condescend to give 
reasons for its ruling, it again apparently felt 
obliged to distinguish Wright v. Littler, and did 
so, this time on a somewhat , 
different ground to 
that which it had offered in 1820, namely that the 
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declaration was self-accusatory and not accusatory 
of others. After these two decisions all that was 
needed to get rid of the old doctrine altogether 
was to administer the coup de grace to Wright V. 
Littler, and this was done in 1836 by a strong 
Court of Exchequer in Stobart v. Dryden [17]. 
This dramatic change of direction in the law 
probably stemmed from increasing judicial unease 
about the anomalous nature of this exception to the 
hearsay rule and the scope it offered for fraud. 
But why was the exception allowed to-survive in 
homicide cases? The explanation offered by 
contemporary text writers was necessity. If dying 
declarations were not received in homicide cases, 
murderers would escape justice [21]. The reality, 
however, is probably that in homicide cases their 
admissibility was too well established to be 
questioned, there being numerous decisions 
(including several by the Twelve Judges) [22] in 
favour of their admission, some even dating back to 
the-seventeenth century [23]. 
:' Mead did not quite mark the end of the old 
doctrine so far as criminal cases were concerned. ' 
In yindfield (1848) [24] and in Hind (1860) [25], 
both of which were prosecutions for abortion, the 
dying declaration of the woman was admitted by the 
trial judge (Hind's conviction was in consequence 
quashed by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved; in 
yindfield the jury's acquittal of the accused 
prevented the point being reserved). And 
ünsuccesful attempts were made in 1830 [26], 1841 
[27] and 1859 [28] to get dying declarations 
admitted in prosecutions for robbery, shooting with 
intent - to murder (in this' case, the death bed 
confession of a man, alleged by the defence to be 
the, perpetrator of the offence, was sought to be 
put in to exculpate the accused) and for rape. 
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The rules applied after Mead to determine the-,, 
admissibility of statements tendered as dying. 
declarations in homicide cases were essentially the 
same as those laid down in the eighteenth century. 
The declarant must have been a person competent in 
law to give sworn evidence [29], the declaration 
must relate to the cause of the declarant's death 
[30],. and at the time he made it the declarant must 
have been under a settled and hopeless expectation. 
[31] of almost immediate death [32]. What was new,.., 
however, was the strictness with which judges now 
demanded that the accused's state of mind be-, 
proved, the result of which was rulings against., 
which, in Wigmore's words, 'common sense revolts', 
rulings such as that in Mooney (1851) [33], where a.. 
declaration made by a woman, after she had been. -., 
warned by, a clergyman to prepare for death and had 
been heard commending her soul to God, was rejected- - 
on the grounds that the proof that she was aware. 
she was in a dying state was not sufficient. A. 
celebrated instance of this excessive judicial-_ 
scrupulousness occurred in the 1870s. It had-been-- 
held in a number of eighteenth century cases that 
the fact that the deceased knew he was in a'dying 
state could properly be inferred from the nature of, 
his wounds or illness alone [34]. And one finds. 
the same proposition laid down both by text writers. - 
[35] and in reported cases in the first half of. 
nineteenth century [36]. In 1875, however, in 
Morgan [37] Denman J., after consulting Cockburn, 
L. C. J., refused to draw the inference, declaring 
that there was no case in which a judge 
'had admitted the statement entirely upon an 
inference drawn from the nature of the wound 
itself and from giving the deceased credit 
for ordinary intelligence as to its natural 
results' 
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and four years later in Bedingfield [38] Cockburn 
L. C. J. rejected out of hand, as a dying 
declaration, a statement. made by a woman minutes 
before dying of a severe throat wound inflicted 
inside a house from which she had fled. There was, 
he ruled, no evidence that she was aware she was 
dying. The two cases were severely criticised by 
commentators [39] as based on a mistaken view of 
the law, and were thereafter generally so regarded. 
Had-they stood, however, the result would have been 
that the dying words of a victim who expired within 
minutes of the fatal injury being inflicted would 
in many cases not have been receivable as a dying 
declaration. 
Their scrupulousness the judges justified on 
the ground that dying declarations, not being 
subject to cross-examination, were a dangerous 
species of evidence [40], and their admission an 
anomaly to be confined within as narrow bounds as 
possible. In the main the judges' stance was 
supported by text writers such as Phillipps and 
Pitt Taylor, who were at pains to point out the 
dangers inherent in such evidence (misreporting, 
animosity or resentment on the part of the deceased 
at his condition, or mistake or confusion caused by 
his injuries) [41]. Phillipps' assiduity had even 
thrown up a case of a man wrongly convicted and 
executed in 1749 for rape on evidence of a dying 
declaration [42]. A factor which must undoubtedly 
have'played a part in. shaping judicial attitudes 
was' the frequency with which dying declarations 
were offered as evidence in homicide cases. At the 
present day, medical science has rendered the dying 
declaration well nigh obsolete. Victims of 
violence, who remain conscious or recover 
consciousness, now usually live to tell their tale 
-in the witness box. In the nineteenth century any 
serious injury carried with it a high risk of a 
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fatal outcome [43], and, for this reason, it was,,. 
commonplace for a victim of serious assault to be., 
pressed (particularly if his condition took a turn: 
for worse) to give his version, with a view to its: 
being adduced in evidence in the event of his, 
succumbing. 
From the accused's point of view, the, 
progressive narrowing of the scope for the 
admission of dying declarations in evidence was 
obviously welcome, as indeed were the principles, 
laid down early in-the century, that he could pray,, 
in aid an exculpatory declaration [44],, and, in- 
cases where such evidence was called against him,., 
lead evidence to show the deceased's bad character 
or unreliability as a witness [45]. 
One result of the judges' strictness in the. - 
matter of dying declarations was the enactment in, 
1867 of a provision designed to make it easier to; 
get in evidence statements made by dangerously ill: 
patients who subsequently died, Russell Gurney's 
Act [46] empowering magistrates to take out of 
court the deposition in relation to an indictable,, 
offence of any person dangerously ill and unlikely 
to recover, and making the same admissible in 
evidence at any later trial, provided that the,, 
_ 
accused was given notice of the taking of the 
deposition and the opportunity to attend and cross-, 
examine, and the deponent was by the date of trial, 
either dead or-ill with no probability of his ever', 
being well enough to attend trial. 
In cases where the deceased died within 
minutes of the fatal blow, his dying words -could 
arguably be received in evidence as part of the res 
gestae. Indeed, in 1834 [47] the dying words of a 
man run down by a coach were admitted on a 
prosecution of the coachdriver for manslaughter., 
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However, that door was effectively slammed shut by 
the ruling of Cockburn L. C. J. in Bedingfield that, 
to be admissible on this ground, the words spoken 
had to be contemporaneous with the fatal attack. 
The decision in Bedingfield, although severely 
attacked in the legal . press, was nonetheless 
accepted as authoritative on the point [48]. Even 
before Bedingfield judges had, on the whole, shown 
a marked lack of enthusiasm for admitting dying 
statements in evidence on this ground in criminal 
cases [49]. 
So far as depositions were concerned, at the 
start of the century these could be put in only in 
felony [50], and then only subject to two stringent 
conditions, first that it be shown that the witness 
was dead [51], so ill as not to be able to travel 
[52] or was being kept out of the way by the 
accused [53], and that the deposition was taken in 
the presence of the accused and that he had had 
full opportunity to cross-examine the deponent 
(54]. The condition that the accused should have 
been present and had to opportunity to cross- 
examine, was one which some eighteenth century 
judges had been inclined to dispense with in the 
case of coroners' depositions [55], but in the 
nineteenth century it was strictly insisted upon in 
all cases - not least because it formed the 
principal justification for letting in this species 
of hearsay. Nonetheless, in practice this supposed 
safeguard was in many respects a hollow one. It 
was, in fact, rare for witnesses who gave evidence 
at committal hearings to be rigorously cross- 
examined. Most prisoners were undefended and had 
little skill in cross-examination, and attorneys 
when they were admitted (and many benches excluded 
them) [56] would often for tactical reasons ask but 
few questions [57]. Also effective cross- 
examination was frequently made difficult by the 
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objectionable but common practice of taking 
statements from witnesses out of court, and then 
merely having a witness's statement read out and 
confirmed by him in the prisoner's presence [58]. 
Again, because of the careless way in which-, " 
depositions were often taken it was no uncommon'-. 
thing for a deposition to omit important answers '1s 
given in cross-examination [59]. 
As the century wore on the scope for putting 
`3 
depositions in evidence was increased by statute. -' 
In 1826 depositions taken by examining magistrates 
in misdemeanour became admissible to the same 
extent as in felony [60]. More thorough-going 
reform came in 1848 when, by Jervis' Act, strict' 
rules were laid down as how examining magistrates 
should take depositions, and the procedure extended" 
to cases of treason [61]. As well as dealing with' 
the taking of depositions, the Act also declared in 
what circumstances they could be given in evidence 
at trial, namely where the deponent was dead or too 
ill to travel [62]. This poorly drafted section" 
gave rise. to a host of problems. What of witnesses 
kept out of the way by the accused; could their' 
depositions still be read? In Scaife (1851) [63] 
the Court for Crown Cases Reserved held they could, 
also ruling that a deposition put in on this ground 
was, on a trial of co-accused, admissible only 
against the prisoner responsible for the witness's 
absence (thereby obliging the jury to undertake a 
feat of mental gymnastics of the type already 
common in confession cases). The Act was also 
silent as to the case of the witness who had become 
insane since committal (pre-1848 the deposition of 
such a witness had been held admissible on the 
basis that he was to be regarded as to all intents 
and purposes as dead) [64]. Then what of the words 
'too ill to travel' how were they to be construed? 
Pre-1848, it had been held that illness would only 
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justify the reading of a deposition where it could 
be shown that the witness was so ill as unlikely 
ever to be fit to come to court [65], and that 
where the illness was not of this seriousness the 
appropriate course was postponement of the trial. 
The courts, however, felt obliged to construe the 
words of the Act literally, with the result that 
even temporary illness was now enough to allow a 
witness's evidence to be read [66]. In 1856 
Greaves in his Report [67] to the Lord Chancellor 
on Criminal Procedure recommeded that the section 
- be redrawn to cover the cases omitted, including 
that of pregnancy (a constant source of difficulty 
in this connection) (68]. Nothing was however 
done. The only reform made in fact made in the law 
came in 1867 when Russell Gurney's Act, by 
requiring examining magistrates to take depositions 
from witnesses tendered by the defence, made it 
possible for the first time for the evidence of 
defence witnesses, who had died or were ill, to be 
read at trial. 
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CHAPTER 16 
EVIDENTIAL PROTECTION III 
CONFESSIONS AND POLICE INTERROGATION 
'For a constable to press any accused person to say 
anything with reference to the crime of which he 
is accused is very wrong' 
Preface, Vincent's Police Code (1882). 
(a) Confessions 
One of the main exclusionary rules inherited 
by nineteenth century judges was that rendering 
involuntary confessions inadmissible. In,,, 
Warwickshall [1] in 1783 the judges had defined an 
involuntary confession as one 'got by promises or, 
threats' but the definition left unanswered two 
important questions. First, did the identity of 
the person offering the inducement matter? Second, 
what of the inducement itself? Would any promise 
or threat exclude, however trivial, and whatever 
its subject matter? 
Upon the first question judicial opinion was 
as late as the mid-1830s divided, but by 1840 the 
rule was settled [2]: - only an inducement held out 
by, or with the sanction of [3], a person in 
authority (that is a person in a position to 
influence the conduct of the prosecution) would 
exclude. Pitt Taylor was later to suggest that the 
adoption of this rule was due principally to fear 
of opening 
'a wide door to collusive practices ... (with) 
perjured witnesses ... called to affirm that 
they had urged the prisoner (that it would be 
best) to confess' [4]. 
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As to the second question, if the reason for 
the exclusionary rule was (as dicta in Warwickshall 
and later cases suggested) [5] the likely 
unreliability of confessions obtained by 
inducements, it followed that the only inducements 
which ought to exclude were those of a kind 
calculated to lead the prisoner to make an untrue 
confession. And this approach in fact received a 
measure of judicial support. Indeed, the ruling of 
the Twelve Judges in Gilham [6] in 1828 (a decision 
never- thereafter questioned) that a purely 
spiritual inducement would not exclude seems to 
have been based on just this reasoning. Likewise 
the refusal of judges to treat exhortations to tell 
the truth as inducements. How could it be said that 
telling a man to be sure to tell the truth was 
advising him to confess what he was not really 
guilty of? [7] Or yet again the 1840 ruling that 
property discovered in consequence of an. 
inadmissible confession rendered the confession pro 
tanto admissible [8] (the finding of the property, 
so the argument ran, demonstrated that in that 
respect at least 'the party was not accusing 
himself falsely'). In 1842 Joy, the former Irish 
Chief Baron, published a treatise on confessions, 
in which he sought to argue that reliability was 
the true test of admissibility . '(The) ... threat 
or'inducement held out must', he wrote, 
'have reference to the charge, and be such as 
would lead (the prisoner) to suppose that it 
would be better for him to admit himself 
guilty of an offence which he had never 
= committed' [9]. 
And he was able to cite' in support a handful of 
English cases, in particular those of Green [10] 
and Llý [11] (both 1834) where the removal of the 
prisoner's handcuffs (desired by him as the price 
of; confession), and a promise to allow the prisoner 
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to see his wife were respectively held not to 
render the confessions which followed inadmissible. 
When Joy wrote the reliability test was in 
fact relatively little employed in cases of: 
temporal (as opposed to spiritual or moral), 
inducement, proof of any such inducement commonly 
being treated as sufficient to exclude, without the 
need for any inquiry as to whether the inducement; 
was in fact one which, in the particular, 
circumstances, would have been likely to lead the, 
particular accused to make a false confession. The 
judges justified this uncritical approach on two 
grounds. First, the difficulty of assessing the 
influence of an inducement on a prisoner's mind 
[12]. Second, the need for great caution before, 
admitting confessions in evidence. Had not Hotham 
B. said in Thompson (1783) that it was 'impossible 
to be too careful on the subject'? [13] Indeed,,, 
in one class of case, namely where the prisoner had 
been told it would be better to confess, the rule. 
as early as the 1830s was rigid and fixed. The use 
of any such expression rendered any confession: 
which followed automatically inadmissible (even 
where the phrase had been intended and understood. 
by the prisoner to be no more than an exhortation. 
to tell the truth) [14]. 
As well as failing to make reliability the 
touchstone of admissibility, the judges were by the 
1830s also displaying an increasing astuteness in 
spelling inducements out of seemingly innocuous 
phrases. In Enoch (1833) (15], for example, an 
admonition to a prisoner to confess 'otherwise the 
matter would lie on her and the guilty would go' 
free' was held to be an inducement, and yet, as Joy 
complained, it is difficult to see what threat or 
promise was held out. In Mills (1833) [16] telling 
a prisoner it is of no use for you to deny it for 
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there is the man and boy who will swear they saw 
you do it' was held by Gurney B. to render his 
confession inadmissible, on the ground that it was 
'an inducement to say something'. In Fleming (1842) 
[17] an admonition from a police inspector to a 
constable accused of stealing a watch 'Be cautious 
in the answers you give to the questions 
.I 
am going 
to put to you about the watch' was held to exclude. 
In, Croydon (1846) [18] an attorney's telling a 
suspect 'I dare say you had a hand in it; you may 
as well tell me about it' was treated as equivalent 
to saying it would be better to tell, and as 
therefore rendering what followed inadmissible. 
Perhaps most bizarre of all was the line of 
cases which spelt an inducement out of forms of 
caution in daily use by police officers and 
magistrates. The starting point of this line of 
authority was Drew (1838) [19] where Coleridge J. 
held that to caution a person that anything he said 
would be given in evidence for or against him 
constituted an inducement. It might, he explained, 
lead the prisoner to put forward an untrue story 
which he believed would help him at his trial. He 
repeated the ruling in later cases [20] and it was 
followed in Ireland [21]. Police officers, in the 
light of Drew, altered the form of caution telling 
prisoners simply that what they said would be used 
in., evidence against them, only to find that this 
would not do either. To tell a man what he says 
will be used against him was, said Maule J. in 
Jones (1843) [22], little different from telling 
him that it may be used for or against him. It was 
just. as likely to lead him to say something that he 
supposed might make for him at his trial, and so 
constituted an inducement. 
To many the judges' approach to the question 
of voluntariness was far too favourable to the 
245 
prisoner. The law was also coming under criticism 
for its obscurity [23]. By the 1840s the case law 
on confessions had swollen to huge proportions with'" 
some of the cases difficult, if not impossible, to 
reconcile. 
Inevitably, there were calls for reform. Aý' 
scheme suggested both by the Law Magazine [24] and' 
by a number of those who, answered a questionnaire' -' 
put out by the Criminal Law Commissioners in 1844' "- 
[25], was that all confession evidence should be 
admitted, leaving it for the jury to decide what- 
weight it deserved, and subject to the safeguard 
that no jury should be permitted to convict upon 
confession evidence alone. The first limb of the 
scheme, which had been canvassed by Bentham twenty 
years before, won a measure of judicial support. --, 
In Baldry (1852) both Parke B. and Campbell L. C. J. 
declared themselves attracted by it [26]. As for'-, 
the proposed corroboration requirement, this was' 
already part of United States law [27], where, `' 
taking as their starting point dicta of Hale [28] 
as to the danger of convicting a man of homicide'",, 
where no body had been found, judges had developed 
the doctrine that a man could not be convicted upon'-{ 
his own confession without independent proof of the 
corpus delicti. The justification offered for the=, 
rule was well known cases of false confession such 
as those of Perry [29], Hubert [29], Wood [29] and- 
the Boons [29]. Where English law stood upon the 
point was in the 1840s uncertain [30]. Apart from, 
Hale's dicta there was a decision of Pollock C. B:, = 
in 1847 [31] to the effect that in bigamy some, 
evidence of the legality of the prisoner's first 
marriage was required apart from his confession,. 
but against this was an imperfectly reported case" 
[32] in which Lord Kenyon had, semble, ruled that'a" 
man could be lawfully convicted on his own 
uncorroborated confession, and two rulings at nisi- 
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prius. In addition there was a succession of cases 
from the first half of the century in which English 
courts had contrived to avoid ruling on the point 
[33]. 
In the end, the Law Magazine proposal was not. 
taken up, and reform when it came, came at the 
hands of the judges themselves. In 1851, Campbell 
L. C. J. (fresh from piloting through Parliament his 
Criminal Procedure Act,. which had so severely 
reduced the scope for the taking of technical 
points on indictments - then at least as great a 
cause of disquiet as the indulgent state of the law 
on inducements), turned his attention to 
confessions. In Baldry (34], a case which he had 
himself reserved, the Court for Crown Cases 
Reserved, at the same time as overruling the Drew 
and Jones line of cases, made it clear that in 
their view the pendulum in confession cases had 
swung too far in favour of prisoners. 'I cannot but 
concur, ' said Parke B., 'with the observations of 
Mr. Pitt Taylor 'that justice and common sense seem 
to'have been sacrificed on the altar of mercy', and 
with these words the other judges agreed. And 
after Baldry one undoubtedly sees a stricter 
approach being adopted to the question of 
voluntariness. The old inclination 'to torture 
words and speculate as to what words may have been 
misunderstood to mean' was now a thing of the past. 
In-1872 [35], a confession extracted from two young 
lads was actually let in, notwithstanding that it 
had 'been preceded with the exhortation. 'you had 
better as good boys tell the truth' - an outcome 
which would have- been unthinkable thirty years 
before. 
Baldry did not, however, put an end to the 
call for reform. In 1856 a Bill [36] was presented 
to Parliament by Fitzroy- Kelly which proposed, 
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inter alia, that no confession should be excluded..,,. - 
on the ground that a promise or threat had been.. 
held out, unless the judge considered it of, such 
character as to cause an untrue admission to be 
made, and that confessions made to spiritual 
advisers should be privileged (this latter being a 
rule which Alderson B. had six years before vainly.. 
sought to establish [37]). It did not, however,, 
pass. The battle to import a corroboration- 
requirement into the law of confessions was lost by,,., 
default. The Irish courts (whilst leaving open the., 
position in homicide) twice came out against such a 
rule, and by the end of the century (despite the,, 
lack of any recent English ruling on the point), it 
had come to be generally accepted that the rule was 
not part of English law [39]. Calls for a, 
corroboration requirement were during this period 
based. not, as today, upon the risk of police, 
fabrication (although dicta such as those of Cave., 
J. in Thompson (1893) [40] show that not all judges, 
were blind to this danger) but rather upon the 
danger of false confession. 
The criticism which has been heaped upon the, 
judges, most notably by Wigmore-[41], for their 
indulgent approach to voluntariness pre-Baldry, 
tends to obscure the fact that in the first half of 
the century (and indeed after- Bam) the law of 
confessions was, on some points, far from 
favourable to the prisoner [42]. 
Take, for example, the practice of the Crown 
opening disputed confessions to the jury [43],. or 
again the practice of arguing their admissibility, 
in front of the jury [44]. ", F 
Then there was the, way in which the 
voluntariness rule was disregarded in the case of, 
accomplices, called as King's evidence, who, in the 
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witness box failed to come up to proof. Any 
'evidence' behaving in this way would be forthwith 
indicted, and would have adduced in evidence 
against him the admissions he had made before the 
examining magistrate. The fact that such 
admissions had been made under the clearest 
possible inducement was brushed aside. He had 
broken his compact with the Crown, and that breach, 
so it was argued, justified the Crown using his 
statements against him [45]. This rule was not 
finally reversed until 1861 when, in Gillis [46], 
the Irish Court for Crown Cases Reserved held that, 
though the Crown was fully entitled to put on trial 
an accomplice who broke his bargain, they were 
obliged to prove their case against him by legal 
evidence, and confessions made under a promise of 
immunity were not lawful evidence nor did nor could 
his breach of bargain make them so. 
And most significant of all there was the 
refusal of the courts to treat oppressive and 
unfair conduct towards a prisoner, falling short of 
improper inducement, as a ground for exclusion. 
Their stance was that improper inducement was the 
only ground of exclusion and, if none was used, the 
prisoner's confession was admissible, no matter how 
unfair or reprehensible his treatment might have 
been` in other respects. [47]. Admissions and 
confessions obtained from a prisoner when drunk 
[48], or when in a highly distressed state [49], or 
when in severe pain and about to go into labour 
[50] were thus admissible. Likewise confessions 
obtained by such means as the browbeating 
interrogation of a child [51], holding a prisoner 
in custody illegally (52],, 'intercepting his mail 
[53], deceiving him as to the strength of the case 
against' him [54], playing- on his emotional 
vulnerability-[55], promising that any disclosure 
heýmade would go no further [56], or sending a 
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clergyman to his cell to persuade him that divine 
forgiveness depended upon full repentance, and that 
full repentance involved making full disclosure to 
the civil authorities [57]. This gap in the law; ' 
which was never plugged during the century, gave' 
rise to a much disliked but common police practice 
of sending into a prisoner's cell a fellow 
prisoner, or a policeman disguised as a prisoner 
to win his confidence and worm admissions out of'' 
him, a practice still in use in Cumberland as late 
as 1883 [58]. 
1 
Another aspect of the nineteenth century law 
of confessions, which has generally been 
overlooked, is the attempts made by judges in the' 
first half of the century to find solutions to two" 
problems which are still with us: - 
(i) the misreporting of confessions, and 
(ii) the plight of the prisoner who denied 
guilt but was incriminated by a 
confession made by a prisoner jointly 
tried with him. 
The danger of confessions being misreportedi 
had been stressed by Foster and others after him 
[59], and it was something about which many felt 
unease. In the 1820s and 1830s an attempt was made' 
to do something about the problem. In Sexton [60]_ 
in 1822 Best J. refused to allow a police officer 
to give evidence of a confession which he had not 
written down at the time it was made. And inn 
Mallett [61] in 1830 Littledale J. took the same 
course, excluding a statement, returned by the" 
examining magistrate and signed by the prisoner, 
but written in language which the prisoner herself 
had almost certainly not- used. In the end the 
initiative came to nothing. In Roche (62] (1841) 
Denman L. C. J., despite having Sexton and Mallet 
cited to him, declined to exclude a statement of 
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the prisoner taken down in the third person, 
although he offered to reserve the point (a course 
rendered unnecessary by the jury's acquittal of the 
prisoner), and that was the last that was heard of 
the doctrine. Thereafter, judges, whilst stressing 
the dangers of misreporting, no longer treated 
paraphrasing as a ground of exclusion. In the last 
quarter of the century an attempt was made to deal 
with the problem by the Metropolitan Police General 
Orders [63] which stressed the need for officers to 
record at the time and in the prisoner's own words 
any statement volunteered by him. 
The confession of a prisoner was in 1800, as 
now, no evidence against others named in it (this 
rule had been settled for well over a century) 
[64], but the danger was that the jury would, 
despite a warning from the judge that they should 
not do so, use it as evidence against all named in 
it [65]. How could the judge prevent their doing 
so? In 1789 [66] Buller J. had hit upon an 
imaginative solution. Faced with a case in which 
prisoner A was implicated in a confession made by 
prisoner B, he summed up the evidence as it 
affected A, requested the jury to come to a 
decision in his case but not to say what that 
decision was, and upon their announcing that they 
had done so, summed up the evidence as it affected 
. B. it 
is difficult to be sure how widespread this 
technique became but one can see it in use at 
Assizes as late as 1844 [67]. 
Another device resorted to in the 1830s (and 
much favoured by Parke J. ) was that of reading out 
the. confession with the names of all the persons 
implicated omitted (juries were not, as today, 
furnished with copies of a prisoner's statement; 
instead it was merely-read out by the clerk of the 
court). For a short time, this practice enjoyed 
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some currency on the Oxford Circuit [68], but the 
majority of judges were against it [69] (in part... 
because of practical difficulties to which it could 
give rise) [70], and within a few years it had 
passed into limbo, not to resurface again until the. 
Broadwater Farm case in 1987 [71]. 
Oddly enough, there was an even more obvious, 
answer namely to have the prisoners separately 
tried. And there was a method by which this could 
be achieved, namely the severing of challenges- 
(each prisoner would exercise separately and to the 
full his right of challenge thereby obliging the 
Crown to choose between agreeing to separate trials 
or seeing the jury panel exhausted and the trial 
delayed by the challenges). In practice, however, 
it seems to have been little used. Where prisoners., 
were unrepresented it is easy enough to understand , 
why there would be no severing of challenges and no 
separate trial (it would be an exceptional prisoner., 
who knew of the right, still less appreciated the., 
tactical advantages to be reaped from its use). But: 
it is difficult to explain why counsel appearing 
for prisoners jointly accused so rarely availed 
themselves of 'the right. The answer may lie in 
judicial disapproval of the practice. Platt B. had. 
certainly been condemnatory of it in a case in 1848 
[72]. If that is not the explanation, the case of 
Blackburn in 1853 [73] becomes very difficult to. 
understand. There counsel for one of three co-. 
prisoners applied to the trial judge for an order. - 
that his client be tried separately, on the ground 
that he being named in the confession of one of his 
co-accused, would be prejudiced if tried together 
with that accused. He conceded that the 
application was novel, and in the event it, was 
refused. But why did he not simply persuade the 
accused to sever their challenges? Was it that he 
tried-to persuade them but they refused to agree 
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(possible but unlikely) or was it out of deference 
to judicial pronouncements on the subject? The 
only other possibility (again unlikely) is that the 
jury panel was so large that even the severing of 
challenges would not have won the prisoners a 
separate trial. Although one hears no more of 
severance of challenges in this connection, later 
in' the century the practice of applying for and 
granting separate trials in confession cases did 
gain some limited currency [74]. 
(b) Questioning by magistrates and police 
As the century wore on a question which 
increasingly demanded an answer was whether any 
special rules applied to confessions obtained by 
magisterial or police interrogation? 
Until 1848 examining magistrates were entitled 
to question the prisoners brought before them. 
Indeed it was their duty to do so. The statutes 1 
Ph. & M., c. 13 and 2&3 Ph. & M., c. 10 required 
them to take the examinations of such prisoners. 
However, in Wilson [75] in 1817 Richards C. B. 
refused to allow the answers of a prisoner upon his 
examination to be given in evidence. It was, he 
declared, irregular for magistrates to examine 
prisoners, for an an examination itself imposed an 
obligation to tell the truth, and so amounted to a 
form of compulsion. This doctrine gained a certain 
currency. Wilson was still being cited in Burns' 
Justice of the Peace as late as 1830 [76], but it 
had been disapproved by Littledale J. as early as 
1826 [77], and a succession of cases in the 1830s 
[78] upholding the right of the examining 
magistrate to put questions, robbed it of 
authority. Given thatthe provisions'of the Marian 
statutes as to the examination of prisoners had 
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been re-enacted in 1826 [79] with their wording- 
unaltered, its demise was perhaps inevitable. 
But, for all that questioning of prisoners by 
examining magistrates was lawful, there was by 1800 
a recognition that it was-to be kept within limits,. 
Although Lambard [80] and Dalton [81] had spoken of 
the Marian statutes as permitting confessions to be 
wrung out of prisoners, this was not how 
preliminary examinations were viewed two hundred 
and fifty years later. An examination, wrote 
Chitty [82] in 1816, was seen not as an additional 
peril to the prisoner, but as a privilege to him, 
an opportunity for him to clear himself of the 
charge at the preliminary stage. As a precaution 
against his being compelled to incriminate himself, 
there was first the safeguard of the caution: - it 
was accepted that before he put any question to a 
prisoner, an examining magistrate ought to caution 
him that he was not obliged to answer, and that any 
answers he gave might be used against him. The 
practice of magisterial cautioning, which has been 
traced back to 1730 (and is almost certainly even 
older) [83], as well as being a protection to the 
prisoner, also had, the advantage of rendering it 
less likely that any confession, which he went on 
to make, would be held inadmissible at trial by' 
reason of prior out of court inducements. Then 
there appears also to have been a general feelingi 
(which the decision in Wilson itself reflects) that 
a prisoner upon his examination ought not to be' 
pressed unduly. In 1824 a metropolitan magistrate, 
stung by press criticism that he had not attempted 
to get a confession out of a prisoner examined 
before him, protested that he was not there to drag 
confessions out of prisoners [84]. Nor was he 
alone in adopting this stance. It is clear from 
press reports of committal proceedings that 
examining magistrates in the 1820s and 1830s, if 
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they questioned prisoners at all, in the main 
confined themselves to questions seeking to clarify 
statements already made by the prisoners, and that 
often the only question put was whether the 
prisoner had anything to say to the charge [85]. 
Indeed, in the 1820s, one can find clear evidence 
of a practice (which in 1844 was to attract much 
criticism in replies to a Criminal Law Commission 
questionnaire) namely that of magistrates' shutting 
the mouth of a prisoner when be began to volunteer 
a confession by advising him not to commit himself 
[86]. By the 1840s, although the practice of 
questioning prisoners had not died out, it appears 
to have been much in decline. Prisoners, declared 
the 1844 edition of the Magistrates' Pocket 
Companion [87], were not upon their examination to 
be pressed to answer, examined or questioned like 
ordinary witnesses, and this advice appears to have 
been' in accord with contemporary practice as 
described in the same year in evidence to the 
Criminal Law Commissioners [88]. When the law as 
to preliminary examinations was recast by Jervis' 
Act` of 1848, the magistrates were stripped of all 
power to question prisoners. Thenceforth, at the 
conclusion of the evidence for the prosecution, the 
role of the examining magistrate would be merely to 
aIsk` the accused if he wished to say anything, and 
to administer the caution prescribed by the Act 
[89]. ' If he went beyond this and put any questions 
any answers he got would be excluded at trial [90]. 
The transfer of the function of detecting 
crime from the 'magistracy to the reformed police 
inevitably raised the question of how far police 
officers were to be permitted to question those 
they-. ' arrested. Even" in the 1820s there was 
occasional judicial criticism of: police officers 
who, -took it upon themselves to question prisoners. 
Ing. 1823; in the course of a summing up, Bayley J. 
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expressed the view that officers should refrain- 
from attempting to pump prisoners (91], whilst two,: - 
years later Gaselee J. expressed his disapproval:. 
of: - 
the habit of constables and gaolers getting -.: 
into conversation with prisoners, who then 
made disclosures unfavourable to themselves,, " 
not supposing that those disclosures would; 
afterwards be used against them' [92]. 
However, the law at this period was a long way from 
placing any bar upon such questioning. As recently 
as 1820, the judges of Ireland had, on a reserved. 
case, held admissible a confession extracted by. 
police questioning [93], and four years later their 
English brethren reached a like decision in the., 
case of Thornton [94]. In each case more eloquent . 
than the decision is the fact that defence counsel, 
did not seek to found any objection upon the fact., 
that the confession had been elicited by,, 
interrogation. In so far as any limitation did.. ' 
exist at this period upon the power of the police.,, 
to question, it appears to have lain in the 
customary practice of cautioning - adopted, it 
seems, in imitation of magisterial procedure and,,,, 
as there, having the advantage of rendering less, 
likely the exclusion of any admission thus 
obtained. 
By. the late 1830s, however, the climate had 
changed. Judges were now setting their faces 
against police questioning. In 1838 [95] Patteson 
J. threatened with dismissal from the force an 
officer who had been in the habit of interrogating 
prisoners, whilst in 1839 both the Lord chief 
Justice of England and one of the Irish Chief 
Justices expressed their strong disapproval of the 
practice [96]. Not all judges were, however, happy 
about this new fetter on the police. The evidence 
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published as an Appendix to the Eighth Report of 
the Criminal Law Commissioners spoke of a 
divergence of opinion and practice amongst the 
judges upon the point [97]. And even amongst those 
who disapproved of police questioning, there was 
some disagreement as to where the real evil lay. 
To some all police questioning of prisoners was 
improper [98], whilst to others it was 
objectionable only when not under caution [99]. By 
the 1850s, however, the new doctrine had carried 
the day. All questioning, whether under caution or 
not, was improper. One of the strongest 
affirmations of the rule came from Lord Campbell in 
Baldrv (1852) [100], where, whilst overruling the 
absurd rule in Drew (1837) [101] that to caution ,a 
prisoner that'his answer would be given in evidence 
was an inducement rendering his reply inadmissible, 
he stated emphatically that in England prisoners 
were not to be interrogated. This 'case, together 
with decisions in the 1860s, such as Nick (1863), 
settled the rule for the rest of the century. 
Prior to Jervis' Act, a justification commonly 
offered by the judges for the rule was that police 
questioning was a usurpation of the function of the 
examining magistrate, without any of the safeguards 
which attended a magisterial examination [102]. 
When Jervis' Act deprived magistrates of their 
power to examine prisoners there was a change of 
judicial tack. Stress was now laid upon the fact 
that judges and magistrates were prohibited by law 
from -questioning prisoners. if they could not 
question a prisoner, it was unthinkable that 
inferior officers of justice, such as policemen, 
should be allowed to do so (indeed this became the 
standard justification of the rule for the rest of 
the century and into the twentieth century) [103]. 
These magisterial analogies were not, however, the 
only reasons offered by the 'judges. The risk of 
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unfairness to the prisoner was also stressed [104]. 
An officer might mistake or misunderstand an 
accused's reply [105], or imperfect recollection- 
might cause him to misrepresent it [106], and,, even 
if-he reported the prisoner's words with accuracy, lF 
the jury would have no idea of the tone of voice 
used or the manner in which the reply was given 
[107]. Also, given the police officer's 'natural 
ambition to convict' [108], there was always the'`" 
danger, of his unconsciously twisting or distorting-, - 
a prisoner's words [109]. Then again, as Alderson"' 
B. pointed out, it was: - 
"very easy to put captious and leading' 
questions to a prisoner to induce him to-a, 
give an answer which might be taken entirely 
contrary to its true sense'[107]. 
Another concern (although rarely openly expressed) 
was almost certainly the fear of invented" 
confessions. The Metropolitan Police, in 
particular, had none too savoury a reputation in 
this respect in the 1840s [110]. To others the' 
real objection lay in the relation in which the 
police questioner stood to his prisoner. It 
tended, they claimed, to make any statement- 
obtained from the prisoner the very 'reverse of' 
voluntary. The very act of questioning was an_ 
indication that the questioner might liberate the 
answerer if the answers were satisfactory, or` 
detain him if they were not [111]. 
Joy, writing in 1842 [112], had suggested that` 
the police should forbid the practice of police' 
officers questioning prisoners. And this is in 
fact what ultimately happened. The Metropolitan 
Police General Orders, published in 1873 [113], 
prohibited any attempts by officers or others tö 
extract a statement in the nature of a confession 
from a person brought to a police station on a 
- 11 
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charge of felony, whilst the General Orders and 
Regulations issued by'the Commissioner in 1893, as- 
well as repeating the prohibition, contained 
specific reference to the impropriety of putting 
questions to accused persons [114]. Nor was this 
all. When in 1882 it was decided to publish a 
Police code for the use-of officers, included in it 
was a foreword from Hawkins J. on the duties of 
police constables, which laid 'down in clear terms 
that it was wrong for an officer to question a 
person who was in custody or whom he was about to 
arrest, and this foreword was still being included 
unaltered in revised editions of the Code in the 
mid-1920s. 
` Inevitably the new rule spawned its share of 
practical problems. One of the first was that some 
officers took the prohibition upon questioning to 
mean that it was their duty to stop up the mouth of 
any prisoner who attempted to confess to them, by 
immediately cautioning him [115]. The matter was 
commented upon by the Lord Chief Justice in a 
letter he wrote to the Criminal Law Commissioners 
in 1844 [116]. It was ' also the subject of judicial 
pronouncement in several reported cases from around 
the same era, with judges emphasising that, whilst 
it was no part of the duty of an officer to 
question a prisoner, neither was it his duty to 
caution and shut the mouth of a prisoner who was 
about voluntarily to confess [117]. 
Then there was the question of how far 
officers might legitimately question persons 
against whom there was suspicion, but who had not 
yet-been arrested. To this the judges' answer-was 
that once an officer had taken the decision to take 
a suspect into custody, it was not proper for him 
to-put, questions to him [118], but until that point 
was' reached a suspect might be questioned after- a 
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proper caution, although even here, the power 
should be exercised sparingly [119]. 
The most intractable problem was what stance 
the law should take where a police officer obtained 
admissions by questions in breach of the rule - as 
continued to happen with rather depressing, 
frequency [120]. Upon this question the Irish 
judges initially took a very firm line. Until 
1864, almost every reported Irish case on the point 
favoured the exclusion of answers so obtained 
[121]. In 1864, however, the point came before 
eleven of the Irish judges on a reserved case 
(Johnston) (122]. By a majority of eight to three 
they held that improper questioning did not, of 
itself, render inadmissible answers so obtained. 
The admissibility of such replies, like that of all 
confessions, depended upon their voluntariness., 
This decision, which was in accord with the views 
of the leading text writers [123], and with a, 
number of English cases not least Wild (1835) 
[124], in which the Twelve Judges had held, 
admissible a confession obtained by a civilian 
browbeating a fourteen year old boy who was in 
custody, and Cheverton (1862) (125] and k (1863) 
[126]. Amongst English judges the question had 
provoked its share of disagreement. Indeed, in 
irk, ' Mellor J., whilst ruling the evidence in, 
observed that many judges would not have received 
it. 1864, however, seems to have represented a 
turning point, and after this the rule laid down in 
Johnston (1864) was to prevail unchallenged both in 
Ireland and England for the next twenty years. In 
Johnston, O' Brien J. had suggested a compromise 
rule: - 
'that the police should be at liberty, 
without risk of censure, to question a 
prisoner so far as might be requisite for the 
guidance of their own conduct, and for the 
discovery of other evidence, but that the 
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answers to such questions should not be given 
against the prisoner at his trial [127]' 
but neither this suggestion, nor the scheme adopted 
by the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [128] of making 
all confessions to police officers inadmissible, 
took root. 
In 1885, however, the controversy was 
resurrected when A. L. Smith J. in Gavin [129] 
refused to admit evidence of admissions obtained by 
police questioning. His lead was followed by Cave 
J. in male & Cooper in 1893 [130], and in Morgan 
[131] in 1895, and by Hawkins J. in Histed [132] in 
1898. However, in Rogerson [133] in 1886 the Chief 
Justice of New Zealand declined to follow Gavin, 
and it was expressly dissented from by Day J. in 
nrackenburv [134] in 1893. The sharpest 
denunciation came in Rogers v. Hawken (1898) [135], 
where Lord Chief Justice Russell declared that if 
male & Cooper (1898) laid down that 'a statement 
made by an accused person in answer to a policeman 
.:. which statement has not been brought about by 
any inducement ... or threat ... is .. 0 
inadmissible' it was both wrong in law and 
mischievous. In Gavin, the police interrogation 
had taken the form of confronting the prisoner with 
one of his co-accused and reading over to him the 
co-accused's statement, whilst in Male & Cooper one 
of the accused had had a witness's statement read 
over, to her. This technique of interrogation 
(which seems to have been, particularly prevalent in 
the Metropolitan Police, and which was no doubt 
conceived of as a way of outflanking the 
prohibition on questioning) lingered on into the 
twentieth century [136], and served to keep alive 
the-controversy which Gavin had started, with 
-several judges treating admissibility in such cases 
as a matter for the trial judge's discretion. In 
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Ibrahim [137] in 1914 Lord Sumner summarised the 
position thus: - 
'the ... law is still unsettled, strange as it 
may seem for the point is one that constantly 
occurs in criminal trials. Many judges in 
their discretion exclude such evidence, for, 
they fear that nothing less than exclusion of 
all such statements can prevent such improper 
questioning of prisoners by removing the 
inducement to resort to it ... Others less tender to the prisoner or more mindful of the balance of decided authority would admit such 
statements, nor would the Court of Criminal 
Appeal quash the convictions thereafter 
obtained if no substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred. ' 
The decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the 
capital cases of Voisin 1918 [138] and Booker 1924 
[139] swung the balance heavily in favour of 
admissibility, but the doctrine that there was a 
discretion to exclude did not wholly disappear 
[140]. 
Cases like Voisin played an important part in 
clearing the way for the emergence of the modern 
system of police interrogation. However, the 
undermining of the bar upon the questioning ofr 
prisoners had begun before this. It started in 
fact with the 1912 Judges' Rules for the guidance 
of police officers. Not only did these contain no 
prohibition upon the questioning of persons in 
custody, but by rule 3: - 
'Persons in custody should not be questioned 
without the usual caution first being 
administered. ' 
they implied that such questioning was lawful 
provided that it was preceded by a caution. The 
part played by the Rules in overturning the old 
practice is confirmed by the Report of the Royal 
Commission on Police Powers & Procedure, 1929. The 
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Commission found that, whilst most police forces 
(headed by officers trained on the principles set 
out in Hawkins' foreword to the Police Code) were 
still adhering to the old practice of not 
questioning prisoners, some limited the application 
of. the, principle to the offence for which the 
prisoner was in custody, and approved questioning 
as to other offences, whilst a few, taking their 
lead from rule 3, permitted a prisoner to be 
questioned even on the charge for which he was in 
custody [141]. In 1930, in an attempt to ensure 
uniformity of police practice, the Home Office, 
after consultation with the Judges, issued a 
Circular [142] stressing that: - 
'Rule 3 was never intended to encourage the 
questioning or cross-examination of a person 
in custody after he had been cautioned on the 
subject of the crime for which he is in 
custody' 
a- point which was periodically reinforced by 
judicial pronouncement [143]. However, the 
interpretation given to rule 3 in the Circular, was 
never embodied in the Rules themselves [144], and 
by. implication seemed to legitimise questioning 
concerning charges other than that for which the 
accused was in custody, which meant, of course, 
that the Rules could be simply outflanked by the 
use of holding charges [145]. By the 1950s the 
" Circular was a dead letter [146], and all trace of 
the-old rule was eventually to disappear when the 
judges in 1964 revised the Rules [147]. 
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CHAPTER 17 ;'r 
EVIDENTIAL PROTECTION IV 
CHARACTER AND SIMILAR FACT EVIDENCE 
'Generally speaking it is not competent to a 
prosecutor to prove a man guilty of one felony by 
proving him guilty of another unconnected felony' 
per Bayley J. in R. v. Ellis 1826 6 B. & B. 145. 
(a) Character 
The calling by the prisoner of witnesses to 
speak to his character was a common incident of 
criminal trials at around the start of the 
nineteenth century. Indeed, if an accused was of 
good character judge and jury would expect to hear 
the fact confirmed by witnesses [1]. If it was 
not, the obvious inference was that he was of bad 
character. In capital cases character evidence was 
often of critical importance. Without it an accused-, 
would generally have little hope of mercy at the 
hands of either jury or judge [2]. Nor is there,. 
any doubt that prisoners realised the importance of-, 
calling such evidence [3]. It was not unknown for 
as many as twenty and more character witnesses to, 
be called by a single accused [4], and even lads of; 
fourteen or fifteen, too poor to fee counsel, would. 
sometimes manage to have a witness or two in court- 
to give them a character [5]. Prisoners who had no 
witnesses would try and explain their absence: - the, 
witnesses were too poor to travel or had not yet 
arrived [6]. 
Although character evidence would weigh with 
judges in matters of sentence, and in particular 
when deciding whether to recommend a man capitally 
convicted to mercy, the law placed limits on the 
use which juries might make of it. Jurors were 
264 
always told that it was only where the case was 
doubtful that they should pay any attention to 
evidence of good character [7]. Also character. 
witnesses were debarred from deposing to particular 
acts reflecting credit on the prisoner. The only 
matter to which they might speak was the accused's 
general character [8]. In Rowton (1865) [9] the 
Court for Crown Cases Reserved sought to refine the 
law still further, ruling that a character witness 
was not entitled to give his own opinion of the 
accused's character but must confine himself to the 
accused's general reputation. This ruling, which 
ran counter to existing practice [10], was strongly 
criticised and widely ignored [11]. Text-writers 
-added two further glosses - character evidence 
should bear reference to the nature of the offence 
charged, and relate to the same period as the 
offence [12]. 
Where evidence of good character was elicited 
or called by the accused it was open to the 
prosecution to contradict it. If he had previous 
convictions his character witnesses might be cross- 
examined about them [13]. Indeed, according to a 
ruling of Parke B., they could also be cross- 
examined about matters of which he had in the past 
been suspected [14]. Rebuttal evidence could also 
be called. Where the charge against the accused was 
committing felony or misdemeanour after previous 
conviction [15], the prosecution was by statute 
entitled to rebut any claim of good character by 
proving the previous conviction. There was also a 
right to call witnesses to prove the accused's bad 
character [16]. This latter right was seldom 
exercised in practice, with some judges denying 
that it existed [17]. However, when it was 
exercised the evidence given by, the rebuttal 
witnesses would, on occasion go far beyond matters 
of general character. For example, at an Old Bailey 
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trial in 1844 the prosecution were allowed to call 
in rebuttal of the prisoner's claim of good 
character a police officer to say that the previous 
Saturday he had seen the prisoner at the haunts of .. 
'the swell mob' at around 2 a. m. [18] In Row 
the Court for Crown Cases Reserved placed beyond 
doubt the right of the Crown to call evidence in 
rebuttal, but at the same time insisted that such,., 
evidence must be limited to evidence of generals 
reputation, which ruling had the consequence of 
preventing the Crown (statutory exceptions apart)-, 
proving in rebuttal the prisoner's previous, 
convictions [19]. 
In the early part of the century, the calling, 
of perjured character evidence was apparently, 
common [20], and it was-an evil the law was ill- 
equipped to cope with. Unless the case was,, 
prosecuted by counsel (and most were not), there 
would be no channel through which the matter could 
be taken up, save where the judge himself 
recognised the prisoner as an old offender, and- 
stepped in to expose him [21]; and, even where. - 
there was prosecuting counsel, given that it was., 
the practice always to warn the defence if the, 
Crown had evidence of bad character, the prisoner, 
who was represented would, by the time the trial 
began, know whether the case was one in which her 
could risk calling perjured character evidence- 
(22]. 
If the accused did not give evidence of good 
character, it was not normally open to the Crown to 
adduce evidence-of his bad character. In 1810, in 
Cole [23], the Twelve Judges overturned a capital 
conviction for buggery because the trial judge had 
allowed be adduced in evidence an admission made. by 
the accused on arrest that he had a 'natural 
inclination' to such practices. That case 
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administered the coup de grace to any lingering 
remains of the 'eighteenth century practice of 
allowing the Crown to bolster up its case with 
evidence of the prisoner's bad character and past 
convictions [24]. 
To the prohibition on the Crown adducing 
evidence of bad character there were, however, then 
as now exceptions. Of these perhaps the most 
important was that relating to admissible similar 
fact evidence considered below. But there were 
others too. An accused, who had on a previous 
trial pleaded his clergy, would have the letter F 
branded on his thumb for all the world to see [25]. 
An accused facing multiple indictments (a far more 
common situation in the nineteenth century than now 
due to the bar on charging more than one felony in 
an indictment) had little hope of concealing this 
fact from his jury. He would be arraigned on all 
indictments in the presence of the waiting jurors 
[26], and would then be tried successively on the 
indictments he faced, usually by the same jury [27] 
(the Crown normally only calling a halt when they 
had secured a conviction on one of them). If his 
case had attracted public interest (and sometimes 
even if it had not), the accused would often find 
that the whole of his past life had already been 
laid before the jury by the newspapers [28]. 
Sometimes the very offence charged would reveal him 
as Aa criminal (e. g. returning from transportation). 
And there were still other possibilities. In a case 
in 1885 the prosecution were allowed to püt in 
evidence a ticket of leave found on the accused at 
the, time of his arrest (on the ground that anything 
found on the prisoner was evidence against him) 
(29]. Then again, a prisoner's character might be 
disclosed as a result of the inadvertent or 
malicious remark of a witness, or an improper or 
imprudent question by counsel [30]. By the early 
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years of the twentieth century, judges were in such 
cases prepared to consider discharging the jury., 
[31], but for much, if not all of the nineteenth 
century, a direction to the jury to disregard what 
they had heard was the most that the accused could 
hope for [32]. 
To all these perils, Parliament in 1827 added 
another. By s. 11 of the Criminal Law Act of that 
year persons committing a non capital felony, after 
a previous conviction for felony, were made liable 
to 'exemplary punishment'. The practical working 
of this provision was gravely disadvantageous tort 
the :. accused, for the jury trying him knew 
throughout of the previous conviction. Not only'' 
was it read out when he was arraigned, but any, 
verdict of guilty brought back by them had also to 
state whether they found the allegation of previous' 
conviction proved. The Previous Convictions Act of. 
1836 attempted to correct this unfairness by} 
directing that in such a case the subsequent 
offence should be tried first, and that, only after 
they had brought in a verdict of guilty of such`, 
offence, should the jury be charged to inquire into 
the previous conviction or have the part of the 
indictment concerning the same read to them. That} 
ought to have solved the problem. It did not`: " 
Before the accused could be put in charge he had tö 
be 
. arraigned, and 
the courts held that the 
arraignment still had to be on the whole 
indictment, and such arraignment invariably took 
place in the presence of the jury in waiting [33]'. ' 
When in Shrimpton (1851) (34] (a case concerning a 
similarly worded clause in the Prevention of Crime 
Act,, 1851) defence counsel protested about the 
unfairness, of arraignment in the presence of the 
waiting jury, the judges would have none of it. ` 
'You are crediting the jury', said Alderson B. ' 
'with attending to matters not before them', whilst 
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from the Lord Chief Justice he drew the pedantic 
riposte 'the jurors then present are not a jury in 
the case'. To modern eyes an obvious solution 
would have been to have had the waiting jurors out 
of court during arraignment, but in the 1860s 
sending the jury out of court at any stage would 
have struck lawyers as a very novel idea [35]. In 
1861 the law was recast: the 1827 Act was repealed, 
but the principle of punishing more severely those 
convicted after previous conviction was continued 
by the Larceny and Coinage Offences Acts, with this 
improvement that henceforth the accused was not to 
be arraigned upon the previous conviction until the 
jury had brought in a verdict of guilty of the 
subsequent offence. This provision happily solved 
the problem [36]. 
In the last third of the century, 
practitioners had a fresh and worrying problem to 
cope with - statutes containing prisoners' evidence 
clauses, which gave the. prisoner who elected to 
give evidence no protection against cross- 
examination as to credit. Not until 1898 was 
anything done to remedy this desperately unfair 
state of affairs [37]. 
(b) Similar Facts 
In eighteenth century criminal trials one 
finds instances of evidence admitted as relevant 
which would today be dubbed similar fact evidence 
[38]. These cases were almost wholly ignored by 
contemporary text writers, no doubt because they 
were not regarded as involving any point of 
principle. In the nineteenth century, however, all 
this changed. In the first decade alone, the Twelve 
Judges heard two cases, both destined to become 
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landmarks in this area of law, namely Tattersall 
(1801) [39] and Cole (1810) [40]. 
In Tattersall's case the question for the 
judges was whether, upon a charge or uttering a- 
forged bank note, it was open to the prosecutor to 
prove other similar utterings to show guilty"' 
knowledge. The question was important. Bank note 
forgery was in 1801 a growing problem [41], and was 
to remain so for the duration of the Napoleonic 
wars and indeed for some years after, and yet it 
was far from easy to bring offenders to book. The 
actual forgers were rarely caught [42], and 1 
prosecutions for uttering often failed because of 
the inability of the prosecution to prove guilty 
knowledge. Not more than one uttering could bet 
charged in the same indictment, and an accused 
facing but a single charge could always plausibly 
claim that he had come by the note innocently, and 
had not realised when he passed it on that it was 
forged. In Tattersall the judges gave the bankers 
the answer they wanted: - evidence of other 
utterings was admissible. The ruling did not 
command universal support in the profession. ' 
Precedent was against it (in prosecutions for' 
passing bad coin the evidence was always limited to 
the uttering charged in the indictment) [43]. 
Also, the admission of such evidence appeared to 
undermine the rule prohibiting the Crown from 
charging more than one -felony in an indictment' 
[44], as well as compelling the prisoner to defend 
himself against charges of which he had no notice. 
But three years later the King's Bench judges 
emphatically reaffirmed it in Whiley [45]. The case 
declared Lord Ellenborough was one of necessity., 
Since the mere fact of uttering did not of itself 
show guilty knowledge, proof of such knowledge had: 
'necessarily to be collected from other facts and 
circumstances'. The only significant limitation 
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placed on the rule was a requirement that the 
notes, the subject of the other utterings, be 
actually produced and proved forgeries by clear 
evidence [46]. 
In Cole, the point reserved was whether 
similar fact evidence, which went to show only that 
the accused was a man with a propensity to commit 
crimes of the type with which he stood charged, was 
admissible. The judges held that it was not. The 
decision, having been brought to the attention of 
the profession by Phillipps in the first edition of 
his work on evidence, quickly became the leading 
authority on the point, and has indeed never since 
been questioned - perhaps not surprisingly, given 
that to admit such evidence would be to drive a 
coach and horses through the prohibition on the 
Crown's leading evidence of bad character. For 
most of the first half of the century, the rule in 
Cole was commonly rendered by lawyers and 
textwriters in terms, which looked back to the old 
pleading rule in felony, namely that it was not 
competent for a prosecutor to prove a man guilty of 
one felony by proving him guilty of another 
unconnected felony [47]. It was left to Lord Chief 
Justice Campbell in Ody (1851) [48] to give the 
rule a more modern sound, when he declared that it 
was not open to the Crown to seek to prove its case 
by evidence showing that the accused was a 'very 
bad man and likely to commit such an offence'. 
With the rulings in Tattersall and Cole the 
law began to assume something of its modern shape. 
This is not to say, however, that the eighteenth 
century case law was discarded. In 1789 Buller J. 
had' held that the finding in the accused's 
possession of items stolen from a house at the time 
it was"set on fire was admissible to prove that the 
accused-was the arsonist [49], and this ruling was 
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followed in several cases in the first half of the 
nineteenth century (e. g. Westwood (1813) (50] 
where, on a charge of night poaching, evidence that 
a coat, lost by a gamekeeper during a struggle with 
the poachers, had been found in the prisoner's home 
was held admissible to show that he was one of the 
gang, and Fursey (1833) [51] where, upon a charge 
of wounding a 'constable, the shape of the stab 
wound, which the accused had inflicted upon another 
officer in the same incident, was held admissible 
to show that the wound charged in the indictment 
was caused by the same weapon and the same 
assailant). These cases, although commonly cited 
as authority for the proposition that similar fact 
evidence was admissible to prove identity, could 
equally well be regarded as an application of 
another eighteenth century evidence rule, namely 
that, where several offences were so intermixed as 
to form a single transaction [52] or amount to a 
continuous offence, evidence of all was admissible 
upon the trial of an indictment for any of them 
[53]. This rule (and the linked pleading rule 
which permitted offences forming a single, 
transaction to be charged in a single felony count) 
[52] is one which was constantly invoked and, 
applied throughout the nineteenth century in cases 
ranging from group rape [54] to the theft of coal 
by means of a continuous mining operation from 
twenty different landowners [55], but with the 
courts drawing the line at multiple poisoning [56] 
and systematic embezzlement [57], and it was often 
in practice prayed in aid by advocates with no, 
better argument to offer. 
As well as drawing upon precedents from the, 
previous century, the judges were at the same time, 
also steadily adding to the categories of 
admissible similar fact evidence. In Donnall 
(1817) [58), to show that the deceased had been; 
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poisoned by the accused, evidence was admitted that 
on a previous occasion, after taking tea with him, 
she had developed identical (albeit less severe) 
symptoms to those 'she exhibited immediately prior 
to her death. In Egerton (1819) [59] evidence of an 
attempt by the defendant to rob the prosecutor on 
the day following the robbery charged in the 
indictment was admitted by Holroyd J., on the 
ground that the latter incident corroborated the 
prosecutor's evidence as to the first. In Clewes 
(1830) [60] evidence of one murder was. held 
"- admissible to show the motive (silencing a witness) 
for committing' another. 
From 1823 comes Voke [61], the first reported 
case of similar fact evidence being admitted to 
rebut a defence of accident. The accused, who was 
charged with maliciously shooting at A, had by his 
counsel cross-examined with a view to showing that 
the shooting might have been accidental, only to be 
confronted with evidence that he had shot at A on a 
second occasion that day. And after yoke one also 
begins to get an increasing number of cases in 
which similar fact evidence is admitted as going to 
prove intent. In Winkworth (1830) [62], for 
example, upon an indictment for robbery founded 
upon' the defendant's actions in advising the 
prosecutor to give money to a mob, evidence was 
admitted of his presence on other occasions that 
day when'the mob made demands for money at other 
houses. In Boynes (1843) [63], upon a°'charge of 
making 'a false declaration before a magistrate, 
Erskine J. held evidence that documents, which the 
accused accused had sent - togetherwith- the 
declaration to a Benefit Society in support of a 
claim, were forged, admissible to prove that the 
declaration was wilfully false. In Mahoney (1848) 
[64], 1ýupon a charge of using an instrument to 
procure an abortion, in order to show with what 
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intent the instrument had been used the prosecution 
were allowed to adduce evidence that the accused 
had procured miscarriages of other women. In., 
Cooper (1849) [65], upon an indictment for accusing,, 
a person of an unnatural offence with intent to,.. 
extort money, evidence that the defendant had in. 
the past obtained money in this way was admitted to 
prove with what intent the accusation was made. 
Shortly after yoke, the guilty knowledge, 
] 
principle laid down in Tattersall, which had by ; 
this time already been applied to utterings of bad 
coin [66] and forged bills of exchange [67], was.. 
applied to a wholly new category of offence namely , 
receiving stolen goods, the Twelve Judges holding 
in Dunn & 
-Smith 
[68] (1826) that, upon such charge, 
the fact that there had been found in the accused's_ 
possession goods stolen from the prosecutor on 
other occasions was admissible to show guilty 
knowledge. But even as Dunn & Smith was being, 
decided, there were still those in the profession 
who doubted the soundness of the rule in Tattersall 
[69]. And even in relation to uttering offences. 
there was uncertainty as to the true bounds of the. 
rule. It was, for example, still unclear whether, 
the Crown was entitled to rely upon utterings, 
subsequent to [70] or remote in time from [71] that, 
charged in the indictment. There were also doubts 
as to whether utterings could be led which were the., 
subject of other indictments [72], or which were of 
notes of a different bank or different denomination 
to that charged in the indictment (73]. By the 
1850s most of these questions had been resolved and, 
resolved against the accused [74], although upon 
some points the controversy was a long time dying 
[75]. 
The unhappiness of some at least of the judges, 
with the principle of the uttering cases surfaced 
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in very public fashion in Qddy [48] (1851), where 
the Court' for Crown Cases Reserved refused to 
extend Dunn & Smith holding that it was not open 
to the crown in a receiving case, in order to prove 
guilty knowledge, to adduce evidence of the 
possession' by the prisoner at the date of the 
receiving of other goods stolen at other times from 
other persons. In delivering the judgement of the 
Court Lord Chief Justice Campbell declared that the 
uttering cases went a great way, and that he was 
'by no means inclined to apply them to the criminal 
law generally'. The following year, these dicta 
inspired one defence counsel to make an 
unsuccessful attempt to keep similar fact evidence 
out in an uttering case [76]. 
So far as receiving cases were concerned, the, 
ruling in Oddy stood until 1871, when it was in 
effect overturned by s. 19 of the Prevention of 
Crimes Act [77], a provision strictly construed by 
the courts [78], and in practice but little used. 
But in relation to offences other than receiving, 
the courts, despite Oddv, showed no particular 
reluctance to extend the principle of the guilty 
knowledge cases. In Roebuck [79] (1855), for 
example, such evidence was admitted to fix guilty 
knowledge on a confidence trickster, who had tried 
to pass off as silver a chain of base metal. In 
Parker v. Green [80] (1862), upon a charge of 
permitting persons of bad character to assemble 
upon", -licensed premises, evidence of the same 
prostitutes having gathered on the premises on 
previous occasions was admitted to prove that the. 
licensee knew of their character. 
By the second half of the century, the 
principle in yoke had also been extended, the 
Crown nöw being permitted to adduce : evidence of 
anonymous incidents,, (i. e. incidents which could not 
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positively be linked with the accused) to rebut any 
possible suggestion that the death or other event, 
charged in the indictment was accidental. One of 
the earliest of such a case was Bailey [81] (1847)-,, -, 
where upon the trial - of a maid for arson of a 
stable, evidence of two other recent fires at the, 
prosecutor's premises was admitted to show that the, 
stable fire was not accidental, the trial judge,,: 
Pollock C. B., citing in support of this ruling-a. - 
murder case (Donnallan), in which the Crown, in- 
order to show that the poisoning of the deceased.. '- 
was not accidental, had been permitted to call:: 
evidence to the effect that shortly before his, 
death. the branch of a tree, which overhung a., 
dangerous and deep pool where he had been 
accustomed to fish, had been found sawn nearly 
through. And one sees the principle regularly.., 
applied after 1850 in cases of poisoning, in murder;, 
cases such as Roden (1874) [82] (evidence that-'a-- 
number of deceased's children had died at an early _ý 
age admitted to show that the death of a child who, 
had been found suffocated was not accidental), and- 
waters- & Ellis (1870) [83] (a pre-Makin baby_ 
farming case), and in arson [84]. 
Multiple poisoning cases were, in fact, the 
class of case where the admission of similar fact., 
evidence was perhaps most calculated to cause. 
dismay to the defence. Under the rules of. 
criminal pleading, a prisoner accused of multiple-, 
poisonings could only be tried for one murder at a. 
time, but this rule was substantially eroded by the,. 
ease with which the Crown, after the ruling-. in 
Deering [85] in 1849, was able to get in evidence 
of the other poisonings. In Geering [85], Pollock 
C. B. held such evidence was admissible on two. 
grounds. First, it was, along with the domestic, 
history, admissible to show that that the 
administration of poison to the deceased was 
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felonious and not accidental (for authority he 
cited his own ruling in Bailey). Second, evidence 
that others connected with the accused had died, 
after exhibiting the same symptoms as had been 
displayed by the deceased whose death was the 
subject of the indictment, and that poison had been 
found in their bodies was admissible as evidence 
that his death had been caused by poison (a rule 
less unfair than it looks today, given the 
difficulty which the Crown, with the science of 
forensic pathology still in its infancy, often 
experienced at this time in establishing poison as 
the cause of death) [86]. Geering was to remain 
the leading authority on the question for the rest 
of the century. It was repeatedly followed in 
murder cases such as Garner (1864) [87], Cotton 
(1873) [88], Hersom (1878) [89], and Flannagan & 
Higgins (1884) [90], and was treated as rightly 
decided by the Judicial Committee in 1894 in Makin 
[91]. 
However, not all judges were happy to follow 
it. In Winslow (1860) [92], where there was 
evidence that the prisoner's employer and three 
members of his family had died of antimony 
poisoning at a time when they and the prisoner were 
residing under the same roof, Martin B. refused to 
allow the Crown to call evidence of the other 
deaths or their cause, despite prosecuting 
counsel's submissions that it went to show that the 
death of the deceased from antimony was, not 
accidental, that the prisoner had had antimony in 
her possession, and (more desperately) that the 
deaths were all one transaction. He gave, however, 
no 
. reasons 
for his ruling. And in 1887 the New 
Zealand Supreme Court took the same course in Hsi 
[93]. There, upon a charge of murder by antimony 
poisoning, the Crown, despite defence objections, 
had been permitted to adduce evidence of an attempt 
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by the accused, at a date after the murder, to 
poison his wife with antimony. On appeal, the 
Crown sought to uphold the trial judge's ruling on 
three grounds. The evidence of the attempted 
poisoning was, they argued, admissible to show that 
the administration of antimony to the deceased was 
not accidental, second the poisoning and the 
attempt were all one transaction, and thirdly, the 
evidence went to prove what the symptoms of - 
antimony poisoning were. The Supreme Court rejected 
all three submissions, and allowed the appeal. For 
its rejection of the Crown's third submission the 
court gave no reasons, but it may well be that Sir 
Herbert Stephen was right in his comment [94] that. 
the court probably considered that there was 
abundant other evidence to show that the death was 
due to antimony. For its rejection of the first- 
submission it did, however, give a reason, namely, 
that for evidence to be admissible on this ground, 
there must first be proof aliunde that it was the 
prisoner who administered the poison to the 
deceased. And it may be that this same reasoning 
lay behind Martin B. 's ruling in Winslow. 
Surprisingly late in the century (1861) one 
gets the first reported instance of similar fact, 
evidence being admitted to rebut a defence of 
mistaken accounting in embezzlement [95]. 
By about 1870, one also finds lawyers and- 
judges beginning to speak of 'system' [96] as a 
ground of admissibility of similar fact evidence. ' 
In 1876 this unhelpful proposition found its way 
into the first edition of Stephen's Digest [97], " 
and thereafter continued to enjoy currency for the 
rest of the century [98] (although receiving no 
mention when, in Makin's case (1894), the Judicial 
Committee took the opportunity of stating the' 
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principles considered to govern the admissibility 
of similar fact evidence). 
Makin's case served to stress a point, which 
was in danger of being overlooked as the number of 
reported cases on similar fact evidence burgeoned, 
that the underlying' principle governing the 
admissibility of such evidence in criminal cases 
was relevance [99] . What it did not bring out was 
how far the subject had come in the space of less 
than a hundred years. By 1894 it was possible to 
list over eleven categories [100] of admissible 
similar fact evidence, and it was in terms of such 
categories (conceived of as exceptions to a general 
exclusionary principle) that the subject now tended 
to be discussed both by lawyers and text writers 
[101]. 
For the accused, the steady expansion of the 
categories of admissible similar fact evidence, 
meant a corresponding erosion of the prohibition on 
the crown's leading evidence of his bad character. 
But, given that the justification for admitting 
such evidence was always that it had probative 
value going beyond mere proof of propensity, 
prisoners never had any"realistic hope of being 
able to stop, let alone reverse, the trend. What 
prisoners and their counsel could legitimately 
protest about (and they had to wait until the 
present century for the complaint to be heeded) was 
the absence of any exclusionary discretion on the 
part of the trial judge. If similar fact evidence 
was legally admissible, judges considered 
themselves bound to admit it, no matter how slight 
its weight nor how great the prejudice it would 
generate. In uttering cases, for example, the oft 
posed question whether utterings, remote in time 
from that charged in the indictment, could be 




(1848) [102] Rolfe B. expressed the view that , 
evidence of utterings twenty years before was in 
law receivable although adding that he would in 
such case 'direct the jury to pay no attention to _ 
it'. For the same reason, prosecuting counsel were . 
commonly allowed to adduce similar fact evidence to- 
rebut a defence, which it was theoretically open to 
the defence to raise, even though defence counsel 
had expressly disclaimed the intention of either 
raising or relying upon it. In Dale (1889) [103]. _ _ 
evidence of previous abortions was held admissible 
to show the intent with which the accused had 
inserted a quill pen into the woman's vagina, 
despite the fact that his counsel had already made 
it clear that the issue was not intent but whether 
the instrument had been used at all. In Phillips 
(1848) [104] Rolfe B. held similar fact evidence 
admissible in an uttering case, despite defence 
counsel's protests that on the facts guilty 
knowledge was not an issue, giving as his reason 
that it was just possible that it might become an . 
issue. Occasionally, a judge would hint to. 
prosecuting counsel not to press evidence of., 
dubious cogency [105], but the more usual judicial 
stance was that taken by Lush J. in Roden (1874) 




EVIDENTIAL PROTECTION V 
CORROBORATION AND IDENTIFICATION 
'An accomplice of the name of Durrant ... admitted that he came forward in the expectation of saving 
his life by convicting the prisoner' 
R. v. Lynell, The Times, March 5,1831. 
At the start of the nineteenth century, the 
' law required corroboration in three classes of 
criminal case - prosecutions for treason, and 
perjury, and cases involving the use of accomplice 
evidence. By the century's end further categories 
had been added to the list. Identification evidence 
was never, however, subject to such a requirement, 
nor indeed to any special rules for all that the 
dangers of mistaken identification were well known. 
(a) Treason 
In high treason by the statute 7&8 Wm. III, 
c., 3 [1] the overt acts alleged by the Crown had to 
be proved by two credible witnesses; treasons 
relating to coining fell outside this protection 
however, as did those where the overt act alleged 
was assassination wounding or maiming of the 
sovereign or an attempt thereat. Treason felony was 
also outside the rule. Petit treason, until its 
abolition in 1828, was also subject to a two 
witness requirement [2]. 
(b)-,. Perjury 
The corroboration requirement in perjury took 
a different form -a rule forbidding the conviction 
of the accused on the evidence of a single witness. 
This rule had been laid down as early as 1713 [3] 
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and its roots go back even further, but it was not 
until the first half of the nineteenth century that 
the law was spelt out with clarity. After 
hesitation as to whether there had to be direct 
evidence from two witnesses as to the fact alleged 
as falsely sworn [4], the courts had by 1850 
settled for a less rigorous rule, holding that it,. 
was sufficient for the prosecution to prove the 
falsity by the evidence of a single witness' 
supported some independent corroborating 
circumstance (such as a letter written by the, 
accused admitting the falsehood) [5], or even by 
circumstantial evidence coming from more than at 
single source. Evidence of contradictory' 
statements (whether or not on oath) made by the 
accused was however held insufficient per se [6], 
whilst in Parker [7] in 1842 Tindal L. C. J., in an 
important ruling, held that where the indictment 
contained a number of assignments of perjury, each 
such assignment was subject to a separate 
corroboration requirement. 
(c) Accomplices 
(i) The Accomplice System 
For the detection and conviction of criminals, 
the law in the early nineteenth century depended, 
heavily upon the services of accomplices -a state 
of affairs which began to change only after the` 
reform of the police [8]. 
The means by which accomplices were induced to, 
come forward were various. 
To criminals at liberty the law offered 
substantial incentives to-betray others. More than 
a dozen statutes (all to be repealed in the late 
1820s) offered a pardon to an accomplice, not being 
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in custody, who secured the conviction of two 
others for specified offences [91 (the accomplice 
could also claim a reward of upto £40 a head) [10]. 
In addition, private reward advertisements (with 
Home office permission) regularly offered pardons 
to accomplices (a practice which lingered on until 
well into the second half of the century) [11]. 
But it was from amongst those in custody that 
accomplices were most frequently recruited. 
Attempts were commonly made to persuade arrested 
gang members to become 'evidences', that is to buy 
immunity for themselves by making full disclosure 
of and giving evidence against their associates 
[12].. Indeed, it was not unknown for them to be so 
exhorted by examining magistrates in open court 
[13]. In many cases, however, it was from the 
arrested man that the initiative came [14]. If the 
evidence against him was strong, his only way of 
saving his neck would often be to get himself 
admitted King's evidence. And where several members 
of= a gang were caught red-handed there might be a 
race to be admitted 'evidence'. The decision as to 
whether a man was to be so admitted rested with the 
examining magistrates [15], who were urged to be 
cautious in whom they admitted [16], and to select 
the least infamous [17]. 
Before the examining magistrate, the 
accomplice would be examined on behalf of the 
Crown, with a warning from the bench to be frank in 
his evidence. He would also be told that no hope 
or promise was held out [18]. If, upon his 
evidence, 'a case was made out against those 
accused, 'he and they would be committed in for 
trial in custody [19]. At the court of trial, 
counsel for the prosecution would, onrthe first day 
of the session, apply to the judge for leave to 
admitö'the accomplice as 
'evidence [20]. If leave 
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was given (as it normally, but not invariably, . - 
would be) [21], he would then be taken to give ý 
evidence before the grand jury, and if they found aý- 
bill he would be called at the trial [20]. His`- 
fate would depend upon how he gave his evidence. If, 
he was frank and truthful, he would earn immunity'- 
(whether or not a conviction followed) [22]. The 
law books speak of his being entitled to a pardon, 
but the reality appears to be that accomplices who 
came upto proof were not-pardoned, but simply not 
prosecuted [23]. If, however, he sought to resile 
from his deposition, either before the grand jury,: 
or on the trial, the judge would forthwith direct-' 
the prosecution to get a bill against him from the 
grand jury, and he would then be put on trial: 
himself [24]. Hence the popular saying that 
accomplices: - 
'fished for prey, like tame cormorants, with- 
ropes around their necks' [25]. 
Occasionally, accomplices were recruited at. 
trial. A prisoner jointly indicted who pleaded 
guilty, might (as now) receive an approach from the 
Crown to give evidence against his co-accused., 
Until 1843, it was essential in felony cases that: 
he be called before sentence (for, once sentenced,. _ 
he became incompetent until he had served the 
sentence) [26]. This was not, however, normally a' 
source of difficulty, given the practice of putting, 
off the sentencing of felons until the last day of., 
the session or Assize. After Denman's Act (1843), 
had removed the bar of incompetency, some judges, 
began to adopt the practice of sentencing prisoners 
who were to be called against co-accused before 
they gave evidence, on the ground that there was 
then no sentencing advantage to be gained by false 
testimony [27]. If the Crown's case was weak, it 
was not unknown in a multi-handed case for the 
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Crown to offer to enter a nolle prosequi [28], or 
even take an acquittal, against the prisoner 
considered least culpable if he would undertake to 
give evidence against his fellows [29]. As late as 
1839 [30] one can find an example of prosecuting 
counsel making such an'offer to an accused in front 
of the jury, and with the trial already well under 
way. Winsor's case [31] in 1866 established a yet 
further option. There, a jury, having failed to 
agree in the case of two women jointly accused of 
child murder, the Crown, -on the re-trial, elected 
to try only one of them, and called the other as a 
witness without either entering a nolle prosequi or 
taking an acquittal against her -a procedure, for 
which some slight precedent could be found [32], 
and which, to the surprise of some, was held 
unexceptionable by the Court for Crown Cases 
Reserved. 
(ii) The corroboration requirement 
Of the dangers of accomplice evidence the 
judges were only too well aware, but they justified 
its use on grounds of expediency. Against all 
arguments that accomplices were incompetent from 
infamy of character [33], or from interest [34] 
they resolutely set their faces. Such matters they 
ruled went merely to credit, and a conviction based 
upon,. the evidence of an accomplice alone was 
nonetheless a legal conviction [35]. However, this 
strict legal rule was tempered by a practice of 
advising juries to acquit where the only evidence 
against the accused was the uncorroborated 
evidence of an accomplice. Joy, writing in about 
1824, `, claimed that the practice was less than half 
a". century old [36]. In this, he was almost 
certainly wrong. Langbein found evidence that as 
earlyras the 1750s judges at the old Bailey were 
directing juries to acquit where accomplice 
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testimony was not corroborated by independent 
evidence [37]. 
The 'protection afforded by the practice was 
much reduced by the way the judges chose to define 
corroboration. The stance they took was that any 
evidence, which confirmed an accomplice's story to 
any material extent (whether or not it implicated 
the accused), amounted to corroboration of it [38]. 
Evidence from the victim confirming that the facts 
of the offence (e. g. that four men took part, that 
they had blacked faces and wore shirts over their 
clothes [39], that one had a brazen-mounted pistol 
[40], that one fired a warning shot) was deemed 
ample corroboration. Again, where there were co- 
accused, confirmatory evidence implicating one was 
treated as corroboration as against all [41]. In 
Despard (1803) [42] Lord Ellenborough even went so 
far as to suggest that confirmation need not always 
come from an independent source, but might be found 
in the clearness and consistency of the' 
accomplice's testimony in the witness box. With 
corroboration defined in such wide terms, a 
practice of warning juries not to convict upon 
unconfirmed accomplice evidence was hardly to be- 
wondered at. If an accomplice could not even be 
confirmed as to the circumstances of the offence, 
there was cause for suspicion indeed. 
It was from Ireland that calls for a stricter 
definition first came. In 1824 an anonymous Irish 
barrister published a pamphlet [43] arguing that 
evidence, to be corroborative of an accomplice, 
must implicate the accused, and the following year 
Jebb J., applied this test when trying a case of 
murder [44]. In Sheehan (1826) [45], the point was 
considered by eleven judges on a reserved case, 
and, by a majority of six to five, they held that 
juries"should be told in most cases to disregard 
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accomplice testimony unless there was some 
corroboration of it, and that corroboration as to 
the circumstances of the case merely, and not of 
the, person charged, was deserving of very slight 
consideration. Joy, writing in rebuttal of the 
1824' pamphlet, sought to demolish this new fangled 
doctrine. In Ireland the subject was being treated 
as though it were res integra but it was not. No 
English judge, he' argued, had ever held that 
corroboration need go to confirm the guilt of 
accused nor was there any reason why it should.,. 
The office of corroborative evidence was not to 
prove the guilt of the accused but to restore the 
credit of the accomplice by showing the 
truthfulness of his evidence, and any evidence 
which- confirmed the truth of his story on any. 
material point served to do that [46]. However, 
Joy was fighting a losing battle. By the time his 
book was published in England in 1836, the English- 
courts were already beginning to embrace the Irish 
rule. - In the space of three years no less than 
five English judges held that evidence, to amount 
to, corroboration, must not merely confirm the 
accomplice, but must also implicate the accused 
[47].. rAt 
the same time, the old rule that what was 
corroboration against one of several accused was 
corroboration against all was abandoned [48]. 
Henceforth, it became increasingly common for 
judges-_to advise juries to acquit those as against 
whom : the accomplice was not corroborated. Indeed, 
it. was 
-almost 
inevitable that they should do so. 
Given the new stricter definition of corroboration, 
adherence to the old rule would have not only been 
illogical, but would have made the prospects of 
acquittal of such accused dependent upon the 
accident of whether they were tried alone, or tried 
with, others against whom there was corroboration 
[49]`. '`A further refinement introduced at this time 
was the rule that an accomplice could not be 
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corroborated by another accomplice [50], or by his 
spouse [51]. But not all judges were subscribers 
to the new thinking. As late as 1838 an Irish 
Chief Justice was openly declaring his disagreement 
with the new definition of corroboration [52], and 
in 1845 Coleridge J. was still directing juries 
that confirmation as to one accused was 
confirmation as to all [53]. The new rule was, 
however, placed beyond doubt when, in 1855, the 
Court for Crown Cases Reserved, in Stubbs [54], 
held that a jury should always be told to acquit a 
prisoner accused by an accomplice unless there was 
corroboration as to that prisoner. The reason for. 
the change of judicial stance was a recognition- 
that evidence, which confirmed an accomplice's 
participation in a crime, offered no sort of 
guarantee that his accusations against others were 
true. As Jervis C. J. put it in Stubbs nothing was, 
, 
easier than: - 
'for the accomplice speaking truly as to all 
the other facts of the case to put the third 
man in his own place'. 
Of the twentieth century practice of telling 
juries that it is open to them to convict upon the 
uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice if they, 
are sure that he is telling the truth, one finds 
but little trace in the nineteenth century [55]. 
Where there was no corroboration of an accomplice, ' 
the usual practice was for the judge to advise the 
jury to acquit [56]. Some judges indeed went 
further and actually directed a verdict of 
acquittal. 
This latter practice had a long history. Joy 
thought it went back to about the 1780s. According 
to him shortly after Rudd's case (1775) 
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'a practice began to prevail of even not 
sending to the jury to be considered the 
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice' 
[57]. 
He"cites Durham & Crowder (1787) [58], where Perryn' 
B. - described the practice as 'a matter of 
discretion of the court'. He might also have 
referred to the case of Smith & Davis [59], decided 
three years earlier, where the court declared that, 
notwithstanding that an uncorroborated accomplice 
was legal evidence, it considered it too dangerous 
" to-suffer a conviction to take place on such 
evidence, and, semble, directed an acquittal. 
And, although not a hint of this appears in the law 
. reports, 
the Twelve Judges appear to have felt some 
unease about the matter in Atwood & Robins (1788), 
for; ` whilst in that case they affirmed 
unequivocally the propriety of founding a 
conviction on uncorroborated accomplice evidence 
(so 
_much 
so that the case came to be regarded as 
the locus classicus on the point), the entry in the 
Judges' Notebooks records that they recommended the 
prisoners to pardon thinking that they 
' ought not to be executed merely on his (the 
't«accomplice's) testimony unconfirmed in any 
I circumstance' 
[60]. 
The practice was still in evidence by the 
early-nineteenth century, and was indeed to persist 
for the rest of the century. In Jones [61], in 
1809,, -Lord Ellenborough, in rejecting a defence 
objection that on some counts the only evidence was 
unconfirmed accomplice evidence, restated in 
emphatic -terms the rule laid down in 
'Atwood & 
Robins,; complaining that 'strange notions on the 
subject. _, 
have lately got abroad'. In Jordan & 
sill livan- [62] in 1836 Gurney B., declared that he 
knew that persons had been convicted in the past on 
the evidence of an accomplice alone, but that he 
289 
hoped that it would never be so again, and that, as 
far as he could, he would take steps to see that it 
should not. In a burglary case in 1843, Coleridge 
J. directed an acquittal on the ground of want of 
corroboration, and was criticised by a law reporter 
for so doing [63]. In 1845 counsel, in making a 
submission of no case before Erle J. on the ground 
that the only evidence against his client was 
uncorroborated accomplice evidence, asserted that 
it was the constant habit of judges in such cases 
to direct an acquittal. From this proposition Erle 
did not dissent, but claimed that the position had- 
been altered by Denman's Act, which had made even a 
felon who had been convicted and sentenced a 
competent witness [64]. Between 1830 and 1860, one L 
also gets a line of cases in which judges refused 
to allow the Crown even to call accomplice evidence 
until they had demonstrated, by evidence called, 
that there was satisfactory corroboration of it (a 
practice justified by Hill J. in Sparkes (1858) on 
the ground that it avoided the court's time being` 
wasted) [65]. In 1862 no less a judge than 
Blackburn J. is reported as having directed the 
acquittal of the accused in a fraud trial for want 
of corroboration of accomplice evidence [66] - for 
which he was roundly criticised in the Solicitors' 
Journal [67]. In 1895, on the trial of Taylor, the 
man accused with Oscar Wilde, Wills J. threw out 
some of the counts against the accused for the same 
reason [68] - for which he was criticised by the, 
future Lord Darling in a self important letter to_ 
The Times [69]. Nor was the Taylor case an, 
isolated example. In the 1898 edition of Roscoe' 
[70] the practice is referred to and its legality 
questioned. Even as late as 1909 one finds the, 
Justice of the Peace declaring it not unusual for: 
judges to direct an acquittal, at the close of the 
prosecution case, where there was no corroboration 
of the accomplice [71]. 
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Joy argued- that these 'directed acquittals 
represented nothing more than an illustration of 
the something that happened daily in criminal 
courts - namely a judge treating a particular 
witness, whether an accomplice or not, as one who 
ought not to be listened to [72]. This suggestion 
may not in fact be far wide of the mark. Judicial 
distrust of accomplices was not always shared by 
juries, and it was not unknown for a jury in an 
accomplice case to bring back a guilty verdict in 
the teeth of advice from the bench to acquit (in a 
case in 1864 (73] Pollock C. B., faced with the flat 
refusal of a jury to follow his advice to acquit, 
ended up seizing upon a supposed defect in the 
indictment, and directing them to acquit'on that 
ground, which very reluctantly they did), and,,, 
where that happened, the courts of review (even 
where they had jurisdiction, for example because 
the point had been reserved or because the case was 
one`-'-Of misdemeanour tried in the King's Bench) 
would not interfere [74]. This being the state of 
the law, the only way in which a judge could make 
sure that an accused was not convicted upon the 
uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice he 
personally disbelieved or distrusted, was by a 
directed acquittal. 
(d),. F=The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 
,, 
The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 made 
significant additions to the categories of case in 
which: the law required corroboration. The new 
procuration offences it' created were all made 
subject" to such a requirement. It was this Act 
which -. introduced into our law the 
principle of 
allowing'' an accused to be convicted on the 
corroborated but unsworn evidence of a child 
witness-s. 4 of the Act permitting a child, who in 
the,. opinion of the trial judge possessed sufficient 
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intelligence to justify receiving her evidence,. and 
who understood the duty to tell the truth, to give 
such evidence where the offence charged was 
defilement of a girl under thirteen or an attempt 
,. 
thereat. In 1894 the principle of. s. 4 was applied 
by the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act to 
offences of child cruelty and neglect, but more far 
reaching reform had to wait until the present 
century. 
(e) Rape 
Of the present day rule of practice requiring 
; 
juries to be warned of the danger of convicting on,,,. 
the uncorroborated evidence of victims of sexual; 
offences there was, at the start of the nineteenth 
century, no trace [75). 
Hale, writing in the seventeenth century, had 
warned of the danger of false accusation in rape., 
cases, observing that the charge was: - 
'easily to be made.. and harder to be defended 
by the party accused, tho' never so innocent' 
[76]. . 
He had also urged that how far the complainant in 
such a case was to be believed depended upon her 
reputation and whether the attendant circumstances: ° 
concurred with her testimony: - 
'if she be of good fame; if she presently, 
discovered the offence and made search for, 
the offender; if the party accused fled for` 
it; these and the like are concurring,: 
circumstances which -give greater probability 
to her evidence. But on the other hand if she 
be of evil fame and stand unsupported by the, 
testimony of -others; 
if she concealed the. 
injury for any considerable time after she had 
opportunity to complain; if the place where-. 
the fact was alleged to have been committed. 
were such that it was possible that she mighty 
have-been heard and she made no outcry; these, 
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and the like circumstances carry a strong but 
not conclusive presumption that her testimony 
is false or feigned [77]. 
Until the second decade of the twentieth 
century, Hale's words represented the only learning 
which law books offered upon the matter [78]. 
Inevitably they became part of the the defence 
lawyer's stock in trade [79], and they also on 
occasions found their way into judges' summings up 
[80] (especially where the judge was trying to 
secure an acquittal). However, (unlike the present 
day, corroboration direction), they never had the 
status of directions which a trial judge was 
required to give, and it would be wrong to imagine 
that all nineteenth century judges gave rape juries 
a . 
"warning about the dangers of false charges. They 
did not [81]. Indeed, the only topic on which 
there appears to have been something approaching a 
uniformity of judicial approach was that of 
complaints, with most judges treating failure by 
the; complainant to make prompt complaint as fatal 
to, the prosecution case [82]. Such indeed was the 
importance attached to fresh complaint that, in 
1827,: 
-a 
defence counsel actually went so far as to 
tell a, jury that, by a rule of evidence which had 
become a rule of law, failure to complain for a 
longtime was a bar to a conviction for rape [83]. 
By the 1920s Hale's learning had been 
supplanted by the present corroboration rule. 
Although the emergence of the new rule is difficult 
to" date the seeds of change were probably sown by 
the , 
Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885. This Act 
made= several fundamental changes in the law of 
sexual offences, all of which had implications for 
the'-future development of this area of the law of 
evidence. In the first place, " (as already 
mentioned) it made several of the new sexual 
offences it created 'subject to a 'corroboration 
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requirement [84]. Second, upon a charge of 
unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under 13, it 
permitted the complainant to give evidence unsworn, 
subject to a mandatory corroboration requirement 
[85], (from which it was but a small step to giving 
a corroboration warning in a case where the child's 
evidence was sworn). Third, it raised the age of 
consent from 12 to 16 - which meant that in future, 
the number of sexual cases in which the complainant'=- 
would have to be treated as an accomplice, whose- 
evidence required corroboration would be much', 
greater than before [86]. Fourth, it made the 
accused and his spouse competent witnesses in- 
relation to a wide range of sexual offences , 
including rape [87] -a reform, which in Nebraska 
and several other American states, had already ledt 
to the imposition of a corroboration requirement'in` 
sexual cases [88]. 
The obvious starting point in any attempt to, 
date the corroboration. rule is Graham [89], '. " 
Decided by the Court of Appeal in 1910, it is the"-' 
first reported case in which a criminal court is to. ', 
be heard saying that a jury should be given: 
something akin to a corroboration warning in sexual 
cases. The actual words of the judgement were: - 
'the judge should explain that ... it -ist dangerous to act on the evidence of one 
person'. 
Although the judgment is brief and cites no 
authority, it does not read as though the court' 
considered that it was laying down any novel or 
revolutionary principle. But if the rule is older 
than Graham how much older is it? 
At the Committee Stage of the 1885 Bill, the 
Home Secretary and the Attorney-General both 
justified their opposition to the inclusion of 'a 
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corroboration clause in the Bill, on' the ground 
that it was already the practice of judges not to 
allow men to be 'convicted in sexual cases without 
corroboration [90]. This claim, although hotly 
disputed by a former Attorney-General and another 
lawyer M. P. [91], appears to find some confirmation 
in The Times trial reports from the period. For 
instance, in 1877 Field J. is reported as telling a 
jury in a rape case that the law required 
corroboration [92]. 'Was there', he asked, 
'corroboration and did the complainant afterwards 
make immediate complaint? ' Again, in 1889 the 
report of a charge to the grand jury contains a 
passage commenting upon the lack of corroboration 
in'a case of indecent assault, in respect of which 
they were asked to return a bill [93]. All this 
appears to suggest that the rule goes back twenty 
or so years before Graham. But the matter becomes 
less certain when one remembers that at this period 
it was the habit of lawyers and judges to use the 
word corroboration very loosely as including any 
item of confirmatory evidence (whether of not it 
could` be properly said to be independent of the 
complainant) [94]. Perhaps the strongest evidence 
against a date as early as the 1880s is the 
complete absence of reference to such a rule or 
practice in textbooks, legal journals, and reported 
cases from°the period [95]. 
The first reported case, which affords any 
basis', for suspecting the possible existenceýof such 
a' rule, is in fact Moore v. Bishop of Oxford [96] 
(1904), in which the Privy Council overturned the 
conviction", -'of a clergyman for the ecclesiastical 
offence of''immoral intercourse with a woman,: on the 
ground that there was 'no corroboration of the 
woman's testimony. The--: 'suspicion that such a rule 
was either in place - or emerging= at ý the date ý, of 
Criminal Appeal Act 1907 is'-increasedwhen one 
295 
discovers that in the first two years of the new. 
court's existence want of corroboration was 
ground of appeal in no fewer than three rape, 
conviction appeals [97]. 
Whatever its age,. it took some twenty or so_. 
years after the passing of the 1907 Act for the, 
rule to assume its present shape, with the present 
day form of direction not emerging until 1924 [98]. 
Two factors which appear to have played a part in.,, 
helping it take root were the adoption of the 
practice of giving a corroboration warning in all., 
cases involving child complainants, and the 
creation by the Incest Act, 1908 of yet another 
category of sexual crime in which an accomplice 
direction would commonly be necessary [99]. 
What is perhaps most surprising about the.. 
corroboration rule is that it was so late to 
emerge. The absence of any requirement that the. 
jury be given a Hale warning coupled with the 
inability of the prisoner and his wife to testify, 
made the blackmailing prosecution a thing to be 
feared, and throughout the century blackmailing, 
suits and prosecutions were far from uncommon. In 
Ireland in the 1820s it was by no means unknown-for. 
a woman, who had been seduced, to launch a rape, 
prosecution as a means of bringing her seducer. to 
the altar [100], whilst in England a corroboration 
requirement had to be imposed in 1834 [101] to try 
and stem the flood of perjury and extortion in 
bastardy suits [102]. Nor does the position appear 
to have markedly improved as the century 
progressed. When in 1859 Parliament passed an Act 
to curb vexatious prosecutions, one of the six 
offences made subject to its provisions was 
indecent assault [103]. The following year saw the 
Reverend Hatch bring a successful prosecution for 
perjury against a young girl whose evidence had 
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secured his conviction and imprisonment for sexual 
assault [104]. In 1864, The Times considered the 
problem of false accusations against men 
sufficiently serious to devote a leader to it,, 
which concluded with an observation that, unless 
things changed, it would be necessary to form a 
Society for the Protection of Men [105]. In 1869, 
during the Lords debate on the Evidence Further 
Amendment Bill, a former Lord Chancellor [106] 
argued that, if the bar upon parties giving 
evidence in breach of promise of marriage cases 
were to be. removed, it would be essential to put in 
its=place a corroboration requirement otherwise 
'every case of seduction would be turned into one 
of--breach of promise'. During the debates on the 
Criminal Law Amendment Bill of 1885 [107] and the 
Incest Bill of 1908 [108], the Commons were warned 
that'by adding to the calendar of sexual offences 
they would be simply creating fresh opportunities 
for extortion. Further, in the second half of the 
century the move. in other jurisdictions was towards 
a- corroboration requirement. New York, in 1886, 
following the example of several other States, 
adopted .a corroboration requirement 
in rape cases 
[109],, whilst in England the newly created Divorce 
Court., was, as early as the 1860s, refusing to find 
allegations of sexual crime proved unless there was 




".. °.. Nineteenth century lawyers were well, aware of 
the fallibility of identification evidence. When in 
1838 e William Wills published his work on 
Circumstantial Evidence, he. devoted, several pages 
to the topic of mistaken identity [111]., Eight 
years. 
-later 
The Law Times [112] in a leader called 
for the law to be changed. Juries should not it 
argued, be allowed to convict on. identification 
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evidence alone. In 1848 Patteson J. wrote to a 
House of Lords Select Committee that the 'too ready 
credence' given by juries to identification 
evidence was a source of wrong convictions; he had,,. ':. - 
he said, had two such cases on his last Assize 
[113]. 
Despite the known risks, judges did not in the "_ 
main regard identification cases as calling forP, - 
special treatment. There was certainly 'noý 
requirement that the judge give the jury any'.. 
special direction or warning in such cases [114]. > 
Dock identifications were regarded as acceptable 
[115]; indeed in 1843 Denman L. C. J. rejected out oft' 
hand a proposal by the Recorder of Newcastle for 
the outlawing of such identifications at committal, _ 
hearings [116]. There was no practice of.:. 
withdrawing from a jury fleeting glance 
identifications, such as that based upon the view, 
afforded by the flash from the discharge of an,,. 
assailant's gun [117]. And if defence counsel in-, 
his speech sought to impress upon the jury the,,. 
fallibility of evidence of identification, by.: 
citing examples of past cases of mistaken identity, _ 
he might well find his arguments pooh-poohed in the', 
judge's summing up. That-was certainly the fate of,., 
a counsel who tried such an argument before Lord 
Denman at Somerset Assizes in 1849 [118]. But"nott 
all judges were of the Denman mould. Some, due no 
doubt to personal knowledge of miscarriages of, 
justice, approached identification cases with 
especial care, buttressing counsel's arguments with 
warnings and examples of their own [119], and, on 
occasions, even going as far as to direct an- 
acquittal where the quality of the identification 
was poor [120]. ' 
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(g) Identification Parades 
In practice, one of the most substantial- 
protections for prisoners was the identification 
parade (which, whatever its shortcomings, meant 
, that there would be no. dock identification). 
The precise origin of the 'identification 
parade is unclear. In a memorandum to the Home 
. 
Office written in January 1874 [121], the 
Commissioner' claimed that it had been a feature of 
Metropolitan Police procedure 'almost ever since 
the establishment of the... force'. The earliest 
force order on the subject so far traced dates from 
March, ' 1860 [122]. But, as is clear from the order 
itself, the practice is older than this, and, 
indeed, one only has to look in the Middlesex 
Sessions reports from the previous month to find an 
example of a case in which the prisoner was picked 
out on an identification parade [123]. Outside 
London the practice appears to go back to at least 
the 1850S [124]. 
In terms of fairness to the suspect, 
nineteenth century identification parades fell well 
short of present day standards. According to the 
Commissioner's memorandum-of 1874, it was usual for 
parades to consist'of between 8 and 10 persons, and 
this receives some confirmation in reported cases, 
(although it is possible to find a case in 1871 
where over 15 persons were used on each parade) 
(125]. All this sounds satisfactory enough. 
However, because of, the perennial difficulty of 
finding members of the public (particularly 
respectable persons) willing to -,, stand -on 
identification parades, a practice grew up of using 
police officers- to make up the numbers (126]. 
Criticism`of the'practice by both defence counsel 
and-`judges (based upon the fact that police 
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officers, even in plain clothes, were usually., 
readily recognisable as such) led the Commissioner 
in 1873 to issue instructions that henceforth 
police officers were only to be used in cases of 
emergency, and as a very last resort [127]. But 
the use of police officers was in fact merely part. 
of a wider problem. Under force orders there was 
no obligation upon the officer assembling the 
parade to ensure that those on it were of the same 
general appearance and dress as the suspect - all 
that he was required to ensure was that they were 
of the same sex, and, if police officers, were in 
plain clothes [128]. This gap in force orders was. 
capable of working great unfairness. It was 
plugged by the Commissioner in 1874 [129], but even 
after this, as the Beck [130] and Sheppard [130] 
cases were to demonstrate, cases of a suspect being 
placed on a line up containing men bearing not the 
slightest resemblance to him in dress or_ 
appearance, continued to occur. 
Another source of unfairness was the practice 
of officers 'tipping off' identifying witnesses 
beforehand, by showing them a photograph or giving 
them a description of the suspect. Outlawed by, 
Metropolitan Police General Orders in 1893 [131], 
the Court of Criminal Appeal was still trying to 
stamp it out twenty years-later [132]. 
The shortcomings of identification procedures 
might have been more quickly remedied had text 
writers displayed the slightest interest in the 
subject, but none did, not even Wills. 
(g) Fingerprints 
Though nothing further was done in . the 
nineteenth century to improve visual identification 
procedures, at the turn of the century there 
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occurred a development which was to have major 
implications for the identification of criminals. 
In 1900 a Home Office Committee [133], set up to 
advise on the identification of criminals, 
recommended that the existing methods [134] used 
to identify criminals with previous convictions 
[135] be replaced by the fingerprint classification 
invented by E. R. Henry. The following year a 
Central Fingerprint Bureau was established at 
Scotland Yard. The implications of the new 
technique for criminal investigation were quickly 
realised, and its use and value were placed beyond 
doubt when, in 1910, the Court of Criminal Appeal 






I am perfectly satisfied that many persons have- 
suffered punishment where they have been positively.: -., innocent of the crime with which they were charged 
(where) ... if there had been any court of appeal 
... there would have been a reversal of their 
conviction. ' 
E. A. Wilde (former sheriff of London) giving 
evidence to the Criminal Law Commissioners, 1836. 
(a) Common law appellate procedures 
England in the nineteenth century had no 
system of criminal appeal merely a handful of 
appellate procedures of limited scope - the motion 
for a new trial, the writ of error, and the 
practice of reserving cases. 
(i) The motion for a new trial 
Of the three procedures, the most satisfactory 
from an accused's point of view was the motion for 
a new trial, since it afforded a remedy against 
both judicial and jury error [1] and could be 
brought as of right. Had it been generally 
available in criminal cases, the nineteenth century 
would have had a criminal appeal system falling 
little short of the present day system. But it was 
not. It was available in only a tiny number of 
cases - the hundred or so cases of misdemeanour 
tried each year in the King's Bench in the exercise 
of its original jurisdiction [2]. It was not 
available in treason or felony [3] wherever tried, 
nor in cases of misdemeanour tried elsewhere than' 
in the King's Bench (although an accused desirous 
of securing to himself a right of appeal in the 
event of an adverse verdict in misdemeanour, could 
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before trial, move for certiorari to transfer the 
record into the King's Bench) [4]. 
(ii) The writ of error 
The writ of error was available to any accused 
convicted before a court of record, but only in 
respect of legal error apparent on the record. 
Such errors included defects in the indictment or 
procedure such as want of jurisdiction, 
irregularity in the jury process, wrongful denial 
of .a 
jury challenge, failure to put the allocutus 
and the passing of a sentence contrary to law [5]. 
They did not include errors made by the trial judge 
in his rulings upon questions of admissibility of 
evidence nor in his direction of the jury as to the 
law [6]. In civil suits the scope of error was 
much wider, it being provided by Westminster II, 
1285 [7] that where a court gave a decision which 
would not appear on the record, the judge might be 
asked to seal a bill of exceptions recording the 
objection in a permanent form, which could then be 
used to found a writ of error. During the first 
half of the nineteenth century there was much 
uncertainty as to whether there was a right to 
tender a bill of exceptions in criminal cases [8]. 
Had the right been established, the effect would 
have: been to give the prisoners a means of testing 
a higher court any and every alleged 
irregularity or error in his trial. In the end the 
question was decided against prisoners with the 
result that in the nineteenth century,,, as in the 
eighteenth, the principal use to which the writ was 
put was that of questioning rulings on indictment 
points [9]. 
.., ,, In ý the eighteenth century , 
indictment 
. error had 
been,, -, a happy, hunting ground for lawyers, and many 
accused, - had seen, their convictions . overturned 
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because of a trivial formal error in the indictment-, 
[10]. In the nineteenth century, as has been seen, -: -- 
the scope for technical objections to indictments 
was progressively cut down by statute [11], and by:,. 
1851 their day was almost past, with the result 
that the number of writs of error slowed down to a 
trickle. Indeed by 1880 the writ was being 
described by Stephen as obsolete [12]. Even in its;: 
heyday it had been a cumbersome and expensive 
remedy. Before a writ could be brought the 
Attorney-General's fiat had to be obtained [13],.., 
and when that had been done there followed the time..,, 
consuming process of having the record drawn up and 
checked for accuracy and completeness [14]. 
(iii) Reserving a case 
Reserving a case was a review procedure of .:, 
considerable antiquity [15]. A trial judge who,, 
entertained doubt as to the legal propriety of the, 
conviction of a prisoner might reserve the case for: 
consideration by the whole body of common laws 
judges (the Twelve Judges) [16], sentence being 
postponed or respited until their decision was; 
known. The case would then be considered by the_, 
judges at a meeting held at Serjeants' Inn (17], _; 
and their decision (which was binding on the trial; 
judge) announced in open court at the next session, 
of the trial court. If it was in the prisoner's: 
favour he would be pardoned or judgment against-him 
arrested. If it was against him the law would take-- 
its course [18]. 
Whether a point of law was reserved was 
entirely in the discretion of the trial judge. °,, The 
judges claimed that this was no hardship to the 
accused since they never refused to reserve points 
of substance. But many remained unconvinced.. 
Judges varied enormously in their willingness". ,,. to 
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reserve cases, and the risk that an obdurate judge 
would improperly refuse to reserve a point was all 
too real, as the case of Russell (1832) and the 
-case -of 
the Brazilian Pirates (1845) clearly 
demonstrated [19]. 
` Faced with a refusal to reserve, the accused 
had only two courses open to him - first, where the 
point was capable of being so raised, to sue out a 
writ'of error or move for a new trial, or if it was 
not' to try and persuade the Lord Chancellor or 
other judges to bring pressure to bear on the trial 
judge. 
Some courts had no power to reserve points. 
It was only where the trial was had at the Old 
Bailey or at Assizes [20] that a case could be 
reserved. Courts of Quarter Sessions, for all that 
they were more likely to fall into legal error than 
the superior courts [21], had no power to reserve 
[22]. 
Other aspects of the system which attracted 
criticism were the informality and secrecy of the 
procedure (with cases argued in private and no 
judgment or reasons for decisions given) (23), and 
the fact that the judges had no power to order a 
new-trial [24] nor any power to quash convictions. 
(iv) The narrow scope of the above remedies 
As a safeguard against miscarriage of justice, - 
the three remedies were hopelessly inadequate. 
They -offered no, redress against jury error, [25] 
save in King's Bench misdemeanour trials. Where 
the-judge misdirected the jury or wrongly admitted 
or +excluded evidence, his error could not be 
challenged without his consent. Against harsh 
sentencing there was no 'redress save' where the 
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sentence was illegal (in which case error would 
lie). In the main, the prisoners who benefited. 
from the three procedures were those who had 
lawyers. Most reserved points were points taken by 
prisoners' counsel [26], and without the money to 
fee lawyers the prospect of a prisoner being able 
to sue out a writ of error or move for a new trial 
(even if he was aware of the existence of the 
remedy) was negligible [27]. And even in the case 
of defended prisoners the three procedures combined- 
were in the 1820s giving rise to no more than forty' 
or so cases a year [28]. 
(v) The Home Office 
An inevitable consequence of the lack of 
adequate appeal remedies was reliance upon the 
royal prerogative as a means of putting right 
injustice. It was open to any prisoner to petition 
the Crown for a revision of his conviction or 
sentence and many did [29]. Upon receiving such a 
petition, the Home Secretary would call for a. 
report from the trial judge and for his notes. If 
any 'new evidence' was exhibited to the petition 
the judge would be asked to consider and comment 
upon it [30]. The Home Secretary would also make" 
further inquiries of his own which the case 
appeared to warrant [31]. If the result of these 
inquiries was to cast doubt upon the rightness of 
the conviction or the justice of the prisoner's 
sentence, a pardon or reduction of sentence would` 
follow [32]. 
Successful petitions against conviction were 
rare [33]. A pre-condition of success was material 
[34] casting doubt on the correctness of the jury's 
verdict, and a prisoner in custody and labouring 
(as many were) under the twin handicaps of poverty. 
and illiteracy was rarely in a position to marshall 
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such material [35]. Prisoners capitally convicted 
had a further problem - lack of time - the interval 
between sentence and execution in such cases often 
being no more than a day or two [36]. 
(b) Attempts at reform 1844-1848 
It was not until the 1840s that a reform 
movement got under way [37]. In the van were 
Fitzroy Kelly, a future Lord Chief Baron, Ewart and 
McMahon, both of whom had played a prominent part 
in getting the Prisoners' Counsel Act, 1836 on the 
statute book, and Butt a leading member of the 
Irish bar. 
To the reformers the case for reform was clear 
[38]. The law as it stood was illogical and 
unjust. How could it be right that in civil suits 
the, parties had an unfettered right of appeal, 
whilst in criminal cases, where men's lives and 
liberty was at stake, there was no appeal on fact, 
and an appeal on law only at the judge's 
discretion? What logic allowed a defendant 
convicted of misdemeanour in the King's Bench the 
right to move for a new trial, but denied that 
right to those convicted of treason or felony? 
Miscarriages of justice were not unknown in 
criminal cases, and yet against a mistaken verdict 
there was no appeal merely a right to petition the 
Home office, which was the worst possible tribunal 
of review with its secret and imperfect procedures. 
The cure for these ills, argued the reformers, was 
to copy the system in civil cases and give to all 
persons convicted on indictment the right'to move 
for a new trial on both fact and law. 
The reform campaign got under way in'1844 with 
Kelly's introduction of aI New Trials in Criminal 
Cases Bill [39]. Introduced too late in the 
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session to have any real. hope of becoming law, it 
was withdrawn upon an undertaking by the Government'- 
to look at the whole matter [40]. Of the 
Government promise nothing came. However, the ' 
following year the reformers' hand was greatly 
strengthened by the publication of the Eighth" 
Report of the Criminal Law Commissioners [41], 
which came down strongly in favour of appeals on 
fact in criminal cases. More than a year went by 
without any indication from the Government that it 
intended to take action on the Report. In 
December, 1847 Ewart took up the matter in the 
House. Did the Government intend to take action on'` 
the Report? The Home Secretary declined to give 
him an answer [42]. 
The following year Ewart, by now convinced 
that the Government had no intention of acting, ` 
introduced his own Bill [43]. It was virthally 
identical with that of 1844. At the second reading`' 
he was prevailed upon by the Government not to" 
press the Bill, but instead to await a Bill which 
Lord Chief Justice Campbell was about to introduce 
in the Lords, which would in all probability cover" 
the same ground [44]. 
When Campbell's Bill was introduced, it` 
contained not a word about new trials but merely' 
confined itself to making improvements to the 
system of reserving cases. However, there was to be$ 
a Lords' Select Committee on the Bill, and, before- 
that Committee, the reformers would have the chance' 
to make their case. 
The Select Committee sat for eight weeks 
taking evidence from ten witnesses - three judges, 
two ex-Lord Chancellors, two Chairmen of Quarter 
Sessions, and three pro-reform barristers (Kelly, 
Greaves and Pitt Taylor) [45]. The questions on 
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which it took evidence were reform of the law as to 
the reserving of cases and the desirability of 
allowing new trials in criminal cases. 
On the first issue, Lord Campbell's proposal 
that the practice of reserving be placed on a 
statutory basis received general assent [46], but 
there were sharp divisions of opinion as to the 
advisability of allowing Quarter Sessions to 
reserve cases [47], and as to whether it should lie 
in the discretion of the judge whether a case was 
reserved or not [48]. 
On the question of extending the new trial 
system to all criminal cases the judges were 
hostile [49]. They put forward three arguments. 
First, there was no call to change the law. 
Cases of wrongful conviction were extremely 
rare [50], and were dealt with as 
satisfactorily under the present system as 
they would be under a system of criminal 
appeal [51]. 
Second, the argument that the same appeal 
;., remedies ought to be allowed 
in criminal cases 
as in civil was misconceived. The two cases 
" were not the same. The criminal law 
incorporated safeguards for the accused which 
were wholly absent in civil suits. Civil suits 
frequently involved difficult questions of 
both law and fact whereas in criminal cases 
the law and facts were usually 
straightforward, and the delay incidental to 
appeal, whilst tolerable in civil suits, would 
in criminal cases be a great evil [52]. 
"'Third, granting a general right of appeal 
would give rise to a host of inconveniences 
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which would far outweigh the supposed 
advantages [53]. 
No less than seven inconveniences were listed. 
First, it was said if an unrestricted right of 
appeal were granted every prisoner would appeal 
thereby generating a volume of work so great that"' 
the courts would be overwhelmed ('the floodgates : 
argument') [54]. Second, if appeal were not to be 
a rich man's remedy, it would be necessary for 
lawyers to be assigned to poor appellants at 
enormous expense to the public (55]. Third, unless 
the public met the cost of resisting motions for 
new trials, such motions would go unopposed due to 
the inability or unwillingness of prosecutors to 
bear the cost [56]. Fourth, juries knowing that 
their verdicts were subject to appeal would be more 
ready to convict in doubtful cases [57]. Fifth, 
the deterrent effect of the criminal law, which 
depended (especially in capital cases) on the speed 
with which execution of sentence followed verdict, 
would be watered down by the delays that an appeal 
system caused [58]. Sixth, to allow new trials in 
criminal cases would be to open the door to fraud 
and perjury on a massive scale [59]. Seventh, if a 
general right of appeal were granted to prisoners 
it would be difficult to deny a like right to the 
prosecutor, which would be an end of the cherished 
principle that an acquittal was final [60]. 
When the Lords resumed their consideration of 
his Bill, Lord Campbell made it clear that, so far 
as he was concerned, there was to be no new trial 
clause [61], and he carried the House with him. The 
judges' arguments had won the day [62] and were for 
the rest of the century to remain the principal 
planks in the anti-reform case. 
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In the result, the Bill, when it became law as 
the Criminal Law Administration Amendment Act, made 
only minor and largely cosmetic changes in the law. 
Henceforth, reserved cases were to be heard by a 
court (to be known as the Court for Crown Cases 
Reserved) [63] sitting in public, with power to 
affirm or quash convictions, and consisting of at 
least five of the common law judges including one 
of the Chiefs, with Quarter Sessions given for the 
first time the power to reserve. But no other 
change in the law was made. 
(c) 1848-60 Fluctuating fortunes for the Reformers 
After their defeat at the hands of the judges 
, 
the reformers licked their wounds. In 1853, 
however, Butt decided to raise the subject again, 
and introduced a Bill [64] modelled on those of 
1844 and 1848, but containing provisions designed 
to meet the floodgates argument [65], and to ensure 
that appeals in capital cases were speedily heard 
[66]. It was met with a re-hash of the arguments 
used before the Select Committee [67] and failed to 
pass its second reading. 
In 1856 there was published Greaves' Report on 
Criminal Procedure [68]. Before the Select 
Committee in 1848 Greaves had urged adoption of the 
principle of Ewart's Bill, and in his Report he 
again argued strongly for reform, but this time not 
from the standpoint of the prisoner but from that 
of the public. He made two points. First, before 
the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, a prisoner who 
succeeded in establishing that a legal error (for 
example the reception of inadmissible evidence) had 
been- made during his trial, had his conviction 
quashed, even though the admissible evidence 
adduced at the trial was sufficient to justify his 
conviction. Second, the Home Office, in exercising 
311 
its review function, had inadequate means of 
testing the truthfulness of 'new evidence' laid 
before it, and in consequence there was the ever 
present danger of its being imposed upon, and there 
was in any event doubt as to whether it was really 
satisfactory that a jury's verdict given after a 
trial in open court should be treated as a nullity, =- 
save after review proceedings of a kind such as to, - 
satisfy all reasonable persons that it was' 
erroneous. By way of solution he suggested that 
the Court for Crown Cases Reserved be given a'- 
discretionary power to order new trials, and that 
the Home Office be authorised to use district 
public prosecutors to investigate 'new evidence', 
with the further power to order a new trial where 
the result of the investigation was to cast doubt 
on the conviction. 
Whether Greaves' Report was responsible for-' 
the shift of opinion is hard to judge, but the fact: 
is that when a New Trials in Criminal Cases Bill 
[69] was introduced by M'Mahon in 1858, it received., 
a much better reception than any of the earlier 
Bills had done. The majority of those who spoke in-, 
the second reading debate were in favour of the 
principle of reform, and although the stock anti- 
reform arguments were rehearsed [70], the most 
frequently voiced criticism of the Bill was that;, 
as drafted, it would enable the prosecution -to- 
appeal an acquittal [71]. The vote taken at the 
end of the debate produced a majority of 54 in' 
favour of the Bill [72]. 
After the vote, M'Mahon was pressed by the 
Attorney-General not to attempt to carry the Bill 
further that session. He was, he declared, in 
favour of the principle, but in its present shape 
the Bill was open to substantial objections and 
required considerable revision. This suggestion 
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did not go down well with all members, 
after the Home Secretary declined 
undertaking to bring in a Government 
subject, and by a reduced majority the 
that the Bill be committed [73]. 
further progress was in fact made upon 
particularly 
to give an 




The following year M'Mahon introduced the Bill 
again [74]. It was cordially welcomed by the 
Attorney-General who indicated that the Government 
was in favour of making some alteration in the law 
and would soon introduce its own Bill [75]. A 
general election in June stopped any further 
progress of the Bill, and when, following the 
election, M'Mahon re-introduced it [76], the new 
Liberal Government made it clear that it would 
oppose it, and it got no further than an adjourned 
second reading [77]. 
M'Mahon, however, pressed on. In 1860 he and 
Hutt introduced a modified version of the 1858 Bill 
[78]. The Government, however, was as good as its 
word. When on the second reading debate, the new 
Home'Secretary, Sir Cornewall Lewis, was called on, 
he 
, 
launched into a long speech rehearsing all the 
old,, anti-reform arguments [79]. The most effective 
part of his speech was that which dealt with a 
provision included in the Bill to meet the 
floodgates argument' (viz. a clause empowering the 
Queen's Bench to make the grant of a new trial 
conditional upon the defendant submitting to terms 
as" to costs) [80]. What this clause meant, he 
argued,, was that the right of appeal which the Bill 
conferred would be a rich man's remedy. Poor 
prisoners would not be able to appeal for they 
would ; not be able to comply . with 
the terms as to 
costs., - That was what currently happened in the 
case, of., appeals against summary convictions under 
statutes such as the Vagrancy Act, 1824 which 
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allowed appeals only on terms as to costs. 
Thousands had the right but because of clauses as- - 
to costs only a handful exercised it [81]. Appeal 
to the Home Office might have its shortcomings but 
it was at least free and open to everyone. This'-'- 
was a very damaging point, and M'Mahon's answer-- 
[82] that where there was merit in the appeal the 
question of costs might be waived, and, if not, the 
money would be found by friends and family did not 
convince. By the end of the debate it was becoming 
clear that the Bill was lost, and it was refused`aJ. 
second reading without a division. 
A Bill [83] introduced the following session 
by Butt met with the same fate, Sir Cornewall Lewis- 
expressing surprise that it should have been 
thought necessary to introduce again a Bill which 
had been negatived without a division in the last 
session [84]. 
Three years later Sir Fitzroy Kelly brought in 
a Bill [85], offering as his justification for 
doing so public dissatisfaction at the way in which, 
the Home Office dealt with petitions for revision 
of conviction and sentence, but it came on too late- 
to have any hope of being passed into law, and was 
withdrawn. It would be fourteen years before. - 
another Bill for the granting of a general right of: 
appeal in criminal cases was introduced into the"" 
House. 
(d) Other developments 
Whilst the argument was continuing in` 
Parliament, the power of Quarter Sessions' to, 
reserve cases was proving itself a useful reform, 
The Court for Crown Cases Reserved was not (as some 
had predicted) overwhelmed with such cases, but, the 
figures showed how necessary the reform had been 
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(during the first ten years of the operation of the 
1848 Act Quarter Sessions cases accounted for over 
half of the work (126 out of 237 cases dealt with) 
of the court -a situation which was to change but 
little during the remainder of the century [86]. 
The success of the reform may have been a 
factor in the enactment of the Summary Jurisdiction 
Act, 1857, which gave persons summarily convicted a 
right to require the-magistrates to state a case 
for the opinion of the Queen's Bench. The Act, 
which applied also to decisions of Quarter Sessions 
upon summary appeals, created the curious situation 
that a person whose appeal had been dismissed by 
Quarter Sessions could require the bench to state a 
case, whilst a person who had been convicted before 
them could not. Indeed during the period 1844 to 
1864 it was a curious irony (oddly enough never 
referred to during debates) that, whilst 
Parliament, was setting its, face against rights of 
appeal on fact for persons convicted upon 
indictment, it was at the same time passing 
statutes giving such right to persons summarily 
convicted [87]. 
Outside Parliament there were attempts being 
made- by the legal profession [88] to push forward 
the boundaries of existing appeal remedies. 
In 1852 a defendant [89] succeeded in 
obtaining from the Queen's Bench an order for a new 
trial in a felony case. The case was one of theft, 
removed before trial from Hull Quarter Sessions 
into the Queen's Bench by certiorari, and then 
. tried at Nisi Prius at 
York Assizes, and although 
the precedent it set does not seem to have been 
much- *followed [90], fifteen years were to pass 
before it was finally overruled (91]. 
315 
The previous, year in Alleyne [92] Lord Chief 
Justice Campbell had been prevailed upon to seal, -a 
bill of exceptions in a misdemeanour case. -. He. ' 
subsequently repented of his decision in Esdale-in 
1858 [93], but even as late as 1867 [94] one finds: 
an attempt being made by experienced counselZto get 
one of the City judges to seal a bill. 
In 1860 Hatch's lawyers demonstrated how a 
perjury prosecution could made to serve as an 
appeal tool [95]. The case caused a considerable 
stir [96]. In 1866 the Home Office actually advised, 
a prisoner, who was alleging that he had been 
wrongly convicted of rape, to proceed as Hatch had, 
[97]. In fact, however, the remedy was beyond the 
means of most prisoners [98] and during the rest! of 
the century was but little used [99]. 
(e) The subject that would not go away 
Despite the defeat of the 1860s Bills ; the 
question of criminal appeal would not go away. 
During the 1860s capital punishment was a subject 
of intense public debate [100], and in 1864 a Royal 
Commission was appointed which reported two years 
later [101]. It was inevitable that the Commission 
should touch upon the question of the revision-. by 
the Home Office of capital convictions and 
sentences. Most of the witnesses from whom it 
took evidence on the point favoured leaving things 
as they were, arguing that appeal to the. Home 
Office was as'favourable an appeal for prisoners as 
could'exist. Some, however, were more critical. 
The misgivings which Greaves had expressed in",,, 1856, 
were echoed by Baron Bramwell, whilst to; Lord 
Cranworth it was wrong for the Home Office: _- to 
commute the death sentence where doubt was felt- as 
to the correctness of the conviction; the proper 
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course in such a case was to grant a pardon. In 
its Report the Commission diplomatically declined 
to make any recommendation as to whether there 
should be a right of appeal in capital cases, 
arguing that the question of appeal did not concern 
just capital cases [102]. 
It was, however, capital cases which formed 
the subject of the next Bill on criminal appeals 
introduced into the Commons - Sir George 
Jenkinson's Bill of 1870 [103). The scheme of 
this Bill was that a person capitally convicted 
should have a right to appeal his conviction with 
the. leave of the trial judge, such leave to be 
granted where the trial judge was satisfied by 
affidavit evidence that new evidence existed 
tending to support a defence of insanity or 
otherwise exculpatory of the prisoner. The appeal 
was--to be heard by a court consisting of three 
common law judges and three members of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council. The time limits 
for, appealing and the setting down of the appeal 
were, to be very short. At the hearing of the 
appeal, the appeal court should have power to 
inquire into any matter of law or fact. It should 
have power to examine witnesses on oath, to receive 
affidavits, to send for the notes of the trial 
judge and for letters and papers, and should report 
to the, Queen as to the grant of a free pardon, the 
commutation of the carrying out of the death 
sentence or otherwise as should seem just. The 
Bill was given short shrift. It would, said the 
Attorney-General [104], lead to delay in the 
execution of capital sentences, and so undermine 
the system of capital punishment; it would lead to 
evidence being kept back in order to ensure'a right 
of,, appeal. Worst of all, it would'lead to verdicts 
being '1 set aside 'after an investigation of a 
bastard description unknown to law' in which the 
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appeal court, never having seen the witnesses who 
gave evidence at trial, would proceed simply on 
written statements. Sir George pointed out tha't'-`' 
all of the objections raised applied equally to the 
revision of capital cases by the Home Secretary, ' 
but that was not enough to save the Bill which was" 
refused a second reading without a division [105]".; -" 
The topic was briefly alluded to again in 1874 
by the Select Committee on the Homicide Law 
Amendment Bill [106], but here again the witnesses 
questioned [107] showed no enthusiasm for a right' 
of appeal in homicide cases. 
In 1878 Serjeant Simon and Sir George Bowyer' 
introduced a Bill [108] proposing to give "'an" 
unrestricted right of appeal on law and fact to« 
those sentenced to death or penal servitude without' 
previous convictions, and a right of appeal, with 
leave*of the judge, in other cases. The most' 
novel feature of this Bill was a clause giving an*' 
appellant the right to tender himself as a witness- 
at the appeal hearing (with restrictions placed, 
upon cross-examination as to credit, and' : 'a 
provision that failure to tender himself should not 
prejudice an appellant). The Bill was withdrawn'at' 
the second reading stage. "'' 
(f) The Criminal Code Bills 
May, 1878 saw a far more promising development' 
- the introduction of the Government-sponsored 
Criminal Code Bill [109], providing, inter alias 
for the establishment of a Court of Appeal: in 
Criminal Cases and empowering trial judges to grant 
new trials. The Bill, as has been seen; was 
ultimately withdrawn. In 1879, after revision by 
the Royal Commission, it was reintroduced [110], - 
but again ended up being withdrawn. 
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1879 was nonetheless an encouraging year for 
reformers. It saw the enactment of the Summary 
Jurisdiction Act, conferring a general right of 
appeal in cases of summary conviction, and although 
the 1879 Code Bill did not pass, its appeal 
provisions met all their demands. The refusal of 
the trial judge to reserve a point of law was 
henceforth to be subject to appeal. The powers of 
the court on hearing reserved cases were to include 
the power to order a new trial. Trial judges were 
to have the power to order a new trial on the 
grounds that the jury's verdict was against the 
weight of the evidence, with a right of appeal 
against refusal. So too was the Home Secretary in 
cases where a petition for mercy raised doubt as to 
the correctness of a conviction. And to exercise 
criminal appellate jurisdiction a new court - the 
Court of Appeal in Criminal Cases - was to be 
constituted. 
In 1880 the Government introduced its third, 
Criminal Code Bill (111] (remodelled to take 
account of criticisms from the Lord Chief Justice, 
but with the appeal clauses unchanged). Three 
private members also introduced a Criminal Code 
Bill of their own [112], the appeal clauses of 
which, differed in significant respects [113] from 
those of the Government Bill. A General Election 
put an end to any further progress on the 
Government Bill, the Private Members' Bill having 
inýthe'meanwhile been dropped. 
After a lull in 1881, in 1882 no less than 
three Bills [114] were introduced containing 
clauses dealing with criminal appeal - two Criminal 
Law'Amendment Bills and a Death Sentences (Appeal) 
Bill. In the end all three had to be dropped. 
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In 1883 the Government made another major 
effort, with two Bills [115] being introduced into 
the Commons in tandem - the first yet another 
Criminal Code Bill containing the same appeal 
clauses as the 1879 Bill,. and the other a Court of' ` 
Criminal Appeal Bill providing for appeal on fact 
in capital cases. In the debate on the Code Bill " 
the Government was criticised for bringing before 
the House two Bills containing different provisions 
on the same subject [116]. The debate on the' 
Court of Criminal Appeal Bill saw it attacked on a 
variety of grounds. To some it was unnecessary; 
because of the numerous safeguards for the accused, ' 
wrong convictions in capital cases simply did not'`- 
occur [117], and by providing an appeal remedy the 
Government would cause delay in the execution of" 
sentence, and thus undermine the death penalty'. 
[118]. To others the fault of the Bill was that it 
permitted appeals as of right in capital cases only-" 
[119]. But for all the criticisms, the general 
reception given to the Bill was favourable, and, 
like the Code Bill, it passed its second reading by 
a comfortable majority [120]. But as before, it 
proved impossible to get the Code Bill through all 
its stages within the session, and both Bills in' 
the end had to be dropped. This marked the end ofý 
Government involvement in the subject of criminal' 
appeal for the rest of the century. And within' 
few years the appeal clauses of the Code were being 
publicly repudiated by Stephen, who announced that 
subsequent experience had led him to the view 
that: - 




(g) The fight continues 
The efforts of reformers, however, continued 
with Bills being introduced in 1888,1890 and 1892 
[121], none of which got beyond the first reading 
stage. A novel feature of the 1888 Bill was that 
it proposed a right of appeal against sentence as 
well as conviction. 
In 1892 there occurred a wholly unexpected 
development. Out of the blue the Council of 
Judges, in its annual statutory report [122], 
recommended to the Lord Chancellor the 
establishment of a Court of Appeal in Criminal 
Cases. Lack of uniformity in sentence was, argued 
the report, a serious problem, which could be 
solved if there was an Appeal Court with power to 
give authoritative guidance on sentencing. In 
order to discourage frivolous appeals the court 
should have power to increase as well as reduce 
sentence, and as a check on over-lenient sentencing 
the Attorney-General should have a power of appeal, 
to be exercised only in cases of extreme or 
systematic inadequacy of sentence. It was conceded 
that, at first, the number of appeals would be 
large, but the possibility of an increased 
sentence, and, after a short time the increased 
uniformity of sentences throughout the country and 
the` consequent difficulty of obtaining an 
alteration of sentence, would combine to prevent 
hopeless appeals. As well as dealing with sentence 
appeals, the Court should, the report recommended, 
also have the duty of reviewing convictions and 
sentences referred to it by the- Home Secretary, 
with power-"'in such cases to quash the conviction or 
diminish the sentence but-not the power to order a 
new trial. 
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There was no Government action on the report, 
but in 1895 a private member's Bill [123] was 
introduced, which was the 1883 Bill rehashed with 
additions to give effect to the report's 
recommendations. The Bill was given an unopposed'- 
second reading and referred to a Select Committee. 
The Select Committee reported the Bill in July 
without amendment, stating that it had not had'-- 
sufficient time to conclude its investigations, -, 
_, After this it made no further progress [124]. A 
similar Bill the following year did not get beyond 
a first reading [125]. 
In 1897 a revised Bill [126] limited in scope 
to the reforms recommended in the 1892 report was 
introduced by Pickersgill. On the second reading 
it was given a lukewarm welcome by the Homey 
Secretary and the Attorney-General. The Home 
Secretary conceded that: - 
'there was a general consensus of opinion n' 
favour of some alteration of the law giving-., 
some further appeal in criminal cases' 
but he thought the scheme proposed by the Bill had 
serious shortcomings. He was unhappy about the 
appeal court being given power to increase 
sentences, and equally unhappy about the proposal 
that the Home Secretary should have power to refer 
cases to the court. This would put him in -a 
difficult position. If he refused to refer a case: 
he would be accused of denying access to the court, 
whilst if he sent all petitions to the court the 
judges would complain that he was handing over his 
business to them [127]. The Attorney-General, 
whilst acknowledging the problem of inequality, of 
sentences, thought review by the Home Office, an 
adequate remedy [128]. There were also criticisms 
of the Bill from the backbenches. There was 
general dislike of the provision for the increase 
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of sentences [129]. The wisdom of giving" a 
general right of appeal against sentence was 
questioned; the courts would be flooded out with 
cases [130]. If the scheme were not to be a 
mockery legal assistance would have to be provided 
for poor appellants at public expense [131]. 
Disparities in sentencing were more apparent than 
real and, in so far as there was a problem, could 
it not as well be remedied by the judges issuing 
sentencing guidelines? [132] For some, the 
proposal that the appeal court should have power to 
review convictions at the request of the Home 
Secretary went nothing like far enough. If 
sentence appeals were to lie as of right why should 
conviction appeals require the Home Secretary's 
fiat? [133] Why did the Bill give no right of 
appeal at all in capital cases? What was the 
logic in allowing a man convicted of stealing a 
pair of boots to appeal his sentence but denying 
the like right to a man sentenced to death? [134] 
Nonetheless, despite all the criticism the Bill was 
given a second reading by a comfortable majority of 
147 to 86. But it made no further progress. 
The following year, Pickersgill, the promoter 
of=Ithe 1897 Bill, introduced a revised Bill [135], 
proposing that prisoners should have a right of 
appeal against conviction and sentence both on law 
and'-'I fact. The second reading debate was very 
thinly attended, and saw a strong attack launched 
on the Bill by both the Home Secretary and the 
Attorney-General [136], with all the arguments used 
by"Sir. - Cornewall Lewis in the debate on the 1860 
Bill being deployed against it. When the matter was 
'put, -to, the vote the Bill was 




Still the reformers would not give up, and in 
1899 yet another Bill [137] was introduced but 
failed to get beyond the first reading stage. 
The 1899 Bill was the thirtieth criminal. 
appeal Bill to be presented that century. Out of 
the thirty only one - Lord Campbell's Bill of 1848 
- had got onto the statute book, and in 1900 the 
prospects for reform looked no brighter than they 
had in 1848. There was still a general belief that 
wrongful convictions were rare, and that the 
procedures of reserving cases and petition to the 
Home Office provided an adequate remedy against 
error. However, a time bomb was ticking away. In 
1896, in the course of an Old Bailey trial, the: 
Common Serjeant made a blunder which would, within 
less than ten years, lead to a Committee of Inquiry., 
Report, which would in turn help pave the way for 
the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907. His mistake was, to 
refuse to admit, on an indictment for obtaining by, 
false pretences, evidence, which, had it been- 
received, would have proved beyond doubt that the 
case was one of mistaken identity, an error which 
he then compounded by refusing to reserve the 
point. As a result the accused was convicted. In 
1904 the unfortunate accused, Adolf Beck, was 
wrongly convicted on mistaken identification 
evidence for a second time, but this time the 
mistake was discovered. The Committee of Inquiry 
[138] into his case expressed the view that, 
- 
had 
the Common Serjeant reserved the question of 
admissibility raised at the first trial, the first 
conviction would almost certainly have been. - set 
aside, and the second conviction would never have 
taken place. In short, Beck had been twice wrongly 
convicted as a result of an event (namely, the 
refusal of a judge to reserve a point of substance) 
which judges had throughout the nineteenth century 
been claiming would never happen. The Committee 
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recommended a right of appeal on law in all cases, 
but another sensational wrongful conviction a year 
later - that of Edalii [139] - obliged the 
Government to go the further step of allowing 
appeals on fact as well. 
The failure to reform appellate procedures 
had, as has already been seen, consequences which 
went'beyond the misfortunes of individual prisoners 
wrongly convicted or over-harshly sentenced who 
could get no redress therefrom. Lack of an appeal 
remedy meant that judicial misconduct (by no means 
unknown at Quarter Sessions and amongst the City 
judges in mid century) went largely unchecked, with 
adverse press publicity the only sanction. It also 
meant that judges in the lower courts (of whom many 
were 
. 
laymen) were almost wholly without 
authoritative guidance (of the kind now given by 
the Court of Appeal) as to how the duty of summing 
up was to be discharged. The result was that many 
prisoners were convicted after summings up which, 






'Nothing so easy as to repudiate the abuses of 
former days; nothing more difficult than to; - 
acknowledge and root out those of our own. ' 
Henry Rich M. P. (1841) P. D. LV1,651. 
The aim of this thesis has been to assess how 
far trial on indictment in nineteenth century 
England conformed to the present day concept of a. 
fair trial. The conclusion is that at the 
beginning of the century it fell far short of such 
a concept, but that by the century's end (save, in 
relation to legal aid and appellate remedies) it 
had moved close to the twentieth century model. 
In 1800 the manner in which serious criminal, 
charges were tried was for many Englishman a matter 
of pride. Against the risk of frivolous 
prosecutions there was the safeguard of the grand 
jury and, in felony, of the preliminary 
examination. By denying the accused the right to 
testify, but conceding to him the right to make an 
unsworn statement, the law enabled him to tell his 
story whilst at the same time protecting him 
against 'the moral torture' of cross-examination. - 
Its evidential rules (particularly in relation to 
hearsay, confessions, character, and corroboration) 
were all highly favourable to him, and, by casting 
upon the Crown the burden of proving guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt, and requiring unanimity of trial 
juries, the risk-of wrongful conviction was reduced 
to the minimum. To many it was hard to see how 
such a system could be improved upon. 
By current standards, however, the system-was 
badly deficient. Rights, today regarded as lying 
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at the heart of a fair trial, were°denied to the 
accused as either unnecessary or, in some cases, -as 
actually obstructive of justice. So that an 
accused should not know the case against him, and 
thus be enabled to fabricate a defence, he was 
denied a copy of the depositions. Lest he delay, 
the trial by the taking of pleading points acopy 
of'the indictment was refused him in felony. Legal 
representation, still, save in treason, a novelty 
in`' criminal courts, was regarded as wholly 
inessential. Calls for poor prisoners to be 
provided with legal representation would in 1800 
have been greeted with astonishment. What need had 
prisoners of counsel in felony? Such cases were 
rarely prosecuted by counsel, and, in any event, 
what handicap was lack of counsel to an innocent 
man? It required 'no manner of skill to make a 
plain and honest defence. ' [1] Nor was the law 
prepared to allow the employment of counsel serve 
to obstruct justice. It was considered important 
that any defence speech should come from the 
prisoner's own mouth: - his demeanour, as he made 
it, 'rwould often give an indication as to where the 
truth lay [2). Hence, in felony, the assistance of 
counsel was to be limited to help in the 
examination or cross-examination of witnesses. The 
accused could not have counsel speak for him. 
Witnesses, whom a prisoner through poverty was 
unable to bring to court, went unheard. Against 
conviction on indictment there was no appeal on 
fact: (save in King's Bench misdemeanour cases), nor 
in law (unless the judge saw fit to reserve a 
point, or there was error of law on the face of the 
t sfr 9`"_ 
record). 
And these were by no, means the system's only 
failings. It'tolerated laymen acting as judges at 
Quarter 'Sessions. In, the-London courts,, for want 
of , ý_ 
someone to guide-them through, the evidence, 
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grand juries, year in year out, threw out bills in 
clear cases which had already passed the scrutiny 
of an examining magistrate. In political_ 
prosecutions in the King's Bench jury packing was 
an open scandal. For all its boasted tenderness to 
the accused, the law made him stand for the 
duration of his trial no matter how long it lasted. 
Prosecutions of child abusers regularly broke down " 
because the victims were too young to be sworn. 
The rules of criminal pleading were so strict that 
each year trifling indictment defects and variances 
carried guilty men to an unmerited acquittal. In' 
capital cases, rather than order a jury locked up- 
overnight, courts commonly sat until the early, " 
hours of the morning, with the defence case taken 
at a time when the jurors' powers of concentration 
were at their lowest ebb. Juries which could not' 
agree would be starved into a verdict, and, at 
Assizes, sometimes threatened with carting as well. - 
Of all the system's shortcomings none bore 
more harshly on accused than the lack of a system 
of legal aid. Where a prisoner through poverty was` 
obliged to defend himself the trial was usually 
hopelessly one sided. His efforts at defence were 
generally 'pitiable even if he has a good case' 
. t. [3]. Indeed, many accused, knowing the task beyond 
them, did not even try to defend themselves, and 
were convicted with scarcely a question asked or ''a 
word uttered in their defence. For them the trial 
rushed by 'like a dream which (they could not) 
understand. ' [3] 
Scarcely less grave was the lack of adequate 
appeal remedies. 
By 1899, the trial system had moved, much 
closer to that of today. Progress had been 
greatest in the the law of evidence. This, had 
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during the century undergone extensive reshaping at 
the hands of both judges and Parliament. In 
accomplice cases a new and stricter definition of 
corroboration had been adopted. The law as to 
confessions had been cleansed of 'sentimental 
excesses'. Victims of child abuse too young to be 
sworn could now give their evidence unsworn. In 
cases of sexual assault Hale's old 'consistency of 
conduct' test was fast being displaced by the 
modern corroboration rule. A similar fact doctrine 
had emerged and, by 1900, assumed substantially its 
modern shape. Judges were starting to adopt the 
practice of hearing arguments about admissibility 
out of earshot of the jury. Since October 1898, 
prisoners had enjoyed the dangerous privilege of 
being able to give evidence in their own defence. 
Proclaimed in some quarters as a boon to innocent 
prisoners, arguably the most important effects of 
the criminal Evidence Act, 1898 were (a) to strip 
the accused of his old immunity from cross- 
examination (henceforth, if he wished to offer an 
explanation of the evidence against him, he would 
have to offer it from the witness box, or run the 
risk of the jury drawing an inference to his 
discredit); and (b) to expose the accused,. who 
attacked the character of Crown witnesses, to a new 
peril'- retaliation in kind should he venture into 
the witness box. With this Act the the shape of the 
criminal trial was decisively and, drastically 
altered, and with it both the trial system and the 
law'of criminal evidence entered the modern age. 
Progress in the field of procedure had, 
however, been less impressive. There had been 
reform. ' With a clerk to assist them London grand 
juries were no longer 'the hope of- the London 
thief'. Minor indictment, flaws and variances no 
longer won an accused his freedom. Abuses such as 
jury'packing and the starving of juries were gone. 
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Late sittings and the practice of judges,, 
prosecuting were much curtailed. There was now a 
measure of protection for accused (albeit limited) 
against prejudicial pre-trial publicity. An 
accused now had the right to a copy of the 
depositions, and to notice of additional evidence 
(although not to sight of unused material, nor to a 
copy of the indictment in felony). He was allowed 
a seat during the trial, and in felony his counsel 
now had the right to address the jury (a privilege 
the value of which was much reduced by the rule 
that the calling of evidence by an accused 
represented by counsel served to give the Crown the 
last word with the jury). In the vital fields of 
appeal and legal aid, however, progress had been 
derisory. 
Despite more than half a century's 
campaigning, the establishment of a Court of, 
Criminal Appeal seemed as far away as ever. Indeed 
it had become the century's 'standing lost cause' 
[4], a saga that had run even longer than they 
campaign for a Prisoners' Evidence Act. 
Progress towards a scheme of criminal legal" 
aid had been only slightly greater. In the 1820x, 
shamed perhaps by the spectacle of prisoners, 
sometimes as young as eight, standing trial for: 
their lives undefended, the judges had begun, to 
adopt the practice of assigning counsel in capital 
cases, and the practice had gradually taken root. 
This, together with relatively inexpensive means of 
defence such as the dock brief and the I. P. system, 
were the century's answer to the problem of, the 
poor prisoner. But it was a hopelessly inadequate 
answer. At the Old Bailey in the 1890s over 50%, of, 
all prisoner tried were still being tried 
undefended [5]. Almost equally ineffective had 
been the attempts made to assist prisoners to, _get 
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their witnesses to court. Russell Gurney's Act of 
1867 had proved largely a dead letter, nor had the 
practice introduced in the 1890s of using police 
officers to warn defence witnesses apparently made 
much difference. Indeed, since the the passing of 
the Winter & Spring Assize Acts, 1876-9, in some 
country areas the difficulties faced by poor 
prisoners in trying to get witnesses to court had, 
if anything, got worse rather than better. 
Some of the weaknesses of the nineteenth 
century system received early attention in the 
present century. In the wake of the Criminal 
Evidence Act, 1898 was enacted in 1903 the woefully 
inadequate Poor Prisoners' Defence Act, whilst in 
1907 the Court of Criminal Appeal was set up. 
However, it was only in the 1960s that a scheme of 
criminal legal aid that was anything like 
satisfactory was established [6]. And from this 
same era date reforms such as the abolition of lay 
judges, the abolition of the Crown's right of reply 
and the banning of the reporting of committal 
proceedings, whilst the imposition upon the Crown 
ofýýa duty to disclose unused material had to wait 
until 1981. 
-- In the evolution of the trial system since 
1800 the great landmarks have been the Prisoners' 
Counsel Act, 1836, the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 
* the-, criminal Appeal Act, 1907 and the Legal Aid., & 
Advice Act, 1949. Between them they, provide a 
useful measure of the progress which had been made 
during the nineteenth century, - and which still 
remained to be made at its end. 
In the last twenty years the law of criminal 
evidence, the nineteenth century's most important 
contribution to our trial system, has come under 
r, lose and increasingly critical scrutiny. Since 
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1970 there have been four major reports upon it or 
upon aspects of it, and at the present time (along 
with other aspects of the trial system) it is under 
consideration by the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Justice. 
The trend is not unexpected. Increasingly, 
the evidence code has begun to show its age. A 
particular problem field has been pre-trial 
interrogation. The growth, after the Second World 
War, in the practice of police interrogation 
created an obvious need for safeguards to protect 
suspects against the risk of their replies to 
questions being misreported, or worse still 
fabricated. But the law of evidence, whose rules' 
still looked back to the era when interrogation was 
both sternly discouraged by the judges and rare in 
practice, offered none. In the absence of 
safeguards, malpractice and false allegations of' 
malpractice flourished. By 1974 the problem had 
become so serious that the Court of Appeal called 
for something to be done, as a matter of urgency, -- 
to make evidence of admissions to police officers 
difficult both to challenge and fabricate [7]. But 
nothing was in fact done until the Police &{ 
Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 grasped the nettle. 
And even the extensive protections which that Act 
put in place have not put an end to the debate. 
There are now calls for yet more extensive 
protection - in particular for the introduction 'of 
a rule forbidding the conviction of accused upon 
unsupported confession evidence, and for s; 
1(f)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 to "be 
amended so that the making of an allegation', of 
police malpractice no longer exposes an accused; 
with a criminal record, to the risk of cross- 
examination about his record. 
t ýf 
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However, it is not simply a case of a new 
century posing new challenges. Other factors are 
at work as well. 
The premises, upon which some rules of 
evidence are based are, by many now no longer 
accepted. In 1988 Parliament, rejecting the view 
that children as witnesses are less reliable than 
adults, abolished the mandatory corroboration 
requirement for children's unsworn evidence [8]. 
And one of the reasons why the corroboration rule, 
which applies in sexual cases, is currently under 
attack is that today few subscribe to the 
nineteenth century view that those who complain of 
sexual assault are more prone to make false 
allegations than those who allege non-sexual 
assault. 
Again, some nineteenth century rules have come 
increasingly to be viewed as working 
unsatisfactorily in practice. One has already been 
referred to - the tit for tat rule laid down in s. 
1'(f)(ii) of Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 (i. e. the 
rule that an accused who attacks the character ofa 
prosecution witness exposes himself to cross- 
examination as to his criminal record). - This is 
seen as operating in some cases (the problem is not 
limited just to police malpractice cases) to deter 
the accused from laying his true defence before the 
jury. If he wishes to keep his record out (and, 
where that record is for offences of the kind for 
which: he is standing trial, it is often seen as 
vital that he should do so) he has, under the Act, 
only; two courses open to him: either to abstain 
from: the attack (in which case he is effectively 
jettisoning his real answer to some of the evidence 
against,; him), or not go into the witness box (in 
which,.. event the jury. , 
hear. not a word from him, and 
learn- of his case only so far, as his counsel is 
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able to bring it out in the course of cross- 
examination of crown witnesses). 
Other rules perceived as working badly in 
practice are those relating to corroboration. 
They are seen as* producing, by reason of their 
complexity, difficulties for judges and juries 
alike, and the unmeritorious quashing of 
convictions on appeal. It is also argued that the 
dangers against which corroboration rules seek to, 
protect can, in an age when accused are no longer 
" tried unrepresented, be better dealt with within 
the ordinary trial processes. No doubt, some 
modern species of accomplice, such as the 
'supergrass' are as dangerous as any nineteenth 
century approver swearing away another's life to 
save his own neck or for a £40 reward, but these 
are dangers which defence counsel can and will, in 
any event, bring out by his cross-examination and 
in his final speech, and which the trial judge 
will, where necessary, stress in his summing up. 
Increasing protection for suspects and accused 
in the form of legal aid and the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act Codes of Practice have also 
played a *part. It has led to demands for other 
protections, in particular the right of silence, to 
be abolished. Given the access that both suspects 
and accused have to legal advice and 
representation, given the safeguard of tape 
recording at the interrogation stage, what 
justification can there be, it is asked, for such a 
right? Whom, apart from the guilty, does it 
benefit? In the debate on the Criminal Evidence 
Bill, 1898 the 'shield for the guilty' argument 
failed to carry the day. But today it is beginning 
to prevail. Since 1967 in England and Wales there 
have been imposed obligations on accused to make 
pre-trial disclosure of alibis [9], of expert 
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evidence [10], and in serious fraud cases (if 
called upon to do so by the judge at a preparatory 
hearing) disclosure of the general nature of his 
defence [11], whilst in Northern Ireland the right 
of silence of both suspects and accused has been 
completely overturned [12]. 
Another (albeit less important) factor has 
been reforms made in the civil law of evidence, in 
particular in relation to hearsay. These have 
generated demands (only partially answered by the 
Criminal Justice Act, 1988) for a similar 
relaxation of the rule in criminal cases. 
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, set 
up in the wake of the failures of the criminal 
justice system revealed by cases such as those of 
the Birmingham Six and the Guildford Four, will 
report in 1993. The law of criminal evidence is 
unlikely to survive that report in its present 
form, but there is a danger that the Commission 
will yield to pressure for a 'restoration of the 
balance' within the criminal justice system which, 
it is alleged, has swung too far in favour of the 
accused, by recommending the removal of safeguards 
which many see as an integral part of the concept 
of a fair trial. This Thesis has demonstrated that 
the nineteenth century was the springboard for many 
of the reforms which justify the description of our 
criminal trial as 'fair'. We must ensure that 
future historians are not able to attribute to the 






The five volumes of notebooks which record the 
reserved criminal cases which came before the 
Common Law Judges between 1785 and 1828 are 
referred to by the abbreviation (2-6) J. N. 
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outlawed by the, 1848,. Act it was a long time 
dying (see R. v. Calvert (1848) 2 Cox 491; R. 
v. Christopher (1854) 4 Cox 76, and C. S. 
Greaves, Report on Criminal Procedure 1856 
P. P. (456) L. 79. 
16. See the statistics as to the literacy of 
prisoners. given in the Judicial Statistics for 
1857 onwards. 
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17. S. 3. A clause that prisoners be supplied with 
copies of the depositions was proposed at the 
Committee Stage of the 1834 Bill but withdrawn- 
upon assurances that it was unnecessary 
((1834) P. D. XXIV 98); the clause in the 1836 
Act was introduced at the Committee Stage in 
the commons, initially rejected by the Lords 
but later re-instated by them. Lord Abinger, 
the principal opponent of the clause, argued. 
that it would put prisoners in a better' 
situation that a defendant in a civil suit, 
and would lead to concocted defences ((1836), 
_ P. D. XXXV 229). The reformers urged that it 
merely represented the extension to poor 
prisoners of advantages enjoyed by those able 
to pay a solicitor (ibid. ); as for concocted 
defences the only way to prevent these was to 
keep the prisoner in total ignorance of the 
evidence against him (ibid. 231). It was 
initially thought that the result of the Act 
would be that trial courts would be swamped 
with applications for copies of the 
depositions but this seems not to have proved 
the case (see The Times, Central Criminal 
Court report, Sept. 20,1836). 
18. R. v. Aylett (1838) 8 C. & P. 669 followed in 
Ireland in R. v. Glennon & others (1840) , 
1. 
Craw. & D. 359; and see 9 Law Mag. (1884), p. 
61 referring to the difficulties the denial to, 
the accused of a copy of documents annexed to 
the depositions caused in fraud cases. 
19. R. v. Sargent (1851) 5 Cox 499. 
20. R. v. Spry & Dore, The Times, Aug. 23,1848 
(murder) - application for leave for a chemist 
instructed by the defence to examine the 
stomach and stomach contents of the deceased 
granted but described by the court as 
'unusual'. 
21. R. v. Connor (1845) 1 Cox 233. 
22. The Irish practice was referred to in the 
debates on both the 1834 and 1836 Bills - see 
1834 P. D. XXIV, 1099 and (1836) P. D. XXXI, 
1159-60. 
23. R. v. Lacey, Cuffey & Fay (1848) 3 Cox 517. 
24. R. v. Duffy (1843) 1 Cox 283, reversing the 
earlier decision of Patteson J. in R. v. 
Gordon (1842) 6 Jur. 99. 
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25. The clause introduced at the Committee Stage 
of the 1834 Bill proposed a charge not 
exceeding 6d. per folio ((1834) P. D. XXVI 
1098); the clause in the 1836 Bill, in its 
original form proposed a charge not exceeding 
4d. per folio, but as enacted it provided for 
the payment of a sum not exceeding lkd. per 
folio. 
26. R. v. Ward (1848) 2 C. & K. 759. 
27. Note in 11 Cox 413. 
28. R. v. Stiginani (1867) 10 Cox 552. 
29. R. v. Greenslade (1870) 11 Cox 412. 
30. R. V. Brown (1869) 6 W. W. & A. B. 269; an 
unsuccessful attempt to establish such a rule 
was made in the Irish case of R. v. Petcherini 
(1855) 7 Cox 79. 
31. R. v. Flannagan & Higgins (1884) 15 Cox 403. 
32. The practice of putting a man on trial on a 
coroner's inquisition, without any preliminary 
examination before *magistrates, was viewed 
with considerable disfavour throughout the 
latter half of the century. There were three 
principal objections: - 
(a) 'If a coroner's jury find a verdict of 
murder a prejudice is excited against the 
prisoner; if they find a verdict of 
manslaughter the (Crown's case) is 
prejudiced ... perhaps a conviction for 
murder is unknown (in such a case)' 
(Criminal Law Commissioners, 8th Report, 
p. 247 (Greaves)); 
(b) most inquisitions returned by coroners 
were technically defective (c. f. Pollock 
: M.. C. B. in R. v. Quaill & others, The Times, 
" ý_ Mar. 5,1862 'there were so many technical objections that could be taken 
to a coroner's inquisition that hardly 
one in a hundred could be supported. '); 
(c) an inquest could be held in the absence 
of the person against whom the verdict 
was found, who-would thus be deprived of 
the opportunity to cross-examine. 
Numerous attempts were made after 1850 to 
deprive coroners of their power to commit 
for trial;., clauses to that 'end, were 
included in the, Criminal Code Bills of 
1879 (cl. 506), 1880 (cl. 454) and 1883 
(cl. 14), in the Criminal Law Procedure 
_.. °'. Bill, ° _, 
1882 (cl. 71), and Criminal Law 
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Amendment Bill, 1882 (cl. 89) and in the 
Criminal Law Procedure Amendment Bill, 
1890 (cl. 3). 
33. In R. v. Greenacre (1837), 8 C. & P. 35 
Littledale J. and Tindal C. J. expressed doubt 
as to whether the Act applied to coroners' 
depositions, but ordered copies to be provided 
in the exercise of their inherent 
jurisdiction; in R. v. White (1852) 5 Cox 562, 
however, Platt B. reached the opposite 
conclusion; this latter ruling was very 
questionable given the wording of the section 
then in force (s. 27 of the Indictable 
Offences Act, 1848) - see the tortuous 
argument adopted in Russell on Crime, (4th 
ed. ) 1865, p. 352(h)); the Manslaughter Act, 
1859 gave those committed by coroner's 
inquisition on a charge of manslaughter the 
right to a copy of the depositions, but was 




34. Coroners' Act, 1887, s. 18(5). 
35. See e. g. Tindal C. J. in R. v. Simpson & others 
(1842) Car. & M. 669 - 'It is one mode and a 
constitutional mode of commencing a 
prosecution that the witnesses shall go at 
once before the Grand Jury ... and wherever 
that is so it is impossible to give the 
depositions because none are taken'. 
36. The Act's promoters claimed that it was needed 
to put a stop to vexatious and blackmailing 
prosecutions, and cited the case of Mellersh 
in 1853 ((1859) P. D. CLII, 1045-7); it was 
opposed by Lord Wensleydale as an interference 
with the privilege which every subject 
possessed to put the criminal law in motion 
(ibid. CLV, 96). A defect in the Act was 
exposed in R. v. Lord Mayor of London ex p. 
Gosling (1886) 16 Cox 77 where it was held 
that a prosecutor could require a magistrate 
who had refused to commit for trial to bind 
him (the prosecutor) over to prosecute and 
thereby acquire the locus standi to present a 
bill. 
37. Report of the Criminal Code Commissioners, 
1879 (1878/9 P. P. (Cmnd. 2345) XX 169) at. p. 
32-3. 
38. He was Sir Francis Truscott; the facts were 
that the prosecutor, having failed to persuade 
a magistrate to issue a summons, had gone 
before the grand jury who, after hearing his 
sworn evidence that be believed the 
handwriting on a libellous postcard to be that 
of Sir Francis, had found a bill for criminal 
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libel; the case caused a considerable outcry 
in the press - see The Times, leader Sept. 23, 
1879, and correspondence columns over the 
weeks that followed. Attempts were made in the 
Code Bills to close the loophole - see the 
1878 Bill, cl. 34; the 1879 Bill, cl. 5; the 
1880 Bill, cl. 453; the Criminal Law 
Amendment Bill, 1882, cl. 88; the Criminal 
Procedure Bill, 1882. cl. 70; and the 1883 
Code Bill, cl. 81. 
39. But see the Assizes and Sessions Act, 1908, s. 
1(5) which required persons, having the right 
to present bills of indictment to grand 
juries, to give notice of their intention to 
do so more than 5 days before Commission Day. 
40. See J. LL. J. Edwards, The Law Officers of the 
Crown, p. 267. In the case of Crown Office 
informations, although there was no committal 
hearing, the defendant would be served with 
copies of the affidavits relied upon by the 
prosecutor in support of his application for 
an information, -and would hear them read when 
he appeared to show cause (the practice 
appears in the reports in cases such as R. v. 
Joliffe (1791) 4 T. R. 285; R. v. Burn (1837) 7 
Ad. & E. 190; & R. v. Aunger (1873) 12 Cox 
407). 
41. The rule is stated in Hale 2 P. C. 236, Foster, 
Crown Law 228-9, and Hawk. 1 P. C., c. 39, 
ss. 13-15 but none offers any explanation for 
it. Kelyng (Rep. p. 3) mentions a Resolution 
passed by five of the Old Bailey judges in 10 
"Car. II to the effect that defendants should 
ý be refused copies of indictments, which gave 
as the reason for its passing the need to 
ensure that prosecutors were not deterred from 
prosecuting by the fear of civil proceedings 
(such an action could not be maintained 
without a copy of the indictment); for another 
reason for the rule see n. 45 below. 
42: }. 7 Anne c. 21, s. 14. 
4360 Geo. III and I Geo. IV, c. 4, _ s. 
8 
(expressed to apply to proceedings by the 
Attorney or Solicitor-General, but held. in R. 
v. Brown & O'Regan (1844) 1 Cox 114 to apply 
to all cases of misdemeanour; according to 
Pennefather B. the accused was entitled to a 
copy' at common-. law-, on payment). 
44. The right to =a copy in felony `I was ' finally 
conceded, by---the - Indictments Act, 1915, 
Schedule, r. ý13(1). 
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45. Polexfen L. C. J. in R. v. Graham (1691) 12 S. T. 
660 'If all people were to have copies of 
their indictment to make exceptions out of 
them before they pleaded, instead of days of 
gaol delivery, a whole year would be spent 
before they could be brought to their trial'. 
46. Hawk., 2 P. C. 62c, repeated by the Criminal 
Law Commissioners, 5th Report, 1840 P. P. (242) 
XX, 1, chap. 4, r. 9. 
47. R. v. Vandercomb (1796) 2 Leach 708. 
48. R. v. Parr (1837) 7 C. & P. 836; R. v. 
Mitchell (1848) 3 Cox 5 ('if the court do not 
permit the Defendant to have a copy he will be 
obliged to get a shorthand writer to take a 
note of it, and it will be the duty of the 
Clerk of the Crown to read it slowly and 
distinctly' per Colman O'Loghlan); R. v... 
Dowling (1848) 3 Cox 509. 
49. R. v. Grace (1846) 2 Cox 101 appears to be 
such a case (there the prosecution conceded a 
copy, and it was remarked by the clerk of the 
court that the indictment would have taken two 
days to read). The prolixity of nineteenth 
century indictments made the threat to call 
for the indictment to be read a very powerful 
one. Normally only a summary would be read to 
the jury; indeed in R. v. Newton (1844) 1 C. & 
K. 99 Tindal C. J. said that he had never in 
his life known an indictment to be read in 
full. The trend towards long indictments' 
showed no signs of abating as the century wore 
on. In 1876 in the case of R. v. Banner & 
Oakley the indictment was reported by the 
Solicitors' Journal (vol. 21 (1876-7) p. 475) 
as 80 yards long. In the Albion Insurance case 
(1878) the indictment occupied some 25 yards 
of parchment and a copy cost £10. (The Times, 
leader, June 13,1878). 
50. E. g. by J. Pitt Taylor, Evidence (7th ed. 
1878), p. 125. 
51.1878 Bill, cl. 351-2; 1879 Bill, cl. 507; 1880 
Bill, cl. 455; 1880 No. 2 Bill, cl. 301; 
Criminal Law Amendment Bill 1882, cl. 90; 
Criminal Law Procedure bill, 1882, cl. 72; 
Code Bill 1883, cl. 70. 
52. Appeal in Criminal Cases Bills, 1844, cl. 15, 
1848, cl. 14,1859, cl. 19,1860, cl. 18; 
Appeal in Criminal Cases Amendment Bill, 1864 
cl. 14; New Trials In Criminal Cases Bills, 
1852, cl. 31; 1858, cl. 23, and 1872, cl. 18; 
a like provision also appeared in the Criminal 
Evidence & Procedure Bill, 1856, cl. 20. 
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53. R. v. Mitchell (1848) supra, R. V. Dowling 
supra; R. v. Casey, Mullaney & Burke, The 
Times, Feb. 29,1868. 
54. R. v. Holden (1838) 8 C. & P. 609 (one can 
find a scattering of other cases to like 
effect namely R. v. Orchard (1838) 8 C. & P. 
559n., R. v. Stroner (1845) 1 C. & K. 650, and 
R. v. Holland (1896) 99 Ir. L. T. 895). The rule 
enjoyed a brief currency in the early years of 
the present century (see Ram Ranjan Roy v. R. 
(1914) I. L. R. 42 Calc. 442 and R. v. Harris 
[1927] 2 K. B. 587 at 590) before being finally 
repudiated in Seneviratne v. R. [1936] 3 
A. E. R. 36 and Dallison v. Caffery [1964] 3 
W. L. R. 385. 
55. R. v. Pook (murder), The Times, May 15,1871. 
56. The picture revealed by the Judicial 
Statistics for 1866 and 1876 is typical; of 
the prisoners convicted at Assizes and Quarter 
Sessions less than 15% had been on bail 
pending trial. 
57. Treason Act, 1695, s. 1: 'such counsel shall 
have free access at all reasonable times'. 
58. See e. g. the Rules for Newgate printed as an 
Appendix to the Report of the Select Committee 
on London Gaols 1813-4 P. P. (157) IV 249; the 
Rules of Wakefield House of Correction printed 
as Appendix 8 to the Report of the Select 
Committee of the House of Lords to inquire 
into the present state of Houses of Correction 
1835 P. P. (439) XI 495; the rules of 
Caernarvon Gaol printed in the Report with 
Minutes of Evidence on the Conduct of the 
Governor of Caernarvon Gaol 1843 
P. P. (422)(477) XLIII 261; the Report of the 
Inspectors of Prisons relative to the system 
of Prison Discipline 1843 P. P. (457) XXV, XXV1 
1 recommended that all remand prisoners ought 
to have the right to see their legal advisers 
at all reasonable times and in private if 
desired. 
59. For a useful summary of some of the worst 
abuses see letter to The Times, Oct. 8,1844 
from 'Veritas'. 
60. The matter was referred to by Ald. Wood in R. 
v. Pond, The Times, Sept. 23,1844. 
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61. Warders: - R. v. Potts Tucker & others, The 
Times, July 22,1839 (Coleridge J. 
disapproved); R. v. Conroy & others, The 
Times, Mar. 3,1856 (condemned by Willes J); R. 
v. Cunningham & Burton, The Times, May 13, 
1885; police: - (1866) 30 J. P. 46 (police 
regulations offered as justification) and 
(1882) 46 J. P. 268. 
62. Medical examination - R. V. Hinson, The 
Times, Oct. 28,1869 (no medical examination 
of accused by doctor instructed by defence 
save in presence of prison medical officer). 
63. Other prisoner - R. v. Watts, The Times, June. 
5,1896. 
64. Prisons - Prison Act 1877 s. 39 and Prison 
Rules, 1878 (Special Rules for Prisoners 
awaiting Trial, r. 21); police: - Metropolitan 
Police General Orders, 1870 (PRO: MEP 8/3) and 
Metropolitan Police General Orders and 
Regulations, 1893 (PRO: MEP 8/4). 
65. Money unconnected with charge ordered to be, 
returned (R. v. Barnett (1829) 3 C. & P. 600; 
R. v. Jones (1834) 6 C. & P. 343; R. . v. O'Donnell (1835) 7 C. & P. 138; R. v. Kinsey.. 
(1836) 7 C. & P. 447 (watch and other articles 
taken from prisoner charged with rape to be 
returned); R. v. Griffiths (1845) 1 New Pract. 
Cas. 119); but contra R. v. McKean & McKean, 
The Times, Aug. 12,1826 and R. v. Pierce 
(185)2 6 Cox 117 (court no power to order 
restitution); prisoner charged with theft or 
fraud, partial restoration of money which 
could not be identified as proceeds of crime 
ordered restored for purposes of defence (R. 
v. Rooney (1836) 7-C. & P. 517 and R. v. 
Burgiss (1836) 7 C. & P. 488). 
66. See (1845) 9 J. P. 98, and the cases of R. v. 
Carter &4 Others The Times, Mar. 3,1849 
(prisoners complained that £2.3.0. seized from 
them had been applied by the police to defray 
the cost of feeding them and conveying them to 
Stafford, a practice described by Platt B. as 
monstrous) and R. v. Bass (1849) 2 C. & K. 
822. 
67. The circular is referred to in the 1893 
General Orders & Regulations supra, reg. 309., 
68. Treason Act, 1708 (7 Anne c. 21) s. 14. 
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69. Chitty, Crim. Law (1st ed. 1816), p. 483-4. 
Chitty offered the following explanation for 
the term traverse 'It is said that the term, 
from traverto to turn over ... means nothing 
more than turning over or putting off. the 
trial to the following session ... though some have referred its meaning originally to the 
denying or taking issue upon an indictment, 
without reference to the delay of trial, which 
seems more correct'. He also offered this 
explanation why traverses were allowed in 
misdemeanour but not in felony: - 'parties to 
be tried ... for felony are well aware of the 
time their trials will proceed from the time 
they are committed, and their committal 
appraises them of the nature of the charge, 
and therefore they have full opportunity to 
prepare for their defence; and also it is a 
mere question of fact which is to be 
determined in case of felony whereas in many 
inferior misdemeanours, as for not repairing, 
intricate questions of civil right and ancient 
liability may come before the court for their 
decisions. ' 
70. See e. g. R. v. Anon., The Times, Feb. 7,1835 
'a prisoner was arraigned and prayed for a 
postponement of his trial as he had not been 
in gaol a quarter hour; the Recorder ordered 
his name to be placed lower down on the list'; 
R. v. Cooper, The Times, May 13,1842 (offence 
committed 5th May; accused committed for trial 
9th May (1st day of session) arraigned 12th 
May); R. v. Conner, The Times, Apr. 14,1845 
(prisoner committed for trial the previous 
Saturday), and R. v. Thomas & Thomas, The 
Times, Jan. 2,1844 (prisoner arraigned the 
day following his apprehension). 
71. With Assize prisoners the complaint was in 
some cases as to the delay in bringing them to 
trial, which could amount to six months and 
occasionally more. 
72. The article is reprinted as Appendix C to the 
8th Report of the Criminal Law Commissioners 
supra. 
73. S. 27 (the right had been curtailed in the 
eighteenth century as regards those charged 
with obtaining by false pretences, sending 
threatening letters, and receiving (by 30 
Geo. II, c. 24 and 39 & 40 Geo. III, c. 87), and 
again in 1819 by the 60 Geo. III and I Geo. 
IV, c. 4, ss. 3 and 5 (defendant committed 20 
days or more before sessions of court of trial 
to plead at that session). 
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74. R. v. Bellingham, The Times, May 13,15, & 16, 
1812 and see chapter 9. 
75. R. v. Lyons, The Times, Oct. 29,1835. 
76. See e. g. R. v. Cooper, R. v. Conner, and R. v. 
Thomas & Thomas supra; R. v. Mellish, The 
Times, Nov. 28,1851; R. v. Taylor (1869) 11 
Cox 340 (postponement granted in murder case 
on ground defence not ready despite looseness 
of the supporting affidavit). 
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CHAPTER 3 
1. St. James Evening Post Case (1742) 2 Atk. 469. 
2. See e. g. the reports of inquests to be found 
in The Times for the period. 
3. See The Times police reports for the period 
and Denman's speech in R. v. Clement infra; 
applications to the King's Bench for criminal 
informations constituted another class of ex 
parte proceeding habitually reported in the 
press to the disadvantage of accused. 
4. The Times police reports regularly included 
such descriptions of persons committed for 
trial as 'both have been in custody before for 
swindling' (Hawkins & Underwood, The Times, 
Mar. 17,1800); 'a notorious pickpocket' 
(Eades, Jan. 14,1808); 'a 13 year old 
hardened offender' (Flynn, Sept. 8,1809); 'a 
most desperate well known characters (Adkins, 
Jan. 3,1810); 'a notorious thief' (Phillips, 
Jan. 6,1817); 'an old hand who has been 
transported and is otherwise well known to the 
police' (Oates, Nov. 1&8,1826); 'a veteran 
pickpocket' (Shield, Feb 26,1828); 'the 
associate and occasional leader of a gang of 
burglars' (Bedsar, Sept. 27., 1836). 
5. Before the trial of Bellingham for the murder 
of Spencer Perceval, The Times (May 13,1812) 
published a biography of him, which included 
the fact that he had been imprisoned in Hull 
for non-performance of a contract, and sent to 
prison in Archangel for being very troublesome 
to the Government there. Before the trial of 
Carter Tuck in November, 1811 for fraud, a 
number of damaging articles appeared in The 
Times: one (of Aug. 5) accused him of 
performing illegal marriages; another (of Aug. 
8), as well as listing other offences of which 
he was suspected, contained the observation: 
'when the irons were put on his legs he 
handled them and appeared to know how to tie 
them to prevent them rattling as well as one 
of the oldest thieves in town'. In its report 
(of Feb. 25,1820) of the examination of 
Thistlewood for his part in the Cato Street 
conspiracy, The Times took pains to remind its 
readers of his acquittal for treason three 
years before. 
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6. E. g. Leary (The Times, Aug. 5,1813 - alleged 
confession to Governor of Coldbath Fields 
Prison published); Stoffell & Scott (The 
Times, June 11 and 12,1823); Thurtell & Hunt 
(The Times, Nov. 2,1823 - in the event the 
Crown did not adduce the confession published 
in evidence because of doubts as to its 
admissibility); Greensmith (murder) (The 
Times, Apr. 10,1837); Roach and others (The 
Times, Dec. 9,1837). 
7. E. g. The Times, Jan. 13,1817 where an extract 
from a letter written by Watson after his 
committal for treason was published. 
8. The allegation appeared in the issue for Nov. 
6. 
9. The Trial of Henry Fauntleroy (Notable British 
Trials Series) pp. 19. & 145. Thurtell and 
Fauntleroy were not the only accused to suffer 
in this way. In March, 1820, during the trial 
of Henry Hunt at York for riot, several of the 
newpapers suggested, quite falsely, that he 
had links with the Cato Street conspirators. 
In 1839 it was suggested in the Newcastle 
papers that an accused called Bolam had 
conveyed away his freehold property in 
anticipation of his forthcoming trial for 
murder (see 2 M. & Rob. 191). How damaging 
pre-trial press comment could be to an accused 
is demonstrated by a murder case (referred to':, -- 
but not identified by Serjt. Best ((1806) P. D. 
VI, 796) tried at the Old Bailey in 1800 
before Grose J., where the jury, after a 
direction to acquit, surprised everyone by 
remaining out for several hours; on their. 
return they told the judge the cause of their 
, - difficulty was that they were unable to keep 
clear in their minds what they had heard in 
evidence and what they had heard and read 
elsewhere. 
10. In 1819 at the trial at Durham of Edens, Wolfe 
& Wolfe for murder, counsel for the defence 
complained of a handbill representing that the 
accused had confessed to the murder (The 
Times, Aug. 17). In 1817 at the trial of Jane 
Scott for petty treason a similar handbill was 
denounced as quite false by counsel for 
prosecution and defence (The Times, Sept. 10). 
11. In R. v. Mead papers had been distributed 
among the jury at the very moment the case was 
about to begin (see R. v. Geach (1840) 9 C. & 
P. 500); see also Serjt. Ballantine's speech 
in R. v. De Vidil The Times, Aug. 23 & 24, 
1861. 
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12.2 L. J. (O. S). 43; The Observer, Nov. 23,1823 
p. 1; the play was called 'The Gamblers'. In 
R. v. Gilham (1827), Moo. & M. 165, Littledale 
J. surprisingly declined to treat as a 
contempt an exhibition (held at the same time 
as the trial of the accused for murder) in 
which there were on display a model of the murder scene, a bust of the accused, and a 
bust of Williams, the Ratcliffe Highway 
murderer. 
13.1 S. T. (N. S). 672 n. 
14. Curry v. Walter (1796) 1 Bos. & Pul. 526. 
15. R. v. Wright (1799), 8 Burr. 293 'the ... 
advantage to the country in having the 
proceedings made public more than 
counterbalances the inconvenience of the 
private person whose conduct may be the 
subject of such proceedings'. 
16. R. v. Lee (1804) 5 Esp. 123. 
17. (1806) P. D. VI, 795-6, and 902-3. 
18. R. v. Fisher (1811) 2 Camp. 799 at p. 805. 
19. R. v. Fleet (1818) 1 B. & Ald. 379. 
20. In 1819 the Birmingham magistrates banned 
reporters from their courts on the ground that 
their activities were unfair to defendants (J. 
Lock, Marlborough Street, p. 120). In the 
same year the Oldham Coroner purported to ban 
the press from reporting the inquest into the 
death of one of those mortally wounded at 
Peterloo (R. Walmsley, Peterloo, The Case Re- 
opened, p. 319). In 1828 the Wakefield 
Coroner was reported in The Times as 
holding an inquest into a murder in private, 
and in the same edition reference is made to 
the fact that the preliminary examination of 
Pallett (as to whom see below) was held in 
private (The Times, Dec. 15,1828). 
21.. The Trial of Thurtell & Hunt (Notable British 
Trials) pp. 193-4. 
22. The Times, Dec. 13,1823. 
23. The Times, Dec. 19,1823; in the present 
century the exposure of Smith, the 'Brides in 
the Bath' killer was due to the publicity 
given to an inquest into the, death of one of 
his victims). The ruling of Park J. in the 
Thurtell & Hunt case itself provoked a storm 
,,, --of, press protests, as to which see A. 
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Borowitz, The Thurtell & Hunt Murder Case, 
pp. 11-20. 
24. The Times, Nov. 1,1824. 
25. Duncan v. Thwaites (1824) 3 B. & C. 556 at 
583; for other examples from this period of 
judicial condemnation of reports of ex parte 
proceedings see Scott & Wife v. Clement, The 
Times, July 13 & 14,1828 (which provoked a 
hostile leader in The Times) and Gaselee J. in 
R. v. Fenn (The Times, Sept. 11,1828), 33 
S. T. 681 at p. 715) 
26. See R. v. Clement below. 
27. R. v. Watson (1817) 32 S. T. 1. 
28. R. v. Brandreth (1817) 32 S. T. 755 at 766. 
29. R. v. Clement (1821) 4 B. & A. 218. 
30. R. v. Duffy (1848) 7 S. T. (N. S. ) 795. 
31. See e. g. R. V. Despard, The Times, Feb. 8, 
1803; R. v. Patch (cited by Serjt. Best, 
(1806) P. D. VI, 79; R. v. Andrews, The Times, ` 
Sept. 25,1811; R. v. Carter Tuck, The Times,, 
Nov. 2,1811; R. v. Henry Hunt, The Times, " 
Mar. 7,1820; letters to The Times published. 
Nov. 18 and 22,1823 from solicitors acting 
for Thurtell & Probert; and R. v. Corder, The_, 
Times, Aug. 8,1828. 
32. This was a point made by Serjt. Best in 
introducing the Bill referred to above; see 
also Re Fowler & Milsom, The Times, May 18, 
1896 'discussion of this matter in open court 
may bring about the very injury of which you 
complain' (per Russell L. C. J. ). 
33. Postponements were granted to Thurtell and to 
Bolam in 1839 (2 M. & Rob. 191) but this was 
exceptional; in R. v. Pallett above, for all 
his strictures about press reports, Park. J. 
refused a postponement. For other instances. of 
refusal of applications for postponement see 
e. g. R. v. Geach (1840) 9 C. & P. 500, R.. v. 
Kirk & Drew, The Times, Aug. 7,1845 (murder) 
where one of the grounds of refusal given by 
Rolfe B. was that it was dangerous to have it 
supposed that a jury could be actuated by 
prejudice or what they had heard out of court; 
R. v. Oscar Wilde, The Times, Apr. 25,1895. "-- 
34. R. v. Holden (1833) 5 B. & Ad. 348. 
35. (1856) P. D. CXL 1299 'changes of venue were 
rare indeed', and see e. g. R. v. Penprase, 
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(1832) 4B& Ad. 572, R. V. Dunn, (1846) 10 
J. P. 740, and Ex p. Lynes, (1846) 1 Cox 246. 
36.1856 20 J. P. 66. 
37. Ibid. 70. 
38.19 Vict. c. 16 (commonly known as Palmer's 
Act); for debates on the Bill see (1856) P. D. 
CXL 217-8,512-3,1767-70, and 2194-2200. 
39. See e. g. R. v. Ruxton (1862) 26 J. P. 773, and 
R. v. Rudge, Baker & Marten, The Times Jan. 
12,1886, and (1886) 50 J. P. 41. 
40.1843 P. P. (513) V 259 (Minutes of Ev., Q. 
429); there was little new about all this; 
Denman had advanced the same arguments in R. 
v. Clement above, and in an article in the 
Edinburgh Review in 1824 (vol. 40 p. 169); in 
the Lords' debate on the Defamation and Libel 
Bill in the same year Lord Campbell ((1843) 
P. D. LXX 1254) claimed that the police 
magistrates were of opinion that the benefit 
of ex parte reports exceeded the evil. 
41. Lewis v. Levy (1858) E. B. &B 537. 
42. R. v. Gray (1865) 10 Cox 184. 
43. Wason v. Walter (1868) 4 Q. B. 73. 
44. Usill v. Hales (1878) 14 Cox 61. 
45. This was still giving rise to problems in the 
1930s - see R. v. Rouse, The Times, Feb. 24, 
1931. 
46. See e. g. R. v. Carr, The Times, July 2,1866 
(murder); R. V. Fish, The Times, Apr. 21, 
1876; R. v. Greany, The Times, Nov. 27,1890 
(murder). 
47. See e. g. Brown, The Times, June 4,1860 ('who 
has recently undergone penal servitude'); 
Burgess, May 31,1865 ('a ticket of leave 
man'); Fearman, The Times, May 25,1870; 
Howlett, The Times, Mar. 1,1880 ('a ticket of 
leave man'); Harris & Proughton, The Times, 
Mar. 9,1890 ('previous convictions' were 
proved against both prisoners'). 
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48. For instances of prejudging in The Times 
during this period see e. g. Ellis, Ellis & 
Ellis, Feb. 17,1855: 'evidence was given (at 
the committal) which rendered the case 
perfectly conclusive against all the 
prisoners'; Butler, May 11,1865 where the 
report of the committal hearing describes the 
, prisoner as 'impudently denying the charge'; 
McCann, May 27,1870: alibi witnesses called 
by the accused at the committal hearing 
described as 'untrustworthy'; Jones, June 1,, 
-- 1870 (murder): 'The prisoner has prepared a 
wild statement which is no secret even though 
he did not refer to it yesterday. In it he 
declares that, though found with the murdered. 
people's property upon him, yet he is innocent 
of the murder as the clothes were given to him 
by the real murderer whom be professes to 
describe'. 
49. The Times, Aug. 18,1850. 
50. Barnsley Chronicle (supplement), Oct. 2,1886. 
51. R. v. Armstrong, The Times, May 9,1894. 
52. Balfour see Re Stead (1895) 11 T. L. R. 492 's. 
rare rogue ... He 
will reappear at the Old, 
bailey and then we may expect to hear no more 
of him for some time to come'; other victims 
of highly prejudicial press publicity in the 
last thirty years of the century included Mary,. 
Ann Cotton, 1873 (R. S. Lambert, When Justice 
Faltered, p. 128); Wainwright, 1875 (The 
Times, Nov. 24, false press reports of 
confession) and Charles Peace, 1879 (Trials of 
Charles Peace (Notable British Trials Series) 
p. 112). 
53. See 110 L. J. 417, and E. Marjoribanks, 
Life of Sir Edward Marshall Hall, R. C., 




Proceedings for contempt in Parnell, (1880) 14 
Cox 474, Barnado, The Times, Nov. 29,1892, - 
Armstrong 1894 supra, Fowler & Milsom, The 
Times, May 20,1896, and Ex p. Smith (1869) 21 
L. T. 294 were instituted by the accused or his 
representatives. 
55. R. v. Onslow & Whalley (1873) 12 Cox 358. 
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CHAPTER 4 
1. I. e. examine the prosecution witnesses. 
2. C. Emsley, Crime & Society in England, 1759- 
1900, p. 138. 
3. See Appendix 1. 
4. Langbein, Criminal Trial Before The Lawyers, 
50 U. Chicago L. R., 1 at p. 311. 
5. The 25 Geo. II, c. 36 and the 18 Geo. III, c. 
19. Under the first costs could only be 
awarded where the prosecution resulted in a 
conviction, and in deciding what award to 
make the court had to have regard to the means 
of the prosecutor. The latter Act removed both 
limitations. Before The 1752 Act the statutory 
rewards payable on the conviction of offenders 
represented the only means whereby the 
prosecutor could recoup his expenditure. 
6.2nd ed. 
7.. This removed the limitation on the power to 
award costs in cases of misdemeanour (see 
further n. 15 below). 
8 1836 P. P. (58) XXVII, 1 at p. 22-3; the 
: Commission argued that where the judge 
prosecuted cases took longer because of the 
double labour cast on him which in turn 
increased the sum the county had to pay out 
in witness costs. Also cases were less well 
prosecuted because the judge was not master of 
the depositions. The same argument had been 
urged by Lord Wharncliffe to a Lords Select 
Committee on County Rates the previous year 
(1835 P. P. (206) XIV, 1 at p. 72). 
9.; See e. g. the evidence of Tindal C. J. and Park 
J. to the 1835 Select Committee. Their 
complaint was that to require the judge was 
inefficient and placed an unduly heavy burden 
on him obliging him to examine witnesses at 
the same time as taking a note of their 
-evidence. 
10. See e. g. R. V. Anon (1843) 1 Cox 48 'A judge 
ought never to prosecute' (Coleridge J. ); R. 
-v. Anon, Bedford Mercury, Mar. 23,1844 'it is a disgrace to the county to impose on the 
judge the necessity-to act as counsel against 
the prisoner' (Patteson J. ); R. v. Hezell 
(1844) 1 Cox 348 'It is most unseemly for a 
judge to be called upon to act as prosecutor 
instead of holding the scales between the 
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parties' (Creswell J. ); R. v. Page (1847) 2 
Cox 221 'The fiction of law in criminal cases 
is that the judge is counsel for the 
prisoner, but here it is sought not only to 
upset and reverse that doctrine and make me 
counsel for the prosecution, but to throw the 
whole burden of this prosecution on me. But I 
will not do it. It is indecent. ' 
11. See e. g. R. v. Lawrence (1844) 1 Cox 61; R. v. 
Robins (1847) 1 Cox 114; R. v. Farrell & Moore 
(1848) 3 Cox 169; 8th Report of the Criminal 
Law Commissioners, 1845, App. B., Q. 201. 
Isolated instances of counsel being handed the 
depositions and requested by the judge to, __ 
prosecute can be found even before the 1840s 
(ibid. ). 
12. The Times, June 18,1847. 
13. (1847) P. D. XCIII, 761. 
14. E. g. 9 L. T. (1847) 256 and 283. 
15.5th Report of the Judicature Commission, 1874 
P. P. (Cmnd. 2345) XIV, 307, App. 1, p. 14.:, 
Even as late as the 1870s it was possible to 
come across cases at Assizes in which no': 
prosecuting counsel had been briefed (see 
letter from Bramwell B., ibid. at p. 3) 
16. Bills for the establishment of a system of" 
Public Prosecutors had been presented in 1854, 
1855,1870,1871,1872 and 1873, but the only 
progress in fact made was the appointment in 
1879 of a Director of Public Prosecutions with 
power to intervene to take over the conduct of 
a prosecution. 
17. The power to award costs in certain cases of 
misdemeanour had been given by the 7 Geo. IV, 
c. 64 (1826), and further extended in 1851 by 
the 14 & 15 Vict., c. 55 and the other 
statutes listed in the 5th Report of the 
Judicature Commission, App. 1, p. 15. But even 
by 1900 there still remained a 'very 
considerable number of misdemeanours in 
respect of which there was no such power 
(including keeping a disorderly house, 
vagrancy, nuisance and libel) - see Report 
of Departmental Committee on Allowances to 
Prosecutors and Witnesses in Public 
Prosecutions, 1903 P. P. (Cmnd. 1650) LVI, 357 
at D. xxl and para. 83 of the Report. 
Conferring a power to award prosecutors their 
costs and inducing courts to exercise it were 
two different things. Pre-1850 there was a 
number of courts which seldom, if ever 
awarded a prosecutor his legal costs. One 
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court which adopted this policy was the Old 
Bailey (see the Report of the Royal Commission 
on County Rates, 1836 supra p. 33, and the 
evidence of Tindal C. J. to the 1835 Select 
Committee (Q. 803). A similar policy on costs 
was followed at Middlesex Sessions (see 4 L. T. 
283), Surrey Sessions and some other County 
Sessions (see Report of Select Committee on 
County Rates, 1834 P. P. (206) XIX, 1 and the 
Return of Rates of Allowances 1845 P. P. (in 
390) XLI 411. In broad terms courts in the 
north appear to have been the most ready to 
make costs orders and courts in the Home 
Counties the least willing. 
18. See 5th Report of the Judicature Commission 
supra, App. 1 p. 14. The decision of the 
Government to shoulder half the burden was 
less generous than it looked, for the effect 
of the abolition of statutory rewards had been 
to throw onto the rates costs which until then 
had been met out of reward money paid out of 
central funds (the practice being not to make 
any awards for costs where the reward money 
exceeded the prosecutor's costs). 
19. The Old Bailey soup system was described by 
the Clerk of the Indictments and the Recorder 
in their evidence to the Select Committee on 
Prosecution Expenses, 1862 P. P. (402) X1,1 
(Q. s. 2257 and 2399). In 1892 it was made the 
subject of regulations issued by the Recorder 
and Common Serjeant (see Crew, The Old Bailey 
p. 50); Quarter Sessions operating a soup 
system included Middlesex Sessions, where the 
briefs were handed out by the County 
Treasurer, and Stafford County Sessions where 
the Clerk of the Peace exercised the patronage 
(see 5th Report of the Judicature Commission 
supra, App. 1, Table B). In some of the towns 
where a prosecuting attorney was employed 
briefs were, distributed on a soup basis. An 
article in the Law Magazine for 1849 listed 
the following objections to the soup system: - 
briefs were given out without regard to the 
weight of cases or the ability of counsel; 
counsel so briefed had no attorney to whom he 
could turn for information which often led to 
,.. 
his consulting the police instead; and less 
care was bestowed upon soup briefs because 
they were soup. 
20'. See Report of Select Committee on Public 
Prosecutors 1854/5 P. P. (481) XII, 1'(Q. s 76, 
106,975,1579 & 2767) and (1870) P. D. CCI, 
242, and (1871) P. D. CCV, 1766. Byý1872 such a 
system was also in operation in Birmingham, 
Newcastle on Tyne and Brecon (see 5th Report 
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of Judicature Commission supra App-1, Table 
B). 
21. The practice was described as very prevalent 
in the Report on County Rates, 1836 (p. 22). 
See also 5th Report of Judicature Commission, 
p. 13. The objection to the practice was that 
it gave magistrates'. clerks a vested interest 
in securing the committal of the accused (see 
(1855) P. D. CXXXVI, 1656). 
22. Municipal Corporations Act, 1835, s. 102 and 
Municipal Corporations Amendment Act, 1861, s. 
5. 
23. Report on Public Prosecutors 1854/5 (Qs. 882-5 
& 2140-2), and 5th Report of Judicature 
Commission, App. 1, p. 13. The objection to 
the practice was that it led to corruption, 
with officers being touted by attornies - see 
(1854) P. D. CXXX, 666. In some areas the 
problem was avoided by the appointment of a 
reputable solicitor as attorney to the police 
with instructions to act in all cases in which 
police officers were bound over to prosecute 
(see R. v. Yates 1853 7 Cox 361). 
24.5th Report of the Judicature Commission, App. 
1, p. 13, and (1871) P. D. CCV, 1746. 
25. The argument was one which had been accepted 
by the 1835 Select Committee and the 1836 
Royal Commission on County Rates as well as by 
the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into 
the costs of prosecutions 1859 P. P. (2575 - 
Sess. 2) XIII Pt. 1,13. 
26. The practice at Surrey Sessions is described 
in many reports including the Fifth Report of 
the Judicature Commission, App. 1, p. 14. In 
the last quarter of the century Surrey 
Sessions enjoyed a poor reputation generally, 
being notorious not only for its niggardliness 
in the matter of costs, but also for its 
severity towards prisoners (as to which see 
(1882) P. D. CCLXIV, 404 and CCLXVII, 411). 
27. Royal Commission on County Rates, 1836, p. 22, 
and (1851)P. D. XIV, 828. 
28. Chitty, Criminal Law (1st ed. 1816), Vol. IV, 
p. 331-2. 
29. R. v. Elliott, The Times, June 18,1836. For 
examples of the practice before the city 
judges and at Quarter Sessions see e. g. R. v. 
Robinson, The Times, Oct. 14,1802 (Surrey 
Sessions); R. v. Ingram, The Times, Sept. 17, 
1823; R. v. Barrett, The Times. Sept. 17, 
362 
1823; R. v. Fawcett, The Times, Dec. 10,1823 
(all Old Bailey). 
30. G. G. Alexander, The Administration of Justice 
in Criminal Matters (1915), p. 125. 
31. See e. g. R. Harris, The Reminiscences of Sir 
Henry Hawkins, pp. 40-1. 
32. See E. D. Purcell, 'Forty Years at the Bar' 
(1916) 'His summing up was usually in strong 
scotch. 'Gentlemen of the jury, you've heard 
counsel for the prosecution, and you've heard 
counsel for the defence. Consider your 
verdict'. See also F. W. Ashley 'My Sixty Years 
in the Law' pp. 97-9 and Pitt-Lewis, Mr. 
Commissioner Kerr, An Individuality, pp. 
251 & 265 (and as to his failure to take a 
note pp. 174-5). 
33. R. v. Newman 1913 9 Cr. App. R. 134 (a decision 
still being cited as authority in Archbold 
(1931 ed. ) p. 219. 
34. See e. g. R. v. Nuttall, The Times, Sept. 8, 
1817 ("I hope, my lord, you will be so kind as 
to be counsel for me"; judge: - "I'll endeavour 
to see justice done to you"). 
35. See e. g. the charge of Gurney B. to the Exeter 
grand jury on the 16th Aug. 1821 cited (1826) 
P. D. XV, 693. 
36. See e. g. R. v. Rawlings (1835) 7 C. & P. 150 
(indictment point); R. v. Donnelly & Murray, 
(1835) 1 Moo. 438 (indictment point taken by 
Bolland B. in a case where the prisoners had 
pleaded guilty); & R. v. Wilson (1837) B. C. & 
P. 111 (point of law). 
37. See Chitty op. cit. Vol. 1 p. 429, and (1826) 
P. D. XV, 289. Numerous instances of judges 
exhorting prisoners to retract guilty pleas 
are to the found in The Times reports of 
trials for the first half of the century. By 
_, 
the later years of the century, however, 
judges were contenting themselves with merely 
ascertaining that the prisoner understood the 
consequences of his : plea (see e. g. R. v. 
Constance Kent, The Times, July. 22,1865; & 
+w. R. v. Bradford, The Times, July 25,1872. ) 
38. See e. g. R. v. Cashon & O'Brien, The Times 
Dec. 13,1828; R. v.. Wakely, The Times,, Aug. 
-1,151 1839;, R. v., Bury;, The Times, Mar. 6,, 1873 
(Quain J.; burglary; accused only 13). 
- 
39. R. v. Rodanbosh, The Times, Dec. 18,1856 
(foreigner accused of attempted murder). 
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40. See e. g. R. v. Barber, The Times, Apr. 8,1842 
(boy aged 10 pleaded guilty to murder; on the 
judge's advice he retracted his plea; a 
confession which was the only evidence against 
him was ruled inadmissible and he was 
acquitted), and R. v. Moore, The Times, Mar. 
26,1860 (murder). 
41. See R. V. Knowles, (1820) 1 S. T. N. S 505 Bayley 
J.: - 'Don't open that which is not evidence. j- 
am obliged to watch as he has no counsel' (in" 
the course of the trial Bayley both assisted 
the prisoner with the cross-examination of 
Crown witnesses and with the examination of 
his own witnesses. See also (1826) P. D. XV, 607 
(R. v. Evans). 
42. See e. g. R. V. Day (1847) 2 Cox 209. 
43. See e. g. R. v. Green, The Times, July 2,1825. 
44. R. v. Anon., Berkshire Assizes, The Times, 
Dec. 30,1830 (Park J. ) and R. v. Salter & 
Kettle (1877) 41 J. P. 187 (Cockburn C. J. 'I 
object to the learned counsel saving his 
client by convicting the other; he is my 
client'). 
45. See D. N. B. and (1843) P. D. LXVI, 1037. 
46. In 1844 at Lancashire Assizes Gurney insisted 
that all unrepresented prisoners put questions 
in cross-examination through him. This unfair 
practice, which both intimidated the prisoners' 
and gave the witness thinking time, and was 
sufficiently unusual to be commented upon. by a 
law reporter (R. v. Cook, (1844) 1 Cox 125). c" 
Generally his reputation was that of a 'severe 
and harsh judge' (D. N. B. ) and see the anecdote 
told about him by Serjt. Robinson, Bench & 
Bar (1879). 
47. The Times, Dec. 10,1888. As to Hawkins, 
penchant for sitting late see Ashley, op. cit. 
pp. 176-8). Stephen J. earned even, more 
notoriety for continuing to sit after 
diagnosed as suffering from mental illness 
The Times, Mar. 6,1891. 
48.21 Law Jo. (1886) 223. 
49. 'He devoted so much of his charge... to heated 
denunciation of marital infidelity that the 
jury practically convicted her for that-- 
offence. ' - New York Times report cited by 
Ryan & Havers, The Poisoned Life of -Mrs. 
Maybrick, p. 211. 
50.29 Ir. L. T. (1895) 94. 
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51. See e. g. R. V. Hayden, The Times, Dec. 13, 
1823 (Recorder of London to defence counsel): 
'I shall state the case to the jury not 
according to your opinion but according to 
mine. The jury are not bound to take my impressions of this case but I am bound to 
state them'. See also Brougham, Miscellanea, 
Public Characters p. 39, referring to 
Ellenborough C. J. 'Upon each case that came 
before him he had an opinion, and while he 
left the decision to the jury, he intimated 
how he felt himself. The manner of performing 
the office of a judge is now generally 
followed and commonly approved'. 
52.10 Law Magazine (1833), Old Bailey 
Experiences, p. 276 "Full two thirds of the 
prisoners on their return from their trials 
cannot tell of anything that has passed in 
court not even very frequently whether they 
have been tried; and it is not uncommon for a 
man to come back after receiving his sentence 
on the day appointed for that purpose saying 
" It can't be me they mean. I haven't been 
tried yet'". 
53. Ibid. 277 'it was a boast at the Old Bailey 
that a recent City judge could despatch 60 or 
70 trials a day'. See also 9 L. T. (1847) 319 
'a great number of cases were disposed of 
during the morning with the usual rapidity 
exercised by the learned Common Serjeant, and 
several prisoners were placed at the bar to be 
tried, convicted and sentenced in the same 
breath with the reading of the charge against 
them'. 
54. See (1836) 55 Quarterly Review, A. Hayward, 
The Origin of Dinners Clubs etc., 455 at 474- 
5; The Reminiscences of Sir Henry Hawkins pp. 
39-41, Punch, Vol. 6 (1844) p. 218, article 
'Justice after Dinner' with cartoon: - 'the 
roseate tinge, the look of fulness on justice 
in the evening compared with the pallid maid 
that summed up in the forenoon' and 'How 
often has a Recorder passed a tremendous 
-. sentence on an offender simply 
because he has 
seen his iniquity double'; Serjeant 
Ballantine's Experiences, pp. 54-5 'one"cannot 
. 
but look back with a feeling of disgust to the 
mode in which drinking, transporting and 
-hanging were shuffled together'; Montagu J. 
Williams, Leaves of a Life p. 162- 
55. Motion by Ald. Lott °21.4.37 (Misc. Papers, 
Administration of'Justice Committee; Corpn. of 
London Records Office). 
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56. The fire occurred on Feb. 26,1877 (The Times, ` 
Feb. 27,1877). When the dining room had been 
repaired the question of reinstating the 
dinners was referred to the judges but they 
were against it (Bowen Rowlands, op. cit., p. 
19 and see also W. E Hooper, History of Newgate 
& The Old Bailey, pp. 17 and 134). 
57. See e. g. 9 L. T. (1847), 319 and the Punch 
article quoted at supra; in 1831 it was also 
referred to in the Commons - (1831) P. D. V, 
648. 
58. The Times, Dec. 25,1838, and also 1839 3 J. p. 
2 'Indecent Haste': - 'five or six witnesses., 
are examined; as many clever jokes'- 
perpetrated; a prisoner bantered; a jury 
charged; the verdict returned; the criminal 
sentenced to transportation; all in six 
minutes. ' 
59. The Times, Jan. 2,1829 ('a wondrous 
improvement in the Common Serjeant's 
behaviour'). 
60. Attributable in no small measure to the 
. influence of Russell Gurney (appointed Common ! - 
Serjeant in 1856 and Recorder in 1857). 
61.20 Sol. Jo. (1875-6), p. 74 (the article 
offered to name three Chairmen who never took 
notes but simply underlined the depositions). 
62.18 Sol. Jo. (1873-4), p. 196 'the magistrates 
are looked on as all of a piece with the 
prosecution and the police' and 20 Sol. Jo'. 
(1875-6), p. 74 which, after referring to the, 
virulence of Quarter Sessions Chairmen against 
prisoners added 'the idea of many a country 
lout tried at Quarter Sessions must be that 
the magistrates and police are merely officers 
of different rank in the same department, the 
object of both being the conviction of 
prisoners'. 
63.11 L. T. (1848), 445 'It is notorious that the 
sentences at Quarter Sessions are so much more 
severe than those at the Assizes that 
prisoners deem it a matter of congratulation 
that they are tried by a Judge and not by a 
Chairman' and 13 L. T. (1849), 293 'in 1848 
the average term of transportation imposed. at 
quarter sessions was 7 years 10 months, at 
assizes only 7 years 3 months, with figures 
for length of sentences of imprisonment- 
showing a similar pattern. 
64. In the last quarter of the century Amphlett & 
Kay LJJ. were both Chairmen of County Sessions 
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(97 L. T. (1894), 372-3). Also a few were 
County Court judges (see The Times, Sept. 
27,1899 - letter from- 'A County Court 
judge'). 
65. A. Foote, Pie Powder, p. 69. 
66. Report of Royal Commission on Municipal 
Corporations, 1835 P. P. (116) XXIII, 1, App., 
Circuit Tables i-x. 
67. Ibid. para. 46 citing the example of Bristol 
where, because the Recorder did not attend the 
Quarter Sessions prisoners were tried by the 
Mayor and Aldermen. The Appendix to the 
Report (p. 53 et seq. ) showed that in 46 out 
of 237 boroughs there was no office of 
Recorder. 
68. Municipal Corporations Act, 1835, ss. 103 and 
105. 
69.7 &8 Vict., c. 71, s. 8 (to be Serjeant or 
barrister of at least 10 years standing). 
70. Local Government Act, 1888, s. 42. 
71. For examples of calls for it to be made 
obligatory for Chairmen to be legally 
qualified see (1838) P. D. XLI, 335; 8th Report 
of Criminal Law Commissioners, App. A; 2 L. T. 
(1844), 367 &7L. T. (1846), 478; 20 Sol. Jo. 
(1875-6), 74; The Times, June 6,1882 and 
Sept. 27,1893. 
72. The Third & Final Report of the Business of 
Courts Committee, 1936 (1935/6 (Cmnd. 5066) 
P. P VIII, 81) expressed the view that it was 
desirable that Chairmen be legally qualified. 
The Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act, 1938 empowered courts of 
county Quarter Sessions to apply to - the Lord Chancellor for the appointment of a legally 
qualified chairman, but it was not made 
obligatory that chairmen should be so 
qualified until 1962 (see Criminal Justice 
Act, 1962 s. 5). - 
73.97 L. T. (1894), 372-3 'The clerk is but a 
-. slender reed; his acquaintance with statute 
law (and) case law is slight' and see letter 
to The Times from 'A County Court judge' 
(supra) 'Clerks of the Peace rarely have any 
practical knowledge of ,, criminal,, -law, and,. often belong to the class of .. family-, solicitor who 'do not take family work'. When a Clerk of 
the Peace advises the Chairman it is generally 
a case of-the blind leading the blind'. 
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74.2nd Report of the Criminal Law Commissioners, 
1836, App. 1, pp. 92 and 95. 
75.20 Sol. Jo. (1875-6), p. 74 'Some Chairmen of 
Quarter Sessions have never been known to 
venture any remark to counsel arguing a legal 
point before them. They dare not. They can'- 
only sit and listen with as great an 
appearance of wisdom as they can assume and;.: 
when both sides are finished deliver their 
opinion oracularly one way or the other 
without giving any reason for it. ' 
76. L. T. 1844,364. See also F. W. Ashley, op. 
cit., p. 219 where he describes a summing up 
by a chairman in the early 1930s placing the 
burden of proof on the accused. 
77. For examples of the practice see R. v. 
Gibbons, (1823) 1 C. & P. 97; R. v. Evans 
(1839) 8 C. & P. 765; R. v. Coley (1868) 10'. 
Cox 356; R. v. Goddard (1882) 15 Cox 7; R. v. 
Hurst (1896) 18 Cox 374. 
78. See e. g. R. v. Webb 1800 C. C. C. Sess. Pap., 
6th Bess., case 577 (Recorder); R. v. Hanson 
1805 C. C. C. Sess. Pap., July sess., case 441, -. - 
(Recorder); R. v. Voss ibid., case 442 
(Recorder); R. v. Taylor ibid., case 473 
(Recorder) and R. v. Buckingham, The Times, 
July 21 & 29,1824 (Burrough J. ). 
79. R. v. Wade (1825) 1 Moo. 86. The problem of 
inability to understand the nature and 
obligation of an oath arose most commonly in 
the case of child witnesses, but they would 
normally be examined prior to their going,, - 
before the grand jury, and if a child was ' at 
this stage found not to understand the oath, 
the prisoner would be remanded to the next, 
Assizes so that the child could receive 
instruction in the matter (R. v. Baylis (1849) 
4 Cox 23). It was also common for applications 
for postponement to be sought and granted for 
like reason (R. v. White (1786) 1 Leach 430; 
R. v. Williams (1836) 7 C. & P. 320; R. v. 
Nicholas (1846) 2 Cox 136 (no postponement 
where lack of understanding due to want of 
maturity rather than want of education), R. v. 
Hall (1849) 14 J. P. 25 (no postponement after, - 
jury sworn). No doubt these were the analogies 
which Bayley J. had in mind when he took the 
course he did. Twenty years later in R. v. 
Whitehead (1866) 30 J. P., 391 a court was 
urged, but refused, to take the same course 
where it became apparent during the course of 
the evidence of a deaf and dumb witness, who 
had already been sworn, that she lacked the 
requisite understanding of the oath. 
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80. R. v. Charlesworth (1861) 9 Cox 44. 
81. Juries Act, 1825, s. 1. 
82. Juries Act, 1870, s. 7. 
83. Juries Act, 1825, s. 50. 
84. Ibid., s. 31. 
85. Juries Act, 1870, s. 6. 
86. Chitty, Criminal Law (1816 1st ed. ), p. 522. 
87. Halsbury's Laws, Ist ed., vol. 18, p. 268. 
88. 17 L. T. (1852) 202; The Times, Dec. 12,1858. 
89. J. Bentham, Elements of the Art of Packing as 
applied to Special Juries particularly in 
cases of Libel Law, 1821. 
90. Chitty, op. cit., pp. 523-4. 
91. Sir L. Woodward, The Age of Reform, 2nd ed., 
p. 31; trials included those of leading 
radicals, such as Sir Francis Burdett, the 
Carliles, Cobbett, and Henry 'Orator' Hunt. 
92.29 Ed. III, c. 13 (confirming 27 Ed. III, st. 
2, c. 8). 
93. Chitty, op. cit., p. 525. 
94. Naturalisation Act, 1870, s. 5 (the Special 
and Common Juries Bill, 1868 had contained a 
similar clause). 
95. " (1870) P. D. CXCIX, 1129. 
96. Perhaps the most celebrated example of an 
attempt to invoke the privilege was in the 
trial of the Mannings 1849 2 Car. & R. 844, 
where the issue was -whether it was claimable 
by the foreign born wife of a British subject. 
The Times trial' reports upto 1870 contain 
several examples of aliens being tried by such 
juries. For an attempt to invoke the privilege 
as late as 1882 see R. v. Howard, The Times, 
Apr. 3,1882. 
97.4 Bla. Comm. 388. Prior to the Sex 
Disqualification Removal Act, 1919 it was the 
only type of jury "on which a'-woman could 
,: serve. 
98. Upon a, plea of pregnancy being -raised the ö}n= court doors were closed to-prevent women from 
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leaving court to escape the duty - R. v. 
Wycherley (1838) 8 C. & P. 262n. 
99. In R. v. Wycherley supra Gurney B. held that 
the proper course, where the jury asked for 
the assistance of a surgeon, was for the 
surgeon to make his own examination and then 
give evidence of his findings in open court. 
100. See the leading article in The Times of Oct.,. 
25,1847, which referred to numerous recorded" 
instances of erroneous verdicts by juries of, 
matrons, including a case 'a few years ago' in 
which a woman gave birth to a child 4 months- 
after being declared by such a jury not with 
child. 
101. See Taylor, Principles of Medical. 
Jurisprudence, 8th ed. (1928) p. 31, citing R. 
v. Mary Ann Hunt (1847) 2 Cox 261 as one where 
the precaution had not been taken. 
102. F. Bresler, Reprieve p. 54 (the change in 
practice was brought about by the public 
clamour caused by the case of Charlotte Harris 
(The Times, Aug. 3,1849. ). 
103. The Juries Bill, 1879 and the Criminal Code 
Bills had proposed to abolish the jury of: 
matrons. It was actually abolished by the 
Sentence of Death (Expectant Mothers) Act, 
1931 (as to which see (1931) P. D. CCXLVII,. 
1817-8). 
104. See McEldowney & O'Higgins, The Common Law 
Tradition pp. 136-53, and H. Montgomery Hyde, 
Carson, p. 44 (explaining 0' Brien L. C. J. 's 
nickname 'Peter the Packer'). Although the 
Crown had no right of peremptory challenge the 
right of stand-by (the right to defer stating 
the cause of its challenges until all the 
panel had been gone through) was where the 
panel was very large, as it usually was in 
Ireland, tantamount to an unlimited right of 
peremptory challenge (as to the right of 
stand-by see R. v. Horne Tooke (1794) 25 S. T. 
p. 1 at p. 25; R. v. Geach (1840) 9 C. -&p. 
499, and Mansell v. R. (1857) Dears & B. 375. 
105. See Bentham, Art of Packing especially pp. -, 5 
and 32-5; (1809) P. D. XIV, 183-4 & R., v. 
Cartwright, The Times, Aug. 5 and 7,1820 and 
R. v. Henry Hunt, The Times, Mar. 16,, 1820., 
The complaint of jurors being passed over on 
the ground that they would not attend was one 
of those most often heard. It was raised, by 
Horne Tooke, by Sheriff Phillips in 1808 and 
in the Commons debate of 1809. 
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106. R. v. Horne Tooke (1794) 25 S. T. 127. 
107. Bentham, ibid., p. 126-33. 
108. The petition of Henry White (1809) P. D. XIV, 
175-90 and the debate thereon. In the debate 
the Attorney-General conceded that it had 
within living memory been the practice in the 
Exchequer to pay special jurors a double fee 
(2 guineas) if they found for the Crown. 
109. The Times, Jan. 21,1818. The Report appeared 
to confirm the existence of an unofficial list 
of jurors, and malpractice by the Crown. It 
also supported the claim that the same men sat 
as special jurors term after term (it found 22 
men who had sat 30 times a year and 1 who had 
sat 55 times in a year). 
110. Juries Act, 1825, s. 32. Peel had first 
proposed the reform in his Juries Empanelling 
Bill of 1824. 
111. Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, s. 108. 
112. Juries Act, 1870, s. 16. 
113. Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, s. 109; Juries 
Act, 1870, s. 17; the 1913 Departmental 
Committee supra p. 112 found that juries were 
still occasionally struck in the old way. 
114. 'There is no statutory provision prescribing 
the order in which names are drawn from jury 
lists to form a panel, and the undersheriff 
therefore has to carry out this important duty 
by whatever method he thinks best. We 
discovered that in practice a good deal of 
variety exists in the procedure adopted' - 
Departmental Committee, 1913 supra. para. 104. 
115. Select Committee on Irish Jury Laws, 1881 
para. 51. The adoption of the system was also 
recommended in a minority report to the Report 
of the 1913 Departmental Committee. 
116. See the Second Report of the Common Law 
Commissioners, 1852-3 P. P. (1626), XL, 6 (poor 
quality of juries in agricultural areas); 
Select Committee on Special and Common Juries 
1867/8 P. P. XII (401) 677 (Q. 1335. (Sussex 
juries) and App. 2 ('Common juries consist 
principally of farmers in rural 'districts and 
shopkeepers in' towns'); , and the Select 
Committee on the Irish Jury Laws, 1881 para. 
10 (to the like effect). See also 10 L. T. 
(1847-8) p. 425 (for a particularly. scathing 
attack) and the Attorney-General during the 
debate on the Jury Bill, 1873 (P. D. CCXIV, 
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546) 'a general deterioration in the character 
of juries. ' 
117. In 1864 Serjt. Pulling (in a Paper read to the... 
Law Amendment Society) argued that the 
regulations as to exemptions greatly 
deteriorated the standard of juries (40 L. T. 
(1864-5) p. 112 and 197) a claim repeated 
during the Committee Stage of the Juries Bill, 
1874 where Sir Chas. Russell observed (P. D. 
CCXIX, 289) that most of those who were 
Commissioners of Income Tax had accepted the 
office because of the exemption from jury 
service it carried with it. The Select 
Committee of 1867/8 had also recommended the 
abolition of many of the existing exemptions. 
118. Peel, (1825) P. D. XII, 968 
119. Report of the Select Committee of 1867/8, App. 
2. The practice had been declared illegal and 
made punishable by fine by s. 43 of the 1825 
Act. 
120. The Jurors' Qualification Bills of 1823 and 
1824 had sought to make the possession of 
Government or company stock above a certain 
value a qualification. The matter was also 
adverted to by the Law Amendment Society in, a 
paper which it submitted to the Select 
Committee of 1867/8 and by the Departmental 
Committee of 1913. 
121. Letter to The Times, Jan. 10,1879 from the 
Under-Sheriff of Middlesex. 
122.2nd Report of the Common Law Commissioners 
supra, p. 6; 1st Report of the Judicature 
Commission 1868/9 P. P. (4130) XXV, 19; Report 
of the Select Committee of 1867/8 App. 2. 
123. Juries Act, 1870, s. 15. 
124. Oct. 5,1878. 
125. Departmental Committee of 1913, para. 111: 
126. Fry J. at Gloucester Assizes, The Times, Aug. ' 
7,1880; Bramwell L. J. and Coleridge J. (22: 
Sol. Jo. (1877/8) 422); Linscott V. Jupp 
(1891) 8 T. L. R. 130. 
127. (1873) P. D., CCXVI, 1510. The scheme was a pet 
project of the Attorney. It had been rejected 
by the Select Committee of 1867/8, and 
canvassed by him at the first reading and 
Committee stages of the 1873 Bill. 
128. P. D., ibid., 1512 (Lopes), & 1514 (West). 
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129. The' provision appeared as cl. 12 in the 1873 
Bill and cl. 77 in the 1874 Bill; for 
Parliamentary reaction see (1874) P. D. CCXIX, 
804-7. 
130. T. U. C. Annual Congress Reports, 1873-83. The 
subject was also raised at Congress in 1892 
and 1894. 
131. The phenomenon was a consequence of the large 
increase in the burgess rolls caused by the 
Representation of the People Act, 1867 (Report 
of the Select Committee on the Juries Bill, 
1870 P. P. (306) V1 61. 
132. Oct. 5,1878. 
133. The Times, leader, Sept. 17,1878. 
134. Bentham, op. cit., p. 140. 
135. Jurors' Remuneration Bill, 1863. 
136. Special and Common Jurors Bill, 1868. 
137. S. 22. 
138. Juries Act Amendment Act, 1871. For the 
background to the repeal see (1871) P. D. CCIV, 
372. 
139. The Juries Bill, 1874; the Jurors' 
Remuneration Bills, 1876/78/79/80; the Common 
Jurors' Remuneration Bill, 1886; the Jurors 
Payment Bills, 1893 (civil) and 1894; the 
Jurors Payment Bill, 1895; the Payment of 
Jurors Bill, 1896, and the Jurors' Expenses 
Bills, 1897/98. 
140. Juries Act, 1949. 
141. Para. 190. 
142. T. U. C., 8th Annual Report, 1875. 
143. Chitty, op. cit.. Vol. 1,540-51. 
144. Joy, Challenges to Jurors in Criminal. Cases, 
pp. 150-3 
145. R. v. Blakeman (1850) 3 C. & R. 97; Creed v. 
Fisher (1854) 9 Ex. 472` (the privilege seems 
to have been modelled upon the Crown's right 
of stand-by which enabled the Crown to 
exercise a right; of peremptory challenge until 
the panel was exhausted). In Ireland those 
charged with misdemeanour were in 1871 given 
the right, to challenge peremptorily upto, 6 
jurors (39 & 40 Vict., c. 78). It was also the 
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practice in some courts for the officer of the 
court, in misdemeanour, not to call the names 
of jurors in respect of whom either side had 
prior to trial raised objection - see Chitty, 
op. cit., 534-5 and 17 Sol. Jo. (1872-3) p. 232. 
146. Treason Act, 1695, s. 7, Juries Act, 1825, s. 
1. 
147. Juries Act, 1825, s. 15. 
148. Printed as Appendix C to 8th Report of 
Criminal Law Commissioners. 
149. R. v. Dowling (1848) 3 Cox 509; R. V. Lacey 
(1848) 3 Cox 517; for an earlier but equally 
unsuccessful attempt see R. v. Edmunds (1821) 
4 B. & Ad. 471. In the 1840s some of the Irish 
judges had shown a disposition to follow the 
U. S. practice (see R. v. Francis (1841) Ir. 
Circ. Rep. 274). 
150. As to which see C. La Rue Munson, Selecting 
the Jury, 4 Yale L. J. (1893) 173 at p. 179. 
151. A juror after challenge for cause could 
be examined as to the leaning of his 
affections or the sufficiency of his estate, 
but he could not be interrogated as to 
'(that)... which may tend to his own disgrace, 
discredit, or the injury of his character... or 
even whether he had previously declared his 
opinion that the prisoner is guilty' (Chitty, 
op. cit., 550). 
152. Questions allowed as to whether jurors came 
from a particular locality (R. v. Edwards, The 
Times, Aug. 16,1822; R. v. Brookes, The 
Times, Sept. 13,1822; and R. V. McKeand, The 
Times, Aug. 18,1826); whether they had any 
connection with the Bank of England (R. v. 
Rigand, The Times, Feb. 17,1826); whether any-i 
of them belonged to the Society by which the, 
prosecution was brought (R. v. Richard Carlile' 
(1819) 1 S. T. N. S 1387). In R. v. Nicholson. 
(1840) 4 Jur. 558 the court expressed the 
view that the defendant should be furnished, 
with the names of members of the society which, 
had instituted the prosecution, so that he, 
might exercise his right of challenge. ` 
Questions were disallowed in R. v. Swann (The 
Times, Jan. 15,1820) as to who a juror's., 
landlord was, and in R. v. Davidson (The" 
Times, Oct. 24,1820) as to whether any juror 




1.7 Wm. III, c. 3 (indictments for treason); 20 
Geo. II, c. 30 (impeachment). 
2. Those accused of misdemeanour, like defendants 
in civil suits, appear always to have been 
allowed counsel (4 Bla. Comm. 355 n. 8). This 
was one of many respects in which procedure in 
misdemeanour resembled civil procedure (others 
included imparlance & the right to move for a 
new trial where the trial had been in the 
King's Bench). Note also prosecutions in the 
King's Bench for misdemeanour were always 
listed in The Times under the head 'Civil 
Actions. ' 
3. Holdsworth, H. E. L., v., p. 192 and the 
authorities there cited. The rule denying 
counsel to those accused of treason or felony 
can be traced back - to at least Edward Is 
reign (c. f. Y. B. 30 & 31 Ed. I (R. S. ) 530). 
Text-writers offered a variety of explanations 
of it: - the court was counsel for the prisoner 
(Coke 3 Inst. 137); the evidence to (convict) 
must be so decisive that all the counsel in 
the world could not gainsay it' per Lord 
Nottingham in Lord Cornwallis' case (1678) 2 
Harg. S. T. 726 (repeating and improving upon 
Coke 3 Inst. 137); 'trials would take too long 
if men of law were allowed' (Staunf, Pleas, f. 
151); if the accused pleaded his own case his 
gesture or countenance would give some 
indication of whether he was speaking the 
truth (Staunf. ibid).; 'it requires no manner 
of skill to make a plain and honest defence 
which in cases of this kind is always the 
best' (Hawk. P. C., c. 39 s. 2); for an unlikely 
explanation see Sir J. Hawles in Colledge's 
Case (1681) 8 S. T. 723 at 726; a more cynical 
explanation is that the rule stemmed from a 
reluctance to allow a prisoner on a capital 
charge any advantage which might lead to an 
acquittal. 
4. The concession was less generous than it 
sounded. The prisoner had to propose the point 
and only if the court thought it arguable 
would counsel be allowed (see e. g. The, Trial 
of Lord Preston (1691) 12 S. T. 659 at 660 'It 
is not the prisoner's doubt but the doubt of 
,,. 
the court that will occasion the assignment of 
counsel' per Atkins. C. B. )., The exception 
extended to, assigning counsel to draw and 
argue a special plea such as pardon or 
autrefois acquit (c. f. R. v. Chamberlain 
(1833) :6C. & P. 93). Other pre-eighteenth 
century, exceptions ., permitted the prisoner 
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counsel in appeals. of felony and upon a 
collateral issue (e. g. the right to sanctuary 
- see Hawkins c. 39, ss. 1 and 5). 
5. This development appears to have occurred 
around 1730. Langbein, in his study of Old 
Bailey trials having found none in previous 
years, found unmistakeable instances of 
counsel cross-examining for the defence in 
1734-5 and regularly in the years thereafter. 
Beattie's study of the Surrey assize records 
led him to a similar dating. At first there 
appears to have been a lack of uniformity of 
judicial practice, some judges permitting 
counsel to put questions direct, others 
allowing counsel to suggest questions to the 
prisoner, whilst others insisted that 
questions be put through the court (17 S. T. 
1022) and this was still, semble, a feature 
even in 1816 (see Chitty, Crim. Law (1st ed. ) 
Vol. 1,408). 
6. Two devices commonly employed by counsel to 
outflank the prohibition were to make a speech 
'under the mask of cross-examination' (as to 
which see n. 32 infra), and making jury points 
in the course of or under the guise of a legal 
submission to the judge (c. f. the Irish case 
(cited by Denman ((1824) P. D. X1,215) where 
the judge in irritation asked 'Sir, are you 
addressing the court or the jury? to receive 
the answer 'I am addressing the court, my 
Lord, but I hope the jury will hear me'; see 
also R. V. Case, The Times, Aug. 21,1821. of 
the two devices the former appears to have 
been both generally employed and fairly 
generally tolerated by judges (see n. 32 infra 
and 2nd Report of the Criminal Law 
Commissioners pp. 3-4 and App. p. 85). 
7. The fate of the pre-1836 Bills was :- the 1821. 
Bill was refused a second reading; the 1822, 
1823 and 1828 Bills had their second reading 
deferred; those of 1824 and 1826 failed at the 
motion for leave to bring in stage; the Bills 
of 1825 and 1833 reached the committee stage; 
the 1834 and 1835 Bills completed all their 
stages in the Commons; in the Lords the, 1834 
Bill did not get beyond a first reading 
whilst the 1835 Bill was referred to a Select 
Committee. 
8. Even Brougham was initially against the Bill. 
He was converted in 1826 ((1826) P. D. XV, 
626). 
9.2nd. Report of Criminal Law Commissioners. The 
Report recommended limiting the reform 
initially to capital felonies and to" non- 
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capital cases in which prosecuting counsel 
addressed the jury. 
10. (1836) P. D. XXXV 1249; royal assent: 20th 
August, 1836. 
11. See e. g. Lamb and MacKintosh in the 1824 
debate (P. D. XI, 182 and 300 citing 
respectively 4 Bla. Comm. 349 and Jeffries 
C. J. in R. v. Rosewall (1684) 10 S. T., 147, 
MacKintosh made the point the need for counsel 
was greater in treason than felony since 
traitors were usally men of education whereas 
most felons were not (ibid. 201). In 1826 
debate Twiss (P. D. XV, 613-4) made the point 
that some misdemeanours were as grave as or 
graver than felony so that it could not be, 
said that there was anything in the character 
of felonies which justified their being 
treated differently then misdemeanours. Also, 
sometimes the same facts could be charged as 
felony, misdemeanour or treason as the 
prosecutor pleased, thus giving the prosecutor 
the power to decide whether the prisoner 
should have full benefit of counsel at trial. 
On these latter points see also the evidence 
of Sir Frederick Pollock to the Criminal Law 
Commissioners, Grant ((1834) P. D. XXIV, 167),, 
and Lord Lyndhurst ((1835) P. D. XXXIV, 761-2) 
who cited the bizarre way the existing rule 
operated in the case of offences which were 
misdemeanour on first conviction but felony 
upon a second or subsequent conviction. 
12. (1824) P. D. XI 201-2 (Mackintosh); 210,211 
(Dr. Lushington) 217 (Denman); (1826) P. D. XV, 
595 (Lamb), 610 (Twiss); (1836) P. D. XXXIV, 
765 (Lord Lyndhurst) and the 2nd. Report of 
the Criminal Law Commissioners, pp. 2-3. The 
reformers argued that it was not simply lack 
of education and intelligence which led 
prisoners to acquit themselves so badly when 
they addressed the jury, there was also the, 
terror of their situation. Also it often'came 
as a , 
complete surprise to the prisoner to 
learn that his counsel was not permitted to 
speak for him (Twiss (1826) P. D. XV, 610). 
Alderman Harmer told the Criminal Law 
Commissioners that it was innocent prisoners 
who were at the greatest disadvantage being 
-`: 'surprised and confused by the false evidence 
called against them' (2nd Report, ',, p. 3). A 
point made time and time again= was, that the 
class of case in which an address by. counsel 
was most needful and the prisoner' at the 
greatest disadvantage was that, where the 
evidence against him was circumstantial', (see 
(1824) P. D. XI. 210 (Dr. Lushington); (1826) 
P. D. XV 612 (Twiss); 623 (Scarlett), and 628 
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(Brougham); (1834) P. D. XXIV, 163 (Althorp). 
See also the story as to Lord Lyndhurst's 
conversion to the principle of the 1836 Bill 
told in (1899) 111 Ed. Rev. 189. 
13. Lord Lyndhurst at the report stage of the 1836 
Bill ((1836) P. D. XXXV, 179. See also Twiss. 
(1824) P. D. XI, 187; (1826) P. D. XV, 609 and 
Denman (ibid. ) 630-1, and 2nd Report of the 
Criminal Law Commissioners, p. 3. 
14. (1824) P. D. XI, 217-20 (Denman), & 219 
(Martin); (1833) P. D. XVI, 1201, (O'Connell); 
(1834) P. D. XXIV, 168 (Pollock); (1835) P. D. 
XXVIII, 868 (Buller), and 2nd Report of the 
Criminal Law Commissioners App. pp. 74 & 86. 
15. (1834) P. D. XXIV 158-60 (Ewart). 
16. (1833) P. D. XVI, 1200 'when a prisoner had a 
real defence it could require no speech from 
counsel' (Poulter); and (1834) P. D. XXIV, 824 
Sir Eardley Wilmot (he had never seen a wrong 
conviction in twenty eight years' experience). 
17. (1821) P. D. VI, 945 (Lockhart), 1513 
(Solicitor-General).. 
18. (1826) P. D. XV, 597 'bar almost universally 
against (as were) the bench' (Attorney- 
General); (1836) P. D. XXXI, 497 'nine tenths 
of the profession and the judges were hostile' 
(Eardley Wilmot). By 1836 the reform had won 
converts amongst the judges most notably Lords 
Lyndhurst and Brougham and it was also claimed 
that the bar now favoured reform (1836) P. D. - 
XXXIV, 763). Park J. threatened to resign if 
the 1836 Bill became law, but did not (A 
Century of Law Reform (1901) p. 50). 
19. (1824) P. D. XI, 194 (North); (1826) P. D. XV, 
606 (Peel); ibid. 625 (Solicitor-General). 
20. A variety of chilling prognoses was offered: 
(1821) P. D. VI, 945 '12,000 hours annually 
would be spent on counsels' speeches in 
criminal cases. '; (1834) P. D. XXIV, 162 'The 
Assizes would be extended to three or four 
times their present duration'; (1835) 'P. D. 
XXVIIII, 872 'the business of the West Riding 
Sessions would never be got through; (1835) 
P. D. XXIX, 356 'it would double or treble the 
county rates all over England. '; (1836)''P. D. 
XXXIV, 771 'a large addition to the... number 
of judges would be necessary. ' 
21. (1824) P. D. XI, 190-1 (North). 
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22. (1824) P. D. XI, 192 (North), 207 (Attorney- 
General); (1826) P. D. XV, 598 (Attorney- 
General); 606 (Peel); (1834) P. D. XXIV, 166 
(Goulburn). 
23. The maxim was so described by the Criminal Law 
Commissioners (2nd Report, p. 8). If it was 
misleading the judges themselves did little to 
disabuse the public of the misconception (see 
Chapter 4, n. 44). The maxim was invoked by the 
judges in 1893 when advising the Home Office 
against introducing a system of criminal legal 
aid (see n. 161 below). 
24. (1824) P. D. XI, 185 (Lamb); (1826) P. D. XV, 10 
'from the prisoner he has no instructions at 
all' (Twiss); (1835) P. D. XXVIII, 629 'the 
only brief he got... was the depositions which 
were in fact the prosecutor's brief' (Twiss); 
and (1836) P. D. XXXIV, 767 (Lord Lyndhurst). 
25. 'The duties clashed' Twiss (1826) P. D. XV, 
610; see also (1821) P. D. IV, 945,1514; 
(1826) P. D. XV, 210; (1834) P. D. XXIV, 159, 
630. The point was neatly made by Ewart in his 
evidence to the Criminal Law Commissioners: - 
'If he is an efficient counsel he transgresses 
his proper position as a judge' 2nd. Report, 
App. p. 31. 
26. In this limited sense the maxim was accurate 
enough. 
27. (1824) P. D. XI, 204 'the strong effect of 
habit - the repugnance to change long 
established rules'. 
28. (1834) P. D. XXIV, 191. See also (1824) X1,204 
(the people were not competent to decide upon 
such nice questions). Two petitions were, in 
fact, presented to Parliament urging reform; 
the first from a number of Old Bailey jurors 
was presented by Martin at the start of the 
1826 debate; the second was presented in 
March, 1827 (H. C. Journal, 1826-7, p. 328). 
29. Romilly cited by Ewart at (1834) P. D. XXIV, 
158. See also O'Connell (1833) P. D. XVIII, 
612 'As to time why try men at all, if they 
had not time to try them justly'. 
30. (1833) P. D. XXXV, 133 'Many prisoners would 
still remain without counsel to defend them, 
for they would not have the funds to procure 
such assistance; and in cases where the 
prisoner's- guilt was.. clearly proved, no 
counsel of the'least discretion would think of 
addressing the jury, (Lord Abinger). A -point 
=-`, made repeatedly was that the Act would result 
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in a shortening of cross-examination which 
would not longer be used as a vehicle for a 
jury speech ((1826) P. D. XV, 624 (Scarlett); 
(1835) P. D. XXVIII, 862 (Buller); 869 
(O'Connell), 870 (Dr. Lushington); Second: 
Report of the Criminal Law Commissioners p. 
15, App. p. 69 and 74. It was also claimed 
that the dislike of the judge, and the 
ridicule of the profession would act as a 
brake on long speeches ((1835) P. D. XXVIII, 
630): Abinger's point that responsible counsel 
would not trouble the jury with a speech if 
the case was clear is borne out by cases both - 
pre- and post-Act (see e. g. R. v. Colvill, Theý_ 
Times, Jan. 12,1803; R. v. Weaver, The Times, 
Jan. 5,1822; R. v. Richards, The Times, Oct. 
28,1836; R. v. Rowe, The Times, Apr. 1,1839; 
R. v. Fitzgerald, The Times, Sept. 23,1870. 
It is not easy to assess what impact the Act 
had on court sitting times. However, it was 
widely believed that it had caused ar 
considerable increase in the length and 
expense of Old Bailey sittings. In January, 
1837 Sir Peter Laurie told the Middlesex 
Magistrates that in 1836 there had been 87 
more sitting days than in 1835 and the cost 
had been £3000 more, which increases he 
attributed to the effects of the Act (The 
Times, Jan. 27,1837). Later that year the 
salaries of the Recorder and Common Serjeant; 
were increased by £500 p. a. each in 
consequence of evidence of increased burdens 
being imposed on the City Judges, particularly; 
since the passing of the Prisoners' Counsel 
Bill (City of London, Administration of 
Justice Committee Records). 
31. (1826) P. D. XV, 625 (Scarlett), 627 
(Brougham). 
32. (Denman); 2nd. Report of the Criminal Law 
Commissioners, App. 73. 
32. (1824) P. D, XI, 189 (Lamb); (1826) P. D. XV, 
590 & 593 Ewart); 2nd. Report of the Criminal 
Law Commissioners p. 12; and so far as 
intemperate conduct by prosecuting counsel was 
concerned the judge would, in any case, 
intervene to stop it (1836) P. D. XXXIV, 770 
(Lord Lyndhurst). The point was also made 
that under the existing system judges 
commenting adversely upon points made by 
prisoners was by no means unknown, whilst heat 
between counsel was often generated by defence 
counsel seeking to make a jury speech under 
the guise of cross-examination ((1826) XV, 
612; (1835) P. D. XXVIII, 630 (Twiss); (1834) 
P. D., XXIV 164 (O'Connell); (1836) P. D. XXXIV, 
770 (Denman). 
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33. For Old Bailey statistics for the whole 
century see Appendix 1. Beattie found from a 
study of the Old Bailey Sessions Papers for 
the period Dec. 1799 to April 1800 that 96 out 
of 335 (28.6%) of defendants accused of 
property offences were represented by counsel, 
a figure which ties in with that for July 1800 
given at Appendix 1. 
34. An analysis of newspaper reports of trials on 
indictment in Staffordshire in 1843 shows 
counsel retained for the defence in only 25% 
of the cases, with the percentage of 
undefended prisoners being much higher at 
Sessions than at Assizes (Phillips, Crime & 
Authority in Victorian England, p. 104 n. 16). 
At the 1841 Summer Assizes the calendar for 
" Nottingham county contained 12 cases in only 
one of which was the prisoner defended by 
counsel (The Times, July 23,1841); see also 
n. 78 infra. 
35. Manchester, Modern Legal History p. 166 citing 
4 Bla. Comm. (5th ed) 3.32. As to foreign 
commentators see generally Radzinowicz, 
History, Vol. 1,712-26. The debates on the 
Prisoners' Counsel Bills abound with tributes 
to the mildness and fairness of English 
criminal procedure - see e. g. (1821) P. D. IV, 
945 & 946; (1824) P. D, XI, 186,189 & 209; 
(1833) P. D. XVI 1199 (Poulter). 
36. Peel in the 1826 debate urged the standard of 
proof and the jury unanimity rule as ground 
for leaving the law as it stood - P. D. XV, 
608. 
37. See generally Langbein, Beattie and chapter 4 
supra. It is perhaps a little surprising that 
during the Commons debates the reformers did 
not make the point that any claim by judges to 
act as counsel for prisoners was inevitably 
compromised by the practice of their acting as 
prosecutors. 
38. See 1835 P. P. (HL 130) XLVI, 317. Phillipps at, 
pp. 7-8 of his evidence and see also The Times, 
Feb. 10,1836. Voices were also raised against 
the clause in the Commons on the Second 
Reading of the 1834 Bill (P. D. XXIV, 1097-8). 
It was claimed it would extend sessions. from 
one sitting to the next, increase judicial 
patronage, and was unnecessary; in the event 
it passed the debate 33-25. 
39.1843 1 L. T. 635. 
40. He also suggested a Society for the Defence of 
Prisoners to be funded by popular subscription 
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as were the many societies for the prosecution 
of felons. In 1884 there is reference to such- 
a society in Finsbury but it was almost 
certainly fraudulent (The Times, Nov. 21, 
1884). 
41.1856 P. P. (456) L 79. 
42. In 1850 the magistrates in many counties were 
not prepared to order the fees of the 
prosecutor's counsel to be paid out of the 
county rates - see 1845 P. P. (in 390) XLI, 411 
and generally chapter 4. See also Lord 
Harcourt (1881) P. D. CCLXVII, 431 'It was 
impossible that the state should undertake the 
defence of every prisoner as well as his 
prosecution. ' 
43. Allison, Principles of the Criminal Law of 
Scotland, vol. ii, p. 379. See also 33 Ir. L. T. 
(1899) 322 'Annually .. in each district two or 
three solicitors for the poor are appointed 
who visit the prisons and take the prisoners' 
statements and prepare their defences. 
Similarly, so many counsel are appointed on 
the various circuits the senior of those who 
volunteer being chosen'. 
44. Mr. Commissioner Kerr (a Scot): G. Pitt Lewis, 
Mr. Commissioner Kerr and Individuality, p. 
259 
45. Letter Nov. 11,1882 quoted 74 L. T. 32. 
46.33 Ir. L. T. (1899), p. 453. 
47. Ibid. A guinea was the minimum fee in Cox's 
day but in 1824 one finds a reference to brief 
fees of half a guinea being paid at' 
Westminster Hall (The Times, Apr. 12,1824 
(Middlesex Sess. cases)). Cox remarked then 
upon the brief fee rule as an obstacle to_a 
criminal legal aid system -IL. T. 635. 
48. Section d. Infra. 
49. The Times, Apr. 14,1903. 
50. (1834) P. D. XXIV, 1098 (Aglionby). 
51. R. v. Hadfield, The Times, June 18,1800. 
Erskine's reply to Lord Kenyon's request that 
he act was 'I have ever understood it to be 
the universal opinion and practice of the bar 
that if a person accused of crime prays the 
court to assign him counsel and names any 
person who practises-in the court in which the 
person is arraigned he is bound to give his 
assistance'. 
382 
52. R., v. Fitzpatrick & Fitzpatrick, The Times 
Aug. 22,1818. 
53. R. v. Daw & Daw, The Tim es, Mar. 28,1825. 
54. R. v. Thomas, The Times, Aug. 11, 1825. 
55., R. v. Probert, The Times, Apr. 6 and 8,1825. 
The actual exchange between Probert and the 
Lord Chief Justice is reported thus: 'My lord 
I have not been able to employ counsel for my 
defence, and I have therefore prepared within 
a few days a brief for that purpose, and I 
trust your lordship will assign some gentlemen 
at the bar to undertake my defence. ' Lord 
Chief Justice: 'The court cannot assign any 
gentlemen to undertake your defence, they can 
only assign counsel to advise you in matters 
of law'. 
56. R. v. Redding, The Times, Aug. 11,1823. 
57. R. v. Nuttall, The Times, Sept. 8,1817; see 
also R. v. Sullivan, Limerick Assizes, The 
Times, Aug. 4,1820. 
58. Vol. 1,407-14. 
59. The Times reports of Assize and Old Bailey 
trials for the period 1820-60 reveal the 
following pattern 
Decade Cases in which Murder-cases in 
counsel assigned which prisoner 
undefended 
1820-29 5 13 
1830-39 4 20 
1840-49 28 32 
1850-59 61 19 
The figures for murder cases in which the 
prisoner was undefended are almost certainly 
understated (they do not include cases in 
which, although the report does not state in 
terms that the prisoner was undefended, there 
are strong reasons for believing that he was). 
60. Occasionally, one comes across assignments in 
cases other than murder - see e. g. R. v. 
Smith, The Times, Aug. 10,1848 
(manslaughter); R. v. Clarke, The Times, June 
17,1849 (arson); R. v. Chesham, The' Times, 
Mar. 7,1851 (poisoning); R. v. Jones, The 
Times, July 28 1855 (theft); 'and ' also R. v. 
Heatherington and R. v. Chipchase no 70. 
infra.. 
61. See e. g. Woodward, The Age of Reform, 2nd ed., 
p. 470 'After 1838 and for the rest of the 
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century no person was hanged except for murder 
or (upto 1861) attempted murder'. 
62. E. g. R. v. Jackson, The Times, Dec. 14,1861, ', = 
R. v. Clark, The Times, Feb. 27,1862; R. v. 
Dethridge, The Times, July 26,1869. 
63. See e. g. R. v. Hodkinson, The Times, Aug. lg, 
1853; R. v. Sanson, The Times, Aug 20,1855; 
R. v. Andrew, The Times, Aug. 3,1874. 
64. See R. v. Anncliffe, The Times, Mar. 15,1842 
(a clear case); R. v. Crawford, The Times, 
July 20,1840, and R. v. Riddle, The Times, 
July 13,1842. 
65. R. v. Johnson, The Times, Dec. 16,1859. See 
also R. v. Orrell, The Times, Mar. 27,1835. 
66. R. v. McGregor & Lambert, (1844) 1 Cox 346. 
67. R. v. Geering, The Times, Aug. 2,1849. 
68. R. v. Frith (1859) 9 Ir. Jur. 367. 
69. Clearly demonstrated by two cases of attempted 
murder tried by Alderson B. at the 1837 Spring 
Assizes. In the first (R. v. Hetherington, The 
Times, Feb. 27) tried at Carlisle the judge 
took the initiative and had counsel assigned 
to the accused. In the second (R. V. 
Chipchase, The Times, Feb. 28) tried at the 
next Assize town (Newcastle) the prisoner was 
undefended. Both were convicted but only 
Heatherington left for execution. 
70. R. V. Plant, The Times, Dec. 17,1857 
(Stafford). 
71. R. v. Murray, The Times, Aug. 2,1858 (York). 
72. R. V. Jones, The Times, Mar. 30,1859. 
73. R. v. Jones, The Times, Dec. 21,1861. 
74. R. v. Hunniset, The Times, Aug. 4,1862. 
75. The 1860s cases were R. V. Gallagher, Aug. 17, ' 
1860; R. v. Jones supra; R. v. Hunisett supra; 
R. v. Moore, Aug. 15,1862; R. v. Lancastell, 
Dec. 24,1863; R. v. Eatwell, Mar. 5,1864; R. 
v. Stowler, Aug. 12,1865; R. v. Pink, Dec. 
11,1865; R. v. Smith, June 11,1868 (5 of-the 
9 were convicted; 2 were found unfit, to 
plead; 1 was acquitted; and the outcome of the 
other cases is not stated; in 3 of the cases 
Martin B. was the judge; 5 at least were 
infanticide cases. 
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The 1870s cases were: - R. V. Egan, July 21, 
1870; R., v. Trewens, Aug. 1,1870; R. v. 
Andrew, Aug. 3,1874; R. v. Igo & Lynn, Dec. 
9,1874; R. v. Brown, Nov. 7,1878; R. v. 
Sherwood, May 5,1879; in 1 case the accused 
was acquitted; in another the accused was 
found not guilty by reason of insanity; in 2 
the conviction was for manslaughter only; in 
the others the outcome is not given; 2 at 
least were infanticide cases. 
76. Examples include; - R. v. Hollowell, The Times, 
Nov. 11,1880 (rape); R v. Haylock, The Times, 
Feb. 3,1882 (poisoning); R. v. Dowling, The 
Times Jan. 11,1889; R. v. Cook, The Times, 
Mar 7,1889 (threatening letter); R. v. Adams, 
The Times, Nov. 6,1896 (wounding with 
intent). 
77. As to infancy see e. g. R. v. Sinden, The 
Times, Dec. 21,1888 (boys aged 10 and 9) and 
R. v. Moss & Thomas, The Times, Dec. 25,1888 
(boys 10 and 8- manslaughter). As to penalty 
see e. g. R. v. Arnemann, The Times, Mar. 10, 
1890 (shooting at county court judge with 
intent - undefended - 20 years' penal 
servitude); R. v. Poulton, The Times, Dec. 6, 
1890 (rape on daughter; undefended; penal 
servitude for life). 
78. R. v. Gillingham 1910 5 Cr. App. R. 187 
79.1903 P. P. VII, 590. See also the Recorder of 
London's explanation of his pre-1903 Act 
practice - he had not liked to exercise (the 
power to assign) except very sparingly as he 
had not been able to make any order for the 
payment of a fee' (1904) 68 J. P. 40. 
80. The Times report of R. v. Luie & Brown, Apr. 
9,1874, suggests that the usual course by 
then was for the judge, upon the conclusion of 
the prosecution opening, to inquire of the 
counsel in court whether any of them 
represented the prisoner. If that be right it 
would explain in part some of the late 
assignments one finds. 
81. E. g. R. V. Daly & MacFarlane, The Times, Apr. 
5,1851. 
82. E. g. R. v. Beveridge, The Times, Mar. 8,1847. 
83. See R. v. Thomson & Mullaly, The. Times,. Mar. 
17,1868 (Fenian case). 
84. In 1868 the Law Journal (Vol. 3, p. 270) 
reported that the Home Secretary had been 
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approached to provide funds for the defence of 
a prisoner charged as accessory to a notorious 
murder on the grounds that an assignment of 
counsel would not secure adequate 
representation. The result of the application 
is not given but the Journal was not sanguine. 
One also sees from time to time traces of a 
doctrine that counsel asked by a judge to 
watch the case on a prisoner's behalf (which 
was one of the form of words used to assign) 
was not obliged to address the jury on his 
behalf but merely to see that he was tried 
according to law - see R. v. Atter, The Times,., 
July 20,1848 (the counsel involved was 
appropriately called Missing) and R. V. 
Mahaig, The Times, Dec. 25,1863. 
85. R. v. Doidge, The Times, Aug. 8, 1862. 
86. R. v. Cody & Cody, The Times, Jan 31,1848. 
87. R. v. Fogarty (1850) 5 Cox 161. 
88.77 Ir. L. T. (1873) p. 3; by the end of the 
century the system in Ireland in capital cases 
was for counsel and solicitor to be assigned 
and paid out of public funds - O'Shaugnessy 
Q. C. in his evidence to the Select Committee 
on the Poor Prisoners' Defence Bill supra. 
89. Doe d. Bennett v. Hale (1846) 18 L. J. Q. B 353 
'we all known instances in which with the 
sanction of the judge barristers have defended: 
prisoners without the intervention of an 
attorney' (per Lord Campbell L. C. J). 
90. Chitty, Criminal Law, Ist ed. (1816), vol. 1, 
413. 
91. R. v. Wright (1736) 2 Str. 1041; R. v. Morgan 
(1745) 2 Str. 1214. 
92. R. v. Stokes (1818) 3 C. & K. 189. 
93. R. v. Page (1831) 1 Dowl. 507. 
94. R. v. Nicholson (1840) 8 Dowl. P. c. 187; 4 
Jur. 506 
95. Archbold, (20th ed. 1886) devotes four lines 
to the assignment of counsel in capital cases. 
but over a page to defence in forma pauperis., 
96.1 Sol. Jo. (1857), p. 702. 
97. See The Bar, The Attorney & The Client 
(pamphlet 1852). See also Brougham's threat 
in 1824 (backed by his Circuit) to accept 
briefs direct (The Times, Dec. 9,1851), the 
386 
campaign of Bird at Exeter 1845-50 (for which 
see 5 L. T. 359 & 15 L. T. 173); 3 L. T. 500; 36 
L. T. 462 & 492; and Bar meeting reported in 
The Times, Feb. 5,1852. 
98.13 Law. Mag. (1887-8), p. 195. 
99. The Times, June 29,1888. See also report of 
Bar Council's Professional Conduct Committee, 
Jan. 29,1897. 
100. The two barristers were Crouch and Pyke; the 
cases giving rise to the scandal were R. v. 
Pond, an old Bailey case in which Crouch 
prosecuted (The Times, Sept. 23,1844) and R. 
v. Thompson 1844 (a Middlesex Sessions case in 
which Pyke prosecuted (see generally 3 L. T., 
pp. 500-1; and 4 L. T. pp. 7,8,12,25 and 44). 
101.4 L. T.; p. 44. 
102.4 L. T., p. 8. 
103.3 L. T., p. 501. 
104.4 L. T., p. 31; 32 Law Mag. (1844) p. 175. 
105.4 L. T., p. 45. See also 32 Law Mag. (1844), p. 
178 where the practice of handing briefs 
across the dock was referred to as an 
established custom. 
106. R. v. Ball, The Times, Oct. 25,1844 and also 
(1844) 8 J. P. 721. 
107.18 L. J. Q. B. 353. The point at issue in the 
case was the right of a barrister to receive a 
brief from a client direct in a civil suit; 
the court held that he was, the want of an 
attorney being a breach of etiquette only, and 
a matter for the barrister's Inn and not for 
the court. 
108.15. L. T., p. 174. 
109.4 L. T., p. 25 'Necessity knows no law and if a 
prisoner came to be tried without the means, of 
employing an attorney, no man at the bar would 
object to conduct his case if required to do 
so' adding ('but the truth is that this 
'necessity is but occasional'). See also a 
letter to like effect in The Times, - Oct. 2, 
1844 (Bar etiquette). 
110. Reply of the Inspectors to the Report of the 
Court of Aldermen so far as relates to the 
Prison of Newgate, 1835 P. P. (486), XLII, pp. 
2 and 6. 
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111. For the term 'docker' see e. g. 29 Law Jo., p. 
275. 
112. Halsbury's Laws, 4th ed., Vol. 3. para. 1141. 
As to the fee of £1.3.6. see Bar Council 
Annual Statement 1906/7, p. 7. The privilege., 
of making a choice from the counsel in court 
appears occasionally to have been afforded to 
prisoners assigned by the court - see case 
cited at n. 83. 
113.1944-5 P. P. (Cmnd. 6641) V, 187, p. 6. 
114. Abel Smith and Stevens, Lawyers & The Courts, 
p. 32. 
115. In 1847 the pay of a sergeant in the 
Metropolitan Police was 27/- per week (see R., - 
v. Ashford, The Times, Mar. 4,1847). The dock, 
workers' strike of 1889 was for a minimum wage- 
of 6d per hour. See also Cornhill Mag., Vol. 
10 N. S. (1901) p. 446 'A workman's budget' -a 
'the class we are considering is... one earning 
from 20/- to 25/- to 40/- a week'). In,, 
November, 1882 a correspondent gave as the- 
reason for the rarity of dock briefs that,, 
'guineas are very scarce among them' 
prisoners) 74 L. T., Nov. 11. ) 
116. Old Bailey prosecuting fees were in 1837 set 
at 1 guinea in all but the most complicated` 
cases (The Times, Aug. 16,1887 and Dec. 17, 
1850). In 1903 the Report of the Departmental 
Committee to inquire into allowances to, 
prosecutors and witnesses revealed that in' 
half the counties the fee allowed to 
prosecuting counsel at Sessions was still 1 
guinea (1903 P. P. (254,264) LVI, 357). At 
Stafford in 1878 Denman J. was assured by,. a 
local solicitor that there would be 'no 
difficulty in finding counsel to undertake an 
Assize defence for 1 guinea (R. v. Anwell°,: & 
Simpson, The Times, Mar. 27,1878). 
117. Chitty, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 407-14. The 
silence in fact continues for much of the 
century. Archbold (20th ed. 1886), although it 
contains much learning about defence in forma 
pauperis, and refers to assignment of counsel 
by the court is wholly silent about dock 
briefs. 
118.1835 P. P. (HL 130) XLVI, 317 at p. 8 of his 
evidence. 
119. Bar Council, Annual Statement, 1900-1. 
120. The Times, Oct 8,1844. 
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121. See chapter 6 for the percentage of bills 
thrown out at the Old Bailey in mid century 
and by the century's end. 
122. The dock brief also operated as a protection 
to prisoners against swindling by sham 
attorneys. In the 1840s cases of prisoners 
being left without counsel at trial, after 
having paid out money to a sham attorney for a 
defence, were common, a grievance made much 
worse by the refusal of judges to put off 
trials in such circumstances - see generally 
(1844) 8 J. P. 721. 
123. Per Recorder of London in R. v. Nunzio Calendo 
(1904) 68 J. P. 40. 
124. E. g. 116 L. T. 493. In 1900 the Report of the 
Special Committee of the Bar Council on Dock 
Defences recommended that the Home Office take 
steps to draw the dock brief system to the 
attention of all prisoners. 
125. F. W. Ashley, op. cit., p. 80. For evidence of 
the existence of the system in the 1860s see 
Sol. Jo., June 15,1861. 
126. Ashley, op. cit., p. 82. 
127.1903 P. P. (254,264) VII, 583. 
128. Bar Council, Annual Statement, 1900/1. 
129. Published Nov. 21,1900. 
130. (1859) P. D. CLIII, 402 'if a man were believed 
by his neighbours to be innocent he would not 
be suffered to remain without the means of 
moving for a new trial'; see also R. v. 
Boreham, The Times, Feb. 5,1896 (schoolmaster 
charged with sexual offence defended out of 
fund subscribed by neighbours); R. v. Prince, 
The Times, Jan. 14,1898 (counsel instructed 
by prisoner's friends). 
131. F. W. Ashley, op. cit., p. 177. 
132. See e. g. (1904) 68 J. P. 100 (Newcastle case), 
294 (R. V. Samways, Dorchester) and 533 (R. v. 
Hunt, Salisbury) friends of accused 
subscribing fund for his defence on a murder 
charge. 
133. The practice is described in detail by Montagu 
Williams, Leaves of a Life, p. 90°and referred 
to in R. v. Buck, The Times, Mar.: 8,1860. 
134. R. v. Cornwell- Wilkinson'-s Newgate Calendar, 
Vol. 3, p. 42. 
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135. R. v. Jackson, The Times, Oct. 23,1844. 
136. R. v. McGregor & Lambert (1844) 1 Cox 346. 
137. Lambert, When Justice Faltered, p. 128-9. 
138. R. v. Harvey, The Times, Nov. 2,1801. 
139. R. v. Bell, The Times, July 30,1831 (for 
other examples see R. v. Nuttall, The Times, 
Sept. 8,1817 (murder); R. v. Probert, The 
Times, Apr. 6&8,1825 (horse stealing); R. 
v. Timbrill, The Times, July 19,1861 
(prisoner charged with theft; on arraignment 
pulled some money out of his pocket and asked 
if any counsel would defend him; defended 
without fee). 
140. R. v. Nash, The Times, Sept. 24,1884. 
141. See 48 Law Mag. (1852) p. 229 (circular letter 
sent out by counsel to solicitors offering to 
do work for low fees); 51 L. T. (1871),. 227_ 
(complaint against Old Bailey Counsel who sign'' 
briefs marked with guineas when they receive, 
only shillings and who take a number of briefs 
at so many a dozen). 
142. E. Marjoribanks, Life of Marshall Hall, pp., 
35-6. 
143. See e. g. The case of the Flowery Land pirates, ' 
The Times, Feb. 4,1864, where the Spanish,. 
Turkish and Greek consuls retained counsel for" 
those of the accused who were their nationals. " 
144.1 L. T., p. 635 (results - of 23 prisoners from- 
whom Yorston took statements 3 were discharged 
as a result of the grand jury throwing out the 
bill, 7 were acquitted and 9 had written 
statements read out to the court). 
145. R. v. Sheen, The Times, July 14,1827. See 
also R. v. Calkin, The Times, Jan. 9,1832 
(child murder). 
146. R. v. Anon., The Times, Oct. 27,1851. 
147. R. v. Adams, The Times, Nov. 27,1851. 
148. R. V. Sloman, The Times, Feb. 1,1859 (see 
also R. V. Parker, The Times, Sept. 23,1854 
(attempted murder)). 
149. R. v. Gould, The Times, Apr. 11,14 & 15,1840; 
see also R. v. Waller, Balch & Noble, 'The 
Times, Nov. 17,1892 where the under-sheriff 
was described as 'retained on behalf of 
the prisoners to instruct counsel'. 
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150. The Times, Nov. 19,1882. 
151. The objects of the fund, were certainly wide 
enough to cover such payments, including as 
they did 'pecuniary aid to... objects of 
distress who come under the official 
cognisance of the sheriffs' and in the 
accounts of the fund for 1880/81 there is 
reference to a sum of £9.16.6. disbursed in 
counsel's fees. 
152. R. v. Gould, The Times, Mar. 1,1862 (murder), 
counsel retained by the sheriff of Berkshire; 
R. v. Brown, The Times, Mar. 29,1864 (child 
murder), counsel retained by sheriff of 
Suffolk; R. v. Gaydon, The Times, Oct. 24, 
1879, Old Bailey, murder case counsel retained 
by sheriff of Essex. 
153. Ashley, op. cit., pp. 328-32. 
154. Marjoribanks, op. cit., p. 51 
155. See H. Montgomery Hyde, Norman Birkett, 1965 
ed., pp. 447-8 (confession for use of 
newspapers signed by the murderer Buck Ruxton 
signed on the day following his arrest); and- 
also PRO: HO 45/2,1330 (trial of Stone for 
murder 1936, newspaper offered to fund defence 
in return for signed confession to be given to 
his solicitor to be held by him under lock and 
key but released to the newspaper in the event 
of his execution). The topic is also discussed 
in R. M. Jackson, The Machinery of Justice in 
England and Wales, 4th ed., p. 139 where the 
author quotes a case in which he was himself 
involved. 
156. Collier v. Hicks (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 663 (cited 
with approval in McKenzie (1971) P. 33 whence 
the institution derives its name). Collier v. 
Hicks concerned a case before magistrates, but 
one occasionally meets with the practice in 
jury cases - see e. g. R. v. Jones, The Times 
Mar. 27,1843, and the case (referred to in 
(1843) P. D. LXIX, 189) where Gurney B., having 
permitted two of the prisoner's friends 'to 
sit near him and assist him with their 
occasional advice and suggestions' put a stop 
to their intervention when it began to disrupt 
the trial). 
157. Dalton, Countrey Justice, 1635 ed., 275 cited 
examples from the reigns of Henry IV and 
Elizabeth I. 
158. In the debate on the Prisoners' Counsel Bill 
of 1834 it was said that when the poverty of a 
prisoner prevented him employing counsel 'all 
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the barristers present lent him what 
assistance they could by suggesting questions 
to the judge and raising points for his 
benefit' ((1834) P. D. XXIV, 167). In 1862 the 
Sol. Jo. (Vol. 6, p. 860) complained of the 
Old Bailey practice of counsel who acted as 
amicus not contenting themselves with merely 
informing the court of a decision or enactment 
but 'beset the judge with vociferous arguments 
in favour of their suggestions'. For examples: 
of counsel intervening as amicus see e. g. R. 
v. Skinner, The Times, Feb. 10,1834; R. v. 
Greensmith, The Times, Aug. 7,1837); R. v. 
Hawtin (1836) 7 C. & P. 281; R. v. Edwards, 
(1838) 8 C. & P. 611 (in both the last two 
cases the prisoner was acquitted in- 
consequence of the point raised by the 
amicus); R. v. Matthew, The Times, Mar. 27,, 
1854 (intervention on behalf of 7 year old-, 
charged with burglary); but the interventions;. 
were not always in favour of the prisoners` - 
(see e. g. R. v. Rawlins & Clark (1835) 7 C. &. 
P. 50 and R. v. Piller (1836) 7 C. & P. 337). 
159. (1883) P. D. CCLXXVIII, 97-8. 
160. PRO HO 45/9784/2907E. 
161.29 L. Jo. (1894), p. 274. 
162. (1897) P. D. XLVIII, 813 (Walton). 
163.1898) P. D. LX, 720-1 (the Chairman of 
Committee ruled the amendment outside the 
scope of the Bill); Viscount Cranborne had 
also put down an amendment along the same 
lines but in the end abandoned it, taking the, 
view that the question ought to be dealt with 
in a separate Bill (1898) P. D. LXII, 748. 
164. Bar Council records. 
165. Report of 24th November, 1898 (Bar Council 
Records) and see 1899 63 J. P. 115. 
166. The Times, Apr. 14,1903 (letter), Apr. 27 
(leader). 
Under the scheme, the cases of all undefended 
prisoners were to be offered to members of the 
bar attending the sessions, according to a 
strict rotation. The cases were to be offered 
first to counsel holding no briefs for either 
prosecution or defence successively in order 
of seniority, and, if the defences had not 
been then exhausted, to counsel who held no 
defence briefs successively according . to seniority, and if the defences were not then 
exhausted the process was to be repeated until 
they were). No counsel was bound to accept any 
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such defence. Those who did were to work 
without fee. The local prison governor was 
told of the scheme, and undertook to inform 
undefended prisoners of it on the first 
morning of each session. 
167. They were Bousfield, Cripps, Sir Joseph Leese, 
Perks, Kimber, Butcher, Atherley Jones, 
Marshall Hall, & Duke (1903) P. D. CXIX, 703). 
168.1903 P. P. (285) III 817. 
169. The Times, letters Apr. 3 and Aug. 2,1903. 
See also letter (12.8.1903) to Lord Chancellor 
(PRO LC02/148). In his correspondence with the 
Lord Chancellor Poland suggested two 
amendments to the Bill: - 
(a) that legal aid under the Act be made 
available to 'children, deaf and dumb 
persons, prisoners of weak intellect, and 
foreign prisoners like The Flowery Land 
pirates and The Lennie mutineers'. 
(b) that legal aid under the Act be confined 
to representation by counsel only (his 
justification for this suggestion, which 
ran entirely counter to what he had been 
saying to The Times six years before was 
that in ninety nine cases out of a 
hundred a copy of the depositions with a 
written statement or an oral conference 
over the dock is the best possible brief 
for counsel). Others were concerned to 
prevent inexperienced counsel being given 
legal aid work. The Common Serjeant 
suggested that men of less than three 
years standing would do more harm than 
good. Herbert Stephen felt that the 
prisoner could be safeguarded by leaving 
it to the solicitor to secure counsel. 
170. PRO LC02/148 - Middlesex Bar resolution 
29.4.1903; Central Criminal Court Bar Mess 
letter May 19,1903; North London Sessions 
Mess letter, (undated). The arguments advanced 
by the bar were essentially the same as had 
been urged against the Prisoners' Counsel Act 
- that under the present system unrepresented 
prisoners were defended by the judge, and 
wrong convictions seldom, if ever, occurred, 
and that if the Bill became law the length of 
.?; court sittings would be enormously increased. 
171.1903 P. P. (254,264) VII, 583. 
172. See Q. 625 'I rather gathered that you think 
that before a prisoner was to be defended at 
the cost of the State he should have fully 
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stated what his defence was? Certainly. 626. 
That should be the one condition? That should 
be the basis of everything. ' 
173. See R. v. Simpson, The Times, Nov. 25,1898 
(adverse comment on failure to disclose 
defence at inquest); & R. v. Larder, The 
Times, Jan. 26,1899. The Justice of the Peace 
for 1903 & 1904 (vols. 67 & 68) records 
numerous examples of judicial criticism of the 
reserved defence - Bigham J. 67 J. P. 557; 
Channell B. ibid. 571 & 583; unidentified 
judge, ibid. 583; Wills J. ibid.; Wills J. 68-- 
J. P. 557 ('I reserve my defence is a common 
trick of solicitors who appear for prisoners- 
who really have no defence. Sometimes it means 
I am going at Assizes to spring a defence upon 
the court, which nobody will be able to 
controvert because they do not know what it is 
and no inquiry can be made. ') 
174. PRO: LC02/148. 
175. PRO: LC02/148: the Central Criminal Court and. 
the Middlesex Sessions Bar messes sent in 
written objections, and the Council of the Law 
Society passed a resolution against the clause 
on Dec. 7,1903. In April, 1904 the Lord Chief 
Justice wrote to the Lord Chancellor asking 
for the repeal of s. 48 of the 1848 Act, and 
suggesting that the examining magistrate 
should, instead of the statutory caution, say 
this to an accused: - 'You have heard the 
charge and the evidence against you. Do you 
wish to make a statement or give evidence upon 
oath? If you do, when the magistrate or, 
magistrates have heard what it is, they will, 
consider whether they can assist you to obtain 
legal assistance. ' 
The proposal aroused no strong enthusiasm in 
the Lord Chancellor and was not pursued 
LC02/148. 
176. (1904) 68 J. P., 29. The Law Times was also 
unenthusiastic: 
'for the small sum of one guinea any poor man 
can be defended by counsel, and this small sum 
is always forthcoming when a prisoner is'made 
acquainted with such right and any defence 
exists' (115 L. T., p. 2). 
177. (1904) 68 J. P., 26.180. Speech on receiving 
the Lord Mayor of London at the Law Courts (He 
had earlier in the year expressed the, same 
view to a grand jury at Hertford: (1904)'68 
J. P., 100). 
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CHAPTER 6 
1. At least 12 jurors had to concur in any 
majority verdict - Hawk., 2. P. C., c. 25, 
s. 15. 
2. J. F. & H. Stephen, Digest of Criminal 
Procedure (1883), p. 187; this was, however, a 
matter of practice, the law prescribed no 
qualification for county grand jurors (Report 
of the Departmental committee on Jury Law, 
1913 P. P. (Cmnd. 6817) XXX, 403, para. 58); 
for-borough grand jurors the qualification was 
the same as for common jurors (see Juries Act, 
1825, s. 1). 
3. See Phillips, Crime & Authority in Victorian 
England, p. 103, and G. G. Alexander, The 
Administration of Criminal Justice, p. 91. The 
1913 Committee found that in London it was the 
practice to call gentlemen who satisfied this 
test. As for boroughs outside London they were 
told that in Nottingham the practice was to 
choose persons of a superior class, and in 
Norwich to select 'professional men and 
persons of independent means' (para. 58). 
4. The oath expressly enjoined secrecy. For the 
form of the oath see G. G. Alexander, op. cit., 
pp. 91-2 
5. As bills began to emerge from the grand jury, 
witnesses in the later cases would be sworn; 
until 1856 such swearing of witnesses was done 
in open court by the common crier (often 
whilst a trial was going on); the Grand Juries 
Act, 1856 substituted a simpler and more 
seemly procedure: - witnesses were henceforth 
to be sworn by the foreman of the grand jury 
in the grand jury room. 
6. When a bill was thrown out by the grand jury 
this did not rank as an acquittal; a second 
bill could not be preferred against the 
accused that session (R. V. Humphreys (1842) 1 
C. & M. 601), and at the end of the session 
he would normally be discharged' by 
proclamation; however, this was not a bar to 
the preferment of a fresh bill at the next 
session - Archbold, 20th ed. (1886) p. 88. 
7. See e. g. Select Committee on Metropolitan 
Police Offices 1837/8 P. P. (578) XV, 321 
evidence of Broughton (Q. 249) "We see bills 
thrown out to our astonishment in-which the 
guilt is put beyond any possibility of doubt". 
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8. Amongst the records of the City of London is a 
draft report from its Administration of 
Justice Committee dated 3 August, 1838, in' 
which it is stated that between November, 1834 
and July, 1838 out of a total of 10,929 bills' 
presented to them Old Bailey grand juries 
threw out 908 (8%); the records of the 
Committee for the same period contain an entry 
to the effect that 1 in 12 bills were ignored 
at the Old Bailey. 
9. Per Sir. F. Thesiger at the Committee stage of 
the Grand Juries (Metropolis) Bill, (1857) 
P. D. CXLV1,1439. 
10. See the Select Committee on Metropolitan 
Police offices 1837/8: - evidence of Good (Qs., 
249-50) 'wholly unused to any business of the 
sort', and Thesiger, (1857) P. D. CXLV, 1429 
'twenty three gentlemen generally unaccustomed 
to legal inquiries'. 
11. Thesiger ibid.: - 'With nothing to guide them 
but the indictment containing the accusation 
and a list of witnesses on the back of it, 
they had to grope their way in the dark'; 
witnesses who gave evidence before the Select 
Committee on Metropolitan Police Offices were' 
divided on the question of the desirability of 
furnishing grand juries with a copy of the 
depositions: Gregory (Q. 1667), and Codd (Q. 
168) thought that the effect would be a- 
substantial decrease in the number of bills 
thrown out whilst Brougham (Q. 252) thought it. 
would make no difference; the jury were under' 
such pressure to get through cases that they 
would not look at the depositions if provided 
with them. 
12. See Bill 1816 P. P. -(416)(0.14) II, 903 and 
(1816) P. D. XXXII, 547-8. 
13. Select Committee on Metropolitan Police 
Offices 1837 P. P. XII (451), 309: evidence of 
Hardwick Q. 575 'there is the opportunity of 
smuggling witnesses away' and Gregory , 
Q. s. 
1666-8 (bribery); see also Select Committee of 
1837/8 (supra) evidence of Brougham Q. 257 and 
Thesiger (1857) P. D. CXLV, 1426-7. 
14. Thesiger (1857) P. D. CXLV, 1429 and (as, Lord 
Chelmsford) (1859) P. D. CLII, 1612; see also 
8th Report of the Criminal Law Commissioners, 
App. C, p. 358n. 
15. The Queen's Bench practice is described in the 
evidence of W. S. Jones set out in Appendix B 
to the 8th Report of the Criminal Law 
Commissioners, Qs. 36-41. The Queen's Bench 
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was not, in fact, the first court to adopt 
this practice (it had been frequently adopted 
between 1660 and the late eighteenth century 
in State Trials (ibid. App. C., p. 358n. ); its 
adoption at the old Bailey was recommended by 
the Administration of Justice Committee of the 
City in its draft report of August 3,1838 and 
approved by the judges on November 2,1838 
(see App. Cr p. 358n. supra, The Times, Nov 3, 
1838 and 6 L. T. (1846) 219 where it was 
claimed that the adoption of the practice had 
reduced the number of bills thrown out from 
12% to 5% of the total; see also Greaves, 
Report on Criminal Procedure, 1856 which 
refers to the practice being in use both at 
the Old Bailey and Durham, and the Old Bailey 
Rules of Dec. 12,1892 r. 6 (cited in Archbold 
, 28th ed. (1900) p. 76)). The Jury Laws Amendment Bill, 1892 proposed that grand 
juries should be furnished with copies of the 
depositions. 
16. See Select Committee on Metropolitan Police 
Offices 1837/8 supra, evidence of Codd Q. 168 
and Thesiger (1857) P. D. CXLV, 1428-9, and (as 
Lord Chelmsford) (1859) P. D. CLII, 1611; the 
Law magazine in an article furnished as a 
response to a questionnaire sent out by the 
Criminal Law Commissioners estimated that the 
attendance of witnesses before grand juries 
involved a cost to the county rates of some 
£3,500 p. a. (8th, App. C). 
17. Thesiger (1857) P. D. CXLV, 1433 and (as Lord 
Chelmsford) (1859) CLII, 1429. 
18. Select Committee on Metropolitan Police 
Offices 1837 supra evidence of Buckle Q. 1182; 
Thesiger (1859) P. D. CLII, 1429. 
19. See Thesiger (1857) P. D. CXLV 1431-2. Also 
chapter 2. 
20. See Thesiger (1857) P. D. CXLV 1431. 
21. See Thesiger ibid. 1426; for the presentments 
themselves see the annual volumes of'The Law 
Times under the heading 'Grand Jury'. 
22. The Bills were the Administration of Justice 
(Metropolitan District) Bill, 1849, (referred 
to a Select Committee which' reported 
favourably on it) ultimately dropped due to 
lack of Parliamentary time; the Grand Juries 
(Metropolitan District) Bill, 1852". -(progress 
halted by general election), and the Grand 
Juries. (Metropolitan District) Bill=, ' 1857 
(withdrawn because I of 'lack of -Parliamentary 
time). The basic scheme of the Bills was that 
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grand juries should be abolished in London, 
and that an information drawn up by the clerk 
of the court and based upon the committal 
charges should take the place of the 
indictment. 
23. Indictable Offences (Metropolitan District) 
Bills, 1860 and 1861. 
24. For the 'thin end of the wedge' argument see 
(1857) P. D. CLVI, 1433-4 and 1436 (Bowyer), 
(1859) P. D. CLIII, 1538, and (1860) CLVI, 901 
(Lord Wensleydale). For the 'constitutional 
argument' see (1857) P. D. CLVI, 1436 (Bowyer) 
1440-1 (Ayrton), 1445 (M'Mahon) 1447 (Cobbett) 
and (1859) P. D. CLIII 1530 (Lord Lyndhurst). 
25. See e. g. presentment by Middlesex grand jury 
1861 31 L. T. 465; presentment by Old Bailey 
Grand Jury 1864 40 L. T. 86; call for abolition 
by Law Society, The Times, Oct. 17,1888. 
26. Jury Law Amendment Bill, 1892. 
27. See chapter 5. 
28. In 1883 grand juries found no bill in 530 
cases and true bills in over 14,000 (4%) - see 
Alexander, op. cit., p. 94; in 1898 the 
percentage of bills thrown out was only h% (95 
out of 3,645 bills) - see Judicial Statistics 
for 1898 (1900 P. P. CIII, 1). 
29. Chitty, Criminal Law, Ist ed. (1816), Vol. 1, 
pp. 168-304. 
30. Criminal Law Commissioners, 8th Report, 1845 
P. P. (656) XIV, 161, p. 12-13 of the Report. 
31. Chitty, op. cit., p. 442-3: 'the prisoner will 
have all the advantage he could possibly 
obtain in this way (i. e. by dilatory plea) by 
motion in arrest of judgment after taking the 
chance of a complete acquittal'. Objections 
based on variances of proof would sometimes be 
taken at the end of the prosecution case. 
32. Abatement was the appropriate plea where the 
name or description of the accused was mis- 
stated. 
33. A demurrer was a plea that the indictment was 
defective in substance or form. 
34.4 Bla. Comm. 334; Chitty, op. cit.,. pp., 
Vol. 1, pp. 442 and 445. 
35. Chitty, op. cit., Vol 1, p. 445 'after the 
indictment has been abated for misnomer the 
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court will not dismiss the prisoner but will 
cause him to be indicted de novo by the name 
disclosed in his plea' and p. 443 'if the 
defendant succeed in his demurrer on any 
formal exception he only obtains a little 
delay'; it was for this reason that abatement 
and demurrer were known as dilatory pleas. 
36. Chitty, op. cit., Vol. l, p. 443; for examples 
of cases where the prisoner was re-indicted 
see e. g. R. v. Sheen, and R. v. Turner and 
Reader infra. In its leader of Dec. 31,1842, 
calling for legislation on the subject, The 
Times asserted that a prisoner who escaped on 
an indictment point could not be re-arraigned. 
This mistake was pointed out by a 
correspondent in a letter published on Jan. 3, 
1843, but the fact that it was made perhaps is 
an indication of how rare a second prosecution 
was in such cases. 
37. R. v. Sheen (1827) 2 C. & P. 634, The Times, 
July 14 and 16,1827. 
38. R. v. Kelly (1825) 1 Lew. 193 (indictment 
charged prisoner with beating deceased on head 
with brick; what he had in fact done was knock 
him to the ground causing his head to strike a 
brick lying on the ground); see also R. v. 
Thompson (1826) 1 Moo. 139 and R. v. McDermott 
(1813) Russ. & Ry. 268 (accused indicted on 43 
Geo. III, c. 58 for cutting with intent to 
murder; acquitted because injury caused by 
stabbing not cutting). 
39. R. v. Turner & Reader (1830) 1 Lew. 49; c. f. 
R. v. Pearson '(1831) 1 Moo. 313 (omission of 
'against the form of statute'). 
40. R. v. Wilson (1806) Russ. & Ry. 116 (this was 
a common cause of acquittal). 
41. R. v. Wilcox (1803) Russ. & Ry. 50 (indictment 
failed to state what forged instrument was). 
42. R. v. Anon. '(1827) 1 Lew. 234" (variance 
between indictment and forged document 
consisting of misspelling of a single word); 
R. v. Wright Roden & Holgate (1828) 1 Lew. 326 
(indictment described forged document as 
signed in the name of Townend; in fact signed 
in name of Turnend); R. v. Goldstein (1822) 
Russ. & Ry. 473 (indictment set out verbatim 
wording of Prussian Treasury bill but 
contained no English translation of it). 
43. Where a prisoner, was undefended, indictment 
points were sometimes taken on his behalf by 
399 
the judge or by a counsel present in court as 
amicus curiae. 
44. See e. g. R. v. Fry & Fry (1822) 5 J. N. 268 
(defendant indicted for and convicted of 
burglary and theft of ten pounds in money; 
counsel moved in arrest of judgment on the 
ground that the money stolen was misdescribed 
in the indictment; pounds had no physical 
existence but were mere expressions of value 
used in computation and so could not be the 
subject of theft; the Twelve Judges held the 
conviction bad). 
45. Peel had originally planned a more 
thoroughgoing reform but had been dissuaded - 
see (1826) P. D. XV, 1235): 'it was originally 
proposed to enact that if upon any indictment 
for felony or misdemeanour, the jury shall be 
satisfied that any person, time, fact, matter; 
or other thing touching which evidence is 
given, is really the same person, time, fact, 
matter or thing intended by the indictment, it 
shall be lawful for the jury to find the" 
defendant guilty notwithstanding any variance 
in the name or description contained in the 
indictment. It was thought, however, by some 
whom I consulted, and in whose judgment i 
place implicit confidence, that this enactment 
goes too far, and that it might introduce a 
laxity and uncertainty into indictments more 
mischievous that the excessive subtlety which 
it is intended to correct'. 
46. S. 20 (the defects listed were averment of any 
matter unnecessary to be proved, omission of 
the words 'as appears by the record', or 'with 
force of arms', or 'against the form of the 
statute' instead of 'against the form of the 
statutes' or vice versa, description of :a 
person by reference to his office rather than 
his name, where time was not of the essence. of 
the offence omitting to state or mis-stating 
the time of the offence, and want of proper or 
perfect venue). 
47. Ibid. s. 19. 
48. By the 11 & 12 Vict., c. 46, s. 4. 
49. By the 12 & 13 Vict., c. 45, s. 10. 
50. See The Times, Feb. 14,1841. 
51. The Times, Dec. 31,1842. 
52.8th Report supra, pp. 8-16. 
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53. Ibid. App. A, p. 249 (the subject was also 
touched upon in a number of other answers to 
the questionnaire, see ibid. p. 216 (Deacon), 
p. 231-2 (Temple); Cobbett at p. 296 actually 
defended the existing law). 
54. S. 24. 
55. S. 25. 
56. Under 3&4 Wm. IV, c. 42, s. 23. 
57. Criminal Procedure Act, 1851, s. 1. 
58. Ibid. s. 4 (murder, manslaughter), s. 5 
(theft, forgery etc. of documents). 
59. See e. g. Sill v. R. (1853) 1 El. & B. 553 
(where it was held that, notwithstanding the 
1851 Act, an indictment for obtaining goods by 
false pretences was bad if it did not state to 
whom the goods belonged; Lord Campbell at p. 
556 said 'I hope that before long the 
Legislature will put an end to this nicety 
among others'. 
60. Indictments Act, 1915. 
61. If the, jury found him mute by visitation of 
God, they might also be called on to try his 
fitness to plead, on which issue the prison 
surgeon would normally be heard. 
62. See Chitty, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 424-5. 
63. By 12 Geo. III, c. 20; for examples of 
prisoners being executed after refusing to 
plead in felony see R. v. Mercier (1777) Leach 
183 and another case referred to therein. 
64. Ss. 1 and 2; this reform had, in fact, been 
urged by Blackstone, 4 Comm. 325 n. 4. 
65. Plea on Indictment Bill, 1860 P. P. (241) V 
207; Greaves in his answer to the Criminal Law 
Commissioners' questionnaire (supra) had 
suggested that prisoners should be taken to be 
pleading not guilty unless they volunteered a 
plea of guilty. The first attempt to carry the 
reform proposed by Brougham's Bill had in fact 
been made by Campbell L. C. J. in 1851 (Criminal 
Procedure Bill, 1851, cl. 28 (see (1851) P. D. 
CXVIII, 1373-4)). 
66. (1860) P. D. CLIX, 757-9. 
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CHAPTER 7 
1. See e. g. R. v. Simonds (1823) 1 C. & P. 84; R. 
v. Bodle (1833) 6 C. & P. 186. 
2. R. v. Beezley (1834) 4 C. & P. 220 (all' 
witnesses on back of indictment ought at least... ' 
to be tendered; Littledale J. ); R. v. Bull", 
(1839) 9 C. & P. 22 (prosecuting counsel ought 
not to keep back witnesses because their-': 
evidence would weaken the case for the 
prosecution; Vaughan & Williams JJ. ); R. v. '", 
Barley (1847) 2 Cox 191 (Beezley cited with, 
approval by Pollock C. B. and Coleridge J. )'. 
3. R. v. Woodhead (1847) 2 C. & K. 520 (the 
prosecution's only duty was to have the 
witnesses on the back of the indictment at 
court - per Alderson B. ); R. v. Edwards (1848) 
3 Cox 82 (the judge would rarely interfere 
with prosecuting counsel's discretion as to, 
which witnesses to call - per Erle J. ); R. V. 
Cassidy (1858) 1 F. & F. 79 (Parke B. ); R. v. 
Thompson (1876) 13 Cox 181. 
4. See R. v. Goodere & others (1741) 17 S. T. 1003, 
R. v. Colley & Sweet (1829) Moo. & M. 329; R., 
v. Wylde (1834) 6 C. & P. 380 (where the judge" 
refused to allow a prosecution witness, who 
remained after being ordered out of court, to 
be examined). 
5. In 1903 the Recorder of Leicester in his 
evidence before the Select Committee on the, 
Poor Prisoners' Defence Bill was asked 'I, 
suppose there is a certain number of ancient 
and skilful prisoners who can cross-examine 
reasonably well? ' He replied 'There is no 
doubt that there is a certain class, but in my 
judgment the majority are wholly incompetent. 
The error made by prisoners attempting to 
cross-examine was: - to make statements 
instead of asking questions, and when reproved 
for that either to lapse into silence or ask 
about irrelevancies' (1903) P. P. (254,264) 
VII, 583). See also T. R. Bridgewater, The-Poor 
Prisoner' Defence Act, 1903. and Gurney 
Campion, Justice & The Poor in England, pp. 
50-1). 
6. In the debate on the 1826 Prisoners' Counsel 
Bill, Lamb M. P. had alluded to a case where 
the trial judge had remarked that he 
considered it a bad thing when men such a's the 
accused were seen so well versed in the 
knowledge of the intricate points of cross- 
examination ((1826) P. D. XV, 94); for examples 
of cases where the prisoner's skill in cross- 
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examining attracted the reporter's attention 
see e. g. R. v. Palmer, The Times, Nov. 8, 
1810; R. v. Redding, The Times, Aug. 11,1823 
and R. v. Clover & Anor., The Times, Mar. 20, 
1824. 
7. R. v. Hardy (1794) 24 S. T. 735. 
8. Parkin v. Moon (1836) 7 C. & P. 408. 
9. Crimen falsi included forgery, perjury, 
subornation of perjury, bribing a witness to 
absent himself, and barratry but not 
conspiracy to defraud (Phillipps on Evidence, 
8th ed., p. 17). 
10. See Phillipps, op. cit., p. 19. 
11.9 Geo. IV, c. 32; competency could also be 
restored by a pardon. 
12. East, 1P. C., 78; it could not be established 
by cross-examination or even by an admission 
of the conviction and judgment by the witness 
(Phillipps, op. cit., p. 19-20). 
13. Gilbert, p. 129. 
14. Penalty (R. v. Gordon (Ld. ) (1781) 21, S. T. 
485; Raines v. Towgood (1796) Peake Add. Cas. 
195); forfeiture (R. v. Newell (1707) Park 
269); ecclesiastical censure (Chetwynd v. 
Linden (1752) 2 Ves. Sen. 450 (incest), Finch 
v. Finch (1752) 2 Ves. Sen. 491 (concubinage). 
15. Lord Melville's case (1806) P. D. VI, 226-45. 
16.46 Geo. III, c. 47. 
17. Cates v. Hardacre (1811) 3 Taunt. 424; Fisher 
v. Ronalds (1852) 12 C. B. 764. 
18. R. v. Boyes (1861) 9'Cox 32, following Osborne 
v. London Dock Co. (1855) 10 Ex. 698 and 
Sidebottom V. Adkins (1858) 27 L. J. Ch. 152, 
and overruling Fisher v. Ronalds'supra, Scott 
v. Millar (1859) John 328, and, Ex p. 
Fernandez (1861) 10 C. B. 3. The judges also 
refused to countenance claims for privilege 
being made on behalf of a witness by counsel 
in the suit - R. v. Adey (1831) 1 M. & Rob. 94 
and see generally R. v. Kingslake (1870) 11 
Cox 499. 
19.1852-3 P. P. III, 337. 
20. (1853) P. D. CXXIV, 1379-80. 
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21. R. v. Freirad (1696) 4 S. T. 259 (Treby C. J. ); 
Layer's Case (1722) 6 S. T. 93 at p. 259 (Pratt 
L. C. J. ). 
22. R. v. Cook (1696) 4 S. T. 748. 
23. Peake's Compendium of Evidence, 2nd ed. (1801), 
p. 130 et seq. 
24. R. v. Lewis (1802) 1 Esp. N. P. C. 225 (see also 
Alvanley C. J. in the civil case of MacBride v. 
MacBride (1802) 1 Esp. N. P. C. 242). 
25. Phillipps, op. cit., p. 918. 
26. Cundell v. Pratt (1827) M. & M. 108. 
27. See e. g. R. v. Owen & Mitchell, The Times,, ' 
July 9,1801; R. v. Jacobs, The Times, Jan. 
23,1819; R. v. Webster, The Times, Dec. 20, - 1823; R. v. Maurice, The Times, Apr. 16,1824. 
28. R. v. Watson (1817) 2 Stark. N. P. C. 591. 
29. R. v. Frost & Holloway (1818) (unreported 
cited in Phillipps, op. cit., p. 922n). 
30. R. v. Pitcher (1823) 1 C. & P. 85, and, 
Alderson B. in Boyle v. Wiseman (1855) 10 Ex. 
647; contra Holroyd J. in R. v. Watson supra-' 
p. 157 'if you propose a question to a witness 
and he declines to answer it, his not 
answering can have no effect on the jury'. 
31. (1853) P. D. CXXIV, 1368-9 (Brougham); Best on 
Evidence, 1st ed. (1849), para. 143. 
32.28 & 29 Vict. c. 18, s. 6. 
33. R. v. Castro, 1873, (Kenealey ed. ) 32nd day jr, 
396; cited Halsbury's Laws (3rd ed. ), Vol. 15, 
424n. 
34. See Stephen, Digest of Law of Evidence (lst", 
ed. 1876), art. 120, which, in dealing'with 
the privilege against self-incrimination, 
makes no mention of degrading questions; 
Roscoe's Criminal Evidence, 12th ed. (1898), 
p. 132; Halsbury's Laws (1st ed. ), vol. 13, p. 
575. Contra Powell on Evidence, 8th ed. 
(1904), p. 100 which speaks of the privilege 
as possibly still existing. 
35. In R. v. Hodgson (1812) R. & R. 211, the 
Twelve Judges held that the prosecutrix in a 
rape case could not be asked about- her 
connection with other men, the question being 
one which had a tendency to degrade her. 
Later cases, however, held that such questions 
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might be put but she was not bound to answer - R. v. Barker (1829) 3 C. & P. 389 (Parke J. ); 
R. v. Mercier (1842) 6 Jur. 243; R. v. Swann 
(1851) 15 J. P. 421. Her right to refuse to 
answer was upheld as late as 1870 by Willes J. 
in R. v. Cockroft (1870) 11 Cox 410. In R. v. 
Holmes (1871) 12 Cox 137 the Court for Crown 
Cases Reserved held that her answer to such 
questions was final, but ignored the question 
of whether she was bound to answer. In the 
result whether there was a privilege to refuse to answer in such cases remained uncertain 
until well into the twentieth century - see 
Archbold, 28th ed. (1931) p. 1046. 
36. Sir Charles Russell in Osborne v. Hargreave & 
Wife (an action for slander) and Sir. Edward 
Clarke in Russell v. Russell (a divorce suit). 
37. The Times, Jan. 2,1892 (leader) and letters 
Jan. 1,2,7 and 12. 
38. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ss. 148-52; and a 
similar rule applied in civil actions, it 
being provided by 0.34, r. 38 of the R. S. C. 
that the judge should disallow any question 
put in cross-examination of any party or other 
witness which appeared to him to be vexatious 
or not relevant to any matter proper to be 
inquired into in the cause or matter. 
39. Cooper v. Curry (1846) 11 J. P. 22. 
40. In its Annual Statement for 1917 the Bar 
Council did, however, lay down rules as to the 
conduct of cross-examination modelled upon the 
Indian Evidence Act. 
41. The Queen's Case (1820) 2 Brod. & Bing. 286. 
42.7 C. & P. 676. 
43. R. v. Edwards (1837) 8 C. & P. 26. 
44. Littledale and Coleridge JJ., Parke B., Tindal 
L. C. J., Park J., Bolland B., Bosanquet J. and 
Coltman and Patteson JJ. (9 out of the 15 
judges). 
45. R. v. Tooker (1849) 4 Cox 93b; R. v. Peel 
(1860) 2 F. & F. 21. 
46. Second Report of the Common Law Commissioners, 
1852-3 P. P. (1626) XL, 701. 
47. See e. g. R. v. Barnett (1850) 4 Cox 269; a 
variant upon the theme was employed by counsel 
in R. v. Newton (1850) 4 Cox 262 where a 
witness was asked whether he recollected such 
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a fact when before the magistrates; Patteson 
J. disallowed the question despite counsel's 
protests that on the first trial of the case 
the trial judge had allowed the question to be 
asked. 
48. Referred to in R. v. Ford (1851) 5 Cox 184. 
49. R. v. Matthews (1849) 4 Cox 93. 
50. R. v. Palmer (1851) 5 Cox 236; R. v. Brewer 
(1863) 9 Cox 49. 
51. R. v. Moir (1850) 4 Cox 279; R. v. Price 
(1857) 5 Cox 405. 
52. R. V. Shellard (1840) 9 C. & P. 277 
53. R. v. Griffiths (1841) 9 C. & P. 746; R. v. 
Christopher (1850) 4 Cox 76. 
54. In R. v. Barnett (1850) 4 Cox 269 it was held 
that the rule did apply to coroner's 
depositions but contra R. v. Maloney (1861) 9 
Cox 6. - 
55. R. v. Taylor (1839) 8 C. & P. 726; R. v. 
Brewer supra. 
56. S. 24. 
57. Greaves, Report on Criminal Procedure, 1856- 
P. P. (456) L, 79 
58. S. 5. 
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CHAPTER 8 
1. Gilbert, Evidence, p. 123 (he also argues that 
the evidence of an interested witness is 
incredible by reason of bias). 
2. See also in this connection the prohibition 
upon examining magistrates and police officers interrogating prisoners and the caution. 
3. See e. g. the Att. -Gen. (1865) P. D. CLXXVII, 
942. 
4. See e. g. Stephen (1857) 29 L. T. 146 and Ashley 
(1876) P. D. CCIX, 1182. 
- 5. Stephen ibid. said that the last case he had 
been able to find in which the prisoner had 
been questioned by the judge was R. v. 
Harrison (1692) 12 S. T. 859; but see chapter 
4, n. 78. 
6. See chapter 7, nn. 5&6. 
7. This point was forcefully made during the 
debates on the Prisoners' Counsel Bills. 
B. (1882) 73 L. T., p. 229 & (1884) Ir. L. T. 317. 
9. See e. g. R. v. Moore, The Times, Mar. 7,1844 
(Alderson B. ) 
10. R. V. Dickinson (1844) 1 Cox 27. 
11. See e. g. R. V. Nutts & Riley, The Times, 
Dec. 9,1800; R. V. Locke, The Times, Aug. 20, 
1808; R. V. Broughton, The Times, Mar. 11 & 
13,1819, and see Copy of Case & Opinions 
printed by W. Shelmerdine & Co. (1802), pp. 3- 
4 cited by Beattie,,. Crime & the Courts, p. 
276. 
12. R v. White (1811) 3 Camp. 98. 
13. E. g. R. v. Roper, The Times, Dec. 28,1816 
(perjury); R. -v. Macklin & others (riot), The 
Times, July 25,1818; R. v. Johnson & others 
(seditious libel), The Times Apr. 19,23 & 26, 
1819. 
14'. E. g. R. v. Peltier (libel) and R. v. Hedges & 
-Hedges (conspiracy) (1803) 28 S. T. 529 and 1315 respectively; R. v. Dinney (1832) 3 S. T. 
(N. S. ) 11. 
15. R. v. Redhead Yorke (1795) 25 S. T.; 1003. 
16. R. v. Perkins (1824) 1 C. & P. 548. 
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17.7 S. T. 276n. 
18. R. v. Bellingham, The Times, May 15-16th, 1812 
(letters). 
19. R. v. Stephens (1839) 3 S. T. (N. S. ) 1189 
(newspapers); R. v. Thurtell & Hunt (Notable 
British Trials Series), p. 138 (newspapers). 
20. R. v. Richard Carlile, The Times, Oct. 13, 
1819; R. v. Ann Carlile (1821) 1 S. T. (N. S. ) 
1033; R. v. Davidson, The Times, Oct. 24, 
1820; R. v. Waddington, The Times, Oct. 24,, 
1822; R. v. Tunbridge, The Times, Jan. 21, 
1823. 
21. See e. g. R. v. Thurtell & Hunt supra in which 
Thurtell read his defence, whilst Hunt had his 
read for him by the clerk of the court. 
Exceptionally counsel might be allowed to read 
the prisoner's statement - see e. g. R. v. 
Perrot, The Times, Apr. 1,1800 (prisoner 
nervous). 
22. R. v. Booth, The Times, July 18,1823. 
23. R. v. Harry, The Times, Aug. 19,1817 and also 
the cases of R. v. Ripley & others, The Times, 
Apr. 7,1815; R. v. Taylor & Taylor, The 
Times, Jan. 17,1816; R. v. Woodyer, The. 
Times, Mar. 21,1859 (where the defence bore 
all hallmarks of lawyer's drafting). 
24. Reply of Inspector of Prisons to the Report of 
the Court of Aldermen 1835 P. P. (486) XLIII 
283 (2 wardsmen allowed to charge their fellow 
prisoners 5/- per brief; the principal turnkey: 
said that at some sessions 'not that long ago' 
they had drawn 20 to 30 briefs). See also The' 
Times, July 27,1836 (Court of Aldermen). 
25. R. v. Brunt (1820) 33 S. T. 1177. 
26. R. v. Mayo, The Times, Sept. 4&5,1818, R. 
v. Burgess, The Times. May 28,1819; in 'both 
cases the judge was Garrow B; in the first he' 
directed the jury that it would be extremely- 
hard to convert such a document into evidence 
against the prisoner; in the second he 
intervened to prevent it being read at all. 
27. R. v. Meetham, The Times, Aug. 23,1625 (the 
prisoner, upon being called upon for his 
defence, pulled many sheets of paper out of 
his pocket; Bayley J. said it might do him 
more harm than good, upon which two of counsel 
present in court looked over it and 
recommended him not to read it). Also R. v. 
Cain, The Times, Jan. 13,1826: illiterate 
408 
prisoner handed in written paper; in answer to 
a question from judge admitted paper had not 
been read to her; judge asked Governor of 
Newgate to take the prisoner out. and read and 
explain paper to her, and then ask if she 
wanted it read. 
28. See e. g. R. v. Hunt, The Times, Oct. 25,1823 
(boy of 8 cried very much and said witnesses 
had sworn falsely); R. v. Mumford, The Times, 
Mar. 8,1854 (boy aged 12 wept and begged for 
mercy). 
29. R v. Hicks & others, The Times, Jan. 4,1831; 
in 6 of the 12 criminal cases brought before 
the Bedfordshire Epiphany Sess for 1832 the 
Chairman of the Bench noted 'Defence says 
nothing' - Beds. R. O. PM 2629 Notebook of Pym. 
30. See e. g. R. v. Gibbs, The Times, Mar. 27,1819 
('I don't know that I can say anything'). 
31. A stock phrase frequently to be found in 
reports of trials in The Times and the C. C. C. 
Sessions Papers in the second quarter of the 
century. 
32. See e. g. R. v. Jones, (1844-5) 21 C. C. C. 
Sess. Pap. ( Nov. Sess. ); R. V. Williams ibid. 
(April Sess. ). 
33. see e. g. R. v. Pratt (1844-5) 21 C. C. C. 
Sess. Pap. (Apr. Sess. ) and R. v. Kirby ibid. 
34. R v. Edwards (1845) 22 C. C. C. Sess. Pap. 
May Sess). 
35. R v. Johns (1845) 22 C. C. C. Sess. Pap. (May 
Sess. ); see also R. v. Mitchell, The Times, 
Jan. 11 1803 (admits guilt (murder)); R v. 
Richardson & others, The Times, June 7,1813 
(R put in a confession and implored mercy); R. 
v. Oughton & Lee, The Times, Aug. 22,1811 
(Lee: 'My lord I have nothing to say but I 
hope you will spare my life'); R. v. Johnson, 
The Times, Jan. 16,1817 (J threw self on 
mercy of court); R. v. Clark, The Times, Sept. 
12,1823 (C asked if he wished to put any 
questions: 'I wish to plead guilty'). 
36. R. v. Tibbs, The Times, Sept. 13,1809; R. v. 
Andrews, The Times, Aug. 19,1816. 
37. R V. O' Connor & others (1843) 4 S. T. (N. S. ) 
935. 
38: R. v. Barstow, The Times. Apr. 15,1813 (ex 
: clergyman). 
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39. R. v. Pilkington, The Times, Aug. 22,1808. 
40. India Act No. XXV of 1861 and see also Code of 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1882, s. 342. 
41. Letter to The Times, Oct. 27,1897 (Ashley). 
42. See chapter 5. 
43. See the comment of Alderson B. in R. v. 
Malings (1838) 8 C. & P. 242 that unsworn 
statements, by defeating the defence intended 
by counsel, often served to advance the cause, 
of justice. 
44. R. V. Skene, The Times, Feb. 16,1812 where 
counsel stopped it being read; and R. v. 
Bennett, The Times, May 28,1819 where counsel 
simply declared himself ignorant of its 
contents. 
45. R. v. Codling (1802) 28 S. T. 177; R. v.. 
Ashcroft & Holden, The Times, Sept. 9,1817; R. =- 
v. Kerr, The Times, Oct. 31,1815; R. v. 
Thurtell & Hunt 1824 (Notable British Trials 
Series) pp. 157-8. 
46. R. v. Carey, The Times, Sept. 17,1803. 
47. R. v. Cullen & others, The Times, Aug. 12, 
1800; R. v. Jackson, The Times, July 5,. 1804; 
R. V. Cane, The Times, July 24,1810; R. v. 
Heath, The Times, Nov. 7,1811; R. v. Cuttis, 
The Times, Sept. 17,1812 (worked to accused', s, advantage); R. v. Antonio, The Times, Sept 
19,1814; R. v. Peru, The Times, July 13, 
1816; R. v. Abbott, The Times, Feb. 25,1822., - 
48. Letter to The Times, Jan. 8,1884 (Littler). 
49. Coleman's Trial (1688) 7 S. T. 1 where Scroggs 
C. J. upon the prisoner asserting in his 
defence 'I came home on the last day, of 
August' asked whether he had any witness, to 
prove this, and, upon being told that he had 
not, retorted 'Then you say nothing'. 
50. R. v. Mansfield, The Times, Aug. 15, ', 1803 
where the jury were told that the prisoner's 
defence must be considered as nothing, as 
there was no evidence to support it; R. v; `-" 
Maddocks, The Times, Oct. 31,1815 where-Heath 
J., although he did not in terms say that the 
prisoner's defence was worthless, commented 
that he had made no attempt to substantiate it' 
by calling witnesses; R. v. Vamplew, The 
Times, Mar. 2,1822 (the judge interrupted the 
prisoner's defence to ask if he had witnesses 
to prove what he said); R. v. Jackson, The 
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Times, July 12,1826 (Hullock B. remarked in 
his summing up upon the absence of friends who 
might have made out the prisoner's defence had 
it been true); R. V. Donovan, The Times, Jan. 
4,1839 (Gurney B. interrupted the defence 
closing speech to ask counsel if he intended 
to call witnesses, and, upon being told that 
he did not, said 'Then your statement goes for 
nothing'); see also leader in (1859) 23 J. P. 
194 on Brougham's Bill to allow prisoners to 
give evidence: '(a prisoner's evidence) of 
course must be supported by corroborative 
evidence, otherwise it will run the risk of 
being disregarded and very properly, for 
courts insist upon legal evidence of 
everything they accept as fact'. 
51. R. v. Power, The Times, Sept. 25,1805; R. v. 
Duncan, The Times, Mar. 21,1807 C. B. directed 
the jury that in considering the prisoner's 
(unsworn statement) it was fair to allow what 
he said in his own favour as well as what he 
said against himself'; R. v. Anon., The Times, 
Oct. 24,1808 the Chairman of Clerkenwell 
Sessions directed the jury that they would 
give prisoner's statement what weight- they 
considered it deserved. 
52. R. V. Beard (1837) 8 C. & P. 142. 
53. R. v. Dyer (1844) 1 Cox 113. 
54. See e. g. R. v. O'Donnell, The Times, Dec. 3, 
1883 Sir Chas. Russell accepted that effect 
could only be given to a prisoner's statement 
to the extent that it fitted in with the 
evidence for the Crown. 
55. R. v. Herbert, The Times, Dec. 4,1807 Grose 
J. commented upon the fact that the prisoner's 
defence had never been mentioned by him when 
he was first charged by the officer nor at any 
period before the trial; R. V. Rush, The 
Times, Apr. 2-5,1849 (failure to give account 
before examining magistrate commented upon); 
R. v. Thompson, The Times, Mar. 25,1854 the 
Chief Baron invited the jury to consider 
whether a statement made -to 'the governor of 
the gaol had been concocted by the prisoner 
after he had reflected on the evidence. See 
also the cases cited at Chapter 5, n. 173). 
56. ". 7&8 Wm. III, -c. 3, s. 7 (in cases'of-treason 
the prisoner to have same process to'compel 
witnesses for him as to' compel witnesses 
against , 
him); '1 Anne, st. 2, c. 9" (witnesses 
for, ` the prisoner to be on oath-in all, cases of 
treason or felony). After the latter statute 
power to subpoena 'witnesses 'was'S granted to 
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prisoners charged with felony Hawk., 2 P. C., 
c. 46, s. 165. (it had always been available 
to prisoners charged with misdemeanour - ibid. ). 
57. R. V. Cooke (1824) 1 C. & P. 321, and Pell V. 
Daubeney (1850) 5 Ex. Rep. 955 per Alderson B. 
arguendo. 
58. R. v. Simmons, The Times, Mar. 29,1830 
(Vaughan B. observed that in Norfolk, where 
the Assizes were held at the very extremity of 
the county, it was often impossible for a 
prisoner to procure the attendance of his 
witnesses). In 1878 the Judges pointed out 
the hardship to prisoners of trying them at 
distant places (Report respecting Circuits 
1878 P. P. (311) LXIII, 1). 
59. Report of Select Committee on Gaols 1819 P. p. 
(579) VII, 1 
60. In the debate on the Prisoners' Counsel Bill, 
1824 Martin M. P. mentioned a case in which 
Garrow B. had refused to put a capital case 
back until a character witness for the 
prisoner arrived saying 'I will give you 
credit for a good character' ((1824) P. D. XI, 
219); R. v. Jones 1803 3 East 31 where. 
Lawrence J. said that it was the constant 
practice at the Old Bailey not to put off 
trials because character witnesses were 
absent; R. v. Lowther, The Times, Mar. 8,1833, 
(after the jury had been sworn, the prisoner 
applied to Gurney B. for a postponement, 
stating that she had counsel and witnesses 
coming on the morrow; she was told her 
application came too late, and had the galling 
experience of seeing her counsel come into 
court after she had been convicted, and 
explain that there were indeed witnesses 
coming the next day, and that it was on his 
advice that they had been held back in order 
to save expense to the prisoner who was poor); 
R. v. Lyons, The Times, Oct. 29,1835, (the 
prisoner's protest that his witnesses as to, 
character were absent was brushed aside by the 
Common Serjeant with the words 'We will, give 
you the benefit of a good character')., 
61. Report of Committee on State of Police of 
Metropolis 1816 P. P. (510) V, 1 (Minutes of 
Evidence p. 65). In 1834 and 1835 there were 
complaints in open court by old Bailey counsel 
about the fact that it was impossible for 
counsel and prisoners to know when their. cases 
would come on, which drew from the, Commom 
Serjeant the observation that they ought-to 
have notice the night before at the 
latest 
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(The Times, Dec. 8,1834 and Jan. 2,1835). At 
the end of 1835 it was announced that 
henceforth homicide cases would be taken on 
Friday and other capital cases on Wednesday 
(The Times, Nov. 2,1835). 
62. R. v. Palmer, The Times, Dec. 11,1843 (a 
prisoner, who protested that he was too poor 
to employ an attorney to prepare an affidavit, 
was told by Cresswell J. that he had no doubt 
that some gentleman would take the case out of 
charity (which fortunately for the prisoner is 
what happened)). In R. v. Langhurst (1866) 10 
Cox 353 Channell B. rejected an affidavit 
sworn by the prisoner's attorney on the ground 
that its contents were hearsay, and insisted 
on an affidavit from the prisoner's mother, 
notwithstanding that the ground of the 
application was that, because of her extreme 
poverty, the mother had found it impossible to 
procure the attendance at court of witnesses 
to prove her son's insanity. 
63. Lefroy B. in R. v. Mitchel (1848) 3 Cox 1. 
64. R. v. Wardle (1842) C. & Mar. 647 (contrary to 
Foster, 62 and not followed in R. v. 
Fitzgerald (1843) 1 C. & K. 201). 
65. R. v. Nesbitt (murder), The Times, July 24 & 
29,1820 (application to stand case out till 
next Assize, the grounds being that, on his 
arrest, the prisoner's money had been taken 
from him, in consequence of which he had been 
unable to procure the attendance of witnesses 
who were necessary to his defence; Wood B. 
refused the application, saying plenty of time 
already been allowed) and R. v. Luis & Brown, 
The Times, Apr. 9,1874 (Brett J., upon being 
told by the prisoner that his witnesses were 
not at court, said 'I can't help that'). 
66. See R. v. Lyons supra. 
67. Gilbert, pp. 131-2; East, 1 P. C., p. 313n; 
Archbold (1st ed. 1822), p. 97; R., v. Wright, 
The Times, Dec. 12,1809 is a case which very 
much wears this appearance and led to strong 
criticism of the prosecutor by Lord 
Ellenborough. 
68. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Bk. 
5, ch. 16. Other remedies suggested by him 
included refusing to receive any alibi 
witness, unless he was accompanied by a 
certain number, of persons, (in the nature of 
compurgators) to speak to his character, and 
giving the judge power, in a case where alibi 
evidence had been called, to adjourn the case 
413 
or discharge the jury so that the alibi and 
the witnesses called in support of it could be 
investigated (this he described as the only 
adequate remedy). 
69. House of Lords' Select Committee on the 
Prisoners' Counsel Bill, 1835 P. P. (HL 130) 
XLVI, 317. 
70. Bentham, op. cit., Bk. V, ch. 16 wrote that 
for every alibi that was true 'there are 
perhaps some hundreds ... which (are) false'. 
The Recorder of London in his Evidence to the 
House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Prisoners' Counsel Bill, 1835 (supra) said at 
p. 338 'I think the case of a true alibi is 
extremely rare'. 
71. As to prevalence of false alibis in the 
nineteenth century see the material cited by 
R. N. Gooderson, Alibi, p. lff. In the early 
eighteenth century, the Sessions House at the 
Old Bailey was frequented by professional 
alibi witnesses, known as Straw Men due to, 
their habit, when plying for trade, of wearing'iý 
straws in the buckles of their shoes; 
(G. Howson, Thief Taker General, p. 141). 
72. A. M. Sullivan, The Last Serjeant, p. 109. 
73. M. Healy, The Old Munster Circuit, p. 168-70. 
A Kerry alibi was one which was true in every 
respect except one, the date. A Tipperary 
alibi was one designed to show that the Crown 
witnesses were on the day of the crime at 
places different to those to which they had 
spoken in evidence. 
74. Foster, p. 368. 
75. See e. g. an article in (1870) 48 L. T., 367,. 
referring to observa tions on the subject made 
by Hannen J. in a recent case at Hampshire 
Assizes. 
76. R. v. Boucher (1837) 8 C. & P. 141. 
77. R. v. Burrows (1838) 2 Moo. & R. 19. 
78. R. v. Rider (1838) 8 C. &P 539. 
79. R. v. Taylor (1859) 1 F. & F. 535. 
80. R. v. Beard supra. 
81 R. v. Butcher (1839) 2 M. & Rob. 228. 
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82. Smart v. Rayner (1834) 6 C. & P. 721, Stevens 
v. Webb (1835) 7 C. & P. 60; Duncombe v. 
Daniell (1837) 8 C. & P. 222. 
83. R. v. Malings (1838)'8 C. & P. 242. 
84. R. v. Walkling (1838) 8 C. & P. 243. 
85.76 L. T. 187. 
86. R. v. Williams (1846) 1 Cox 363. 
87. R. v. Manzano (1860) 2 F. & F. 64. 
88. Dec. 13,1884. 
89.13 Ir. L. T., 566. 
90. R. v. Stephens (1871) 11 Cox 667. 
91. R v. Crane & Debock (1861) 54 C. C. C. Sess. 
Pap. 154; R. v. Brown (1863) 61 C. C. C. 
Sess. Pap. 240. 
92.1882 26 Sol. Jo., p. 191; 13 Ir. L. T., p. 566; 
Mead (letter to The Times, April 9,1898). 
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CHAPTER 9 
1. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 
(1827). 
2. Pickwick Papers, C. 34; see W. B. Odgers, 'A 
Century of Law Reform' (1901) 217 When as ,a boy I read the Pickwick Papers I was always 
puzzled to known why Mr. Pickwick did not go' 
into the witness box and say that he never 
promised to marry Mrs. Bardell and explain how 
the good lady came to make such a mistake'. 
3.9 Geo. 4, c. 32, s. 2. 
4.6 &7 Vict., c. 85. 
5.9 & 10 Vict., c. 95, s. 84. 
6. (1851) P. D. CXVI, 16 'when the parties were 
examined the difficulty of discovering the. 
truth was rather increased'. Lord Truro was not 
its only opponent. Lord Campbell noted in his 
diary 'all the common law judges but one are 
hostile' (Bowen Rowlands, Seventy Two years at' 
the Bar, p. 26). This doubtless explains why 
the Lord Chancellor, in the second reading 
debate, was loud in his complaints that the 
opinion of the common law judges had not been 
sought (P. D. ibid. ). Promoted by Brougham the 
Bill had the support of Denman and Campbell 
and all but one of the county court judges (17 
L. T. (1851), p. 99). 
7.22 J. P. 200; (1858) P. D. CLI, 1481. 
8. Law of Evidence Further Amendment Bill. For 
text see (1859) 23 J. P. 185 and 193-4. 
9. (1859) P. D. CLII, 760-6. 
10. Law of Evidence Further Amendment Bill 1860 
(see 24 J. P. 426; (1860) 35 L. T. 193; (1860) 
P. D. CLIX, 1085. 
11. Petty Offences Bill, 1863 P. P. (240) III, 253. 
12. (1863) P. D. CLXXII, 1203. 
13. Petty Offences Law Amendment Bill 1864 P. P. 
(121) III, 237. 
14. (1864) P. D., CLXXVI, 1433. 
15. 'Mahon & Scully's Bill - Criminal Cases 
Evidence Bill, 1865 P. P. (8) I, 471; Fitzroy 
Kelly's Bill - Law of Evidence etc. Bill, 1865 
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(not printed in Parliamentary Papers but see 
(1865) P. D. CLXXVII, 933-45). 
16. P. D., ibid. 
17. The Times, May 18,1860. 
18. In a lecture to the Juridical Society (1857) 
L. T. 146. 
19.19, Sol. Jo. (1874-5), p. 575. 
20. R. v. Grigg (1660) 1 Ves. Jr. 49. 
21. In 1785 Lord Kenyon had held that a prisoner, 
who had referred to a woman as his wife during 
his trial, was thereby estopped from calling 
her as a witness unreported. The correctness 
of this ruling (cited by Phillipps, 8th ed. 
(1838), p. 173)was doubted by Richards C. B. in 
Campbell v. Twemlow 1814 1 Price 81. In R. v. 
Young (1847) 2 Cox 291 Erle J. held that a 
reputed wife was competent and the ruling was 
followed in R. v. Chadwicke (1847) 11 Q. B. 173 
and R. v. Blackburn 
, 
(1853) 6 Cox 333, and, in 
fact, never thereafter seriously challenged. 
22. (1892) P. D. I, 67 (Lord Halsbury L. C. 
referring to Campbell L. C. J.. 
23. R. v. Arundel (1849) 4 Cox 260; R. v. Fanny 
Archer (1848) 3 Cox 228. 
24. R. v. Stewart & Stewart (1845) 1 Cox 174; the 
reporter of this case doubted the correctness 
of the decision because of the proviso to 
Denman' s Act, but there is no weight to this 
objection in view of the express decision in 
R. v. Hicks & Drury (1848) 3 Cox 190 that the 
proviso applied only to civil proceedings. 
25. R. v. Deeley (1870) 11 Cox 607. 
" 26. Ibid n. 
27. R. v. Payne (1872) 12 Cox 118. 
28. R. v. Barber, The Times, Apr. 11-20,23, & 29, 
1844. 
29. The Times, Sept. 23,1882 (report of 
proceedings of Social Science Congress 
(Hastings M. P. )). 
30. In R. v. Littlechild (1871) L. R. 6 Q. B. 293 
the Queen's Bench dismissed an. appeal against 
a conviction before magistrates based upon the 
refusal of the magistrates to allow separate 
trials, so that one defendants might testify 
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for the other, stating that the matter was 
entirely one for the court's discretion. In R. 
v. Foote & Ramsay, The Times, Mar. 6,1883 an,. 
application for separate trials on the like- 
ground was refused by North J. who ruled that, 
a joint trial could cause no injustice. 
31. See R. v. Boulton (1871) 12 Cox 87 where the 
practice was condemned by Cockburn L. C. J. in 
much the same terms as had been used by Lord 
Ellenborough in R. v. Wright & Others, The' 
Times, Dec. 12,1809. See also R. v Rowlands 
(1851) 5 Cox 466 at p. 497. 
32. Archbold, 20th ed. (1886), p. 171. 
33. The practice of summoning a fresh panel when 
the panel had been so far exhausted by-, " 
challenges that a full jury was not left., 
appears to have been due to doubts as to the 
power of a criminal court to award a tales in 
cases of deficiency of jurors - see Archbold, 
20th ed. (1886), 176. 
34. R. v. Frost & 12 others, The Times, Jan. 1 
1840; R. v. Turner, Kelsall & others, The 
Times, Oct. 12,1842. 
35. R. v. Sealey (1844) 8 J. P. 328. 
36. R. v. Fisher (1848) 3 Cox 68. 
37.1856 P. P. (456) L, 79. 
38. R. v. Woods & May (1853) 6 Cox 274. 
39. R. v. Burdett (1855) 6 Cox 458. 
40. R. v. Smith (1826) 1 Moo. C. C. 289.1 
41. Phillipps, op. cit., p. 160. 
42. R. v. Bartlett & Anderson (1844) 1 Cox 105. 
Other cases where a wife was admitted for--a' 
co-prisoner include R. v. Moore & Turner 
(1843) 1 Cox 59, and R. v. Denslow & Newbury' 
(1847) 8 L. T. (O. S. ) 559. 
43. R. v. Thompson (1872) 12 Cox 202. 
44. Wigmore, Treatise, 3rd ed. (1940), 579 n. 
45. Wigmore, ibid., 579 and 12 Ir. L. T. (1878), 
554; amongst the first states to follow the 
example of Maine were Massachusetts (1866), 
Connecticut (1867), New Hampshire and New York 
(1869) and New Jersey (1871). But note that 
until 1962 defendants in criminal cases in 
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Georgia were not permitted to testify on oath 
(Wigmore 579 n. 7). 
46. Law Magazine, 4th series, vol. 1, p. 631; Code 
of Criminal Procedure Act, 1861 (India Act XXV 
of 1861). 
47.17 & 18 Vict., c. 122, s. 15; 18 & 19 Vict., 
c. 96, s. 36; 20 & 21 Vict., c. 62, s. 14; 28 
& 29 Vict. c. 104, s. 34; The Customs 
Consolidation Act, 1876, s. 259. 
48. Master & Servant Act, 1867, s. 16. 
49. Merchant Shipping Act, 1871, s. 11. 
50. This was the justification for the exception 
urged during the Commons debates on the 1876 
Act ((1876) P. D. CCVIII, 900 'it seemed to him 
that if they threw upon the accused the onus 
of proving that he had used all reasonable 
means of making a ship seaworthy they must in 
justice allow him to be called as a witness'). 
In 1869 provisions in the Habitual Offenders 
and Bankruptcy Bills of that year had been 
criticised in the Law Journal (vol. 4, p. 151) 
on the ground that, where the law cast a 
burden of proof upon an accused, common 
justice required that he be allowed to give 
evidence in order to discharge that burden. An 
example of a statute casting a burden of proof 
on an accused without conferring a 
corresponding right to testify was the 
Factories Act, 1844. 
51. Coal Mines Regulation Act 1872, s. 63 r. 4. 
52. Metalliferous Mines Regulation Act, 1872, s. 
34, r. 4. 
53. Sale of Food & Drugs Act 1875, s. 11. 
54. Merchant Shipping Act 1875, s. 4., Merchant 
Shipping Act, 1876, s. 4. 
55. Threshing Machines Act, 1878, s. 3. 
56. Conspiracy & Protection of Property Act, 1875, 
s. 11. 
57. Evidence Act, 1877, s. l. 
58. Licensing Act 1872, s. 51(4). 
59. Contagious Diseases of Animals Act, 1878, s. 
66(6). 
60. The Times, Mar. 16,1851. 
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61. Report of Committee of Judges respecting 
Circuits, 1878 P. P. (311) LXIII, 1, para. 4. 
62. An Order in Council made under the Winter 
Assizes Acts, 1876-7 enabled a judge or 2 
justices of the peace to order upto £20 to be 
advanced to the defence out of public funds to 
cover the travelling expenses of defence 
witnesses (it did not authorise the making of 
advances in respect of witnesses' 
subsistence). 
63. See R. v. Woolf, The Times, Jan. 10,1884; 
(1890/91) P. D. 000LVI, 770; R. v. Watts & 
Hall, The Times, June 8,1896. 
64. (1890/1) P. D. CCCLVI, 770; S. O. 213 (Local 
Prisons), para. 4 gave effect to the. 
undertaking. 
65. Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869, s. 4. 
66. Quakers & Moravians Act, 1833. 
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CHAPTER 10 
1. The Times, Oct. 6,1874. 
2. (1878) 12 Ir. L. T. 554,563,575, and 593. 
3. Criminal Law Evidence Amendment Bill, 1876 
P. P. (61) If 511. 
4. Criminal Law Evidence Amendment Bill, 1877 
P. P. (76) If 481 (promoters Ashley, Gurney & 
Clive). 
5. Criminal Law Evidence Amendment Bill, 1878 
P. P. (23) II1 243. 
6. Sjt. Simon (1876) P. D. CCXXX, 1928. 
7. Sjt. Simon (ibid. ); Rodwell (ibid. 1927). 
8. Sjt. Simon (ibid. 1928). 
9. Whalley (ibid. 1938-9). 
10. Russell Gurney (ibid. 1928-33). 
11. Ashley (ibid. 1939). 
12. Sir Thos. Chambers (ibid. 1933-4). 
13. Ibid. 1936-7. 
14. Of the 13 members who spoke in the debate 
(1878 P. D. CCLVII), the following spoke in 
favour of the Bill: Ashley (657) and Russell 
Gurney (676) its promoters, Burgess (666), 
Kenealey (674-6), Forsyth (674), Sir H. James 
(678), Mitchell Henry (683). 
15. (1878) P. D. CCLVII, 660-4. 
16. Ibid. 688. 
17. Att. Gen. (ibid. 684-8). 
18. Ibid. 688. The Threshing Machine Bill received 
its first reading'on the same day (ibid. 689). 
191. Sir J. F. Stephen (1877) 2 Nineteenth Century, 
737, 'The Reform of the Criminal Law'. See 
also Alfred Wills (1878) 3 Nineteenth Century, 
169 -'Should Prisoners be Examined? ' 
20. The case was R v. Greenwood, - Jackson & Wild 
(referred to in` The Times report of' R. v. 
Sutcliffe & others, Nov. 12,1877). It was 
referred to in the debate by Ashley (1878) 
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P. D. CCLVII, 659 and Russell Gurney (ibid. 
677). 
21. Cl. 6 of the Bill prohibited cross-examination 
of the accused as to previous convictions or 
charges, or as to other offences (although not,, 
as to other matters of discredit), whilst c1. 
10 provided that the failure or neglect of an. - accused to give evidence should not raise any" 
presumption against him, nor should it be 
referred to or commented on during the trial. 
22. Ashley (1876) P. D. CCXXIX, 1183, & CCXXX, 
1925-6; Russell Gurney (1878) P. D. CCLVII, 
678. 
23. Ashley (1876) P. D. CCXXIX, 1182,1184; (1878) 
P. D. CCLVII, 658, Forsyth (1878) ibid., 674. 
24. Ashley (1876) P. D. CCXXIX, 1183-4, Russell. 
Gurney (1876) P. D. CCXXX, 1932, and (1878)' 
P. D. CCLVII, 659. 
25. Simon (1876) P. D. CCXXX, 1928, & CCXXX, 1928,, 
and (1878) CCLVII, 664; Chambers (1876) CCXXX, `- 
1934: & Rodwell (1878) Rodwell CCLVII, 665. 
26. Simon (1876) P. D. CCXXX, 1928; Knatchbull- 
Hugessen, ibid. 1935-6; Att. Gen., ibid. 1936-"* 
7; Simon , (1878) CCLVII, 663-4, Roebuck ibid., - 665; Paget, ibid. 670; Wheelhouse, ibid. 683. - 
During the debate on the 1876 Bill both. 
Ashley, CCXXX, 1926 and 1939, and Russell 
Gurney, ibid. 1932-3, argued that the accused, 
could be protected by a clause such as that' 
which they inserted in their Bills of 1877 and. 
1878. Bowyer, ibid. 667, argued that if a 
prisoner had an honest reason for refusing to 
give evidence, such as over-nervousness or 
prostration, it could be stated and would have 
due weight with the jury. 
27. Att. Gen. (1878) P. D. CCLVII, 686; the two 
later Bills contained a clause prohibiting'- 
cross-examination as to previous convictions.,, 
28. Rodwell (1876) P. D. CCXXX, 1923, Simon ibid. 
1929; Att. Gen. ibid. 1937; Bowyer pooh-poohed' 
the idea that nervousness would be a handicap; 
in a passage, taken from Hawkins, he urged 
that, however uneducated or nervous he might 
be, an innocent man could hardly fail to 
impress the jury with his plain unvarnished 
tale ((1878) P. D. CCLVII, 667); while Kenealey 
simply denied that that there was any 
probability of innocent persons being 
overwhelmed by nervousness (ibid. 673). 
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29. Herschell (1878)' CCLVII, 668. Kenealey's 
answer to this was that 'If a man resorted to 
falsehood he must suffer the penalty of his 
vice or folly' (ibid. 674). 
30. Simon (ibid. 661). 
31. Paget (ibid. 671). 
32. This argument, although touched on during the 
debates on the 1876 and 1878 Bills, was first 
fully developed in the debates on the later 
Prisoners' Evidence Bills. 
33. Simon (1878) P. D. CCLVII, 662, Herschell 
ibid., 669; Bowyer and Kenealey (ibid. 673) 
suggested any re-examination could be carried 
out by the judge. 
34. Simon (1876) P. D. CCXXX, 1929; Att. Gen. ibid. 
1937-8; Simon CCLVII, 662-3 (laying particular 
stress on the dangers of the Act as it would 
be applied by Quarter Sessions chairmen); 
Ashley (ibid. 659), Russell Gurney (ibid. 677) 
and Henry James (ibid. 681) all claimed that 
the impartiality and fair-mindedness of 
English judges would prevent their being drawn 
into such conflicts, whilst Bowyer (ibid. 666) 
claimed that a similar fear had been expressed 
at the time of the Prisoners' Counsel Act, 
which experience had proved to be quite 
unfounded. 
35. Chambers (1876) P. D. CCXXX, 1933-4; 
Wheelhouse CCLVII, 682. 
36. Morgan Lloyd (ibid. 675) (he confined his 
comments to the right to make an unsworn 
statement) but, in later debates, the point was 
developed to include statements made on arrest 
and before examining magistrates (see e. g. 
Pickersgill (1898) P. D. LVI 988),. 
37. He raised the subject with the Lord Chancellor 
in a letter of 20.1.1877 (PRO: LCO 1/42). On 
Feb. 6 he delivered a lecture on the subject 
of 'A Penal Code' to the Parliamentary 
Committee of the T. U. C. (The Times, Feb. 8, 
1877). Later in the year he published an 
article with the same title in The Fortnightly 
Review (27 O. S., 362). - And see generally 
(1878) P. D. CCXXXIX, 1935). 
38. L. Stephen, The Life of Sir James F. 'Stephen, 
p. 380 'on 2nd August'' Stephen, he had 
just received instructions from the Lord 
Chancellor to draw up a Bill for a Criminal 
Code'. For his efforts he was well rewarded. 
He received 3000 quas. (PRO: LCO 1/42) and the 
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promise of a judgeship, which promise was, 
honoured on 3.1.79, when he was appointed ä' 
judge of the Q. B. D.. 
39. Criminal Code (Indictable Offences) Bill, 1878 
P. P. (178) II, 5, cl. 368. 
40. Code of Criminal Procedure Act, 1861 (India 
Act No. XXV of 1861), s. 342 and Indian' 
Evidence Act, 1872, s. 120 (spouse). 
41. (1877) 2 Nineteenth Century, 737 at pp. 753-4. 
The idea was not new the Chief Justice of New 
Jersey, in his reply to the questionnaire of 
the Society for the Amendment of the Law, had 
suggested dispensing with the oath when 
prisoners gave evidence ((1878) P. D. CCXXXVII, 
668), and Ashley, in opening the second, 
reading debate on the 1876 Bill, had indicated 
that he was prepared to dispense with the oath, 
in the case of prisoners ((1876) P. D. CCXXX, ' 
1926). 
42. Vol. 22 (1877/8), p. 277-8. 
43. (1878) P. D. CCXLII, 2038. 
44.1878/9 P. P. (Cmnd. 2345) XX, 169. 
45. Report, p. 37. 
46. Criminal Code (Indictable Offences) Bill, 1879 
(1878/9 P. P. (117) II1 175), cl. 523. The 
proviso giving the judge power to limit cross- 
examination as to credit attracted criticism 
from all quarters. Some, like Hawkins J., 
argued that a prisoner should enjoy no special 
protection in the matter of cross-examination, ' 
whilst those who favoured protection argued 
that giving the judge power to disallow 
questions as to credit was a useless remedy, 
for once 'the question ... has been asked the' 
mischief is done' 73 L. T. (1882), p. 229. 
47. (1878-9) P. D. CCXLV, 310. 
48. Att. Gen. (ibid. 321-3). 
49. Cole (ibid. 329) (extremely dangerous; it 
would eventuate in a system of torture); 
Martin (ibid. 336) ('so far from its being for 
their benefit it would militate strongly 
against innocent persons'); Assheton Cross 
(ibid. 344) 'I have great doubt with regard, to 
the examination of prisoners ... it may, work 
great hardship against prisoners'). 
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50. (1878/9) P. D. CCXLVII, 1281 (July 3,1879) 
(likely to be lost through lack of 
Parliamentary time). 
51.1879/9 P. P. (232) LIX, 233; (1878/9) P. D. 
CCXLVI, 1915 & CCXLVII, 953. 
52. July 14. 
53.76 L. T. 187. 
54. R. v. Weston (1879) 14 Cox 350. (The deceased 
had been killed by a single shot at close 
range. There were no witnesses to the actual 
shooting. The accused's defence to the charge 
of murder was that the gun had gone off 
accidentally during a struggle with the 
" deceased for possession of it). 
55.76 L. T. 184. 
56. R. v. Le Froy, The Times, Nov, 5,7 & 9,1881; 
(1883) L. T. 644. 
57.76 L. T. 100; 17 Ir. L. T. 644. 
58.26 Sol. Jo., 175 (so too did Lopes J. in a 
case at Worcester Assizes 26 Sol. Jo., 191); 
the ruling was severely criticised in a Times 
leader on Jan. 24. 
59. R. v. O'Donnell, The Times, Dec. 3,1883 (also 
in 99 C. C. C. Sess. Pap. ). 
60. The correspondents were Williams J. (Dec. 29, 
1883, & Jan. 7 & 12,1884); Lord Bramwell 
(under the pseudonym of 'B) (Jan. 2& 5); 
Littler Q. C. (Jan. 3& 8); & Dering (Jan. 4. ). 
61. The point was made by Williams J in his letter 
of Dec. 29. See also Stephen J. in R. v. Ross, 
The Times, Apr. 24,1884. 
62. R. V. Hull & Smith 68 L. T. 264; The Times, 
Feb. 3,1880. 
63. The Times, Jan. 21,1884 (letter signed ML). 
64. Notable British Trials series, p. 200 (the 
trial was held in September, 1877). 
65, R. v. Blades (Leeds Assizes), The Times, Aug. 
5,1880. 
66. R. v. Gerrish 17 Ir. L. T., Dec. 15 ; The Times, 
Jan. 14,1882. 
67. R v. Shimmin (1882) 15 Cox 122. 
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68. R v. Pembroke. The Times, June 10,1882. 
69. See letter 76 L. T. 
70. See letter from Paget to The Times quoted 76', 
L. T. 187 
71. R. v. Everett (1883) 97 C. C. C. Sess. Pap. 329 
at 355. 
72. (1883) 47 J. P. 342 and 355. 
73. (1883) 47 J. P. 342 (Essex); 26 Sol. Jo. 39 
(Sheffield). 
74. R. v. Taylor & Boynes (1883) 15 Cox 265. 
75. R. v. Houltby (1884) 28 Sol. Jo. 84. 
76. R. v. Velasquez The Times, Mar. 21,1884. 
77. R. v. Attwood & Tatham, The Times, Nov. 
1884. 
78. R. v. Taylor (1859) 1 F. & F. 535. 
79. R. v. Ross, The Times, Apr. 24,1884. 
80. R. v. Watters (1883) 47 J. P. 756; The Times, 
Nov. 28,1883. 
81. R. v. Millhouse (1885) 15 Cox 622. 
82. E. g. R v. Cunningham & Burton (1885) 102 
C. C. C. Sees. Pap. 154; R. v. McNally ibid. p. 
342; R. v. Lee & Dredge, The Times, Apr. 29 
1885; R. v. Hay, The Times, Nov. 6,1885; R. 
v. Masters, The Times, Jan. 14,1886; R. `v. 
Riegelmuth, The Times, Mar. 11,1886; R. - v. 
Niblett, The Times, May 6,1886; R. V. Edgar,, 
The Times, Sept. 18,1886; R. v. Rowe, The 
Times, Nov. 3,1886; R v. Doherty, The Times, 
Dec. 20,1888; R. v. Maybrick, The Times, Aug, 
1-9,1889; R. v. Valli (1890) 112 C. C. C. Sess. -_- 
Pap. 1058;; R v. Jones (1891) 114 C. C. C. 
Sess. Pap. 1058; R v. Beezer & Donoghue (1893) 
117 C. C. C. Sess. Pap. 482. 
83. (1888) P. D. CCCXXIV, 120-1 (Sir. G. Campbell)., 
84. Gibson Bowles (1898) P. D. LXII, 750. 
85. R. v. Ross supra; R. v. Masters 1886 supra. 
86. Coleridge L. C. J. in Millhouse supra. 
87. See n. 82 supra. 
88. See e. g. R. v. Valli, R. v. Edgar supra. 
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89. Morgan Lloyd - Criminal Law Amendment Bill, 
1882, Second Reading debate (1882) P. D. 
XXLXVII, 433. 
90. The Times, Nov. 19 (quoted 26 Sol. Jo. 39). Sir 
Ed. Clarke at the committee stage of the 1898 
Bill described it as 'an expedient of judges 
who have felt embarrassment and difficulty 
because the prisoner was not able to give his 
own evidence in the case' ((1898) P. D. LXII, 
751). 
91. T. Humphreys, Criminal Days, p. 45: - 'In my 
experience the privilege was rarely taken 
advantage of. Counsel usually took the view 
that they could put the case for the defence 
much better than the accused, and feared the 
possible effect of an unwise statement from 
their client'. Sir Ed. Clarke at the Committee 
stage of the 1898 Bill said that he had never 
known an unsworn statment be of any value to a 
prisoner, but knew of many cases in which a 
prisoner owed his conviction mainly to the 
fact that his statement gave information 
against him ((1898) P. D. LXII, 751). 
92. Criminal Code Bill, 1880 P. P. (2) II1 1; the 
prisoners' evidence clause it contained (cl. 
471) was identical to that in the 1879 Bill). 
On the same day three private members brought 
in a Code Bill of their own (the Criminal Code 
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905. 
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8. In trials for felony the judges always 
insisted that the prisoner take his trial in 
the dock. (see R. v. Egan (1839) 9 C. & P. 
485n; R. v. St. George (1840) 9 C. & P. 483; 
R. 'v. Douglas (184)1 C. & M. 193), even if he 
was a foreigner who had no'English'(see R. v. 
Zulueta (1843) 1 C. & K. 215). At the start of 
the century a laxer rule prevailed in 
misdemeanour, with defendants often being 
allowed (particularly-if undefended) to'sit at 
-v `` "the table' of the court, especially in"trials in the King's Bench (see e. g. R. v. Carlile 
(1834) 6 C. & P. 636; R. v. Vincent & others 
'(1840) 9 C. & P. 275; R. v. Lovett (1839) 9 C. 
&_P. 462). By the'end of the"century, however, 
TM`' misdemeanants were invariably required to take 
their trial in the dock. For a case which went 
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against the trend see R. V. Edmonds, The 
Times, May 8,1872 - Bramwell B., with 
considerable reluctance, allowed a solicitor 
charged with manslaughter to sit with counsel. 
9. See e. g. R. Harris, Reminiscences of Sir H. 
Hawkins pp. 40-1. The dinners were 
discontinued after a fire at the Old Bailey in 
1877 (W. E. Hooper, History of Newgate and the 
Old Bailey pp. 17 and 134). 
10. (1834) P. D. XXI, 272-350; during the debate 
there was reference to an occasion when 
Chambre J. (J. C. P. 1800-15). had despatched 20 
cases in one night (ibid. 318-9); see also 
(1816) P. D. XXXII, 1146, where one of the 
complaints made by Lord Cochrane against Lord 
Ellenborough was that at his (Cochrane's) 
trial for conspiracy, Ellenborough had 
insisted on sitting till 3 a. m. despite the 
complaints of his counsel that they were 
exhausted. 
11. Report of Commissioners appointed to inquire 
into the existing state of the Corporation of 
the City of London, 1854 P. P. (1772) XXV1,701, 
p. 290 (reference to the practice of the city 
Judges sitting until 9 p. m. to try London 
cases); see R. v. Laerman (murder), The Times, 
Aug. 4,1890 (jury sent out at 7.35 p. m) and 
R. v. Dyer (murder) 1896 in which Hawkins J. 
(who was notorious for his love of late 
sittings) began the trial at 7 p. m. and 
concluded it at 9.30 p. m. (F. W. Ashley, My 
Sixty Years in the Law, pp. 177-8; The Times 
Mar. 22,23,1896). 
12. See e. g. The Times, Dec. 18,1888 (Stephen J. 
sitting till 11 p. m. on Western Circuit); The 
Times, Feb. 25,1889 (Willes J. sitting till 8 
p. m. at Taunton); The Times, Dec. 12,1898 
(Hawkins J. sitting at Maidstone till well 
past 9 p. m. on 4 nights and till 11 p. m. on 
one night). 
13. R. v. Hardy (1794) 24 S. T. 199; R. v. Stone 
(1796) 6 T. R. 527 at 530 ('necessity justified 
what it compelled'); Chitty, Crim. Law, 1st 
ed. (1816), vol. 1,628. 
14. R. v. Hardy supra; at the end of the 
eighteenth century there was a hostel in 
Westminster Hall where county juries were 
lodged during adjournments (R. v. Hardy 
supra). 
15. As in R. V. Stone supra; see also Chitty, op. 
cit., vol. 2., 628; in the 1860s jurors at 
Dublin Assizes were lodged overnight in the 
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grand jury room; Cork juries were also lodged 
overnight at the court house (see (1865) P. D. 
CLXXVII, 1717 and (1866) P. D. CLXXXI, 869. 
16. See The Times reports of old Bailey trials. 
17. R. v. Metcalfe & Robinson, The Times, Dec. 15, 
1848. 
18. If there was an improper separation the jury 
would be discharged - see R. v. Ward (1867) 
10 Cox 573. 
19. R. v. Kinnear (1819) 2 B. & Ald. 462. 
20'. R. v. Coates, The Times, Mar. 6,8 & 9,1875; 
R. v. Lamson, The Times, Mar. 13,1882; R. v. 
Nash, The Times, Sept. 24,1884. 
21. R. v. Foster, The Times, May 14,1859 (Temple 
Gardens); R. v. Dove, The Times, July. 19, 
1856 (York jury allowed to walk in Clifford's 
Tower). 
22. (1866) P. D. CLXXXI, 870 'the practice was for 
the judge to sit late to finish the case 
rather than lock the jury up' (Sir Colman 
O'Loghlen). 
23 Ex p. Castro (1873) 37 J. P. 260 (Cockburn 
C. J. ) and Russell L. C. J. (1897) P. D. XLIX, 86. 
24'. In the debate on the Juries in Civil Causes 
Bill, 1859 it was said that juries were 
sometimes allowed a plentiful supply of lamps 
in order to provide them with some heat, and 
that one judge at least had permitted them 
water on the ground that it was neither meat 
nor drink ((1859) P. D. CLIII, 1014). 
25.3 L. T. 113; (1857) 1 Sol. Jo. 128 (Old Bailey) 
298 (Middlesex Sessions). 
26.3 Bla. Comm., p. 376 citing Lib. Ass. fel. 40, 
p1.11. 
27. "` (1859) P. D. CLIII, 1029. 
28. Winsor v. R. (1866) 10 Cox 276 per Cockburn 
L. C. J. at p. 10 and Lush J. at p. 325, 
29. R. v. Melroy, The Times, Apr. 2, -1825; The Law 
Magazine, Vol. 7 (1832) , p. 46 n'. 1 'cites yet 
another instance from-around this period of an 
Irish jury being carted on donkeys'. 
30R. v. Anon. The Times; `July" 18,1848' (the 
jury in the event reached a verdict before the 
judge left town). 
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31. Co. Litt., 227b 'a jury sworn and charged in 
case of life or member cannot be discharged by 
the court or any other but they ought to give 
a verdict'; Co. 3 Inst., 1110; Hawk., 2 P. C. 
c. 47, s. 1; Foster, Crown Law, pp. 29-39; see 
also Lord Wensleydale ((1859) P. D. CLIII, 
1038). 
32. The main cause of doubt on this point was the 
decision of the Irish Court of Queen's Bench 
in Conway & Lynch v. R. (1845) 5 L. T. (O. S. ) 
458. 
33. Alexander Pope, The Rape of the Lock, c. 3, 
22. Long retirements were, however, the 
exception rather than the rule in both 
civil and criminal cases - see The Times 
reports of criminal cases and Lord Lyndhurst 
(1859) P. D. CLIII, 1021 (referring to civil 
suits) 'In nineteencases out of twenty the 
jury never retires; it comes to a conclusion 
at once'. 
34. R. v. Gould (1763) 3 Burns' Justice of the 
Peace, (30th ed. ), p. 98; R. v. Edwards (1812) 
R. & R. 24 (as to reading over the evidence 
see R. v. Beere (1842) 2 Moo. & Ry. 472). 
35. The practice of starving juries was repeatedly 
condemned by Royal Commissions (e. g. The 
Common Law Commissioners, 2nd. Report, 1852/3 
P. P. (1626) XL, 701), by judges (R. v.. 
Charlesworth (1861) 9 Cox 44, where Crampton 
J. described it as 'a barbaric relic of 
ancient times which would be well got rid of, 
and law journals (e. g. 3 L. T. 113). 
36. (1866) 1 Law Jo., pp. 73-4. 
37. E. g. Smith v. G. N. Ry., The Times, Dec. 20, 
1858 (where a juror on a doctor's advice was 
allowed / pint of port and a few sandwiches). 
38. The Juries in Criminal Cases Bills, 1864/5/6; 
the Criminal Law Practice Amendment Bills, 
1877/78; the Criminal Code (Indictable 
Offences) Bills, 1878 and 1879; the Criminal 
Code Bill 1880; the Criminal Code (No. 2) 
Bill, 1880; the Criminal Law Amendment Bill, 
1882; the Criminal Law Procedure Bill, 1882; 
the Criminal Code (Indictable Offences 
Procedure) Bill, 1883; the Jurors' Detention 
Bills 1886/7/8/9/90; the Criminal Law 
Procedure Amendment Bill, 1890; the Criminal 
Law Procedure Amendment Bill, 1896 and the 
Jurors' Detention Bill, 1897 (which became 
law). 
39. Jurors' Detention Act, 1897, s. 1. 
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40. Criminal Justice Act, 1948, s. 35(4). 
41. Special & Common Juries Bill, 1868, cl. 9. 
42. Juries Bill, 1874. 
43. Criminal Justice Act, 1925, s. 15 
44. Third Report 1831 P. P. (92) X, 375 (at p. 70); 
the Juries in Civil Causes Bill, 1859 sought 
to carry the reform through. 
45. It was one of the subjects covered by the 
questionnaire circulated by the Commissioners 
in 1844 (see Appendix A to their 8th Report). 




1. See e. g. (1826) P. D. XV, 611-2 (Twiss) and 617 
(Tindal); Hale 2 P. C. 289-90; 4 Bla. Comm. 
358. Since Coke's day the high standard of 
proof demanded of the prosecution had been one 
of the justifications traditionally offered 
for the denial of counsel to the accused in 
capital cases. 
2. See chapter 4. 
3. Such text writers as discussed the topic at 
all (and most did not) spoke of the standard 
of proof as being proof beyond reasonable 
doubt (see e. g. Starkie, 4th ed. (1853), pp. 
817 & 865, Best, 1st ed. (1849), p. 100, 
Taylor, 7th ed. (1878), p. 126, Stephen's 
Digest, 1st ed. (1876), art. 94. There are 
countless cases, both reported and unreported, 
in which judges can be found directing juries 
that guilt must be proved beyond reasonable 
doubt - see e. g. R. v. Rowe, The Times, Sept. 
21,1805; R. v. Thornton, The Times, Aug. 9, 
1817; R. v. De Beauvoir (1835) 7 C. & P. 17; R. 
v. Sterne (1843) (cited Best, op. cit., p. 
100); R. v. Belaney (1844) 20 C. C. C. Sess. 
Pap. 441; R. v. White (1865) 4 F. & F. M. 
4. See e. g. R. v. Brady (1821) 1 Leach 327 
('clearly proved'), R. v. Sidney Smith (1845) 
1 Cox 260 ('satisfactorily proved') and 
Greenleaf, i, s. 29. 
5. R. V. Higgins (1829) 3 C. & P. 603 
('satisfied' -a very common form of 
direction); R. v. Hazy & Collins (1826) 2 C. & 
P. 458 ('perfectly satisfied'); R. V. Howlett 
(1836) 7 C. & P. 273 ('satisfactorily shown'). 
As late as 1952 Lord Goddard was suggesting 
that trial judges should avoid all reference 
to reasonable doubt, and, instead, simply 
direct juries to convict only if satisfied of 
guilt (R. v. Summers [1952] 1 All E. R. 1059). 
6. R. v. Beeson (1835) 7 C. & P. 142 ('believe'); 
R. v. Small (1837) 8 C. & P. 46 ('if you 
think'). 
7. Chitty, Crim. Law, Ist ed. (1816), Vol. IV, 
pp. 331-2. 
8. See e. g. R. v 
1822 ('if they 
a verdict of 
discharge of 
prisoners the 
of the grave' 
. Brittle, The Times, Mar. 15, 
should feel compelled to return 
guilty. no judge could, in the 
his lawful duty, give the 
least hope of mercy on this side 
(Garrow B. )); R. v. Weston & 
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Eastwood, The Times, Dec. 28,1822 ('This was 
a case in which, if the prisoners were found 
guilty, their lives would undoubtedly be 
forfeit. ' (Bayley J. ); R. v. Dyer & Dyer, The 
Times,. Apr. 20,1827 (if the accused was 
convicted the law must take its course) and 
see also R. v. Goodfellow, The Times, Jan. 1, 
1832; contrast R. v. Gould (1840) 9 C. & P. 364 
where the jury were told by the judge that the 
trial did not affect the prisoner's life. 
9. See R. v. Belaney supra ('if you convict while 
there is any rational doubt ... you may commit 
that foulest of all enormities - murder under 
colour of law.. '), and Lord Campbell C. J. in 
R. v. Palmer (1856), Notable British Trials 
Series, p. 268 : 'the life of the prisoner is 
at stake and if you find him guilty he must 
expiate his crime by an ignominious death'. 
For examples from earlier in the century see 
R. v. Kain, The Times, Mar. 3,1824; R. v. 
Chapman, The Times, Oct. 31,1825. 
10. On this episode see the footnotes to the 
report of R. v. White supra. 
11. For examples of cases in which Pollock C. B. 
directed juries in these terms see R. v. 
Manning & Manning (1849) 30 C. C. C. Sess. Pap. 
654 ; R. v. Muller (1864) C. C. C. Sess. Pap. 
461; R. v. Exall (1865) 4 F. & F. 922 and R. 
v. Kohl (1865) 4 F. & F. 922. 
12., See e. g. Archbold, 1st ed. (1822), p. 243 in 
relation to the defences of accident and self- 
defence in assault. 
13., See Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 
at the Common Law, p. 355 and pp. 359-64. 
14. Arnold's Case (1724) 16 How. S. T. 764,765 'the 
defence of insanity must be clearly made out' 
' (Tracy J. ). See also R. v. Offord (1831) 5 C. & 
P. 168 and R. v. Oxford (1840) 9 C. & P. 255. 
15. R. v. Dennis & others, The Times, June 19, 
1816. 
16. Gilbert 273 and Foster 255 (cited verbatim on 
this point by most nineteenth century, text 
writers). In India the rule was 'given 
statutory force (Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 
105). , 
17.:.,. See e. g. R. v. 0' Callaghan '& Others; ` The 
Times, Jan. "_17,1818;. R. ' v. Morrison (1837) 8 C. & P. `22; R. V. Greenacre (1837). '8, C. & P. 35; 
R. V. Kirkham (1837)' 8 C. &ý P. 115; R. v. 
, u. 
Holman, The Times', ',, Mar.. 27,1854;, "R. v. 
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Worsley, The Times, July 29,1859; R. v. Peace 
(1879) Notable British Trials Series, p. 161; 
R. v. Little, The Times, May 6,1886. 
18. Woolmington V. D. P. P. (1936) 22 Cr. App. R. 72. 
The trial judge's direction in Woolmington was 
in identical terms to that commonly given in 
nineteenth century cases, namely ' In every 
charge of murder the fact of the killing being 
first proved all the circumstances of 
accident, necessity or infirmity are to be 
satisfactorily proved by the prisoner unless 
they arise out of the evidence produced 
against him'. (Infirmity is presumably a 
reference to insanity thus affording further 
evidence that the burden was conceived of as 
persuasive). 
19. The 28th edition of Archbold (1931) quoted 
verbatim and without comment the passage from 
Foster above referred to, as had every 
previous edition. 
20. See e. g. Cross on Evidence, 5th ed., p. 90 
'The speech (of Lord Sankey in Woolmington) 
can be regarded either as making a change in 
the law or as an insistence on a distinction 
ignored by the old authorities between the 
legal and evidential burdens'. See also the 
following passage from Powell on Evidence, 8th 
ed. (1904), p. 262 'In criminal proceedings 
the burden of proof as a general rule rests on 
the prosecution on account of the presumption 
of innocence. That burden is discharged in 
cases of murder and manslaughter by simply 
proving the killing of the deceased, and it is 
for the accused to prove, if he can, those 
facts which will reduce the act to one of 
manslaughter or justifiable or excusable 
homicide' (the author then proceeds to 
consider cases in which the burden of proof is 
cast on the accused by statute). 
21. R. V. Davies (1913) 8 Cr. App. R. 211 
(accident); R. v. Lobell [1957] 1 Q. B. 547 
(self defence). See also Archbold, 1st ed., p. ` 
243. 
22. For a list of statutes which cast a burden of`- 
proof on the accused see Taylor, op. cit., pp. 
340-4. See also authorities which cast on an 
accused, who relied upon an exemption, 
proviso, exception, or qualification contained 
in the statute creating the offence charged, 
the burden of proving the same, especially'. 
where subject matter of the exception etc. was 
peculiarly within his own knowledge - e. g. R' 
v. Stone (1801) 1 East 639; R. V. Turner 
(1816) 5 M. & S. 206, Apothecaries Co. v. 
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Bentley (1824) 1 C. & P. 531, and see 
Zuckerman, The Third Exception to the 
Woolmington Rule, (1976) 92 L. Q. R. 402. 
23. M'Naghten's Case (1843) 10 Cl. & Fin. 200. 
24. The first English case in which the standard 
of proof in insanity is discussed would appear 
to be R. v. Sodeman [1936] 2 All E. R. 1138. 
In Canada the point had been discussed as 
early as 1918 (see R. v. Kierstead 42 D. L. R. 
193 and also R. v. Clark (1921) 61 S. C. R. 
608), and in the United States much earlier 
still (see the discussion in Wigmore, 3rd ed., 
2497). 
25. 'Make out' (R. v. Leigh (1866) 4 F. & F. 915); 
'prove' (R. v. Stokes (1848) 3 C. & K. 185); 
'clearly prove' (R,. v. Kopsch (1925) 19 
Cr. App. R. 350); 'satisfy' (R. v. Offord supra, 
R. v. Southey (1865) 4 F. & F. 864); sometimes 
the question was framed in terms of whether 
the jury 'believed' the defence evidence (R. 
v. Davies (1858) 1 F. & F. 69). 
26. C. f. R. v. Nobin Chunder Banerjee (1873) 13 
B. L. R. 20 'The fact of unsoundness of mind as 
a defence must be clearly nd distinctly proved 
before any jury is justified in returning a 
verdict under s. 84 of the Penal Code' 
27. - R. v. Woodcock (1789) 1 Leach 500. 
28,., According to the judgment of Lord Ellenborough 
in R. v. Hucks (1816) 1 Stark. 516, it was 
overturned upon a case referred to the Twelve 
Judges by the Irish bench. 
29..: By Huddleston (later Huddleston B) in R. v. 
Blackburn (1853) 6 Cox 333. 
30. R. v. Garner (1848) 3 Cox 175. 
31., R. v. Warringham (1851) 2 Den. 447n. 
32. R. V. Thompson (1893) 17 Cox 641. 
33. In R. v. Jenkins (1869) 11 Cox 250 at p. 256. 
34. R. v. Fenn, The Times, Sept. 12 1828. ' 
35. Beattie, op. cit., 
, 
p. 365 'since the 
discussion of that evidence went on in the 
presence of the . 
jury, and the fact that the 
-prisoner had confessed was disclosed to them, 
. 
it must frequently not have mattered a great 
deal whether the confession was actually read 
or not', citing 129 Surrey Assize papers, Lent 
1742, p. 5 (Simmons), 1743 p. 13 (Scate). 
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36. See e. g. R. v. Day (1837) 2 Cox 209 (boy of 8; 
Cresswell J. conducted investigation); R. v. 
Collier & Morris (1848) 3 Cox 57; R. v. 
Griffin (1853) 6 Cox 219; R. v. Frewin (1855) 
6 Cox 530 (prisoner unrepresented). 
37. R. v. Yarham, The Times, Mar. 30,1846. 
38. See chapter 5, n. 7. 
39. R. v. Blackson (1837) 2 C. & P. 43. 
40. R. v. Megson Battye & Ellis (1840) 9 C. & p. 
420. 
41. R. v. Brooks (1843) 1 Cox 6. 
42. R. v. Ingrey (1900) 64 J. P. 106. 
43. R. v. Forster (1855) 6 Cox 521 at p. 522. 
44. See e. g. R. v. Overfield, The Times, Mar. 22, 
1824; R. v. Peel (1860) 2 F. & F. 21; R. v. 
Richardson (1861) 8 Cox 448; R. V. 
Bedingfield, The Times, Nov. 14,1879 (where 
the trial judge intervened of his own motion); 
& R. v. Honour, The Times, July 30,1898. 
45. R. v. Thompson (1917) 12 Cr. App. R. 261 at p. 
269 'whenever the judge in his discretion 
thinks it will unfairly prejudice the defence 
if the argument should be heard in the 
presence of the jury, he should direct the 
jury to retire to their room ... This course 
should only be adopted when the judge in the 
exercise of his discretion thinks that the 
defence would be unfairly prejudiced'; see 
also R. v. Anderson (1929) 21 Cr. App. R. 178 at 
p. 182 where the Court of Criminal Appeal held 
that a judge was not entitled to order the 
jury to withdraw during legal argument upon a 
point of admissibility without the consent of 
the defence'. 
46. R. v. Falconer Atlee (1973) 58 Cr. App. R. 348 
per Roskill J. at p. 354 'This court has said 
again and again that it is very undesirable 
that (submissions of no case) should take 
place in the presence of the jury'; a case 
which prompted the editor of the 1976 edition 
of Phipson to observe that formerly it had 
been the general practice for the jury to be 
present during such submissions. 
47. See R. v. Turpin, The Times, Aug. 9,1824 
(discussion about incompetency of child 
witness, and need for case to be adjourned for 
her to be instructed as to the nature of an 
oath); R. v. Dewesbury, The Times, Sept. 7. 
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1824 (discussion about admissibility of document); R. v. Fauntleroy, The Times, Nov. 
1,1824 (discussion after accused's conviction 
on first indictment as to whether he should be 
tried on the remaining indictments); R. v. 
Scott, The Times, Sept. 10,1827 (discussion 
as to sufficiency of evidence). 
48. R. V. Taylor (1851) 5 Cox 138. 
49. R. v. Winslow (1860) 8 Cox 397. 
50. R. v. Beesley, The Times, Mar. 18,1889 (voir 
dire as to competency of child witness); R. v. 
Davis & others, The Times, July 28,1893 
(application by prosecution for case to be 
adjourned pending the arrival of a witness 
recently discovered); R. v. Scott, The Times, 
Dec. 1,1896 (bail during trial). 
51"9, R. v. Thompson supra. 
52. R. v. Ward (1860) 54 C. C. C. Sess. Pap. 576 and 
R. v. Carlos (1864) 59 C. C. C Sess. Pap. 292 
(where the witness instead of being asked to 
write down his answer was asked to whisper it 
to the clerk of the prosecuting solicitor). 
53. See e. g. R. v. Bartlett & Dyson, The Times, 
Apr. 13,1886 where defence counsel, in 
applying to sever the indictment, said he did 
not think it convenient to go into the reasons 
for making the application, which immediately 
elicited from Wills J. an indication that he 
understood what those reasons were. And see 
also the observation of the Lord Chief Justice 
in Thompson supra that it was not necessary to 
send the jury out, where the question was 
capable of being argued in the abstract, as it 
frequently was when the evidence objected to 
appeared on the depositions. 
54. R. v. Ivimy (1880) 107 C. C. C. Sess. Pap 570. 
55. One finds reference to the jury being sent out 
whilst admissibility was argued in two appeal 
cases from around this time, namely R. v. 
Booth (1910) 5 Cr. App. R. 180 and R. v. Ballard 
(1914) 12 Cr. App. R. 1. 
56. See the note on The State v. Kelly in Vol. 42 
Central Law Journal 158, and the authorities 
there cited. 
57.15th edition, p. 287. 
58. See e. g. R. v. Crockett (1831) 4 C. & P. 545 
!I must strike the whole of the evidence out 
of my notes' (Bosanquet J. ), R. v. Blackburn 
451 
(1853) 6 Cox 333, where Talfourd J. announced 
that, having spoken overnight to Williams J., 
he had come to the conclusion that a 
confession which he had admitted in evidence 
on the first day of the trial was 
inadmissible, and he should therefore expunge 
it from his notes; R. v. Drage (1878) 14 Cox 
85 where Bramwell L. J., upholding a defence 
submission that a piece of evidence tendered 
by the Crown was not in fact admissible, said 
'I shall tell the jury they are not entitled 
to consider (the evidence). ' 
59. R. v. Rose (1898) 18 Cox 717 at p. 718. 
60. R. v. Inhabitants of Eriswell (1790) 3 T. R. 
707 at p. 711 Grose J. dreaded 'that rules of 
evidence should ever depend upon the 
discretion of the judges'. See also R. v. 
Christie (1914) 10 Cr. App. R. 141 at p. 149: 'I 
must protest against the suggestion that any 
judge has the right to exclude evidence which 
is in law admissible on the ground of prudence 
or discretion or so on' (per Lord Halsbury). 
61. R. v. Roden (1874) 12 Cox 630 'The value of 
the evidence cannot affect its admissibility' 
per Lush J.; R. v. Flannagan & Higgins (1882) 
15 Cox 403 at p. 410 'The question of its 
prejudicing the prisoners was not what he had 
to try' (per Butt J. ). 
62. R. v. Salt (1858) 3 F. & F. 835. 
63. R. v. Christie supra at p. 160. 
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CHAPTER 15 
1. Hale 1 P. C., p. 632. 
2. Phillips, 8th ed. (1838), p. 204 n 2. 
3: It had been so held in Brazier's case (1779) 1 
Leach 199 where the Twelve Judges held 
evidence of a complaint made by a child 
incompetent to give evidence wrongly admitted 
(a ruling repeated in 1808 in R. v. Tucker 3 
J. N. 184 (case reserved by Serjt. Marshall). 
See also Archbold, 1st ed. (1822), p. 260. As 
to the confirmatory nature of such evidence 
see e. g. R. v. Megson (1840) 9 C. & P. 420 
(evidence of complaint by dead complainant 
inadmissible), and R. v. Guttridge (1840) 9 C. 
& P. 471 (evidence of complaint by absent 
complainant inadmissible). 
'4. R. v. Clarke (1817) 2 Stark. 241 is commonly 
cited as authority for this proposition but in 
fact it is not. For later rulings on the point 
see R. v. Wink (1834) 6 C. & P. 397; R. v. 
Walker (1839) 2 Moo. & R. 212; and R. v. 
Osborne (1842) Car. & M. 622 (see also the 
Irish cases of R. v. Alexander (1841) 2 Craw. 
& D. 126; R. v. Maclean (1840) 2 Craw. & D. 
35, and Quigley's case (1842) Ir. Circ. Rep. 
677). 
5. R. v. Walker (1839) 2 M. & Rob. 212. 
6. R. v. Wink supra; for instances of nineteenth 
century judges admitting evidence of complaint 
in cases other than rape or sexual assault - 
see e. g. R. v. Ridsdale (1837) Stark. Ev. 
469n. (shooting at the person); R. v. Lunny 
(1854) 6 Cox 477 (robbery); R. v. Foley (1896) 
60 J. P. 569 (wounding with intent). 
70Cresswell J. in R. v. Osborne supra. 
8. R. V. Eyre (1860) 2 F. & F. 579 (Byles J. ), R. 
-v. Wood (1877) 14 Cox 46 (Bramwell L. J. ); Stephen's Digest (lst ed. 1876) art. 8 n. 'I 
heard Willes J. rule that they were on several 
s. `= occasions, vouching Parke B. as his 
authority"; Stephen goes on in the note to say 
that Bramwell B. had been in the habit of 
admitting the whole of the complaint, and adds 
his own view that the practice accorded with 
common sense. 
9`. j R. v. Lillyman (1896) 18 Cox 346 (the Court 
added that another purpose of admitting such 
evidence was to show want of consent). 
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10. The other exception most commonly encountered 
in criminal cases was that relating to 
statements made by persons as to their bodily 
health and feelings. The exceptions relating 
to 'the admission of declarations in cases of 
pedigree, of old leases rents and other 
surveys' were of little importance in criminal 
cases, and this was also true of depositions 
taken before a judge magistrate or consular 
officer abroad under s. 270 of the Merchant 
Shipping Act, 1854. 
11. Swift on Evidence (1810), p. 125 (see also 
McNally, Evidence (1802), pp. 381 and 386). 
12. As to which see Wigmore, art. 1430 n. 1 and 
the cases there cited. 
13. Wright v. Littler (1761) 3 Burr. 1244. 
14. The two cases were Aveson v. Kinnaird (1805) 6 
East 188 at 195 and Bishop of Durham v. 
Beaumont (1808) 1 Camp. 206. 
15. Douglas Peerage Case 2 Harg. Collect. Jurid. 
1769. 
16. R. v. Drummond (1784) 1 Leach 337. 
17. Stobart v. Dryden (1836) 1 Mee & W. 615 at 
626. 
18. Doe d. Sutton v. Ridgway (1820) 4 B. & Ald. 
35. 
19. Wilson v. Boeram (1818) 15 Johnson's Rep. 286 
(Supreme Court of New York). 
20. R. v. Mead (1824) 2 B. & C. 605 (perjury; 
motion for new trial); (see also the nisi 
prius decision of R. v. Hutchinson (1822) 
cited 2 B. & C. 608n). 
21. East, 1 P. C. 353 (1803). This passage in East 
was, according to Wigmore, the unintentional 
source of the rule limiting the admissibility 
of dying declarations to homicide cases. 
However, Wigmore offers no evidence to support 
this thesis, and indeed the passage does not 
support any such limitation, merely describing 
dying declarations as a kind of evidence more 
peculiar to homicide. East was careful to make 
clear that necessity was not the ground of 
admissibility, and, as Wigmore points out, if 
the principle were applied logically dying 
declarations ought to be admitted in all cases 
of necessity, whatever the nature of the suit, 
and excluded in cases of homicide where the 
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circumstances of the death could be 
satisfactorily proved without the declaration. 
22. See e. g. R. V. Tinkler (1781) East, 1 P. C. 
354; R. v. Radburne (1787) East, 1 P. C. 358, 
and R. v. John (1790) East, 1 P. C. 357. 
23. R. v. Earl of Pembroke (1678) 6 S. T. 1309; 
Lord Mohun's Trial (1691) 12 S. T. 967, and the 
other cases cited in Wigmore, art. 1431 
24. R. v. Lindfield (1848) 12 J. P. 745. 
25. R. v. Hind (1860) 8 Cox 300. 
26. R. v. Lloyd (1830) 4 C. & P. 233. 
27. R. v. Gray (1841) Ir. Circ. Rep. 76. 
28. R. v. Newton & Carpenter (1859) 1 F. & F. 641. 
29. R. v. Pike (1829) 3 C. & P. 598 (4 year old 
child). 
30. R. v. Mead supra, R. v. Murton (1862) 3 F. & 
F. 492 (sed contra R. v. Baker (1837) 2 Moo. & 
R. 53). 
31. R. v. Woodcock (1789) 1 Leach 500; R. v. Peel 
(1860) 2 F. & F. 21 Willes J.; R. v. Jenkins 
(1869) 17 W. R. 621 'an unqualified belief in 
the nearness of death'; R. v. Mooney (1851) 5 
Cox 318 (clear impression that in dying 
state). 
32. R. v. Woodcock supra Eyre C. B. ('soon to 
answer to his maker'); R. v. Van Butchell 
(1829) 3 C. & P. 629 ('almost immediate 
dissolution'); R. V. Jenkins supra 
('expectation of impending and -almost 
immediate death'); R. v. Osman (1861) 15 Cox 1 
('if he thinks he will die tomorrow it is not 
enough'); but contra R. v. Bonner (1834) 6 C. 
& P. 386 where Patteson J. held that it was 
not necessary to prove apprehension of 
immediate danger. 
33. R. v. Mooney (supra); other examples include 
R. V. Spilsbury (1835) 7 C. & P. 190 (deceased 
stated he should not recover; declaration 
rejected because his failure to take his leave 
of his relatives and settle his affairs 
suggested he entertained hope); R. v. Nicholas 
(1852) 6 Cox ' 120 . (declaration rejected 
although, immediately after making it, the 
deceased said 'Oh God I am going fast*. :I am 
too far gone, to say any more. ') 
34. ", R. v. Woodcock supra, R. V. John supra. 
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35. Phillips, op. cit., 297. 
36. R. v. Bonner supra. 
37. R. v. Morgan (1875) 14 Cox 337 (based on a 
misunderstanding of R. v. Cleary (1862) 2 F. & 
F. 853). 
38. R. v. Bedingfield (1879) 14 Cox 341. 
39. See especially 14 Cox 339-40 and 343-5. 
40. Ashton's case (1837)-2 Leach 147 ('opportunity 
of investigating the truth much less' Alderson 
B, ); R. v. Jenkins supra: - 'a great anomaly 
and ought to be allowed with scrupulous and 
almost superstitious care, and, for this 
reason, that the prisoner is not present when 
it is made, there is no opportunity of cross- 
examination, and it is not made under the 
sanction of an oath' (Byles J. ); R. v. Hind 
supra 'the reception of this kind of evidence is clearly an anomalous exception in the law 
of England which I think ought not to be 
extended' (Pollock C. B. ); R. v. Gloster (1888) 
16 Cox 471 where Charles J. cited with 
approval the above quoted passage from 
Jenkins. 
41. Phillips, op. cit., p. 305; Taylor, 7th ed. 
(1878), p. 612. 
42. Phillips, op. cit., p. 306 n. 1; the case was 
that of Richard Coleman executed in 1749. 
43. The prospects of recovery improved somewhat in 
the second half of the century with the 
introduction of new surgical techniques, in 
particular the use of anaesthetics (ether 
first used in 1845) and antiseptics (first 
used in the 1860s) - Sir. L. Woodward, The Age 
of Reform, (2nd ed. ), 620. 
44. R. v. Scaife (1836) 2 Lew. 150. 
45. R. v. McCarth y (1842) unreported cited Russell 
on Crime (6th ed. ), p. 270. 
46. Criminal Law Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict c. 35), 
s. 6. 
47. R. v. Foster (1834) 6 C. & P. 325 followed in 
the Irish cas e of R. v. Lunny supra. 
48. (1880) 15 Law Jo., pp. 5 and 18. 
49. See R. v. Jackson (1864) 61 C. C. C. Sess. Pap. 
128 (declaration made within thirty seconds of 
injury; trial judge prepared to admit in 
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evidence but said he would reserve the 
question of its admissibility, at which the 
prosecution abandoned the attempt to get the 
evidence in); R. v. Williams (1872) 77 C. C. C. 
Sess. Pap. 27 (statement made ten minutes 
after injury held not admissible). In R. v. 
Morgan supra, evidence that the deceased, 
whilst lying mortally injured had pointed at 
the prisoner, was let in without argument and 
unchallenged. 
50. Under 1&2 Ph. & M., c. 13, and 2&3 Ph. & 
M., C. 10. 
51. Hale, 1 P. C., p. -305; Buller, N. P. 242 
(applies even where witness accomplice - R. v. 
Westbeer (1739) 1 Leach 12). 
52. Hale, 1 P. C., p. 305. 
53. Hamson's case 4 S. T. 492; Lord Morley's case 
(1666) 6 S. T. 776. 
54. R. v. Woodcock supra; R. v. Dingier (1791) 2 
Leach 561; R. v. Forbes (1814) Holt N. P. 
599n.; R. v. Errington (1838) 2 Lew. 148. 
55. Lord Morley's case supra; Bromwich's case 
(1667) 1 Lev 180; Thatcher & Waller's case 
(1677) T. Jones 53; R. v. Harrison (1661) 5 
S. T. 1008; dicta of Lord Kenyon and Buller J. 
in R. v. Eriswell (Inhab. ) (1790) 3 T. R. 721, 
citing Radburne supra (which is not in fact in 
point), a note of a case said to have been 
decided by Hotham B. (R. v. Purefoy, Peake Ev. 
(5th ed. ), 61n. ); a ruling by Coleridge J. in 
Sills V. Brown (1840) 9 C. & P. 601, 
repudiated by Starkie, Phillips and Russell 
and by M. Smith J. in R. v. Rigg (1866) 4 F. & 
F. 1085. 
56. R. v. Borron (1820) 3 B. & A. 432; Cox v. 
Coleridge (1822) 1 B. & C. 37; R. v. 
Staffordshire 17. (1819) 1 Chit. 218; Collier 
v. Hicks (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 663. 
57. Phillipps, op. cit., p. 565. 
58. See e. g. R. V. Hake (1845) 1 Cox 226, and 
chapter 2. 
59, Phillipps, op. cit., p. 567. 
60.7 Geo, IV, c. 64, s. 3. 
61.11 & 12, Vict., c. 42, ss. 17 and 18 
(procedure) and s. 1 (extension to treason). 
62. s. 17. 
457 
63. R. v. Scaife (1851) 5 Cox 243. 
64. R. v. Eriswell (Inhab. ) (1790) 3 T. R. 721. 
65. R. v. Hogg (1833)6 C. & P. 136; R. v. Wilshaw 
(1841) Car. & M. 14; and R. v. Savage (1831) 5 
C. & P. 14. 
66. R. v. Wilson (1861) 8 Cox 453 (witness said to 
be too ill to give evidence but not too ill to 
travel; held deposition could be read); R. v. 
Croucher (1862) 3 F. & F. 285 (pregnancy), and 
R. v. Stephenson (1862) 9 Cox 156 (pregnancy 
and illness). 
67.1856 P. F. (456) L, 79. 
68. See e. g. R v. Shaw (1854) 6 Cox 464 (pregnancy 
not enough); R. v. Walker (1857) 1 F. & F. 
534 (quaere was pregnancy illness); R. v. 
Meeson (1878) 14 Cox 40 (fact that witness 
expecting daily to be confined sufficient to 
enable deposition to be read); R. V. 
Goodfellow (1879) 14 Cox 326 (pregnancy alone 
enough) and R. v. Harvey (1850) 4 Cox 441 
(weak from recent confinement; sufficient). 
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CHAPTER 16 
1. R. v. Warwickshall (1783) 1 Leach 267. 
2. Early cases in which inducements held out by 
persons not in authority were held not to 
exclude include R. v. Row (1809) Russ. & Ry. 
153, R. v. Hardwick (1811) 1 C. & P. 98n., and 
R. v. Gibbons (1823) 1 C. & P., 97. One of the 
doughtiests advocates of the exclusion of 
confessions obtained by inducements held out 
by persons not in authority was Bosanquet J. 
(see R. v. Dunn (1831) 4 C. & P. 543 and R. v. 
Slaughter (1831) 4 C. & P. 544n. ). In R. V. 
Spencer (1837) 7 C. & P. 776. Parke B. 
observed that there was a difference of 
opinion among the judges upon the question, 
but two years later Patteson J., having had 
these dicta cited to him, felt able to say (in 
R. v. Taylor (1839) 8 C. & P. 733) that the 
opinion of the judges was in favour of 
admissibility. 
3. See e. g. R. v. Pountney (1836) 7 C. & P. 302, 
(inducement held out by innkeeper in presence 
of constable); R. v. Moody (1841) 2 Craw. & D. 
347 (implied sanction of constable); & R. V. 
Laugher (1846) 2 C. & K. 225 (inducement held 
out by spouse in presence of constable). 
4. Taylor, 7th ed., p. 735; Taylor thought that a 
confession to a private person ought to be 
excluded if procured by an inducement 
calculated to induce a prisoner falsely to 
admit guilt (p. 734). 
5. R. v. Warwickshall supra 'it comes in so 
questionable a shape.... that no credit can be 
given to it'. For other dicta to like effect, 
see R. v. Thomas (1837) 7 Co & P. 345 
(Coleridge J. ); R. v. Court (1836) .7C. & P. 486 (Littledale J. ), and R. v. Moore (1852) 5 
Cox 555 (Parke B. ). 
6. R. v. Gilham (1828) 1 Moo. 186 (R. v. Nute 
(1800) 2 Russ. C. & M. 832 is to like 
effect). 
7. `, R. v. Court supra. 
8. ` R. v. Gould (1840) 9 C. &. P. -486; R. v. Butcher (1798) 1 Leach 265n. 
9. Joy-on Confessions, p. S. - -- 
10. R. v. Green-(1834) 6 C. & P. 393. 
11. R. v. Lloyd (1834) 6 C. & P. 393. 
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12. Starkie, Ev., II, p. 36. 
13. R. v. Thompson (1783) 1 Leach C. C. 291 'It is 
almost impossible to be too careful ... Too 
great a chastity cannot be preserved on this 
subject' (Hotham B. ). 
14. See e. g. R. v. Kingston 
R. v. Dunn supra. In R. 
1 C. C. R. 96 Kelly C. B. 
'you had better' seem tc 
of technical meaning. " 




said that "the words 
have acquired a sort 
15. R. v. Enoch (1833) 5 C. & P. 539. 
16. R. V. Mills (1833) 6 C. & P. 146 
17. R. V. Fleming (1842) Arm. M. & 0.330. 
18. R. V. Croydon (1846) .2 Cox 67. 
19. R. V. Drew (1837) 8 C. & P. 140. 
20. R. V. Morton (1843) 2 M. & R. 514 explained by 
Coleridge J. in R. v. Hornbrook (1843) 1 Cox 
540. 
21. R. v. Simpson (1849) 1 Ir. Jur. 200. 
22. R. v. Jones (1843) cited in R. V. Attwood 
(1851) 5 Cox 322 and followed in R. v. Holmes 
(1843) 1 C. & K. 248, R. v. Furley (1844) 1 
Cox 76 (all Maule J. ) and in R. v. Harris 
(1844) 1 Cox 106 (Rolfe B. ) and in Ireland in 
R. v. Hallam (1846) 1. D. & Osb. 88. In 
Ireland the principle laid down in these 
cases, semble, survived R. v. Baldry, (see 
Taylor, op. cit., p. 743 citing R. V. Toole 
(1856) 7 Cox 244). 
23. One finds this criticism being made as early 
as 1809 by the Twelve Judges in R. V. Row 
(1809) R. & Ry. 153 ('obscurity and 
discordance of cases'). See also Joy, op. 
cit., p. 3. 
24. Vol. 28 (1842), p. 17. 
25.8th Report, 1845, App. A. evidence of 
Woolrych, p. 281 (he would have retained the 
existing rule in capital cases) and Messrs 
Stone & Wall, p. 307. 
26. R. v. Baldry (1852) 5 Cox 253. 
27. Taylor, op. cit., p. 728, and Greenleaf, 
Evidence (1842), s. 217. - 
28. Hale, 2 P. C., 290. r- 
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29. Perry's case (1660) 14 S. T. 1312 (one of two 
brothers confessed that he and his brother and 
mother had murdered his master; they were all 
executed; two years later the master returned 
home, and explained that he had been kidnapped 
and sold to the Turks); Hubert's Case (1666) 6 
S. T. 807,821 (Hubert voluntarily confessed 
that he had started the Great Fire of London 
in 1666 'yet neither the judge nor any present 
at the trial did believe his guilt, but that 
he was a poor distracted wretch weary of life 
who chose to part with it in this way'); 
Wood's case (1810) (2 Life of Sir Samuel 
Romilly 2nd ed., p. 188) (court martial for 
mutiny; accused appliced to another man to 
write a defence for him and read it thinking 
it calculated to excite compassion; he was 
executed before its falsity was discovered); 
the case of the Boons (1819) (cited Taylor, 
op. cit., p. 723) (two brothers saved from 
execution for a murder (to which one of them 
had confessed) by the timely appearance of the 
'victim'). 
30. Greenleaf, op. cit., s. 217. 
31. R. v. Flaherty (1847) 2 C. & K. 782. 
32. R. v. Wheeling (1789) 1 Leach 311n. The two 
other cases were R. v. White (1823) Russ. & 
Ry. 508 and the curious case of R. v. 
Sutcliffe (1850) 4 Cox 270). 
33. See R. v. Eldridge (1821) Russ. & Ry. 440; R. 
v. Falkener (1822) Russ. & Ry. 481; R. v. 
Tippet (1823) Russ. & Ry. 509; R. v. Tuffs 
(1831) 5 C. & P. -167. 
34. R. v. Baldry supra per Campbell L. C. J.. 
35. R. v. Reeve & Anor. (1872) 12 Cox 179. 
36. 1856 P. P. (111) V, 523, cl. 13 (Sir. Fitzroy 
Kelly later became Kelly L. C. B. ). 
37. Ibid., cl. 15 (the decision of Alderson B. 
referred to is R. v. Griffin (1853) 6 Cox 
219). 
38. j.. R.. v. Unkles (1874) Ir. R. 8 C. L. 50 (unlawful 
disclosure by election agent of, tenor of 
vote), and R. v. Sullivan (1887 ) 16 Cox 347 
(unlawful publication of, notice of seditious 
meeting). 
39. See e. g. Best on Evidence, 9th ed. (1902), 
. T. _; 459, and the omission of all reference to the 
point in Stephen's Digest, 1st ed. (1876). 
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40. R. V. Thompson [1893] 2 Q. B. 12. 
41. Wigmore, 3rd. ed., art. 820a :- 'sentimental 
excesses'. For nineteenth century criticism of 
the rule see e. g. Phillipps, 8th ed. (1838), 
p. 424 'There is a general feeling which seems 
to be well founded that the rule has been 
extended much too far', citing Parke B. 's 
dictum that 'the doctrine of inducements has 
been carried to the verge of common sense', 
and the dictum of Pitt Taylor cited in Baldry. 
Wigmore was at great pains to explain the 
'sentimental irrationality' of the judges in 
the matter of confessions. In fact, like their 
stance on indictment defects and variances 
(which goes back to Hale's time), it probably 
represents no more than an application of the 
well known principle that the judge should act 
as counsel for unrepresented prisoners, and be 
astute to detect and take on their behalf any 
technical point which may redound to their 
advantage. 
42. In addition to the examples given in the text 
one can point to the emergence during the 
first half of the century of the 'person in 
authority requirement', and to the refusal of 
the judges throughout the century to have any 
truck with arguments that admissions made on 
oath in other proceedings were made under 
compulsion, and so inadmissible (see for a 
summary of the extensive case law on this 
point Archbold, 20th ed. (1886), pp. 265-8). 
43. R. v. Elsley (1844) 3 L. T. (O. S. ) 6 (counsel 
ought to open the precise words used so that 
the accused can have the benefit of any 
discrepancy (overruling R. v. Swatkins (1831) 
4 C. & P. 548 where it had been held that 
counsel ought not to state the precise words 
used in case the confession turned out not to 
be admissible (it does not seem to have been 
realised that ther real objection was to 
mention not of the terms but of the fact of 
the confession). 
44. See chapter 14. 
45. R. v. Burley (1818) 2 Starkie, Evidence 13; R. 
v. Dingley (1845) 1 C. & K. 637 'A Queen's 
evidence who refuses to make full disclosure 
may be convicted on the confession he has made 
with a view to being admitted a. Queen's 
evidence' (Pollock C. B. ). 
46. R. v. Gillis (1866) 17 Ir. C. L. 512. 
47. R. v. Derrington (1826) 2 C. & P. 418 (Garrow 
B. ). 
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48. R. v. Spilsbury (1835) 7 C. & P. 187; R. V. 
Carter, The Times Mar. 23,1835 where 
Coleridge J. expressed disapproval of the 
conduct of the police but nonetheless let the 
confession in. 
49. R. v. Anon. (Nottingham Assizes), The Times, 
July 22,1825. 
50. R. v. Mitchell, The Times, Dec. 24,1823 
(confession excluded on another ground). 
51. R. v. Wild (1835) 1 Moo. C. C. 452, and R. v. 
Risborough (1847) 11 J. P. 280. 
52.. R. v. Thornton (1824) 1 Moo. C. C. 27 (fourteen 
year old boy kept in custody without food for 
a day, Bayley J. observing that his detention 
was probably illegal); contra R. v. Ackroyd 
(1824) 1 Lew. 49. 
53. R. v. Derrington (1826) 2 C. & P. 418. 
54. R. v. Burley (1818) Phill., Ev., (10th ed. ), p. 
420. 
55. R. v. Gibney (1822) Jebb Cr. & P. Cas. 15 
(acts done by those escorting prisoner to gaol 
calculated to excite horror in him at 
recollection of the crime); R. v. Nolan (1839) 
1 Craw. & D. 74 (telling prisoner accused of 
murder that his father had been charged with 
the offence). 
56. R. v. Shaw (1834) 6 C. & P. 372 (promise on 
oath not to tell) and R. v. Thomas (1837) 7 C. 
& P. 345 (advice not to confess coupled with 
promise of secrecy). 
57. R. v. Gilham supra. 
58. (1844) 8 J. P. 514 referring in particular to 
R. v. Smith (arson case at Ipswich); see also 
evidence of Cobbett to Criminal Law 
Commissioners (8th Report, App. At p. 294 
('they (the police) put others to watch and 
overhear what is said by those who are to be 
tried and thus extort evidence from'the"mouth 
: 
rt of the accused'). For the 
1883 Cumberland case 
see 18 Ir. L. T. 617 (Carlisle Assizes, Day 
J. ). 
59. Foster, p. 243 'words in criminal cases are 
often _ misreported through. 
ignorance, 
inattention or malice°and are extremely-'liable 
to misconstruction'. See also R. v. Simons 
(1834)`6äC. & P. 540. 
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60. R. v. Sexton (1822) 1 Burns JJ. (29th ed. ), p. 
1081 (it was said in that case that Dallas 
C. J. had followed the same rule). 
61. R. v. Mallett, (1830), MSS. Greaves, cited in 
Russell, 4th ed. (1865), p. 867. 
62. R. v. Roche (1841) C. & M. 341. 
63. Metropolitan Police General Orders, 1870 (PRO: 
MEP 8/3; Prisoners para. 32); Metropolitan 
Police General Regulations and Orders, 1893 
(PRO: MEP 8/4) section XVII para. s 308 and 
397. 
64. Hale, 1 P. C., p. 585; Hawkins 2 P. C., c. 46, 
s. 3; see also R. v. Boroski (1682) 9 S. T. 1 
and R. V. Tonge (1662) Rel. 17. 
65. R. v. Shakespeare & Clarkson, The Times, Feb. 
16,1899 (Old Bailey); after two hours 
deliberation the jury foreman told the Common 
Serjeant 'the difficulty the jurymen were in 
was to accept the statement in respect of one 
of the accused, and to blot it out of their 
minds in relation to the other'; in the end 
the jury convicted one prisoner and were 
unable to agree as to the other. 
66. R. v. Young (1789) 1 Leach 505 (Buller J. 
spoke of having previously followed the same 
practice and said that Yates J. had also done 
so). 
67. R. V. Clothier & Tiler (1844) 1 Cox 113. See 
also R. v. Holloway & Kennard, The Times, Dec. 
15 & 17,1831. 
68. R. v. Maudsley (1830) 1 Lew. 110; R. v. 
Barston (1831) 1 Lew. 110. 
69. R. v. Fletcher (1829) 4 C. & P. 250 
(Littledale J. ); R. v. Hearne (1830) 4 C. & p. 
215 (Littledale J. ); R. v. Hall & Ritson 
(1833) 1 Lew 110 (Alderson J. ) and R. v. 
Foster (1833) 1 Lew. 110 (Denman J. ); see also 
Russell, 4th ed. (1865), p. 867 'On the Oxford 
circuit it was the constant practice a few 
years ago to omit the name of any prisoner 
that was mentioned in the confession of 
another prisoner'. 
70. R. v. Harding, Bailey & Shumer, Glouc. Spr. 
Ass., (1830) MSS. Greaves, cited Russell, 
op. cit., p. 867n. Littledale J.: - 'Suppose two 
men are indicted, one as principal and the 
other as accessory, and the principal is-named 
in the indictment and the accessory makes a 
confession admitting himself to be the 
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accessory to the principal, how is it to be 
known that he is accessory to such principal 
if the name of the principal is not to be 
read? ' 
71. R. V. Silcott 1987 Crim. L. R. 765. 
72. Platt B. in R. v. Fisher (1848) 3 Cox 68 at p. 
69. 
73. R. v. Blackburn (1853) 6 Cox 333. 
74. See R. v. Anon., The Times, Nov. 1 1862 (Old 
Bailey); see also Russell, op. cit., p. 868 n 
(b) 'It would be extremely beneficial to 
prisoners in such cases to be tried 
separately, and such a course is nothing more 
than expedient in cases of difficulty as it is 
almost beyond the power of a jury properly to 
discriminate between the evidence affecting 
different prisoners'. Greaves, the editor of 
Russell, had also advocated this course in his 
Report on Criminal Procedure 1856 P. P. (456) 
L, 79. 
75. R. v. Wilson (1817) 1 Holt N. P. 597., 
76.25th ed., (1830), Vol. 1, p. 982. 
77. R. v. Ellis (1826) Ry. & Moo. 432. 
78. R. v. Court (1836) 7 C. & P. 486; R. v. Rees 
(1836) 7 C. & P. 568; R. V. Bartlett (1837) 7 
C. & P. 569. 
79.7 Geo IV., c. 64, ss. 2&3. 
80. Lambard, Eirenarcha, Bk. 2, c. VII. 
81. Dalton's Countrey Justice, (1635 ed. folio) 
cap. III, p. 299. 
82. Chitty, Crim. Law, 1st ed. (1816). vol. 1, p. 
84. 
83. Report of Royal Commission on Police Powers & 
Procedures, 1928/9 P. P. (Cmnd. 3297) IX, 127. 
App. 4. 
84., R. v. Foster, The Times, Oct. 1 & 2,1824. 
85. See The Times Police reports for the period. 
86. See e. g. Reynolds, Marylebone Police Office, 
The Times, Jan. 2&3,1824 (prisoner advised 
not 'to, commit imself );, 8th Report of the 
Criminal Law Commissioners, 1845, App. A: T, 
Paynter at p. 242, Messrs. Mee & Bigsby p. 
256; R. v. Sansome (1850) 4 Cox 203 at p. 20; 
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Pue, The Twilight Zone, (1983) 21 Alberta Law 
Review, p. 334 at pp. 346-7. 
87. Eagle, The Magistrate's Pocket Companion, 2nd 
ed. (1844), p. 112. 
88.8th Report of the Criminal Law Commissioners, 
App. A: T. Paynter, p. 242, Messrs. Mee & 
Bigsby, p. 256 and J. P. Cobbett, p. 293. 
89. S. 18. 
90. R. v. Pettit (1850) 4 Cox 164; R. v. Berriman 
(1854) 6 Cox 184. 
91. R. v. Young & Aynsley, The Times, July 31, 
1823. 
92. R. v. Baker, The Times, Aug. 2,1825; see also 
Park J. in R. v. Read, The Times, Jan. 2, 
1844. 
93. R. v. Gibney, (1820) Jeb. Res. Cas. 15. 
94. R. v. Thornton (1824) 1 Moo. C. C. 27. 
95. Hill's Case (cited Roscoe, Criminal Evidence, 
6th ed., p. 48). 
96. Denman L. C. J. in R. v. Anon. (Bury St. Edmunds 
Assizes), The Times, Aug. 1,1839, & Dougherty 
C. J. in R. v. Hughes (1839) 1 Craw & D. 13. 
97.8th Report of the Commissioners on Criminal 
Law, App. A: J. P. Fawcett, p. 219; W. H. 
Woolrych, p. 281; see also Rolfe B. in R. v. 
Anon. (1844) 2 L. T. 175. 
98. See e. g. Dougherty C. J. in R. v. Doyle (1840) 
1 Craw. & D. 396; R. v. Grey (1856) 7 Cox 
244n. (Le Froy J. ); R. v. Bodkin (1863) 8 Ir. 
Jur. N. S. 240. 
99. Crampton J. in R. v. Martin (1841) Arm. M. & 
0.197. 
100. R. v. Baldry (1852) 2 Den. 430. 
101. R. v. Drew (1837) 8 C. & P. 140. 
102. R. v. Glennon, Toole & McGrath (1840) 1 Craw. 
& D. 359. 
103. R. v. Mick (1863) 3 F. & F. 833; R. v. 
Johnston (1864) Ir. C. L. R. 60 at p. 88 (O'Brian 
J. ) at p. 133 (Le Froy J. ); R. v. Anon. 11 
Sol. Jo. (1866) p. 168 (Chelmsford Assizes) 'I 
have no such powers, the magistrates of the 
county have no such powers, and is an ignorant 
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policeman to have the power to put such 
questions? ' (Bramwell B. ); Yeovil Murder Case 
(1877) 41 J. P. 187; R. v. Davitt, The Times, 
July 16,1870 (Cockburn L. C. J. ); R. v. Marshall, The Times, Feb. 28,1874 (Cave J. ); 
R. v. Gavin (1885) 15 Cox 656; & R. v. Male & 
Cooper (1893) 17 Cox 689. 
104. See e. g. Alderson B. in R. v. Stokes (1853) 17 
Jur. 192 'We are not always certain it is 
fairly done. ' 
105. Denman L. C. J. in R. v. Anon. cited at n. 96 
above. 
106. R. v. Toole (1856) 7 Cox 244. 
107. R. v. Anon., The Times, Mar. 5,1845 per 
Alderson B. 
108. 'ambition to convict' Cox at (1844) 2 L. T. 
356; R. v. Toole (1856) 7 Cox 244 ('natural 
anxiety to get convictions'); R. v. Stokes 
supra 'You ask questions to compromise the man 
not to get him off'. 
109. Cox, (1844) 2 L. T. 356; R. v. Stokes supra per 
Alderson B. 
110.8th Report of the Criminal Law Commissioners, 
App. A: J. P. Cobbett, p. 294; Gribble, p. 318. 
111. Per Pigott C. B. in R. v. Johnston supra at pp. 
122-3; c. f. Christian J. in R. v. Hassett 
(1861) 8 Cox 511 'There was a difference in 
the value of testimony voluntarily given and 
that elicited in answer to questions. '" 
112. Joy on Confessions, p. 38. 
113. PRO: MEP 8/3 'Prisoners' para. 8. 
114. PRO: MEP 8/4 para. s 202,203 and 306. 
115. See the anecdote recounted W. Forsyth both in 
a letter to the Criminal Law Commissioners 
(8th Report, App. A, p. 253),. `and in 
Hortensius the Advocate, 3rd ed., p. 272, of a 
constable, who, when asked by counsel whether 
the prisoner had made a statement, replied 
'No. He was beginning to do so, -but I know my duty betterand prevented him'. In the letter 
he describes the incident as having occurred 
recently at the Old Bailey. 
116.8th Report. of ; the Criminal Law Commissioners, 
- App. A, p. 211. 
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117. R. v. Dickinson (1844) 1 Cox 27, R. v. Watts 
(1844) 1 Cox 75, and R. V. Priest (1847) 2 Cox 
378 
118. R. v. Davitt, The Times, July 16,18 & 19, 
1870 (Cockburn C. J. ). 
119. R. v. Berriman (1854) 6 Cox 388 (Erle J. ); R. 
v. Reason (1872) 12 Cox 228 (Keating J. ). 
120. See e. g. R. v. Reason (1872) 12 Cox 228 and 
the Yeovil Murder Case supra; in 1881 the 
Justice of the Peace remarked upon 'a growing 
tendency to infringe the rule ... forbidding the interrogation of prisoners'. In 1882 the 
Marquis of Salisbury, in a charge to a Quarter 
Sessions grand jury, went out of his way to 
draw their attention to two cases in the 
calendar where such improper questioning had 
occurred (1882) 46 J. P. 665. 
121. Cases in which such evidence had been excluded 
included R. v. Doyle (1840) 1 Craw. & D. 396; 
R. v. Martin (1841) Arm. M. & 0.197; R. v. 
Devlin (1841) 2 Craw. & D. 151; R. v. Toole 
(1856) 7 Cox 244; R. v. Grey (1856) 7 Cox 
244n.; R. v. Warrell (1861) 13 Ir. Jur. 357; 
R. v. Hassett (1861) 8 Cox 511; R. v. Bodkin 
(1863) 8 Ir. Jur. N. S. 340. The only case in 
which answers obtained by questioning had been 
received was R. v. Hughes, cited by Joy, op. 
cit., p. 39. 
122. R. v. Johnston, supra. 
123. Taylor, 1st ed. (1848), p. 421, Joy , op. cit., 
Phillips, 8th ed. (1838), p. 427. 
124. R. v. Wild (1835) 1 Moo. C. C. 452. 
125. R. v. Cheverton (1862) 2 F. & F. 833. 
126. R. v. Mick (1863) 3 F. & F. 822. 
127. At p. 105. 
128. Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 25. 
129. R. v. Gavin (1885) 15 Cox 656. 
130. R. v. Male & Cooper (1893) 17 Cox 689. 
131. R. v. Morgan (1895) 59 J. P. 827. 
132. R. v. Histed (1898) 19 Cox 19; in R. v. Miller 
(1895) 18 Cox 54 Hawkins J. said that he did 
not expressly dissent from Gavin. Nor, semble, 
were Cave and Hawkins JJ. the only judges to 
follow Gavin. In 1893 the Justice of the Peace 
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at p. 310 claimed that the judges 'constantly 
reject or discredit answers to questions given 
by persons under suspicion at the time. ' . 
133. R. v. Rogerson [1870] N. S. W. C. R. 234. 
134. R. v. Brackenbury (1893) 17 Cox 628. 
135. Rogers v. Hawken (1898) 19 Cox 122. 
136. R. v. Pearson (1908) 1 Cr. App. R. 77; R. v. 
Firth (1913) 8 Cr. App. R. 162; R. v. Gardner & 
Hancox (1915) 11 Cr. App. R. 247; R. v. Grayson 
(1921) 16 Cr. App. R. 230; R. v. Adams (1923) 17 
Cr. App. R. 77. See also a reference to the 
Metropolitan Magistrates having commented on 
the practice in 109 L. T. (1910) 389. 
137. Ibrahim V. R. [1914-15] A. C. 509. 
138. R. v. Voisin (1918) 13 Cr. App. R. 89. 
139. R. v. Booker (1924) 18 Cr. App. R. 47. 
140. R. v. Matthews (1913) 14 Cr. App. R. 23; R. v. 
Grayson supra; R. V. Taylor (1923) 17 
Cr. App. R. 109; R. v. Brown & Bruce (1931) 23 
Cr. App. R. 56; R. v. Dwyer (1932) 23 Cr. App. R. 
156. 
141. Report of the Royal. Commission on the Police 
Powers & Procedure supra, p. 60, para. s 161-2. 
142. Home Office Circular of Jan. 24,1930 
(536053/29). 
143. See e. g. R. v. Brown & Bruce, and R. v. Dwyer 
supra; R. v. Rattenbury & Stoner (1935) 
Notable British Trials Series, p. 126. 
144. The Inns of Court Conservative Association and 
the Bow Group both suggested to the 1962 Royal 
Commission, on the Police that it should be 
included - see Gooderson, The Interrogation of 
Suspects, 1970 48 Can. B. R. 272. 
145. The D. P. P. had told the Royal Commission of 
1929 that the practice was from the point of 
,., view of the public a first rate procedure' but the Commission had condemned it (para. 159). 
It had been used in R. v. Booker supra and 
upheld in. R. v. Whitway, The Times, Oct. 29, 
1953, and in particular in R. v. Buchan (1948) 
32 Cr. App. R. 126. 
146. Glanville Williams 1960 Crim. L. R. 330. 
147. Rule 1 of the, 1964 Rules. 
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CHAPTER 17 
1. See e. g. R. v. Landfriede, The Times, Oct. 30, 
1805 (jury ask if there are witnesses to the 
prisoner's character); R. v. Budge, The Times, 
Aug. 27,1811 (a speech from counsel extolling 
his client's character prompted the judge to 
observe that, if such was the prisoner's 
character, why had no character witnesses been 
called? ). The Times report of R. v. Howe, Mar. 
20,1813 (a murder case) commented on the 
failure of the prisoner to call a single 
character witness. See also R v. Fonswick, 
The Times, Sept. 22,1819 where the judge 
asked the prisoner if he had any person to 
give him a character. Also Beattie, op. cit., 
p. 448 (speaking of the eighteenth century) 
'To have no witnesses at all was almost 
certain to be disastrous, especially if the 
charge was particularly serious', and 
Langbein, The Criminal Trial before the 
Lawyers, p. 305 'The Old Bailey Sessions 
Papers often recite that the want of 
character evidence for the accused was 
material to his conviction. ' 
2. With the jury good character might sometimes 
win the prisoner a partial verdict (i. e. a 
verdict acquitting him of the capital part of 
the charge) - see Beattie, op. cit., p. 443. 
As to the role of character evidence in the 
decision of judges to reprieve capitally 
convicted prisoners see Beattie, op. cit., p. 
443 and Green, Verdict According To 
Conscience, p. 443. 
3. Beattie, op. cit., 447: 'Prisoners appreciated 
the importance of character witnesses... large 
numbers managed to arrange from jail to get 
one or two witnesses to come to court. ' 
4. See e. g. R. v. Bryan, The Times, Aug. 5,1814 
(murder; 21 character witnesses); R V. 
Blackburn, The Times, Mar. 29,1815 (forgery; 
upwards of 20); R. v. Stent, The Times, Sept. 
20,1819 (attempt murder; a vast number); R. 
v. Sparkes, The Times, Jan. 2,1823 (attempt 
murder; 17); R. v. Fauntleroy, The Times, Nov. 
1,1824 (forgery; 16). 
5. See e. g. R. v. Allen, The Times, Oct. 31,1814 
(the accused, a lad of 15-16, said nothing in 
his defence but called a number of respectable 
persons who gave him a good character). 
6. E. g. R. V. Solomon, The Times, Jan. 25,1817 
(young lad indicted for theft asked Recorder 
to postpone trial because his witnesses had 
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not yet arrived, which drew from the Recorder 
the usual answer 'We will give you a' good 
character'). 
7. E. g. Lord Ellenborough C. J. in R. v. Cock, The 
Times, May 3,1802 'good character can-avail 
only in doubtful cases' and in R. v. Davison 
(1809) 31 S. T. 99 'If the evidence were in 
even balance character should make it 
preponderate in favour of the Defendant, but 
in order to let character have its operation 
the case must be reduced to that'; Le Blanc J 
in R. v. Haigh, (1813) 31 S. T. 1092 'If the 
evidence leaves it a matter of fair and 
reasonable doubt whether a party is guilty or 
not, in common sense if you prove that a 
prisoner upto that time has always maintained 
a good character it will apply and balance in 
his favour; but if the evidence of guilt is 
satisfactory to the minds of the jury, 
evidence of the prisoner's good character 
cannot and ought not to have any avail'. This 
form of direction had, semble, been in use 
since the late seventeenth century (see e. g. 
Hyde C. J. in R. v. Turner (1664) 6 How S. T. 
565), and it was still being given as late as 
1918 (see R v. Bliss Hill (1918) 13 Cr. App. R 
125). It undoubtedly lies at the root of the 
direction which is still sometimes given today 
that 'good character cannot fight facts'. It 
had been strongly criticised by Greaves 
(Russell, 4th ed. (1865), 300); evidence of 
character was, he argued (as Williams J. had 
said in R. v. Stannard (1837) 7 C. & P. 673), 
evidence to be submitted to the jury to induce 
them to say whether they think it likely that 
a person, with such a character would-have 
committed the offence, and ought even in plain 
cases to be left to the jury for them to 
consider along with the other evidence in the 
case. The direction was also open to the 
criticism that if the evidence was such as to 
leave the jury doubtful it was their duty to 
acquit whatever the defendant's character. 
8'. Archbold, Ist ed. (1822), p. 70; Phillips, 8th 
ed. (1838), p. 490. 
9. ` R. v. Rowton (1865)'10 Cox 25. 
10. This was conceded by Cockburn L. C. J. ýat-p. 30. 
The decision was at odds with earlier reported 
cases, in particular R. v. Davison supra where 
Lord ý Ellenborough C. J. had ruled that{, 'the 
correct mode ` of examining :. -a. witness to 
character is to. `ask him whether. from his 
knowledge of the Defendant's general character 
he ; thinks, 'him-"capable of 'committing the 
offence charged against him' and R. v. Hemp 
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(1833) 5 C. & P. 468. Erle C. J. pointed out in 
the course of his dissenting judgment (at p. 
33) that the effect of the majority decision 
would be to prevent an employer being called 
to say 'This man has been in my employ for 
twenty years, and I have always regarded him 
with the highest estimation and respect. ' 
11. Some of the strongest criticism came in 
Stephen's Digest, lst ed. (1876), p. 167 where 
the comment was made 'The case is seldom if 
ever acted upon in practice. ' 
12. These glosses seem to have originated with 
Phillips and to have been later generally 
adopted by other text writers. 
13. R. v. Hodgkiss (1836) 7 C. & P. 298. 
14. R. v. Wood & Parker (1841) 5 Jur 225 (Parke B. 
justified his ruling on the ground that 
'character is made up of a number of small 
circumstances, of which his being suspected is 
one. '. Five years later in R. v. Rogan & 
Elliott (1846) 1 Cox 291 Erle J. refused to 
allow such a question). 
15. Previous Convictions Act, 1836 proviso; 
Prevention of Offences Act, 1851, s. 9; 
Larceny Act, 1861 s. 116; Coinage Offences 
Act, 1861, s. 37; Prevention of Crimes Act, 
1871, s. 9. 
16. R. v. Hughes (1843) 1 Cox 44 (Rolfe B. ); R. v. 
Lovejoy (1850) 14 J. P. 592 (Mr. Commiss. 
Gurney); in both cases the judge whilst 
allowing such evidence to be given said he had 
never heard of such a thing being done before. 
17. R. v. Burt (1851) 5 Cox 284 (Martin B. after 
consulting Erle J. ). 
18. R. V. Collins, The Times, Apr. 17,1844. There 
was in fact by the time of Rowton some 
authority for allowing in such evidence, viz. 
R. v. Hains (1695) Comb. 337 ('if the 
defendant give evidence of a general 
reputation, it may be answered by particular 
instances on the other side'), and R. v., 
Lovejoy supra, where Mr Commiss. Gurney 
allowed rebuttal witnesses to prove particular 
acts of dishonesty. 
19. See e. g. Cockburn L. C. J. at p. 31 where, after 
making it clear that the same rules applied to 
evidence called in rebuttal as to evidence led 
in chief, added 'evidence of particular 
facts... must be put out of consideration 
altogether. ' See also Willes J. at p. 39 
472 
'particular acts must be excluded on the part 
of the prosecution, partly for the same reason 
that excludes them in the first instance, and 
partly from the reason that no notice has been 
given to the prisoner that you are going to go 
into an inquiry as to particular acts'. This 
was certainly the view of the text writers, 
see e. g. Taylor, 7th ed., p. 322 and Best, 9th 
ed. (1902), p. 239. It was also the view taken 
by a Canadian court in R. v. Triganzie (1888) 
15 O. R. 294 
20. R. v. Roberts, The Times, Sept. 23,1820, 
where Best J. after cross-examining a 
character witness about a previous conviction 
of the prisoner's, observed to the jury 'It 
was an old saying that no man ever had a 
character until he came to the Old Bailey, and 
the reception of such testimony as had just 
been offered was a great stain on the 
administration of justice' adding that he had 
always done all he could to stamp out the 
practice. 
21. R. ` v. Roberts supra affords one example of a 
judge intervening in this way. For others, see 
R. v. Norris, The Times, Aug. 2nd, 1804, where 
Grose J., in the course of his summing up, 
told the jury that the evidence of good 
character the prisoner had called would not 
avail him for reasons he would explain 
afterwards, and R. v. Kelly, The Times, Dec. 
21,1838 where a character witness was cross- 
examined by the Common Serjeant as to the 
accused's previous convictions. Old offenders, 
appearing before the City Judges, always ran 
the risk that the judge would remember their 
faces. 
22. See the judgment of Martin B. in Rowton at p. 
36. 
" 23. R v. Cole (1810) 3 J. N., p. 267. 
24. As to such practice see Langbein, op. cit., p. 
303. 
25. 'Langbein, op. cit., p. 304. 
26. Seeýe. g. R v. Fauntleroy supra; The Times for 
Mar. 7,1843 reports the waiting jurors 
complaining of being kept out of court during 
the trial of Daniel M'Naghten'(public interest 
was such that - their + seats had` . 
been 
. -commandeered by others); and R. v. Shrimpton (1851) 2 Den. ` 319, and the exchange=-therein 
between counsel and the judges referred to 
below. 
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27. For examples of cases of prisoners being tried 
successively on a number of indictments see R. 
v. Oliver, The Times, July 31,1800 (tried on 
2 indictments in succession); R. v. Jonquay & 
Gails, The Times, Feb. 17,1803 (2 indictments 
in succession); R. v. Warren, The Times, Apr. 
26,1803; R. v. O'Donnell, The Times, Sept. 
24,1806, where the accused, on his second 
trial, addressed remarks to the jury 
concerning the first trial; R. v. Guy, The 
Times, Jan. 19,1807; R. v. Smith, alias 
Holmes, The Times, Mar. 20,1807; R. v. 
Cannon, The Times, Dec. 3,1808; R. v. Cole, 
The Times, Aug. 11,1810; R. v. King, The 
Times, July 15,1811, where the Recorder 
actually told the jury that there were other 
indictments and trials to come; R. V. 
Fauntleroy supra, where Park J. expressed the 
view that it might not be right to have the 
same jury try all the indictments against the 
accused; R. v. Goodfellow, The Times, Jan. 1, 
1831; R v. Mulvey, The Times, Mar. 19,1831; 
R. v. Napier, The Times, Sept. 18,1839; & 
R. v. Carn, The Times, Jan. 10,1885, where 
the report refers in terms to fact that the 
indictments were tried by the same jury. 
28. See chapter 3. 
29.101 C. C. C. Sess. Pap. 5 (the Common Serjeant 
appealed to counsel for the prosecution not to 
press the evidence but he would not be 
dissuaded). 
30. See R. v. Anon. (Guildford Assizes), The 
Times, Aug. 2,1862, where a police officer 
volunteered that the accused had previous 
convictions; and R. v. Tuberfield (1864) 10 
Cox 1 where prosecuting counsel elicited 
evidence from an arresting officer as to his 
then knowledge of the Defendant's character, 
as going to the question of whether he had 
reasonable grounds to arrest him. 
31. See R. v. Smith (1916) 80 J. P. Rep. 199, and 
chapter 14. 
32. In the first case noted at 30 above Bramwell 
B., although remonstrating with the officer, 
did not consider discharging the jury. 
33. R. v. Anon. (1851) 5 Cox 268 and R. V. 
Shuttleworth (1851) 3 C. & K. 375 (Alderson B. 
claimed that if the procedure were otherwise 
the accused would have no opportunity of 
challenging the jury). 
34. R. v. Shrimpton (1851) 2 Den. 319. 
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35. See chapter 14. 
36. R. v. Maria Fox (1866) 10 Cox 505 and R. v. 
Martin (1869) 11 Cox 343, where the Court for 
Crown Cases Reserved held that the new 
procedure applied even in a prosecution for 
the felony of possessing counterfeit coin 
after a previous conviction, despite the fact 
that it was only the fact of the previous 
conviction which made the offence felony. 
37. By s. 1 proviso (f) of the Criminal Evidence 
Act, 1898. 
38. See e. g. R. V. Rickman (1789) East, 2 P. C. 
1035 (infra); R. v. Pearce (1791) Peake Add. 
Cas. 106 (libel - paragraphs other than those 
in issue admitted to corroborate testimony of 
printer and identify Defendant); R. v. Neville 
(1791) Peake 91. 
39. R. v. Tattersall (1801) 2 J. N. 252 referred to 
by Ellenborough L. C. J. in R. v. Whiley & 
Haines (1804) 2 Leach 983. 
40. R. v. Cole (1810) 3 J. N. 267 and referred to 
in Phillipps, 1st ed., pp. 69-70. 
41. The increase in bank note forgery was 
reflected both in the number of prosecutions 
brought and the number of forged notes 
detected. Between 1783 and 1796 only 4 persons 
were prosecuted for bank note forgery. By 1801 
the number of prosecutions had risen to 54. It 
was 63 in 1802 and after a falling off between 
1803 and 1806 the figures picked up again 
rising to 120 in 1816, and 142 in 1817. In 
1812 the value of forged notes detected by the 
Bank of England was £17,883; for 1817 the 
figure was £31,180 (see (1818) P. D. XXXVIII, 
xxxv-xl). The increase in forgery - was 
accompanied by a huge increase in the number 
of bank notes in circulation (to which the 
Bank of England's decision to suspend cash 
payments for the duration of the war 
materially contributed). In the first half of 
1797 the number of Bank of England notes in 
circulation was £10.8 million. For the 
corresponding period in 1817 the figure was 
-£27.3 million. Bank of England notes were not 
of course the only bank notes in circulation; 
country banks also had power to issue notes 
(even after the Bank Charter Act, 1844 about 
280 banks still retained the,;. privilege of 
issuing their own bank notes. The forgery of 
bank notes was made easier by their : still 
primitive design (see (1818) P. D. XXXVIII, 275 
and 282. On the question of . 
forged notes 
generally see (1816) P. D. XXXIII, 1178-9 and 
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XXXIV, 310-11, (1818) P. D. XXXVII, 1223-4 and 
XXXVIII, 272-84. 
42. See e. g. the charge of Hullock B. to the Grand 
Jury at the York Summer Assizes, 1828 'It is 
seldom that the individual who actually 
commits a forgery is reached' (Sheffield 
Courant, July 25,1828). 
43. Per counsel in R. v. Whiley & Haines supra. 
44. Chitty, Crim. Law, -ist ed. (1816), Vol. 1, 
284-5. The remedy for breach of the 
prohibition was either to move, before 
arraignment, to quash the indictment, or, 
after arraignment, to ask the judge to call 
upon the prosecution to make their election. 
The objection could not be taken by demurrer 
or motion in arrest. The reason given for the 
rule was that to permit more than one felony 
to be joined might embarrass the prisoner in 
the exercise of his right of challenge. The 
rule did not apply in misdemeanour (where 
there was no right of jury challenge), it 
being possible to join any number of 
misdemeanours in a single indictment. 
45. The argument about want of notice was rejected 
by Lord Ellenborough on the ground that 
'prisoners must know that, without receipt of 
other evidence than that which the mere 
circumstances of the transaction afford, it 
would be impossible to ascertain whether they 
uttered ... with guilty knowledge... '. 
Ironically the same argument was one of the 
justifications advanced by his lordship for 
prohibiting witnesses being asked degrading 
questions. 
46. R. v. Millard (1813) Russ. & Ry. 245; R. v. 
Phillips (1829) 1 Lew. 105 and R. V. Moore 
(1858) 1 F. & F. 73. The rule was departed 
from by Coleridge J. in R. v. Forbes (1835) 7 
C. & P. 224 (where an admission by a prisoner 
in a letter that a bill of exchange not 
produced in evidence was forged was held 
admissible to prove the fact). 
47. See e. g. counsel in R. v. Smith (1827) 2 C. & 
P. 633, and R. v. Dossett (1846) 2 C. & K. 
306; Bayley J. in R. v. Ellis (1826) 6 B. & C. 
145; and Russell, 4th ed. (1865). 
48. R. v. Oddy (1851) 2 Den. 264. 
49. R. v. Rickman supra. 
50. R. v. Westwood (1813) 4 C. & P. 547. 
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51. R. V. Fursey (1833) 6 C. & P. 81. 
52. E. g. R. v. Young (1789) 3 T. R. 98, R. V. 
Thomas 1800 East, 2 P. C., 934. 
53. Per Lord Ellenborough in R. v. Whiley supra. 
54. R. v. Folkes (1832) 1 Moo. 354; (see also R. 
v. Rooney (1836) 7 C. & P. 517 and R. v. 
Giddins (1842) 2 Car. & M. 634 (two persons 
robbed in same incident); R. v. Ellis supra 
(theft of marked coins from till on different 
occasions during same day); R. v. Birdseye 
(1839) 4 C. & P. 386 (thefts from same shop 
separated in time by only minutes); R. v. 
Trueman (1839) 8 C. & P. 727 (arson of a row 
of 5 houses). 
55. R. v. Bleasdale (1848) 2 C. & K. 765 and see 
also R. v. Firth (1867) 11 Cox 234 (theft of 
gas over period of years by means of secret 
pipe). 
56. R. v. Winslow (1860) 8 Cox 397 and R. v. Hall 
(1887) 5 N. Z. L. R. 93. 
57. R. v. Williams (1834) 6 C. & P. 626. The 
Larceny Act,. 1861, created an exception to the 
prohibition on charging more than one felony 
in an indictment, permitting in cases of theft 
and embezzlement upto three charges, separated 
in time by no more than six months, to be 
included in the same indictment. 
58. R. v. Donnall (1817) 2 C. & K. 308 n. 
59. R. v. Egerton (1819) Russ. & Ry. 375. 
60. R. v. Clewes (1830) 4 C. & P. 221. 
61. R. v. Voke (1823) Russ. & Ry. 531 followed in 
R. v. Dossett supra. 
62. R. v. Winkworth (1830) 4 C. & P. 444. 
63. R. v. Boynes (1843) 1 Car. & Kir. 65. °, 
64. R. v. Mahoney (1848) 12 J. P. 377. 
65. R. v. Cooper (1849) 3 Cox 547. 
66. R. v. Whiley supra. 
67. R. v. Hough (1806) Russ. & Ry. -120. 
68. R. v. Dunn & Smith (1826) 1 Moo. -C. C. 146. 
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69. See Vaughan B. in R. v. Sunderland (1828) 1 
Lew. 102 ('the rule has been much questioned 
by many able lawyers'). 
70. R. v. Taverner (1809) 4 C. & P. 413n. (such 
evidence admissible only where the utterings 
were in some way connected, as where the notes 
could be shown to be of the same manufacture); 
R. v. Smith (1831) 4 C. & P. 411 (prosecution 
declined to press the evidence when Gaselee J 
threatened to reserve the point). 
71. R. v. Whiley supra (remoteness went to weight 
not admissibility); R. v. Ball (1808) 1 Camp. 
324; R. v. Millard. (1813) Russ. & Ry. 245 
(doubt expressed as to whether an interval of 
6 weeks between utterings was not a bar to 
admissibility). 
72. R. v. Smith (1827) 2 C. & P. 633 (Vaughan B. 
refused to allow the evidence in); R. v. 
Hodgson (1828) 1 Lew. 103 (the court expressed 
great doubt as to the admissibility of the 
evidence); R. v. Kirkwood (1830) 1 Lew. 103 
(Littledale J. admitted the evidence without 
hesitation). 
73. R. v. Hodgson supra; R. v. Sunderland (1828) 1 
Lew. 102. 
74. R. v. Harrison (1834) 2 Lew. 118, and R. v. 
Forster (1855) 6 Cox 521 (later uttering); R. 
V, Jackson (1848) 3 Cox 89n. (remote 
utterings); R. v. Jones & Hayes (1877) 14 Cox 
3 (subject of another indictment); R. v. 
Harris (1836) 7 C. & P. 29 (notes of different 
denomination or description). 
75. R. v. Forster (1855) 6 Cox 521 (prosecutor 
asked judge to reserve question of whether 
uttering of another denomination of base coin 
so that point could be put beyond doubt); R. 
v. Salt (1862) 3 F. & F. 385 (admissibility of 
utterings remote in time); Byles on Bills of- 
Exchange (4th ed. ): - doubt expressed whether 
uttering of forged bills drawn on different 
persons could be given in evidence to prove 
guilty knowledge (referred to in Salt above).., - 
76. R. v. Green (1852) 3 C. & K. 209. 
77. This made evidence of the finding of other 
stolen property in the possession of the 
accused within the period of 12 months' 
preceding the alleged receiving admissible to 
prove guilty knowledge. 
78. See R. v. Drage (1879) 14 Cox 85 and R. v. 
Carter (1885) 15 Cox 448 (section held to 
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apply only where other stolen goods were 
actually found in the possession of the 
accused). 
79. R. v. Roebuck (1856) 7 Cox 126, followed in R. 
v. Francis (1874) 12 Cox 612 (paste ring 
offered as diamond). 
80. Parker v. Green (1862) 9 Cox 169. 
81. R. v. Bailey (1847) 2 Cox 311. 
82. R. v. Roden (1874) 12 Cox 630. 
83. R. v. Waters & Ellis (1870) 72 C. C. C. Sess 
Pap. 544, and The Times, Sept. 22/3/4,1870. 
84. R. v. Gray (1866) 4 F. & F. 1102. 
85. R. v. Geering (1849) 8 Cox 450n., (1849) 18 
L. J. M. C. 215. 
86. See e. g. Palmer's case 1856, Smethurst's case 
1859, and Mrs Maybrick's case 1889 (all in 
Notable British Trials series). 
87. R. v. Garner (1864) 3 F. & F. 681, &4F. & F. 
346. 
88. R. v. Cotton (1873) 12 Cox 400. 
89. R. v. Heesom (1878) 14 Cox 40. 
90. R. v. Flannagan & Higgins (1884) 15 Cox 403. 
91. Makin V. A. G. for New South Wales [1894] A. C. 
57. 
92. R. v. Winslow (1860) 8 Cox 397. 
93. R. v. Hall (1887) 5 N. Z. L. R. 93. 
94. Herbert Stephen, Evidence in Criminal Cases of 
Similar but Unconnected Acts, (1888) 13 L. Q. R. 
71. 
95. R. v. Richardson (1861) 8 Cox 448 followed in 
R. v. Murphy (1864) 59 C. C. C. Sess. 'Pap. 77, 
R. v. Proud (1861) 9 Cox 22, R. ' v. Stephens 
(1888) 16 Cox 387. 
96. See e. g. R. V. Waters & Ellis supra. 
97.1876 p. 139. 
98. Blake v. Albion Life Insurance 1878 4 C. P. D. & 
P. 94 at 166 (Lindley J. ), R. v. Rhodes (1898) 
19 Cox 182 and Halsbury's Laws, 1st ed., Vol. 
9, para. 742. 
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99. See also letter from Hawkins J. to Windeyer 
J., printed at 1893 14 L. R. (N. S. W. ) 1, 
'relevancy to the issue is all that is 
required to make evidence, not otherwise 
objectionable, admissible'. And see generally 
J. Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar 
Fact Evidence: England (1933) 46 Harv. L. R. 
954. 
100. Categories :- to prove guilty knowledge, to 
rebut accident, to rebut mistake, to rebut 
alibi (R. v. Rooney (1836) 7 C. & P. 517, and 
R. v. Briggs (1839) 2 M. & R. 199); to prove 
intent; to corroborate the evidence of the 
prosecutor (R. v. Egerton supra, R. V. Neill 
Cream (1891) 116 C. C. C. Sess, Pap. 1451); as 
forming a single transaction or a continuous 
offence; to explain answers given by a witness 
in cross-examination (R. v. Chambers (1848) 3 
Cox 92 (charge of unlawful knowledge; re- 
examination of complainant as to other acts of 
intercourse by Defendant allowed in order to 
explain answer given by her in cross- 
examination that the act charged did not 
cause pain); to prove motive, to prove that 
the death of the deceased was caused by 
poison; & as evidence of system. 
101. See e. g. counsel in R. v. Winslow supra, 
Stephen's Digest, 1st ed., Taylor, 1878 ed.., 
Archbold, 20th ed. (1886), pp. 245-50, and 
Roscoe's Criminal Evidence, 1898 ed., pp. 79- 
88. 
102. Rolfe B. in R. v. Jackson (1848) 3 Cox 89n. 
103. R. v. Dale (1889) 16 Cox 703. 
104. R. v. Phillips (1848) 3 Cox 88. For an example 
of an attempt to get in similar fact evidence 
to prove guilty knowledge, where guilty 
knowledge could not possibly be an issue in 
the case, see R. V. Oriel (1845) 9 J. P. 170, " 171. 
105. For an example of counsel being invited not to 
press evidence see e. g. R. v. Martin & Collins 
(1830) 1 Lew. 104, and for a threat to reserve 
the point see R. v. Smith (1831) 4 C. & p. 
411, and R. v. Phillips (1848) 3 Cox 88. 
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CHAPTER 18 
1.7 &8 Wm. III, c. 3, s. 2. 
2.1 Ed. VI, c. 12, s. 22. 
3. R. v. Muscot (1713) 10 Mod. Rep. 192. 
4. R. v. Champney (1836) 2 Lew. 258; Jordan v. 
Money (1854) 5 H. L. Cas. 185, & R. v. 
Braithwaite (1859) 8 Cox 254. 
5. R. v. Mayhew (1834) 6 C. & P. 315. 
6. R. v. Wheatland (1838) 8 C. & P. 238. 
7. R. v. Parker (1842) Car. & M. 639. 
8. See Radzinowicz, History, Vol. 2, chap. 2. 
9. The most important of these statutes were 4 
Wm. III, c. 8 (1692) (highway 
robbery); (repealed 7 Geo. IV, c. 64); 10 & 11 
Wm. III, c. 23 (1699) and 5 Anne, c. 31 (1706) 
(burglary) (repealed by 7&8 Geo. IV, c. 21 
and 7 Geo. IV, c. 64 respectively). 
10. The 58 Geo. III, c. 70 (1818) made payment of 
statutory rewards a matter for the court's 
discretion. 
11. For an example of an 1852 reward advertisement 
see R. v. Blackburn (1853) 6 Cox 333. The 
practice of the offering Home Office rewards 
was discontinued by Harcourt during his term 
as Home Secretary (1880-5) - see PRO: HO 
45/9961/X6851. 
12. See Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth Century 
Criminal Trial, 50 Chicago L. R. -, p. 1 at pp. 
83-9 and Beattie, op. cit., pp. 367-9. 
13. See e. g. R. v. Sharpe, The Times, May 17, 
- 1833. 
14. For an example of an approach by a prisoner to 
be admitted approver see R. v. Read'-(1844) 1 
'Cox- 65; see also C. Dickens, Oliver Twist, C. 
50. 
ku .. r 
15. In strict law magistrates had no- power to 
admit accomplices King's evidence (see Lord 
Mansfield in R. v. Rudd (1775) 1 Leach 121) 
;;. ,. but as Langbein puts it, op. cit., p. 96 they 'had'total command of that power in practice'. 
Rudd had been' admitted approver -by a 
magistrate. See also Eagle, The Magistrates' 
Pocket Companion, 2nd ed. (1844), p. 42. ý 
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16. See Home Office letter cited by Radzinowicz, 
op. cit, vol. 2, p. 44 n. 42. See also The 
Times Police reports for July, 18,1819 (the 
Clerkenwell murder). 
17. R. v. Dunne (1852) 5 Cox 507. 
18. R. v. Ransley, The Times, Jan. 14,1823 and Stone's Justices Manual, 17th ed. (1874), p. 
64. The warning was necessary in view of the 
fact that the magistrates' decision to admit 
did not bind the trial judge. 
19. As to the desirability of remanding the 
accomplice in custody (to ensure that he did 
not abscond) see Chitty, Crim. Law, 2nd ed. 
(1828), Vol. 1, p. 83 & R. v. Beardsmore 
(1837) 7 C. & P. 497. To avoid the risk of 
collusion the accomplice would normally be 
committed to the Bridewell and the other 
prisoners to the County Gaol (Chitty, ibid. ). 
20. R. v. Bernard (1823) 1 C. & P. 87 (especially 
the footnotes to the report); and Walter 
Scott's case (1858) 2 Lew. 36. 
21. See Phillipps, 10th ed. (1852), p. 91 'It is 
not a matter of course to admit a person 
charged with the commission of a crime as a 
witness against his associates even after he 
has been allowed to give evidence before the 
examining justices. ' Following the cases of R. 
v. Lee (1818) R. & R. 361 and R. v. Brunton 
(1821) R. & R. 454 it became the practice of 
judges to refuse to admit prisoners against 
whom there were other indictments pending (see 
R. v. Anon. (1826) 2 C. & P. 411). Also not 
more than one accomplice would normally be 
admitted per case - see the Barnsley Rioters' 
Case (1830) 1 Leach 5 (but contrast Walter 
Scott's case supra where three were admitted). 
22. The immunity of an approver depended upon his 
securing convictions (see R. v. Rudd supra). 
The right to a pardon under the statutes 
listed at n. l above also depended upon 
convictions being secured, but the judges 
declined to extend the principle to 
accomplices - see an unreported decision of 
Gould J. cited with approval by Lord Mansfield 
in Rudd supra. 
23. See Langbein, op. cit., p. 94 & Beattie, op. 
cit., p. 367. See also R. v. England (1796) 2 
Leach 767, where a second in a duel, whom the 
prosecution wished to call, was told in open 
court that, if he gave evidence and was then 
prosecuted, the Attorney-General would enter a 
nolle prosequi. Nineteenth century material 
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seems to confirm Langbein's conclusion. A 
random search through the Circuit Letters 
(PRO: HO 6/5 (Circuit Letters for 1820) and 
the Home Office Criminal Entry Books (PRO: HO 
13/55 and 13/75 for 1830 and 1839 
respectively) for three years during the 
period 1820-40 failed to throw up a single 
case of an accomplice granted or recommended 
for a pardon. Turning to the second half of 
the century one finds in the Table in the 
Judicial Statistics, showing the disposal of 
prisoners committed for trial, the heading 
'not prosecuted'. One suspects many of the 
persons whose cases are listed under this 
heading were accomplices. For the period 1893- 
1900 (for which the Judicial Statistics give 
detailed information as to the exercise of the 
royal prerogative) of 15 free pardons granted 
not one was granted to an accomplice. 
24. See R v. Burley (1818) 2 Stark. Ev. 13, and R. 
v. Stokes (1837) 2 Lew. 37. For an example of 
a judge intervening to warn a temporising 
accomplice as to his conduct see Vaughan B. in 
R. v. Baker, The Times, Mar. 5,1828: - 'You 
have offered yourself as King's evidence to 
come here and speak the truth; if you fail in 
that you will be placed at the bar where you 
ought to be'. See also R. v. Hinks (1845) 2 C. 
& K. 482, where Alderson B. referred to a case 
in which Wood B. had said he would, pass 
sentence upon an accomplice who had pleaded 
guilty because of the way he fenced with 
questions. 
25. Cited by Taylor, 7th ed. (1878), p. 811 n. 8. 
26. Chitty, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 601, R. v. Lyons 
(1840) 9 C. & P. 355 (the only alternative was 
to grant him a pardon, or for the judge to 
impose a nominal penalty (as in R. v. Noble, 
The Times, July 18,1819 where a fine of 1/- 
was imposed upon an accused who had pleaded 
guilty in order to enable him to be used as an 
evidence against others; in R. v. Lyons supra 
the penalty imposed was 1 day's imprisonment). 
27. See R. v. Jackson (1855) 6 Cox 525 (refusal to 
allow prisoner who had pleaded guilty to give 
evidence for co-accused- until he had been 
sentenced) and Cockburn C. J. in R. V. Winsor 
(1865) 10 Cox 276. 
28. See R. v. Storer, The Times, Sept. 8, '- 1813 
(after the-nolle prosequi had been entered but 
before he embarked upon his evidence, the 
accomplice asked the judge if he, was safe). 
3' 
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29. See e. g. R. v. Rowland (1826) Ry. & Moo. 401; 
R. v. Peacock (1849) 13 J. P. 254. 
30. R. v. Owen Ellis & Thomas (1839) 9 C. & P. 83. 
31. R. v. Winsor (1865) 10 Cox 276. 
32. See R. v. Gerber (1852) T. & M. 647 (A BC&D 
indicted together; after plea and before they 
were given in charge to the jury, the court 
allowed C to be removed from the dock and 
examined as a witness against his associates). 
33. Joy, On the Evidence of Accomplices, p. 2; R. 
v. Durham & Crowder (1787) 1 Leach 464; R. v. 
Thistlewood (1820) 33 How. S. T. 681' at p. 921 
per Abbott C. J.. 
34. R. v. Tonge & others (1662) 6 S. T. 225. 
35. R. v. Rudd supra; R. v. Atwood & Robins (1788) 
1 Lea. 464; Jordaine v. Lashbrooke (1798) 7 
T. R. 601; R. v. Jones (1809) 2 Camp. 132; R. 
v. Thistlewood supra; R. v. Hastings & Graves 
(1835) 7 C. & P. 152; R. v. Jarvis, Langdon & 
Stear (1837) 2 Moo. & R. 40. 
36. P. 3. 
37. Langbein, op. cit., p. 30 (Langbein's claim 
receives confirmation in Fielding's Enquiry 
into the Recent Increase of Crime in London 
(pub. 1751), in which he complained that the 
judges would not accept the uncorroborated 
evidence of confessed accomplices. Indeed 
Fielding indicates that in the 1750s 
corroboration was regarded as a mandatory 
requirement. 
38. Chitty, Crim. Law, 2nd ed., Vol. l, p. 605; 
Archbold, 1st ed. (1822), p. 96; charge of 
Thomson C. B. to Grand Jury at the York Trials 
(1813) 31 How. S. T. 967 and 971; R. V. Birkett 
(1813) Russ. & Ry. 251. 
39. R. v. Swallow (1813) 31 How. S. T. 971. 
40. R. v. Mellor (1813) 31 How. S. T. 998; see also 
R. v. Charnock King & Keys (1698) 12. S. T. 
1377, where Holt C. J. treated the confirmation 
by independent witnesses of the account one of 
the accomplices gave of the discovery of the 
plot to the Government as corroboration. In R. 
v. Despard (1803) 28 How. S. T. 998 Lord 
Ellenborough C. J. treated as corroboration 
evidence confirming that the accomplices were 
were they had said they were at a particular 
time. In R. v. Carroll, The Times, Jan. 2, 
1823 the evidence of an accomplice at a 
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receiver's trial was held to be corroborated 
by a certificate of conviction of the person 
he named as thief for theft of the goods in 
question. 
41. R. v. Jones supra, citing a recent unreported 
decision of the Twelve Judges (the case was 
almost certainly R. v. Fordham Hartford & 
Bridge (1803) 3 J. N. 154). See also Thomson 
C. B. in R. v. Swallow supra; Le Blanc J. in R. 
v. Haigh (1813) 31 How. S. T. 1094; and Bayley 
J. in R. v. Dawber (1821) 3 Stark 34. 
42. R. v. Despard (1803) 28 How. S. T. 488 an 
observation taken up by Park, prosecuting 
counsel, in R. v. Swallow supra. 
43. Referred to by Joy, op. cit., at p. 19. 
44. R. v. Green (1825) 1 Craw. & D. 158. 
45. R. v. Sheehan (1826) Jebb Cr. & P. Cas. 54. 
46. Joy, op. cit., pp. 2& 97 and p. 10-11 'the 
defect in an accomplice's evidence ... is the 
quality. What is required is something that 
will improve the quality of the proof which 
has been given by the accomplice, and that 
something may be anything which induces a 
rational belief in the minds of the jury that 
the narrative of the accomplice is in all 
respects a correct one. ' 
47. Williams J. in R. v. Webb (1834) 6 C. & P. 595; 
Patteson J. in R. v. Addis (1834) 6 C. & P. 
388; Alderson B. in R. v. Wilkes & Edwards 
(1836) 7 C. & P. 272; Abinger L. C. B. in R v. 
Farler (1837) 8 C. & P. 106; Gurney B. in R. v. 
Dyke (1838) 8 C. & P. 261; R v. Birkett (1839) 
8 C. & P. 732. 
48. R. v. Moores & Spindlo (1836) 7 C. & P. 270 
(Alderson B. ); R. v. Jordan (1836) 7 C. & P. 
433 (Gurney B. ); R. v. Fletcher (1838) (cited 
2 Lew. 45n. )(Alderson B. ); R. v. King & 
Hancock, The Times, July 18,1834 (Gurney B. ); 
R. v. Jenkins (1845) 1 Cox 177 (Alderson B. ). 
49. Joy used this point as an, argument in favour 
of the old rule - see op. cit., pp: 17-8 'if 
the rule was that corroboration was-required 
against each accused, it would be the duty of 
the judge, as counsel for the prisoners, to 
direct that they should not join in their 
challenges and that in all cases prisoners 
should be tried separately, and that any judge 
who should omit to do, so would take advantage 
of the ignorance of-, the. prisoners to deprive 
them of a just and lawful defence'. 
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50. R. v. Noakes (1832) 5 C. & P. 326 (Littledale 
J. ) followed by Blackburn J. in R. v. 
Bunscher, The Times, Jan. 7,8,10 & 12,1863. 
The view of the Irish judges was different. 
They considered that one accomplice could 
corroborate another where, since their 
apprehension, they had been kept separate so 
as to avoid all possibility of collusion (The 
Wild Goose Lodge case, cited and followed in 
R. v. Aylmer & Behan (1839) 1 Craw. & D. 116; 
the same view was expressed some forty years 
later by Hawkins J. in R. v. Levy & others 
(1882) 74 L. T. 121; Joy, op. cit., p. 102 also 
considered that one accomplice could 
corroborate another. 
51. R. v. Jones (1835) 7 C. & P. 168; R. v. Neal & 
Taylor (1835) 7 C. & P. 368. 
52. R. v. Curtis (1838) 1 Craw. & D. Abr. Cas. 265 
(Doherty C. J. ). 
53. R. v. Andrews & Pryne (1845) 1 Cox 183. 
54. R. v. Stubbs (1855) Dears 555. 
55. For examples of summings up reminding juries 
of their right to convict see R. v. Jarvis 
(1837) 2 Moo. & R. 40, and R. v. Staunton & 
Others (Notable British Trials Series, p. 251). 
See also Stephen's Digest, 1st ed. (1876). 
Art. 231. 
56. R. v. Wells Hudd & College (1829) Moo. & M. 
326; R. v. Noakes supra; R. v. Kelsey (1838) 2 
Lew. 45; R. v Stubbs supra; R. v. Boyes 1861 1 
D. & S. 311 (per Blackburn J. ); R. v. Pratt 
(1865) 4 F. & F. 315; R. v. Webster & Wells 
[1880] 1 N. S. W. R. 333 at 337; R. V. Myles 
[1889] N. Z. L. R. 324; In Re Meunier (1894] 2 
Q. B. 415 at 418; Phillips, 8th ed. (1838), p. 
31; Taylor, 7th ed. (1878), p. 812; Roscoe, 
12th ed. (1898), p. 114; Powell, 8th ed. 
(1904), p. 43. 
57. Joy, op. cit., p. 3. According to Langbein, 
op. cit., p. 98 in Fielding's day it was the 
invariable practice to direct (not merely 
recommend) an acquittal where there was no 
corroboration. 
58. R. V. Durham & Crowder (1787) 1 Leach 478. 
59. R. v. Smith & Davis (1784) 1 Leach 479. 
60.2 J. N. 43. 
61. R. v. Jones supra. 
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62. R. v. Jordan & Sullivan (1836) 7 C. & P. 432. 
63. R. v. Keats (1843) 7 J. P. 484. 
64. R. v. Skiller (1845) 9 JP 314. 
65. R. v. Mellor (1833), R. v. Saunders (1842); R. 
v. Salt (1843) (all cited in Russell, 4th ed. 
(1865), Vol 3, p. 644) and R. v. Sparks (1858) 
1 F. & F. 378. 
66. R v. Cunnings 56 C. C. C. Sess. Pap. 378. 
67.7 Sol. Jo. 197. 
68. R. v. Taylor, The Times, May 22,1895. 
69. The Times, May 30,1895. 
70. Roscoe, 12th ed. (1898), p. 118. For other 
examples of directed acquittals see R. y. Owen 
& Mitchell, The Times July 9,1801; R. v. Fox 
Fisher Boar & Boar, The Times, Mar. 20,1824; 
R. v. Huggins & Dutton, The Times, Mar. 5, 
1847; R. v. Druce, The Times, July 7,1847; R. 
v. Desmond & others, The Times, Apr. 28,1868; 
R v. Winkel (1911) 76 J. P. 191. 
71. (1909) 73 J. P. 251. 
72. Joy, op.. cit., p. 47. 
73. R. V. Robinson (1864) 4 F. & F. 43. 
74. R. v. Boyes (1861) supra (unsuccesful attempt 
to move for a new trial in a misdemeanour case 
on ground of want of corroboration). See also 
Cave J. in In Re Meunier [1894] 2 Q. B. 415 at 
p. 418. 
75. c. f. Wigmore. Treatise, 3rd ed., para.. 2061: 
'At Common Law the testimony of the proscutrix 
or injured person in the trial of all offences 
against the chastity of women was alone 
sufficient evidence to support a conviction; 
neither a second witness nor corroborative 
circumstances were necessary'. As .. regards 
nineteenth century England, the' accuracy of 
this observation is demonstrated by an absence 
of all reference to a corroboration 
requirement in sexual cases in contemporary 
practitioners'. books. 
76. Hale, 1 P. C., pp. 635-6.77. 
- Ibid. 633-4. . 
In R v. ' Scallon, 
_-The-, 
Times, Dec. 
13,1825, # Bayley J. neatly summarised the 
passage thus 'One-looks more to: the: conduct 
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than the textimony of a party in cases of this 
description. ' 
78. They were repeated in Blackstone, Comm-(1825 
ed. ), Bk. 4, p. 213, Hawkins, 1 P. C., c. 70, 
s. 3, East, 1 P. C., p. 445, Burns, Justice of 
the Peace (1805 ed. ), sub nom. Rape, Chitty, 
Crim. Law, Ist ed. (1816), p. 810, in every 
nineteenth century edition of Archbold, 
Russell and Roscoe and in Greenleaf, The Law 
of Evidence in Criminal Cases (1883), pp. 201- 
2. Some nineteenth century textbooks on 
evidence were completely silent on the topic 
e. g. Starkie, Taylor and Stephen. Hale's 
cautionary words were still being quoted in 
practitioners' books in the early years of the 
present century - see e. g. Roscoe, 13th ed. 
(1908), Pritchard's Quarter Sessions Practice, 
2nd ed. (1904), p. 109, and Halsbury's Laws, 
1st ed. (1910), Vol. 1X, p. 613(k). 
79. For examples of defence speeches praying in 
aid Hale see R. v. Mariner, The Times, Mar. 4, 
1837; R. v. Osborn, The Times, Dec. 21,1857; 
R. v. Osborn, The Times, July 14,1864; R. v. 
Rudland, The Times, July 20,1865; R. v. 
Hunter, The Times, Nov. 22-4 1865. 
80. For examples of summings up containing 
borrowings from Hale see e. g. R. v. 
Lippincott, The Times, Apr. 21,1810; R. v. 
Scallon n. 3 supra; R. v. Anon., The Times, 
Mar. 18,1827 (Burrough J. ); R. v. Trenchard, 
The Times, Mar. 24,1827 (Park J. ); R. v. 
Malabar, The Times, Aug. 17,1827, (Bayley 
J. ); R. v. Vessey, The Times, Mar. 21,1843 
(per Alderson B. in an unsuccessful attempt to 
persuade a jury to acquit); R. v. Kelly, The 
Times, Dec. 9,1861 (Channell B. ); R. v. 
Osborn, The Times, July 14,1864 (Erle C. J. ); 
R. v. Lord St Leonards, The Times, May 24 
1884 (Recorder). 
81. See e. g. R. v. Chapman, The Times, Sept. ' 19, 
1805, and R. v. Freeman, The Times, July 13, 
1867 (jury merely directed to weigh evidence 
for prosecution against that called by 
defence); and R. V. Legg, The Times, Sept. 22, 
1815, where Heath J. appears neither to have 
given any warning to the jury nor summed up 
the evidence. 
82. See Phillipps, 8th ed. (1838), p. 204 n. 2 
'the absence of recent complaint, unless 
explained by particular circumstances, is 
generally fatal to the prosecution. ' See also 
R. V. Connor, The Times, Sept. 16,1802 (case 
stopped by jury); R. v. Scallon, n. 3 supra 
(case stopped by Bayley J. ); R. v. Webb, The 
488 
Times, Sept. 3,1818 (a case of indecent 
assault) in which Garrow B. told the jury 'Had 
they been trying a rape, they must acquit, 
whatever their moral conviction, since the 
unhappy girl had concealed the circumstances 
so long' (two weeks)); R. v. Osborne, The 
Times, Mar. 22,1827 (case abandoned by 
prosecuting counsel); R. v. White, The Times, 
May 30,1829 (case stopped by judge); R. v. 
Page, The Times, July 12,1853 (Alderson B. 
invited jury to stop case because of failure 
by prosecutrix to complain at first 
opportunity); R. v. Hales, The Times. Dec. 3, 
1859 (strong warning against conviction from 
Byles J. ); and R. v. Howard, The Times, Apr. 
16,1864 (strong warning against conviction by 
Common Serjeant). There are some grounds for 
supposing that the absence of fresh complaint 
was regarded as less critical in indecent 
assault than in rape (see e. g. R. v. Webb 
supra, and R. v. West, The Times, July 20, 
1865 (another case of indecent assault) in 
which Kelly C. B. told the jury that he could 
not stop the case despite the lack of 
'corroboration' since the case was not one of 
rape'). 
83. R v. Woodward & others, The Times, Mar. 24, 
1817 (a prosecution of a clergyman and his two 
daughters for conspiracy falsely the charge 
arising out of a failed rape prosecution). 
84. S. 2 (procuring unlawful sexual intercourse, 
procuring a woman to become a common 
prostitute) and B. 3 (procuring sexual 
intercourse by threats or false pretences). 
85. S. 4. 
86. S. 5. The new offence of gross indecency 
created by s. 12 was also one, the proof of 
which might involve the calling of accomplice 
evidence (see e. g. R v. Wilde, The Times, May 
21,1895). Prior to the Act, the question of 
an accomplice direction would occasionally 
arise in cases of buggery and unlawful' carnal 




88.81 Yale Law Journal 1367, The Rape 
Corroboration Requirement (Note). 
89., R. v. Graham (1910) 4 Cr. App. R. '°218. 
90.. (1884-5) P. D. CCC, 914 (Home Secretary) and 
918 (Attorney General)., See also the question 
asked by Balfour at 915-6. "'' It was" also 
claimed by.,; Hopwood 'at, ',, 915 that it was the 
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practice of the metropolitan stipendiary 
magistrates not to convict in cases of indecent exposure upon the evidence of a 
single witness. 
91. See Sir Henry James, ibid., 919, Staveley 
Hill, ibid., 916, and also a letter published 
in The Times on June 2,1882. 
92. R. v. Watts, The Times, June 29,1877. 
93. The Times, May 27,1889. 
94. See e. g. R. v. Osborn, 
1864, where Erle C. J. advi 
for 'circumstances of 
similar direction was gi% 
in R. v. Lord St. LeonardE 
1884. It is possible that 
in the 1885 debate was us 
sense (see especially 918 
not mean that there shoul 
... it might arise f circumstances'; see also 
James said he was unable 
there could be corroborat 
witness). See further R. 
Cr. App. R. 262 (rape) at p 
. (and certain other ma 
which the jury were ent 
Phe Times, July 14, 
sed the jury to look 
corroboration'. A 
en by the Recorder 
, The Times, May 24, the Attorney General 
Lng the word in this 
' Corroboration did 
i be another witness 
rom a variety of 
920 where Sir Henry 
to understand how 
on without a second 
v. Hedges, (1909) 3 
. 265 'The complaint 
: ters) are all facts 
itled to take into 
consiaeration as being in some aegree 
corroboration of the girl's story' (per 
Phillimore J. ); R. v. George, (1909) 2 
Cr. App. R. 282 where Jelf J. 's answer to 
counsel's assertion that there was no 
corroboration was 'A speedy complaint is part 
of the res gestae ... '; R. v. May, (1912) 
8 Cr. App. R. 63 at p. 67 'Corroboration in the 
old writers such as Blackstone and East meant 
evidence of consistency of conduct or 
character' (per Phillimore J. ); R v. Christie, 
(1914) 10 Cr. App. R. 141 at 147 'the 
consistency of conduct shown by a complaint is 
corroboration' (per the Attorney-General 
arguendo), and R v. Lovell, (1923) 129 L. T. 
638 from which it is clear that even at this 
late date some judges were still apt to treat 
complaints as corroboration (see especially 
the helpful analysis of Crown counsel at pp. 
638-9 and the judgment of Hewart L. C. J. at pp. 
640-1) 
95. See nn. 1 and 4 above. Even as near to events 
as 1925 the Report of Departmental Committee 
on Sexual offences against Young Persons 1925 
(Cmnd. 2561) was apparently unable to trace 
the rule back further than R. v. Graham - see 
p. 47 'Many people are puzzled as to how, if 
in law corroboration is not essential, it has 
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become in practice required. It is unnecessary 
to go back further than the case of R. v. 
Graham (1910) 4 Cr. App R. 218'. 
96. Moore v. Bishop of Oxford [1904] A. C. 283. 
97. R. v. Goulding, (1908) 1 Cr. App. R. 121, R. V. 
Baker, (1909) 2 Cr. App. R. 249 and R. v. 
George, (1909) 2 Cr. App. R. 281. 
98. See e. g. R. v. Salman, (1924) 18 Cr. App. R. 50; 
R. v. Berry, (1924) 18 Cr. App. R. 65, R. v. 
Rillick, (1924) 18 Cr. App. R. 120 and R. v. 
_ 
Jones, (1925) 19 Cr. App. R. 40. Earlier cases 
had tended to use the 'oath against oath' 
approach adopted by the Court in R. v. Graham 
- see e. g. R. v. Quinn, (1911) 6 Cr. App. R. 269 
where the L. C. J. referred to the direction in 
Graham as an approved direction, and see also 
the judgment of the L. C. J. in R. v. Crocker, 
(1922) 17 Cr. App. R. 46 (a case which is also 
noteworthy for the fact that Salter J., during 
the course of argument, asked counsel in terms 
'Is corroboration necessary in a sexual 
case? ') 
99. For accomplice cases see e. g. R. v. Brown, 
(1910) 6 Cr. App. R. 24; R. v. Stone, (1910) 6 
Cr. App. R. 89; R. v. Dimes, (1911) 7 Cr. App. R. 
43; R. V. Bloodworth, (1913) 9 Cr. App. R. 80. 
For child witness cases see e. g. R. v. Pitts, 
(1912) 8 Cr. App. R. 126 'it is always wise for 
the judge to address some caution to the jury 
as to the possibility of such a young - child 
(girl of 10) having a mistaken recollection' 
(per Ridley J. ); R. v. Cratchley, (1913) 9 
Cr. App. R. 232 (boys aged 12 and under 10); R. 
v. Dossi, (1918) 13 Cr. App. R. 158; R v. 
Warren, (1919) 14 Cr. App. R. 4 (a sodomy case, 
where the court said that in addition to the 
age warning, an accomplice warning should have 
been given); and as to the importance of these 
lines of cases in the development of the rule 
see the citation of authority in the judgments 
in the Australian case-of Hargan v. R.,.. (1924) 
27 C. L. R. 13. 
100. See R. v. Clifford, The Times, Aug. 2,. 1826 in 
which a judge told a jury trying a rape case 
at Tralee Assizes that such charges, were 
'sometimes made by females in the hope of 
'obtaining a match'; R. v. Moloney, The Times, 
Aug. 10,1824 (Limerick Assizes) where, during 
the jury's retirement, the parties_- were 
married in the judge's room, and the jury then 
called back into court and directed to acquit, 
the judge-observingrthat he had known the same 
procedure adopted in a case in Cork; R. v. 
Callaghan, The Times, Aug. 17,1825, where 
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Pennefather B. refused to sanction a similar 
compromise; R. v. Baron, The Times, Mar. 27, 
1828, where an abduction case at Waterford 
Assizes was so compromised with the judge's 
approval; R. v. Murphy, The Times, Apr. 21, 
1829, an abduction case at Cork Assizes, where 
the prosecutrix was pressed both by counsel 
and judge as to whether she would prefer to 
marry the prisoner or have him hanged. 
101. Poor Law Amendment Act, 1834, s. 72. 
102. Report of Poor Law Commission (1834) P. P. (44) 
XXVII, 1 (at p. 195 of the report); (1834) P. D. 
XXIII, 522 (Robinson); 528-9 (Buller); Grote 
(530); and especially 536-7 (Peters) 'the 
child was threatened to be sworn to a party, 
and by the threat money was extracted from the 
individuals sought to be charged. He knew 
instances where £10 and £20 had been so 
obtained in sums of 5/-, 10/- and pounds from 
the young men resident in the neighbourhood of 
the pregnant woman who eventually swore the 
child against a poor and perfectly innocent 
man from whom nothing could be recovered by 
the parish'. Also (1834) XXV, 603. 
103. Vexatious Indictments Act, 1859. 
104. See chapters 9& 18. Hatch's was not the only 
case of wrong conviction from around -this 
time. In 1866 the conviction of a man called 
Toomer for rape was the subject of a Times 
leader (Sept. 5,1866); and in the 1870s a 
case which attracted considerable attention 
was that of Seth Evans (convicted of indecent 
assault at Salford Quarter Sessions on May 28, 
1878, he prosecuted the complainant for 
perjury only to find the jury unable to agree 
despite two trials -Rv. Alice Adams, The 
Times, Nov. 1,1878, and also (1878/9) P. D. 
CCXLIV, 401. 
105. The Times, Oct. 11,1864. The reference to a 
Society for the Protection of Men was prompted 
partly by the activities of the Society for 
the Protection of Women, and its role in such 
prosecutions (see also letters Oct. 12,13,14 
and 16). _;. 
106. Lord Chelmsford (1868/9) P. D. CXCII, 674. 
107. Cavendish Bentick (1884/5) P. D. CCC', 912-4. 
108. Rawlinson (1908) P. D. CXLI, 280 and Staveley 
Hill, ibid. 282. 
109. See article 81 Yale Law Jo. 1367 supra. 
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110. See N. v. N (1862) 3 Sw. & Tr. 234, where Sir 
Cresswell Cresswell referring to a charge of 
sodomy made in a divorce suit said 'The crime 
... imputed is so heinous and so contrary to 
experience that it would be most unreasonable 
to find a verdict of guilty where there is 
simply oath against oath without any further 
evidence direct or circumstantial to support 
the charge'. 
111. Some of the more notorious of the late 
eighteenth and the nineteenth century mistaken 
identity cases are described in wills, 
Circumstantial Evidence, 6th ed., pp. 179-91. 
112.6 L. T., Feb. 21,1846. 
113. Report of the Lords' Select Committee on the 
Further Amendment of the Administration of the 
Criminal Law 1847/8 P. P. (523) XV1,423 (at p. 
51 of the report). 
114. This was an attitude which was to persist 
until R. v. Turnbull (1976) 63 Cr. App. R. 132. 
See in particular Arthurs v. A. G. for N. 
Ireland (1970) 55 Cr. App. R. 161, where the 
House of Lords declined to follow the Irish 
decision of People v. Casey (No. 2) [1963] 
I. R. 33, Lord Morris saying at p. 170 'it 
would be undesirable to seek to lay down a 
rule of law that a warning in some specific 
form or in some partly defined terms must be 
given. ' 
115. See R. v. Watson (1817) 2 Stark. 116, and R. 
v. De Berenger cited Russell, 4th ed. (1865), 
p. 522. 
116. See 8th Report of the Criminal Law 
Commissioners, 1845, App. A. No. 22. 
117. R. v. Brook (1813) 31 S. T. 1124, and the cases 
cited in Wills, op. cit., pp. 182-3. 
118.13 L. T. (1849) p. 55. In his summing up the 
Lord Chief Justice told the jury that in his 
view 'no evidence was more satisfactory. ' See 
ký, also R. v. Howe & others, The Times, Feb. 3, 
1882 where Grove J., after listening to a 
defence speech about the dangers' of mistaken 
identification, told the jury that he was not 
sure that mistakes often occurred, and that, 
even if they did, if the possibility of error 
was to be a reason for not convicting no one 
would ever be convicted. 
119. R. V. Martindale, The Times, Sept.. 25,1800 
where the judge warned the jury against 
. '' convicting- where the identification by the 
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identifying witnesses was made long after the 
event; R. V. Sweeper, The Times, Mar. 1,1830 
(a case of burglary where the evidence of 
identity was conflicting) where Bolland B. 
warned the jury of the risks of convicting 
upon evidence of identity exposed to such 
doubt, and said that, when at the bar, he had 
prosecuted a woman for child-stealing, tracing 
her buying ribbons and other articles at 
various places in London, and at last into a 
coach at Bishopsgate, by 11 witnesses whose 
evidence was contradicted by a host of other 
witnesses, and she was acquitted; and that he 
had afterwards prosecuted the very woman who 
really stole the child and traced her by 13 
witnesses. 'These contradictions' he added ' 
make one tremble at the consequences of 
relying on evidence of this nature unsupported 
by other proof'; R. v. Sutcliffe, Crossley & 
Mallinson, The Times, Nov. 12,1877 where Lush 
J. told a jury 'I now always approach with 
great anxiety the question of identification. 
I have myself in the course of a trial felt 
convinced of the identity of the parties on 
evidence laid before me and, on hearing 
further evidence, found that my conviction was 
wrong. ' 
120. See e. g. R. v. Dace, The Times, July 23,1806 
where Heath J., on successive trials of the 
accused on separate indictments, directed the 
jury to acquit because of the poor quality of 
the identification evidence. 
121. PRO: HO 45/9386/30237. One certainly finds no 
trace of the practice in the early eighteenth 
century where it was common, upon the arrest 
of a criminal for an offence such as waggon 
theft, for victims of similar offences to be 
invited to come and view him to see if they 
could identify him - see report of arrest of 
Thomas Edwards in Daily Courant for Mar. 18, 
1781 and the court order from 1724 cited in 
G. Howson, Thief-Taker General, p. 230. 
122. Order of March 24,1860 directing that the 
'practice hitherto followed be carefully 
observed wherever practicable'; the order was 
issued following some remarks passed by the 
Assistant Judge at the Middlesex Sessions (it 
has not proved possible to trace the case). 
123. R. v. Daly & Morgan, The Times, Feb. 22,1860. 
124. R. V. Blackburn (1853) 6 Cox 333 
(Staffordshire); R v. Cain and Rayne The 
Times, July 28,1856 (and R. S. Lambert, 'When 
Justice 'Faltered',, p. 144-5) (Durham); in both 
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these cases the identification line up- was 
held in prison. 
125. R. v. Pook, The Times, May 15,1871 and see 
J. W. Shepherd, H. D. Ellis, & G. M. Davies, 
Identification Evidence a Psychological 
Evaluation, (1982), p. 9. 
126. Referred to in Commissioner's letter of Jan. 
7,1874 and in a report to the Commissioner 
from a police inspectorincluded in the same 
Home Office file and dated Dec. 4,1873 (PRO: 
HO 45/9386/30237). 
127. Amendment to the Metropolitan Police General 
Orders, 1873 dated 20.1.74 - see PRO: MEP 8/3. 
128. See order of 24 March, 1860 supra and General 
Orders, 1873 para. 65. 
129. See amendment to General Orders referred to at 
n. 117. 
130. The Beck case - on the identification parade 
held in relation to the 1877 charges, only two 
of the men on the parade had grey hair like 
Beck, and only one bore any physical 
resemblance to him; on the identification 
parade held in relation to the 1895 charges 
all the other members of the parade were 
younger than Beck, and one witness claimed 
that Beck was the only person on the parade 
with a moustache (see Shepherd Ellis & Davies, 
op. cit., p. ll). 
The Sheppard case - Major Sheppard, arrested 
in 1923 upon suspicion of theft from a 
prostitute, was placed on a parade, only two 
of the members of which wore clothes of a cut 
and style comparable with his; in his words 
'None of the others looked the least like an 
army officer and four of them were wearing 
chokers'; the Tribunal of Inquiry which 
investigated the case agreed with him that 
'the process of identification ... was little 
more than a farce' - Report 1924-5 P. P. (Cmnd. 
2497) XV, 265. Following the report the Home 
Office issued new guidelines for the conduct 
of identification parades. 
131. Metropolitan Police General Orders & 
Regulations, 1893 (PRO: MEP 8/4), Sect. XVII, 
para. 304. 
132. In Beck's case one of the witnesses. on the 
1877 parade claimed she had been shown a 
photograph of Beck before the parade. Early 
Court of Criminal Appeal cases dealing with 
the subject include: - R. v. Bundy (1910) 5 
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Cr. App. R. 120 (police officer giving witness 
description of accused); R. v. Chadwick (1917) 
12 Cr. App. R. 247; R. v. Goss (1923)17 
Cr. App. R. 196; R. v. Dwyer (1925) 18 Cr. App. R. 
145 (showing witness photograph). See also R 
v. Chapman (1911) 28 T. L. R. 135 (witness asked 
by officer 'Is that the man? ') 
133. Committee on Methods of Identification of 
Criminals; Report 1900 (PRO: HO 
144/566/A62042). 
134. These consisted for most of the century of 
having prison officers and police officers 
inspecting remand prisoners for old faces. 
Other methods such as photography (developed 
at Bristol Gaol in the 1850s), the Habitual 
Criminals Register set up in 1869, and the use 
of a system combining anthropometric 
techniques with the Galton system of 
fingerprinting had proved of very limited 
value. 
135. The identification of those with previous 
convictions was a matter of importance, given 
the policy of the Legislature, initiated by 
the Criminal Law Act, 1827, of visiting with 
heavier penalties offences committed by those 
with previous convictions. 
136. R. v. Castleton (1909) 3 Cr. App. R 74; the 
attitude of some judges to fingerprints had 
initially been one of distrust (see e. g. R v. 
Chadwick (1908) (Wills, op. cit., p. 204) 
where Byles J. had advised a jury not to 
accept fingerprint evidence as enough by 
itself to sustain a conviction (the jury 
ignored his advice). 
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CHAPTER 19 
1. Chitty, Criminal Law, 1st ed. (1816), Vol. 1, 
pp. 654-8. 
2., See Appendix 3. 
3. ' A special verdict found in felony could, 
however, be removed to be argued in the King's 










8th Report of the Criminal Law Commissioners, 
App. C. Grounds had to be shown before removal 
would be ordered. Local prejudice or legal or 
factual complexity were the grounds most 
commonly relied on. A defendant who secured 
removal of the indictment faced a potential 
penalty in costs: if convicted, he would be 
ordered to pay the prosecutor's costs. In the 
case of some misdemeanours (e. g. obtaining by 
false pretences) removal was, prohibited by 
statute. 
Chitty, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 741 and 747. 
The trial judge's rulings on evidence and 
directions on law were not entered on the 
record, which confined itself to stating the 
commission of the judges, the presentment of 
the grand jury, the indictment, the plea, the 
fact that the accused had placed himself on 
his country, the summons of the jury, the 
verdict and the judgment - Holdsworth H. E. L., 
i, 317. 
S. 31. 
Pre-nineteenth century precedents seemed to 
suggest that a bill of exceptions would lie in 
misdemeanour (The Lord Paget & the Bishop of 
Coventry's Case (1583) 1 Leon 5; R. v. 
Higgins_(1683) 1 Vent. 366; R. v. Nutt (1728) 
1 Barn. 307; R. v. Preston on the Hill 
(Irrhab. ) (1738) 2 Str. 1040) but not in felony 
or treason (Sir Henry Vane's case (1661) 1 
Keb. 324). 
Of- the cases of error reported in Cox C. C 
between 1851 and 1900 11 out of"20 concerned 
indictment points. 
See e. g.; Eden, Principles, p. -181 repeating a 
complaint'made_by Hale 2 P. C. -193: 
Seei . 7- Geo. IV., _ c. 
' 64, S., 20 and- 14 & 15 
Vict., 
}, 
c., 100, ss. 24, `and 25 and chapter 6. 
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12. H. C. L. (1883), i., 312. During the last six 
decades of the century the number of cases of 
error reported in Cox C. C. were: - 1845-49: 17; 
1850-59 8; 1860-69 6; 1870-79 2; 1880-89 3; 
1890-99 1. 
13. in treason and felony grant of the fiat was in 
the Attorney-General's discretion. In 
misdemeanour the fiat was grantable ex debito 
justitiae where the error was probable, and, 
if in such a case the Attorney refused to 
grant it the court would order him to do so 
(Paty's case (1705), 1 Salk, 504), In Ireland 
it was in the mid-nineteenth century the 
practice of the Attorney-General to demand a 
fee for perusing the writ of error. The 
practice was in 1868 declared illegal (R. v. 
Costello (1868) 11 Cox 81) by which time it 
had been going on for at least thirty years. 
14. The record had to be drawn up in a form which 
was both archaic and prolix, usually from very 
inadequate material ('short notes in a rough 
minute book kept by the clerk of the court' 
(Report of Criminal Code Commission, 1879 p. 
39); 'a private ... book having no legal 
authority' (Stephen, H. C. L., i., 308). One of 
the changes proposed by Stephen's Criminal 
Code Bill of 1878 was that the court clerk 
should be required to keep a record of the 
proceedings in the form set out in a schedule 
to the Bill. If the accuracy of the record as 
drawn up was disputed a diminution of the 
record had to be alleged by the party 
aggrieved -4 Bla. Comm. 390. 
15. Stephen H. C. L., i., 217. 
16. After 1830 the Fifteen Judges (see chapter 1). 
17. Later at the Exchequer Chamber. 
18. Where the point reserved was one which the 
trial judge was inclined to resolve in the 
prisoner's favour, reserving it would, if the 
Twelve Judges did not share his doubts, work 
to the prisoner's disadvantage - see e. g. R. 
v. Frost (1841) 2 Moo. C. C. 140 where the 
conduct of the three trial judges in 
overruling and reserving an objection, which 
two of them were inclined to resolve in favour 
of the accused, and which, if good, was fatal 
to the prosecution case, caused such an uproar 
both in Parliament and the press that the 
Judges were driven to write an explanatory 
letter to the Home Office. They claimed in the 
letter that what they had done was in 
accordance with long standing practice and 
that the practice was intended to prevent a 
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failure of justice (see (1840) P. D. CLI, 1080- 
96). 
19. On this topic see generally Appendix 3. 
20. The Welsh judges could not reserve cases 
directly, but had instead to petition the 
King who could then refer the case to the 
Twelve Judges - R. v. Harley (1830) 4 C. & P. 
369. 
21. The risk of error was at its greatest at 
county Quarter Sessions, the Chairmen of which 
were usually laymen. On the incompetence of 
many Chairmen in matters of law see chapter 4. 
22. The Commission under which Quarter Sessions 
sat enjoined them in cases of difficulty not 
to give judgment thereon except in the 
presence of a judge of Assize. This procedure, 
wholly impractical in the case of jury 
trials, was apparently followed in appeal cases 
until the early eighteenth century (R. v. 
Chantrell (1875) 10 Q. B. 587). In 1837 a Bill 
was introduced proposing that Quarter Sessions 
should have the power to reserve questions of 
law for the opinion of the Assize judges but 
was lost. Although Quarter Sessions had no 
power to reserve cases, they were entitled to 
refer any case about which they felt doubt to 
the Home Secretary who would then refer it to 
the Law Officers for their opinion. If their 
opinion was in favour of the prisoner a pardon 
would issue. The procedure, however, seems to 
have been little used (Lord Wharncliffe told 
the Criminal Law Commissioners (2nd Report, 
Minutes of Evidence, p. 95) that he had not 
used it once in his twenty years as Chairman 





Cases were considered at Serjeants' Inn after 
dinner. Since the judges when meeting to 
consider a reserved case did not constitute a 
court there was no official record of their 
proceedings. Until 1828 reserved cases and a 
brief note of the decision thereon was copied 
up- in notebooks, but in 1828 even this 
procedure was abandoned in favour of releasing 
a copy of _ 
the case - to the law reporters for 
them to report it (see the note at the front 
of the notebooks). 
R. V. 'Lea (1837), 2 Moo. 9. 
The refusal to allow, jury verdicts to be 
challenged in criminal, ' cases back many 
centuries. The writ of attaint, which had been 
the medieval remedy against false verdicts, 
was never available in criminal cases, the 
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reason given being that the accused's guilt 
was 'affirmed by two inquests, the grand 
inquest who present the offence ... and the 
petty jury who agree with them' Hale 2 P. C., 
310. An explanation offered for the refusal to 
extend to felony the successor remedy to 
attaint, namely motion for a new trial, is 
that an illogical extension of the principle 
that a man should not be put in jeopardy twice 
- see Devlin, Trial by Jury, p. 77 and U. S. v. 
Keen 'The Constitution guarantees him the 
right of being hung to protect him from the 
danger of a second trial' (cited (1879) 150 
Ed. Rev., 524 at 550). 
26. Occasionally one finds judges reserving a 
point in a case in which the prisoner had no 
counsel (see e. g. R. v. Brown (1819) 5. J. N. 
23; R. v. Westwood (1822) 6 J. N. 29; R. v. 
Armstrong (1824) 6 J. N. 55, & R. v. Stock 
(1825) 6 J. N. 160). 
27. There is a case in 1846 of a prisoner suing 
out a writ of error in forma pauperis (Ryalls 
v. R. (1840) 2 Cox 80) but this appears to be 
an isolated case (c. f. R. v. Stokes (1848) 3 
C. & R. 189 where Parke B. expressed doubt as 
to whether the in forma pauperis procedure 
could be used in such a case). 
28. In the years 1818-28 the average number of 
cases reserved each year was 21 (6 J. N. ). In 
the years 1820-22 the number of writs of error 
presented was 48, an average of 16 per year 
which figure includes writs of error in civil 
cases (1823 P. P. (447) XV, 1). Between 1824 
and 1828 there were 20 motions for new trials 
in the King's Bench (see App. 3), an average 
of 4 per year. The percentage of success in 
applications for new trials was very high (90% 
during the period cited). Reserved cases by 
contrast showed a success rate for prisoners 
of only 25%. 
29. In 1905 the Committee of Inquiry into the Beck 
case was told that the Home Office received 
approximately 5,000 petitions per year (1905 
P. P. (Cmnd. 2315) LXII, 465, App. 40). 
30. Report of the Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment, 1866 (P. P. (3590) XX1,1 (evidence 
of Walpole) and Beck Inquiry Report supra. '-' 
31. In 1858 in the case of Dr. Smethurst, 
convicted at the Old Bailey of murder by 
poisoning, the Home Office took the opinion of 
the. Queen's surgeon on the reliability of the 
scientific evidence called by the prosecution 
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at the trial (Trial of Dr. Smethurst, Notable 
British Trials Series). 
32. The trial judge's view of the case always 
carried great weight with the Home Office 
(Report of the Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment supra). Indeed, it was always open 
to a judge who was dissatisfied with a jury's 
verdict to take the initiative and himself 
recommend the accused be pardoned without 
waiting for any petition from the accused 
himself (Chitty, op. cit., vol. 1,654 and 
Brougham (Report of the 1848 Lords' Select 
Committee on Campbell's Criminal Law 
Administration Amendment Bill, 1847/8 (523) 
XVI, 423 - evidence of Brougham). An 
alternative was for him to impose a nominal 
penalty (see e. g. R. v. Stanton & Cummings, 
The Times, Sept. 13,. 1822). From time to time 
one sees lawyers, whose clients had been 
convicted engaging in manoeuvres in open court 
designed to procure a favourable report from 
the trial judge (see e. g. R. v. Scott (The 
Times, Apr. 13,1824) - evidence called after 
verdict with a view to showing that a Crown 
witness had perjured himself; R. v. Robinson 
(The Times, July 17,21, and 27,1824) - 
accused charged on seven indictments of 
robbery; defence to each charge mistaken 
identity; after being convicted on the second 
indictment, he insisted on being tried on the 
remaining indictments in order to demonstrate 
that the guilty verdict was mistaken). 
33. In the period 1880-3 the number of persons 
convicted of serious crime set free. by the 
Home Office was 12 per annum ((1883) P. D. 
CCLXXVII, 1183). Between 1898-1903 5 persons 
were pardoned and a further 90 had their 
sentences remitted (Beck Inquiry Report, App. 
40). 
34. See Beck Inquiry Report, App. 40. New evidence 
usually took the' form of affidavits from 
witnesses who had not given evidence at the 
trial. Although such new evidence was, often 
perjured not all'was. Poverty often prevented 
witnesses for poor prisoners getting to court 
or getting there in time. ' The temptation to 
put in false affidavits was strong because the 
sanction of prosecution for perjury was 
absent., The exposure of perjury was made more 
'difficult by the fact that it was not Home 
Office, practice to test such evidence by 
cross-examination (see Greaves, Report on 
Criminal Procedure; 1856). Sometimes the 
affidavits would be sworn before the examining 
magistrate. `who had, committed the 'accused for 
trial . `(se',, e. g. R. v. '- Ferris, The 'Times, Dec. 
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12,1825), but this does not appear to have 
provided any real guarantee of reliability. 
35. See the evidence of Edward Wilde to the 
Criminal Law Commissioners (2nd Report, 1835, 
App. l). Often a prisoner's best hope lay in 
having his case taken up by the press or by an 
M. P. Questions about the cases of individual 
convicts were a constant feature of Commons 
proceedings throughout the century. Indeed, in 
1844 Fitzroy Kelly urged that one of the 
benefits which would follow from granting a 
right of criminal appeal would be that the 
Commons would no longer be made a Court of 
Appeal (1844) P. D. LXXIII, 24). 
36. By the 25 Geo. II, c. 37, s. 3 murderers were 
to be executed on the day next but one after 
that on which sentence was passed, unless the 
same happened to be a Sunday. In practice 
murderers were usually sentenced on Friday to 
allow an extra day between sentence and 
execution ((1836) P. D. XXXIII, 466). In other 
capital cases there was a difference in 
practice between London and the rest of the 
country. Prisoners capitally convicted at the 
Old Bailey were not ordered for execution 
until the Recorder's report on their cases had 
been considered by the King in council, which 
involved a delay which might run into weeks. 
Prisoners capitally convicted at Assizes and 
left for execution would normally be executed 
within a day or two of sentence, and in their 
cases shortness of time and the distance 
involved often made appeal to the Home Office 
impractical (c. f. anecdote 131 in Lord Eldon's 
Anecdote Book (ed. Lincoln & McEwen). In their 
2nd Report the Criminal Law Commissioners 
criticised the short interval allowed between 
sentence and execution in murder cases, and 
the following year murder cases were by 
statute placed on the same footing as other 
capital cases, with the Government announcing 
that henceforth the interval would not be less 
than 14 nor more than 27 days. The practice of 
the King in Council considering the Recorder's 
report was abolished on the accession of 
Victoria, such cases being thenceforth 
considered by the Home Office alone. 
37. In the debates on the 1847 and 1853 Bills (see 
infra) it was suggested that a Criminal Appeal 
Bill had been introduced by Romilly ((1847) 
P. D. XCV, 528 and (1853) P. D. CXXVII, 629. This 
however appears to be wrong. 
38. The reformers' arguments are set out in full 
in Kelly's speech on the second reading debate 
of the 1844 Bill (P. D. LXXV, 11-25), and in the 
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evidence given by Greaves, Kelly and Pitt- 
Taylor to the 1848 Lords' Select Committee 
(Minutes of Evidence pp. 13-22,25-30, and 37- 
40). 
39.1844 P. P. (376) It 13. 
40. (1844) P. D. LXXV, 1337-8. 
41.1845 P. P. (656) XIV, 161 the report described 
the law as 'very defective as regards the 
means afforded for the correction of errors in 
criminal proceedings'. It described wrongful 
convictions as not infrequent and by way of 
remedy urged a general extension of the right 
to move for a new trial. 
42. (1847) P. D. XCV, 527-8. 
43. Appeal in Criminal Cases Bill, 1848 (1847/8 
P. P. (128) It 193). 
44. (1853) P. D. CXXVII, 969-70. 
45.1847/8 P. P. (523) XV1,423 
46. Minutes of Evidence of Select Committee - 
Parke B., p. 4; Alderson B., p. 9; Greaves, 
p. 22; Kelly, p. 32; Pitt-Taylor, p. 39; 
Denman C. J., pp. 45/6; Lyndhurst, p. 47; 
Patteson J., p. 51; only Maule J. at p. 56 saw 
little good in it. 
47. Ibid. Kelly, p. 33; D'Oyley, p. 34, & 
Bathurst, p. 35, were in favour but Parke B., 
p. 7, Greaves, p. 23, Denman C. J., p. 43, 
Coleridge J., p. 52, Wightman J., p. 53, 
Coltman J., p. 55, Maule J., p. 56, Cresswell 
J., p. 57, and Rolfe B. were either hostile or 
doubtful. Quarter Sessions trials, it was 
argued, rarely involved difficult points of 
law and there was the risk that lay Chairmen 
would be pressed by ingenious counsel to send 
up hopeless points. Denman argued that, if 
there was a problem, a better solution would 
be to improve the court by appointing 
barristers as Chairmen. The proposal that 
Quarter Sessions cases should be reserved to 
the Assize judges was opposed' on all. sides 
tz (for the objections raised see Greaves, p. 
27, Kelly, p. 33, Patteson J. at p. 51 and 
Wightman J. at p. 53).. 
48. See'Appendix 3. 
>49. The only, one prepared to give any countenance 
to it . was Alderson B. who suggested at p. 9 that if change was to be made-it ought to be 
made in capital cases. 
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50. Ibid. Parke B., pp. 4-5; Denman C. J., p. 44; 
Brougham, p. 49; Patteson J., p. 51 (although 
he acknowledged an. occasional problem in 
identification cases) ; Wightman J., p. 53 and 
Coltman J., p. 55. 
51. Ibid. Parke B., p. 5 (in civil cases a new 
trial would only be granted on the grounds 
that the verdict was against the evidence 
where the trial judges was dissatisfied with 
the jury's verdict; in criminal cases a judge 
dissatisfied with the jury's verdict 
recommended a pardon); Alderson B., p. 9( The 
Home Office more for the benefit of average 
class of prisoner than a court of appeal would 
be); Patteson J., p. 51 (a court could not 
inquire into questions of mistake as 
completely as the Home Secretary could). 
52. Ibid. Parke B., pp. 6 and 8; Alderson B., p. 9 
(making the further point that the sanction of 
costs present in civil appeals would be absent 
in criminal cases). 
53. Ibid. Parke B., p. 5 "the avoiding of an 
occasional and rare injustice would be 
purchased at too great a price". 
54. Ibid. Parke B., p. 4 (he argued that the 
danger would be particularly great if the 
State paid for legal representation for poor 
appellants); Denman J., p. 44; Lyndhurst, p. 
47; Brougham, p. 49 (more judges would be 
needed and he doubted if the bar could furnish 
the increase); Pollock L. C. B., p. 59 'it would 
stop not only all the criminal business of the 
country (or delay it not inconsiderably) but 
all the civil business of the country 
transacted at Westminster Hall'. 
55. Ibid. Alderson B., p. 10; Parke B., p. 4 took 
the argument a stage further; if legal aid was 
given to defendants on appeals it would be 
difficult to resist giving it to them at 
trial. 
56. Ibid. Denman C. J., p. 44; Lyndhurst, p. 47. 
57.. Ibid. Denman C. J., p. 45; Brougham, p. 50. 
58. Ibid. Parke B., p. 4; Alderson B., p. 10; 
Brougham, p. 49 (a man found guilty of murder 
at York in the first fortnight in July who 
appealed could not be executed till mid- 
November). 
59. Ibid. Denman C. J., p. 44 'witnesses dying, 
forgetting, tampered with, spirited away'; 
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Lyndhurst, p. 47; Brougham, p. 49, Coltman J., 
p. 55. 
60. Parke B., p. 6; Brougham, p. 50. To have given 
the Crown the right. to move for a new trial 
where the accused had obtained his acquittal 
by keeping back witnesses or by other 
fraudulent means would, in fact, have been in 
accord with existing Queen's Bench practice in 
misdemeanour - Chitty, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 
657. 
61. (1848) P. D. C, 465-6; he was staunchly 
supported by Denman (466-7) and Brougham (467- 
8). 
62. Before the Select Committee Greaves, Kelly and 
Pitt-Taylor were very unconvincing when 
pressed about the volume of work which a New 
Trials Act would generate (see their answers 
at pp. 18,25-8, and 37 respectively). The 
answers of Greaves and Kelly (at pp. 18 and 27 
respectively) to the argument that appeal 
would be a rich man's remedy were if anything 
weaker. Surprisingly none of them cited in 
answer to the judges' claim that wrong 
convictions were of rare occurrence the 
compelling and contrary evidence given by 
sheriff Wilde to the Criminal Law 
Commissioners in 1835. 
63. Often called 'the Court of Criminal Appeal', 
see e. g. Cox's Criminal Cases. 
64. New Trials in Criminal Cases Bill, 1853 
(1852/3 P. P. (164) V, 215; debate (1852/3 P. D. 
CXXVII, 964-93). The Bill as drafted applied 
only to Ireland, but it was Butt's intention 
that, if it passed its second reading, it 
should be amended in committee to include 
England and Wales (P. D., 977). 
65. Cl. 6 made the trial judge's certificate a 
pre-condition to the making of an application 
on the ground that the verdict was against 
the weight of the evidence. 
66: Cl. 21-3 (appeals in capital cases to be'heard 
out of term time by a Commission of five 
judges appointed by the Lord Chancellor). 
67. E. g. rarety of wrong convictions (Napier 987); 
the 'floodgates' argument (Phillimore 978); 
jury's sense of responsibility , 
diminished 
(Napier 987, Grey 992);, the right of appeal 
give was 'one-sided'. (Palmerston: 982); perjury 
on second trials (Palmerston 982). 
'68.1856 P. P. (456) L, 79. 
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69.1857/8 P. P. (137) III, 587; debate (1857/8) 
P. D. CLI, 1051-64. 
70. E. g. the 'floodgates' argument (Miles 1057); 
jury's sense of responsibility diminished 
(Fitzgerald 1053); delays in capital cases 
would make it difficult to maintain system of 
capital punishment (Fitzgerald 1053). 
71. See e. g. Walpole 1052, Evans 1057, Hanley 
1061. 
72. Ibid. 1062 (the vote was 145 to 91). 
73. Ibid. 1062-4. 
74. Appeal in Criminal Cases Bill, 1859 (not 
printed). 
75. (1859) P. D. CLII, 1112-3. 
76. Appeal in Criminal Cases Bill, 1859 (P. P. 
(2575 Sess. 2) I, 17. 
77. (1859) P. D. CLIV, 771-4. 
78. Appeal in Criminal Cases Bill, 1860 (P. P. (I) 
I, 211). The principal modifications were cl. 
2 infra, the inclusion of a clause making it 
clear that the Crown was to have no right of 
appeal, and the abandonment of the clause 
giving prisoners the right to tender bills of 
exceptions. 
79. (1860) P. D. CLVI, 407-24. 
80. C1.2. The 1859 (Session 2) Bill also included 
this clause. 
81. Lewis made specific reference to the figures 
for summary convictions and appeals in 1858 in 
three classes of case where there was a right 
of appeal to Quarter Sessions, conditional 
upon the accused entering into a recognisance 
with surety to pay such costs as Quarter 
Sessions should order him to pay, namely cases 
under the Vagrancy Act (i. e. the Act of 1824) 
where there were 18,630 convictions and 10 
appeals, cases under the Game Laws (i. e. under 
the Night Poaching Act, 1828 and the Game Act, 
1831) where there were 7,379 convictions and 
14 appeals, and cases of malicious trespass 
and damage to property (i. e. under the 7 &- 8 
Geo. IV., c. 30 ) where there were 11,211 
convictions and 2 appeals. 
82. P. D. ibid., 405. 
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83. New Trials in Criminal Cases Bill, 1861 (P. P. 
61) III, 613). 
84. (1861) P. D. CLXXVI, 2070. The second reading 
of the Bill was put off for six months. 
85. Appeal in Criminal Cases Amendment Bill, 1864 
(P. P. (121)I, 39; debate - (1864) P. D. CLXXVI, 
1773-4. 
86. See Appendix 3. 
87. E. g. Hosiery Act, 1843, s. 29; Factories Act, 
1844, s. 70; Public Health Act, 1848, s. 135; 
Cruelty to Animals Act, 1849, s. 25; Larceny 
Act, 1861, s. 110; Malicious Damage Act, 
1861, s. 68; Poaching Act, 1862, s. 6. 
88. Occasionally one finds judges adopting very 
questionable procedures to reverse wrong 
verdicts - see e. g. R. v. Holding, The Times, 
Feb. 7,1857 (H. convicted of buggery of 15 
year old boy; after verdict Bramwell B. 
directed a police officer to take the boy to 
two of the places he had mentioned in his 
evidence and make inquiries; after a short 
time the constable returned to court, saying 
that the boy had admitted to him that he had 
not told the truth in his evidence; Bramwell 
B. had H. brought back and told the jury to 
reconsider their verdict, whereupon they 
immediately returned- a verdict of acquittal; 
since the jury's verdict had by then almost 
certainly been recorded it could not lawfully 
be altered). 
89. R. v. Scaife (1851) 5 Cox 243. 
90. It was followed in Australia, but in England 
it was always regarded as a case of doubtful 
authority (c. f. the preamble to the Criminal 
Appeal Bills of 1853/58/59 & 61). From the 
report it looks as though the decision was per 
incuriam, although, if it was, this is 
surprising given that the court was presided 
over by the Lord Chief Justice who had chaired 
the 1848 Select Committee). This was certainly 
the view taken by the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council in R. v. Bertrand (1867) 10 
Cox 618 at p. 623. 
91. R. v. Bertrand supra. 
, 
92. Unreported cited Archbold, (16th, ed. ), p. -182. 
93. R. V. Esdale (1858) 1 F. & F. 253. 
94. ' R. V. Jelly" (1867) 10 Cox 553 (this, 
notwithstanding that the Court for Crown Cases 
507 
Reserved had the previous year declared that 
the remedy would not lie in criminal cases - 
Winsor v. R. (1866) 10 Cox 300). 
95. Hatch had been convicted at the Old Bailey in 
December, 1859 and sentenced to two years' 
hard labour; the prosecution of the 
complainant girl came the following year (R. 
v. Plummer, The Times, May 10,11,12,14 & 
16,1860).. 
96. It provoked both a Times leader and a letter 
from Pitt-Taylor (The Times, May 16th, 1860) 
97. R. v. Toomer, The Times, Sept. 5,1866 
(leader). 
98. Letter to The Times on the Toomer case 
(published Sept. 3,1866) asking 'Where can 
the Defendant, a poor man, raise funds for the 
prosecution? ' 
99. One finds occasional examples of its 
employment in The Times trial reports - see 
e. g. R. v. Kinnear, The Times, Aug. 27,1872 
and R. v. Alice Adams, The Times, Nov. 1, 
1878. 
100. See Radzinowicz, History, Vol. 4, pp. 661-81. 
101.1866 P. P. (3590) XXI, 1. In the same year as 
the Commission was appointed the Earl of 
Ellenborough had introduced a Sentences of 
Death Bill which proposed a reversion to the 
pre-1837 practice of having capital sentences 
considered by the Queen in Council (see (1864) 
P. D. CLXXV, 247-56. 
102. They did, however, acknowledge that the 
subject was one requiring investigation. 
103. Capital Sentences (Court of Appeal) Bill, 1870 
(P. P. (85) I, 193); debate - (1870) P. D. 
CCII, 727-35. 
104. Ibid. 732. 
105. Ibid. 735. 
106.1874 P. P. (315) IX, 471 
107. They included J. F. Stephen, Bramwell B. & 
Blackburn J. 
108. The Criminal Appeals Bill, 1878 (P. P. (92) II, 
1). 
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109. Criminal Code (Indictable Offences) Bill, 1878 
(P. P. (178) II1 5); debates (1878) P. D. CCXL, 
1671-3 & 1881, and CCXLII, 2038-40. 
110. Criminal Code Bill, 1879 (1878/9 P. P. (117) 
II1 175); debates (1879) P. D. CCXLV 310-47, & 
1750-73; CCXLVI, 1238-9,1719, & 1915; and 
CCXLVII, 953 & 1281. 
111. Criminal Code Bill, 1880 (P. P. (2), II1 1); 
debates - (1880) P. D. CCL 244 & 1236; CCLI, 
1014. 
112. Criminal Code No. 2 Bill, 1880 (P. P. (47) II, 
223). 
113. Central to the Government Bill was the 
proposal to establish a Court of Criminal 
Appeal in which all appellate jurisdiction 
would be vested, including a limited 
jurisdiction to grant new trials. The No. 2 
Bill concerned itself simply with the question 
of new trials, and proposed that trial judges 
should have the power to grant new trials on 
any of a number of specified grounds, with a 
right of appeal against refusal to the 
Divisional Court. 
114. The Criminal Law Amendment Bill, 1882 (P. P. 
(15) II1 1 at p. 60); Criminal Procedure Bill, 
1882 (P. P. (43) II1 81 at p. 119); Death 
Sentences Appeal Bill, 1882 (P. P. (81) II1 
135). 
115. Criminal Code (Indictable Offences Procedure) 
Bill, 1883 (P. P. (8) II1 249); Court of 
Criminal Appeal Bill, 1883 (P. P., (9) II,, 211). 
116. Assheton Cross ((1883) P. D. CCLXXVII, 1234; 
Sir Ed. Clarke ibid. 1219. 
117. Ibid. Giffard 1197, Sir E. Clarke 1219. 
118. Ibid. Giffard 1196, Gibson 1229, & 1231. The 
opponents of reform also brought up the 
familiar arguments about the jury's sense of 
responsibility, especially in: capital cases, 
being diminished (Giffard 1197,. Sir Ed; *, Clarke 
1218,1222 (to whom - the fact that the 
conviction rate in 1880. and 1881 had been 50% 
in murder cases and 75% in other classes of 
case. -, was evidence of the care which juries 
currently took. over capital cases)  and ; Gibson } 1229);. T the lack: of provision, for legal aid for 
'poor:, appellants- (Assheton-. Cross. 1228);, & that 
the Bill would greatly encourage the practice 
of holding back evidence (Assheton-Cross 1235- 
-6). More original= arguments included 
Grantham's= claim (1205) that., ordering, a new 
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trial upon a prisoner's statement was, by a 
sidewind, to allow prisoners to give 
evidence. 
119. Ibid, Waddy 1201; it was also criticised for 
failing to offer a remedy for 'the scandal of 
inequality of sentencing' - Clarke 1217, & 
Harcourt 1227. 
120. Voting was 132-78 (majority 54). 
121. The Bills were the Court of Criminal Appeal 
Bill, 1888 (P. P. (377) II1 391); the Court of 
Criminal Appeal Bill, 1890 (P. P. (83) I, 535) 
and the Criminal Cases Appeal Bill, 1892 (P. P. 
(163) II1 201). The 1890 Bill was said to have 
been prompted by the Maybrick case (a 
poisoning case where the Home Office commuted 
the death penalty because of doubts about the 
medical evidence) - see Lloyd Wharton (1897) 
P. D. XLVII, 1252. 
122.1894 P. P. (127) LXX1,173. 
123. Court of Criminal Appeal Bill, 1895 (P. P. (53 
- Sess. l) I, 493); P. D. (1895) XXX, 316; XXXI, 
521 & 1517; XXXII, 875; XXXIII, 1347,1497, & 
1672; XXXV, 54. 
124.1895 P. P. (351) VII, 499. 
125. Court of Criminal Appeal Bill, 1896 (1896 P. P. 
(60) I, 443). 
126. Court of Criminal Appeal Bill, 1897 (P. P. (17) 
I, 373); debates - debates P. D. XLV, 295, and 
XLVII, 1229-1282. 
127. P. D. XLVII, 1261-7. 
128. Ibid. 1276. 
129. Ibid. Reid 1246; Ashcroft 1247; Lloyd Wharton 
1250. 
130. Ibid. Ambrose 1241; Lloyd Wharton, 1250; Sir 
Ed. Clarke 1269; Pickersgill in opening the 
debate had sought to anticipate this point 
arguing that the power to increase sentences 
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131. Ibid. Sir Ed. Clarke 1270. Pickersgill (1235) 
had acknowledged this point and expressed the 
hope that appeal against summary conviction 
could be brought more within the reach of poor 
defendants. 
132. Ibid. Lloyd Wharton 1253. Hawkins J. (1893 8 
New Review, 617) and Crackanthorpe (1893 34 
510 
Nineteenth Century, 614) had proposed a Royal 
Commission to report on the principles on 
which punishment should be based. 
133. Ibid. Reid 1244; Howell 1271. 
134. Ibid. Darling 1259. 
135. Court of Criminal Appeal Bill, 1898 (P. P. (3) 
I, 413); debate P. D. LV, 5. 
136. Home Secretary - P. D. LV, 55-62; Attorney 
General ibid. 72-5 
137. Court of Criminal Appeal Bill, 1899 (P. P. (58) 
I, 305). ' 
138. See Beck Inquiry Report supra. 
139. See 1907 P. P. (Cmnd. 5066) LXII, 465. 
51.1 
CHAPTER 20 
1. Hawk., 2 P. C., c. 39, s. 2. 
2. Staunford, Les Plees de Coron, f. 151. 
3. Stephen, H. C. L., i, 442. 
4. 
. 
Cornish & Others, Crime & Law in Nineteenth 
Century Britain, p. 59. 
5. See Appendix 1. 
6. Legal Aid & Advice Act, 1949 not brought into 
force as regards criminal proceedings until 
1963 (see Legal Aid & Advice Act, 1949 
(Commencement No. 11) Order, 1963 (1963 No. 
432 C. 4), and see generally R. M. Jackson, The 
Machinery of Justice in England & Wales, 4th 
ed., pp. 138-47. 
7. Per Lawton L. J. in R. v. Turner (1975) 61 
Cr. App. R. 67, at p. 77. 
8. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, s. 34. 
9. Criminal Justice Act, 1967, s. 4. 
10. Police & Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, s. 81, 
and Crown Court (Advance Notice of Expert 
Evidence) Rules, 1987. 
11. Criminal Justice Act, 1987, s. 9(5). 




Representation by counsel in Old Bailey Trials 
1800-1900 
Year and Total No. Trials in which Counsel 
Session of Trials appeared for: - 
the Crown The Prisoner 
1800 July 104 16 (15%) 25 (24%) 
1805 July 80 19 (24%) 26 (32%) 
1810 July 85 9 (11%) 15 (18%) 
1815 June 88 1 (1%) 12 (14%) 
1820 July 167 20 (12%) 28 (17%) 
1825 July 158 13 (8%) 42 (27%) 
1830 July 203 21 (10%) 61 (30%) 
1835 July 75 9 (12%) 27 (36%) 
1840 July 85 11 (13%) 16 (19%) 
1845 July 74 24 (32%) 35 (47%) 
1850 July 83 28 (34%) 40 (48%) 
1855 July 36 32 (89%) 20 (55%) 
1860 July 53 48 (91%) 32 (60%) 
1865 July 55 51 (93%) 22 (40%) 
1870 July 57 54 (95%) 29 (51%) 
1875 July 53 50 (94%) 33 (62%) 
1880 July 59 59 (100%) 27 (46%) 
1885 July 53 51 (96%) 21 (40%) 
1890 July 53 52 (98%) 31 (59%) 
1895 July 49 46 (94%) 15 (31%) 
1900 July 39 34 (87%) 17 (44%) 
Source: - Central Criminal Court Sessions Papers 
Where the Sessions Papers leave it doubtful whether a 
prisoner was represented he has been treated as 
unrepresented; in no year does the number of such 
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doubtful cases exceed 2 save for July 1820,1845 and 







The Prisoners' Evidence Bills 
Protection of the accused against cross-examination 
as to credit, and comment upon his failure to give 
evidence. 
(a) Cross-examination as to credit 
The earliest Prisoners' Evidence Bills gave no 
protection to the accused against cross-examination 
as to credit. Brougham's Bills of 1858 [1], 1859 
[1] and 1860 [1] expressly provided that an accused 
who gave evidence should be subject to cross- 
examination in like manner as any other witness, 
whilst the Bills of 1863,1864 and 1865 were silent 
on the point, as were the first clutch of Acts 
creating exceptions to the incompetency rule. 
The first Bill to contain a clause restricting 
cross-examination as to credit was Ashley's Bill of 
1877 [2], and such a provision was also a feature 
of most of the Bills introduced between 1877 and 
1898 (the only ones which denied the prisoner 
protection were Bramwell's Bill of 1884 and the 
Government Bill of 1897). 
Ashley's Bills of 1877 [2] and 1878 [2] 
prohibited cross-examination as to other offences, 
save where the accused had himself given evidence 
of good character. The Criminal Code Bills [3] 
sought to deal with the problem by giving the judge 
a discretion to limit cross-examination as to 
credit. But in its 1884 Bill (4] the Government 
reverted to Ashley's formula. In the Bill of 1885 
[5] protection for the accused was increased. He 
was not to be questioned either as to other 
offences or as to his character, save where he had 
sought to hold himself out as being of good 
character, or where the proof that he had committed 
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another offence was admissible to prove his guilt 
of the offence charged. A clause in these terms 
also appeared in the Bills of 1888 [6], 1892 [6], 
1893 [6] and 1895 [6]. The Bill of 1896 included a 
further exception to the prohibition, permitting 
cross-examination of an accused who had given 
evidence against a person charged with the same 
offence. 
However, such clauses did not reflect existing 
English practice on the matter. None of the 
statutes which permitted accused persons to give 
evidence placed any - restriction upon cross- 
examination. On the contrary, several of them 
declared in terms that he was to be liable to 
cross-examination to the same extent as an ordinary 
witness. And whilst it was true that there were 
judges who intervened to prevent defendants being 
cross-examined as to previous convictions, many did 
not. Indeed in Gawthrop [7] in 1893 the Lord Chief 
Justice had declared himself in favour of 
prisoners who gave evidence under the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act, 1885 being subject to cross- 
examination as to credit, and purported to lay this. 
down as a rule of practice to be generally adopted 
thereafter. 
United States and Colonial practice afforded 
no clear guidance on the point. Some American' 
states disallowed cross-examination as to credit, 
but many permitted it. In New South Wales cross-, 
examination of the accused as to his previous 
convictions required leave of the trial judge [8], 
but most Colonial statutes gave no protection in 
the matter. 
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(b) Comment upon the prisoner's failure to give 
evidence 
The Criminal Evidence Bill of 1898, as 
originally drafted, was silent as to the matter of 
comment by the prosecution or judge on the failure 
of the accused to give evidence. In this respect, 
it mirrored existing law and practice. None of the 
existing statutes which allowed prisoners to give 
evidence contained such a provision, and, the habit 
of judges and counsel commenting upon the failure 
of the accused to give evidence, which the Law 
Journal had criticised during the first year of 
operation of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 
had, in the intervening years, shown no sign of 
diminishing. Indeed, according to one correspondent 
to The Times [9), it was common practice in some 
courts for prosecuting counsel, in his opening 
speech, to point out that the case was one in which 
the prisoner could fortunately give his own 
evidence, adding the comment 'If he does so, I can 
again address you; if he does not, you will not 
need another speech from me'. 
In this respect, English practice was far less 
favourable to the prisoner than that in the United 
States where, in a number of States, statutes, 
giving prisoners the right to testify, expressly 
provided that no adverse inference was to be drawn 
from the failure of the accused to testify, this 
provision in some cases (e. g. New Hampshire, and 
Pennsylvania) [10] being buttressed- by a 
prohibition upon comment by prosecuting counsel 
upon such failure. 
Colonial- practice upon the point was. mixed. 
The Canada Evidence 'Act of 1893 : [l1] had followed 
United States precedent, and outlawed, all, comment 
by either counsel or judge. This had also been the 
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stance adopted by the first Australian States to 
adopt the reform. The South Australia statute of 
1882 [12] had followed the United States model by 
declaring that no presumption of guilt should be 
drawn from the failure of the accused to testify, 
whilst in the New Zealand Act of 1889 [13] this 
provision was buttressed by a prohibition upon 
comment. However, the New South Wales Act of 1891 
was silent on the point. In Rops (1893) [14] the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was called 
upon to construe the Act. The trial judge had told 
the jury that they might draw an inference from the 
failure of the accused to testify. The defendant 
was convicted and appealed on the ground that to 
allow such comment amounted to an indirect 
compulsion to testify, whereas the Act expressly 
declared that the accused was not compellable. This, 
argument had failed before the State Appeal Court, 
where' Windeyer C. J. spoke of the section of the 
South Australian Act which sought to safeguard the 
accused in this respect, as 'one of those futile 
legislative attempts to control thought, which are 
the outcome of timidity to accept the natural 
consequences of a great reform'. It fared no better 
before the Judicial Committee. Lord Morris pointed 
out that, prior to the Act, comment might have been 
made to the jury that the accused had offered no 
explanation of the evidence against him, whilst the 
Lord Chancellor contented himself with the. 
observation that, though there might be cases where 
it would not further the ends of justice to make 
such a comment, there were cases (which he did not 
identify) in which such comment was both legitimate. 
and necessary' [15]. After Bops, the tide in 
Australasia turned against protecting the accused 
from comment. When the New Zealand Act of 1889 was 
repealed and replaced by the Criminal Code Act of 
1893, the latter dropped the safeguard. Nor was any 
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such safeguard included in the Western Australian 
statute of 1899. 
So far as the pre-1898 English Criminal 
Evidence Bills were concerned, Ashley's Bills of 
1877 and 1878 had contained a clause [16] 
(following the United States model), providing that 
the neglect or refusal of a prisoner to give 
evidence should not create any presumption against 
him, nor should any reference to or comment upon 
such neglect or refusal be made during the trial, 
but none of the succeeding Bills contained any 
comparable clause. 
Notes 
1. Cl. 2 (see 1858 22 J. P., p. 200,1859 23 J. P., 
p. 193, & 1860 24 J. P., p. 426). 
2. Cl. 6 (his 1876 Bill contained no such 
restriction but on the contrary expressly 
provided that an accused who gave evidence 
should be subject to cross-examination to the 
same extent as any other witness. 
3. See 1879 Bill, cl. 523; 1880 Bill, cl. 471; 
1883 Bill, cl. 100. 
4. Cl. 1. 
5. Cl. 2. 
6. Cl. 1. 
7. R. v. Gawthrop (1895) 59 J. P. 377. 
8. Criminal Law & Evidence Amendment Act, 1891 
(New South Wales, 55 Vict. No. 5), s. 6. 
9. Letter to The Times, Apr. 17,1897 from 'A 
Chairman of Quarter Sessions'. 
10. See 1878 Ir. Law Times, pp. 575 & 593. 
11. Canada Evidence Act (Canada: 56 Vict., c. 31), 
s. 4. 
12. Evidence Amendment Act, 1882 (South Australia: 
45 & 46 Vict., no. 245), s. 1. 
Ii 
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14. R. v. Kops (1893] N. S. W. R. 150 at 173-4. 
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(a) Motions for New Trial in Misdemeanour 1824-43 
The number of prosecutions for misdemeanour in 
the Ring's Bench and the number of motions for new 
trial (in brackets) brought upon such prosecutions 
in the years 1824-43 were: - 
1824, 101 (12); 1831 60 (3); 1838 54 (2); 
1825 115 (1); 1832 59 (3); 1839 37 (2); 
1826 82 (2); 1833 71 (7); 1840 34 (4); 
1827 114 (1); 1834 72 (11); 1841 41 (3); 
1828 100 (4); 1835 52 (4); 1842 57 (2); 
1829 123 (4); 1836 51 (3); 1843 43 (2). 
1830 74 (1); 1837 43 (2); 
Source: 1844 P. P. (408) XXXVIII 681. 
(b) The Discretion of the Trial Judge to Reserve 
cases 
(i) The debate 
Before the 1848 Lords' Select Committee on 
Lord Campbell's Criminal Law Administration 
Amendment Bill [1], the judges had brushed aside 
calls for prisoners to be given the right to 
require the trial judge to reserve a case to the 
Fifteen Judges. To grant such a right would they 
claimed lead to a flood of hopeless reserved cases. 
Nor was there any need for such a reform, since no 
judge ever in practice refused to, reserve a point 
as to which there was real doubt.; 'The error' said 
Parke B., 'was, if at all, in reserving, cases, for 
the advice of the judges in which their advice was 
hardly required'-. 
Fitzroy Kelly in his evidence to the Committee 
argued that the reality was less reassuring, citing 
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Russell [2], in which he had himself been counsel, 
and the very recent case of Serva [3], commonly 
known as 'The case of the Brazilian pirates'. 
Russell was tried before Vaughan B. at 
Huntingdon Assizes in 1832 on a charge of murder. 
He had given a woman poison to procure her 
abortion; she took the poison in his absence and 
died from it. At his trial Kelly took the objection 
that he should have been. indicted as an accessory 
and not as a principal. Vaughan B. overruled the 
objection and Russell was convicted. Kelly asked 
Vaughan to reserve the point but he refused. Five 
times he applied to the judge in private to change 
his mind. Shortly before Russell was due to be 
hanged, Kelly again visited Vaughan and implored 
him, if he would not reserve the point, at least to 
write to both the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord 
Chancellor and ask their opinion as to whether the 
point was good. After an hour Vaughan gave in and 
agreed to do so. Eight hours before Russell was due. 
to hang replies were received recommending Vaughan 
to reserve the point which he then did. When it was 
argued the following term before eleven judges 
(including Vaughan himself) they unanimously held 
the objection valid and recommended a pardon. 
In Serva, the accused and others were tried in. 
1845 at Exeter Assizes for murder on the high seas. 
Counsel for the prisoners took the point that the 
court had no jurisdiction to try the case. Platt B. 
overruled the objection and after the prisoners' 
conviction refused to reserve the point. 
Ultimately, he was prevailed upon to consult his 
brother judge of Assize, who advised that the case 
be reserved. When it came before the judges they 
held by a majority of 13 to 2 (Platt and Denman 
L. C. J. dissenting) that the objection was valid. 
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The reserving rates of judges (set out at (ii) 
below) provide strong confirmation of another claim 
made by Kelly, namely that judges varied enormously 
in their willingness to reserve points. 
Kelly's arguments, however, left the judges 
unpersuaded. Only Lord Denman came out on his side 
saying that if the judge had made a mistake, it was 
against all principle to leave it upto him whether 
it should be reserved or not. 
The final round in the argument came with a 
letter written to the Committee by Alderson B., 
supplementing the evidence he had already given. In 
it he argued that a judge's refusal to reserve did 
not leave a prisoner remediless at all; he could 
petition the Crown who would refer the matter to 
the Lord Chancellor, who, if he considered there 
was merit in the point, would refer the case to the 
judges, a procedure which he claimed had been 
followed in the cases of Wait [4] and Fauntleroy 
(5]. In practice, whatever the theoretical 
availability of this procedure, it was one which 
was little known and seldom resorted to (between 
1785 and 1828 only 5 out of 521 cases were reserved 
by the Lord Chancellor) '[6]; and in murder cases 
the time between sentence and execution was so 
short as to render it impractical save in London 
cases. 
When Campbell laid the evidence of the Select 
Committee before the House, he told them that he 
was not prepared to recommend that prisoners be 
given the right to require cases to be reserved. 
The Lords followed his advice and his 1848 Bill 
passed into law ' with the law' on this point 
unaltered. 
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One matter which could have been (but was not) 
urged by the judges in support of their argument 
was that, in cases of any difficulty, it was the 
well nigh universal practice for trial judges to 
canvass the opinions of their brethren sitting in 
the same building as to the point raised, and as to 
whether the case should be reserved. Both at the 
Old Bailey and at Assizes it was a commonplace for 
a judge to rise during a case to confer with the 
judge(s) sitting in the adjoining court(s) upon 
points of law raised by counsel, and, having 
conferred, to announce the result of his 
discussions and his ruling in open court [7]. 
Alternatively, during long trials there might be 
discussion overnight [8], and occasionally a judge 
would write to a brother judge to take his opinion 
[9]. 
The Criminal Code Bills 1878-1883 all sought 
to give a prisoner a right of appeal on law in 
cases where the judge refused to reserve, although 
such appeal was to be brought only by the leave of 
the Attorney-General. Debate on the clause brought 
forth from Hardinge Gifford the familiar claim that 
judges never refused to reserve doubtful points, 
but many were not persuaded. The Code Bills however 
never became law and once again the matter dropped 
out of view. 
It next resurfaced in the Report of the 
Committee of Inquiry into the Beck case, which laid 
the blame for Beck's being twice wrongfully 
convicted on the refusal of the Common Serjeant to 
reserve a point of admissibility raised by the 
defence at the first trial. The Committee 
recommended that prisoners be given a right of 
appeal on law, and in 1905 the Government 
introduced a Criminal Cases (Reservation of Points 
of Law) Bill to give effect to the recommendation. 
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In the end, the furore caused by the Edalii case 
led to the Bill being withdrawn in order to enable 
a more comprehensive measure to be brought in. It 
is, however, interesting to read what Lord Halsbury 
had to say about the Bill when he introduced it in 
the Lords: - 
, it is very unsual, I may say almost 
unexampled, for any one of Her Majesty's 
Judges to refuse to reserve a question which 
is really a question that could properly be 
argued. Yet sometimes Judges, who are not of 
the status of her Majesty's Judges, are a 
little jealous of their decisions being made 
the subject of inquiry, and it has sometimes 
happened that a judge has refused to reserve a 
point' [10]. 
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7. See e. g. R. v. Gibbons (1823) 1 C. & P. 97; R. 
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(1868) 10 Cox 536; R. v. Goddard (1882) 15 
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(ii) The number of cases reserved by individual 
puisne judges 1800 - 1850 
Common pleas 


















































Judge No. of cases Years in 
reserved office 
1800-1850 
Best 9 7 
(1818-1824) 
Coleridge 10 16 
(1835-1858) 
Dampier 1 4 
(1813-1816) 
Grose 4 14 
(1787-1813) 
Holroyd 22 13 
(1816-1828) 
Le Blanc 13 17 
(1799-1816) 
Littledale 22 18 
(1824-1841) 
Patteson 22 21 
(1830-1852) 
Taunton 0 6 
(1830-1835) 
Wightman 9 10 
(1841-1863) 
Exchequer 
Judge No. of cases Years in 
reserved office 
1800-1850 
Bolland 13 11 
(1829-1839) 
Garrow 12 16 - 
(1817-1832) 
Graham 33 27 
(1832-1827) 
Gurney 10 14 
(1832-1845) 
Hotham 0 6 
(1775-1805) 
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Hullock 8 7 
(1823-1829) 
Platt 2 6 
(1845-1856) 
Richards 5 4 
(1814-1817) 
Manners-Sutton 2 3 
(1805-1807) 
Thomson 9 15 
(1787-1814) 
Wood 17 17 
(1807-1823) 
Hotham B. reserved only 2 cases in a judicial 
career stretching more than 30 years. 
Puisne judges holding office in more than 1 court 
Judge No. of cas es Years in 
reserved office 
1800-1850 
Alderson 16 21 
(C. P. & Ex. 
1830-34-57) 
Bayley 62 23 
(K. B. & Ex. 
1808-30-34) 
Erle 2 7 
(C. P & Q. B. 
1844-46-59) 
Lawrence 12 13 
(K. B. & C. P. 
1794-1808-12) 
Maule 3 12 
(Ex. & C. P. 
1839-39-54) 
Parke 17 28 
(K. B. & Ex 
1828-34-55) 
Vaughan 5 13 
(Ex. & C. P. 
1827-34-46) 
Williams 11 11 
(Ex. & R. B. 
1834-34-46) 
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(c) Number of cases reserved annually 1800-1899 
1800-1828 
An average of 14 per annum* 
1828-1849** 
1829 11 1836 11 1843 9 
1830 11 1837 9 1844 15 
1831 12 1838 17 1845 14 
1832 " 21 1839 7 1846 12 
1833 12 1840 13 1847 14 
1834 10 1841 17 1848 19*+ 
1835 12 1842 11 1849 21*++ 
1850-1899+ 
Year Total By Q. S. Year Total By Q. S. 
1850 23 13 1875 9 4 
1851 22 13 1876 10 4 
1852 18 8 1877 21 15 
1853 21 12 1878 15 13 
1854 28 19 1879 19 17 
1855 24 13 1880 12 8 
1856 29 11 1881 12 5 
1857 36 13 1882 16 14 
1858 31 15 1883 12 3 
1859 15 6 1884 19 11 
1860 19 12 1885 8 7 
1861 22 13 1886 14 7 
1862 32 18 1887 12 8 
1863 16 9 1888 11 9 
1864 24 17 1889 19 4 
1865 19 8 1890 18 8 
1866 18 12 1891 6 3 
1867 27 13 1892 12 6 
1868 25 14 1893 16 10 
1869 24 13 1894 12 11 
1870 32 16 1895 8 2 
1871 27 15 1896 7 4 
1872 21 7. 1897 5 4 
1873 24 13 1898 11 9 
1874 9 4 1899 3 2 
* This figure is based upon the number of 
reserved cases (376) entered in the Volumes 
3-6 of the Judges' Notebooks which cover the 
period November 1801-1828. 
The figures for these years are derived from 
the reports of Moody, Denison, Dearsly and 
Dearsly and Bell. 
*+ Of these 6 were cases reserved prior to the 
coming into force of the Criminal Law 
Administration Amendment Act 1848; of the 13 
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post-Act cases 8 were reserved by Quarter 
Sessions. 
*++ Of which 8 were reserved by Quarter Sessions 
+ The figures for the years 1850-1855 are 
derived from the reports of Dearsley and 
Dearsley & Bell; the figures for the years 
1856-1899 from the annual Judicial 
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. 1790 30 Geo. III, c. 31 (Treason Act) 
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